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PREFACE 
This thesis is centred on antecedentso It is a study 
of the origins and development of Australia's policy and 
posture at San Franciscoo As such, it does not provide 
a detailed exposition of Australia's participation in the 
Conference, although, in the course of establishing 
Australia's po.licy and posture at the Conference its elf, 
it gives close attention to Dro Evatt's activities prior 
to the commencement of detailed discussions in the technical 
committees. 
The distinction made.:in the title between Australia's 
'policy', that is the actual points put forward, and 'posture', 
the general attitude adopted by Evatt, at San Francisco 
suggested i tse.lf from a reading of comments by a number of 
writers on Evatt's participation in the Conferenceo Thus 
Nicholas Mansergh notes his 'bitter campaign against great-
power pretensions 1 ; 1 William T.R. Fox says that he 'thundered' 2 
.1 ~ Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Co!!!!!!Qnwea.l th Affa.i!::.§., 
Problems of Wartim!i....£.Q-op~ti.Q..!!_Snd Pos:t.::War Change, 
1939-1952, London, 1958, p.Jl4o 
2. Wi.l.liam T.R. Fox, 'The Super-Powers at San Francisco', 
The Review of Politics$ vol. 8, no. 1, January 1946, 
p.12Jo 
viio 
and speaks of him 'playing the role of David in the San 
Francisco version of the David and Goliath story'; 3 while 
F.H. Soward writes that 'Canada was less vehement or obdurate 
than Australia in the debates at San Francisco upon such 
questions as the exercise of the veto by the great powers'. 4 
That an aggressive smal.1-power posture was an outstanding 
characteristic of Australia's presence at San Francisco is 
generally conceded. As H.S. Albinski has it 'At the 
Conference Australia had, in fact, assumed the self 
appointed role of champion of the small nations'.5 Harper 
and Sissons have written likewise 'Australia consistently 
championed the ro.le of the middle and smaller powersj often 
deliberate.ly seeking leadership'. 6 An interest in explaining 
the origins of Evatt's posture .has been increased by the 
belief that this posture, in addition to Australia's po.licies, 
contributed to his emergence as one of the outstanding 
figures at San Francisco. 
3~ Ibid. p.122. 
4. F.H. Soward, 2.fil!ada in World Affairs -. From Normandy to 
Paris, 19~4-~6, Toronto, 1950, p.25. 
5~ H.S. Albinski, Australia's Search for Regional Security 
in Southeast Asii!,, unpublished Ph.D~ dissertation, 
University of Minnesota, 1959, p.140. 
6~ Norman Harper and David Sissons, Australi~and the Unit~ 
Nations, New York, 1959, p.79. 
i 
1 
CHAPTER I. 
-----
DR. EVATT'S EARLY THOUGHTS ON THE POST-WAR 
WORLD 
On 7 October 1942, the Australian Labor Party, under 
the leadership of' John Curtin~ assumed the government of' the 
Commonwealth of' Australia. The f'irst Curtin government 
succeeded a coalition of' the United Australia Party and the 
Country Party which had been led, since the resignation of' 
R.G. Menzies on 28th August 1941, by A.W. Fadden of' the 
Country Party. The Attorney-General and Minister f'or 
External Af'f'airs in the Curtin ministry, Dr. Herbert Vere 
Evatt, K.C., had resigned f'rom the Bench of' the High Court 
in September 1940 to enter Federal politics as the Labor 
member f'or Barton (N.S.W.). Prior to his elevation to the 
High Court in 1930 at the age of' 36, Dr. Evatt had, f'or f'ive 
years, been a Labor member of' the New South Wales Legis.la tive 
Assembly. Evattrs Cabinet seniority - he was fourth in 
precedence af'ter F.M. Forde, Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister f'or the Army, and J.B. Chif'ley, Treasurer, - reflected 
both his own exceptional ability and the contemporary prestige 
of' the Attorney-Generalship which had been he.ld in immediately 
preceding governments by W.M. Hughes and J.G. Latham. Evatt 
was also ministerial head of' the smal.l Department of' External 
2. 
Affairs. 1 In the years prior to the San Francisco Conference 
the increasing status of that Department was to reflect the 
energy which he gave to the deve.lopment of Australian foreign 
po.licy. 
Dr. Evatt found himself immediately 'preoccupied with 
actual mi.litary urgencies 12 rather than with 'the formulation 
of permanent princip.les for the conduct of foreign relations'. 3 
1. For an excel.lent factual summary of Australian federal 
politics during the period covered by this thesis see 
Geoffrey Sawer, Australiari._;Federal Politic§.....§nd Law 
1929-1949, Melbourne 1963, :Q._as.§im.. The Department of 
External Affairs had been separated from the Prime 
Minister's Department in 1935· At the end of 1940 the 
External Affairs Establishment in Australia numbered 14. 
Diplomatic representation abroad consisted of a Legation 
in Washington (since 6 March 1940), a High Commission in 
Ottawa (since 24 March 1940), a Legation in Tokyo (since 
24 December 1940), and an External Affairs Office in 
London (since 1924). In 1936 the Lyons Government had 
attached a Counse.llor to the British Embassy in Washington. 
The CounsellorYs functions ceased with the arrival of the 
Australian Minister, R.G. Casey, in 1940. On 28 October 
1941 an Austra.lian Minister, Sir Frederic Eggleston, 
presented his credentials in Chungking. The decision to 
create this Legation, however, had been announced on 12 
May 1941. The creation of an independent Austra.lian 
dip.lomatic service between the outbreak of war in Europe 
and the formation of CurtinYs government is ably discussed 
in Alan Watt, The EY.:21Jdti2.IL of Australian Foreig:n_J?.olicy 
1938-1265, Cambridge, .1967, Ch. 2. The Australian Govern-
ment had been represented in London since 1910 by a High 
Commissioner who had been, and continued to be, responsible 
to the Prime Minister 1 s Department. 
2. W. Macmahon Ba.1.1 in his introduction to H.V • Evatt, 
Foreign Po.licY.._..of Australia, Sydney, 1945, p.v. 
3. Ibid. 
J. 
His first ministerial statement in the House of Representa-
tives on 27 November, 1941 didi however, contain emphases 
which were to persist when he was later able, towards the 
end of .1942, to turn his attention to problems of post-war 
foreign po.licy. There was, first.ly, an awareness of 
difficu.l ties in consultation between the British and 
Australian Governments~ though Evatt spoke of these in a 
spirit of optimism - 'If things are not going so well as they 
should, we can and shall make changes in the method of 
consultation' 4 and made fu.11 al.lowance for the need in 
war-time to make decisions quickly - 'In peace, such 
difficulties are occasional, and time is seldom the 
essence of the contract. In war-time al.l is changed. 
D . . h t b d . kl y 5 ec1s1ons ave o e ma e quic . Yo Secondly, although he 
affirmed that Yin the supreme essential Britain and her 
Dominions are at one 1 he stressed the importance of an 
'understanding and appreciation of the status which the self-
governing British Dominions have attained, not only in their 
internal affairs but also in their external re.lations Yo 7 
4 • Com!!!.£p.weal th Parliament~Debates, vo.l. 169, 27 November 
194.1, p.973. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid., p.972. 
Thirdly, Dr. Evatt, in the conc.lusion of his statement spoke 
with approval of the Atlantic Charter and of President 
8 Roosevelt's four freedoms. 
The strength of Evatt's interest in the question of 
Dominion status was illustrated in the following month by 
the attention he gave to the legal form of Australia's 
declarations of war with Finland, Hungary and Rumania, and 
with Japan. 9 He wished to make it clear that a direct grant 
of authority had been made by the King to his personal 
representative in Australia, the Governor General, to 
declare war on the advice of the Australian Executive Council. 
For this purpose two urgent.ly requested instruments from the 
King clearly vesting the necessary powers in the Governor-
General were sent to Australia by air. Dr. Evatt subsequent.ly 
to.ld the House that 'United Kingdom Ministers took no part 
in the arrangements which were made directly with the Palace 
10 
authorities by our High Commissioner in London'. On 6 
8. Ibid., p.978. 
9. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Declaration 
2£~Exi.§.ten£.~f.- Sta~War wi th.L:kfilan<j..J Jiv.nga_rY.1,_Rumania 
and J~I?.~n 0,. 8 DecembeLl:.2JiL__Do.QQfil§.U.i§._Relatin.g:_!Q_Pro-
£~Ure .of His Ma,jest.~Governm~nt in the Commonweal th of 
~:tralia.L-.Parlia.!!ill.11..iaU Paper§...i__General 1 Sesston 19!f.0-tJ.l, 
~-li:J~, vol. II, pp.349-355. 
10. C.P!.!?._., vo.l. 169, .16 December .194.1, p.1089. 
December, 1941 Evatt instructed the Australian Minister in 
Washington to make Australia's declaration of war with Finland, 
Hungary and Rumania clearly separate from that of the United 
Kingdom government: ' •••• there is no question that we sha.11 
declare a state of war. At the same time separate status of 
the Commonwealth is such that you will act separately from 
Halifax. You wil.l receive precise instructions from me when 
and so soon as final decision is made by Cabinet here .'·11 
That decision was made on 8th December and the decision for 
war with Japan on 9th December, 1941. The Menzies Government, 
by contrast, had in 1939 considered itself at war with Germany 
as a consequence of the British declaration of war."12 
Relations between Australian and British governments 
had become increasingly strained as Australia grew anxious in 
the face of possible invasion from Japan. Fadden had differed 
from Churchi.1.1 over the relief of Australian troops at Tobruk. 13 
Curtin, who held in addition to the Prime Ministership, the 
portfolio of Defence Co-ordination, worsened Australia's 
relations with Churchill by his public appeal to the United 
ll. Parliament of the Commonweal th of Australia, Dec.laration 
Q!__Existen~of State of War, loc. cit., p.349. 
12. Watt, op. cit., pp.27-8. 
13. Nicholas Mansergh, fu:!rvey of British Commonwea~Affairs. 
Problems of Wartime Co-op!ll:ation and Post-War Change, 
J.939-1952, London 1958, p.116. 
6. 
14 h" States for military aid on 27th December, 1941 and is 
refusal, in February 1942 to sanction Churchi.11' s diversion 
to Burma of Australia's Seventh Division, which was at the 
time returning from the Middle East. 1 5 A month later the 
Australian High Commissioner in London at an interview with 
Churchi.11 was confronted with ta tirade more or less on the 
lines that the Australian government was impossible and quite 
16 
unhelpful'. The question of the diversion to Rangoon had 
shown not only a difference of policy between the two 
goverrnnents but also the aggravation of this difference by 
Churchill's failure to consult Curtin on the 17 moveo 
In a Ministerial Statement to the House of Representatives 
on 25th February 1942, Evatt again dealt primarily with 'war 
.18 policy and the war activities of the nations', for he fe.l t 
14. Herald, Melbourne, 27 December, 1941. 
15. Watt, op. cit., pp.56-7. See also John J. Dedman, 'The 
Return of the A.I.F. from the Middle East', Au~lifil! 
Outlook, vo.l. 2.1, no. 2, August 1967, pp.151-640 
16. Cecil Edwards, Bruce of Melbourne, London, 1965, p.339. 
17. For an analysis of Churchill's conception of the British 
Commonwealth see J.D.B. Miller, .§..!!:_Winston Churchill and 
the Commonwealth of Nations, University of Queensland, 
Murtagh Macrossan Lecture, 1966, Brisbane 1967. passim. 
18. C.P.D., vol. 170, 25 February 1942, p.48. 
that Austra.lia was certain to meet direct thrusts against her 
homeland the territories of her Pacific neighbours. His Prime 
Minister's differences with Churchill may explain the increased 
emphasis which this statement gave to the problem of Al.lied 
consultation on questions of military strategy. Evatt spoke 
of agreement with the British government for an Australian 
Government representative to attend meetings of the British 
War Cabinet and of Churchi.Ll' s decision on 6 February to 
establish a 'Far Eastern and Pacific War Council' in London 
although he added 'until the other day the Australian Common-
wealth had no means of meeting either the United States or 
China at the same level of consultation, whether the subject 
was governmental or strategic, whether the function was 
l •t. h" . I 19 supp y, muni ions or s 1pp1ng • China and India had been 
added to the Pacific Council in London, but Australia still 
had no representation in the United States 1 in any council, 
committee, or strategic body direct.ly concerned in the 
controlling of the Allied war against Japan, or for that 
matter Germany or Italy'. 20 
In March Evatt left for the United States and the United 
Kingdom on a mission designed to improve consultation and to 
19. Ibid., p.52. 
20. Ibid., p.53. 
8. 
procure additional military supplies f'or Australia. In 
Washington he was ab.le to represent Australia on the newly 
created Pacific War Council, over which President Roosevelt 
presided, and in London he attended meetings of' the British 
War Cabinet. 2·1 In London also, he met the Chief's of' Staf'f' 
on 12 May and 'p.leaded that everything possible should be 
done to spare Australia the horrors of' invasion which he 
be.lieved to be more imminent than was supposed in London and 
22 
to send reinforcements before the emergency occurred'. 
His plea was successful. In the opinion of' the official 
British war historians, the Chief's of' Staff', dif'f'ering from 
Churchill, saw a Japanese invasion of' Australia as a 
"b"l"t 23 possi 1 1 Y• Evatt was given three Spitfire squadrons 
f'or the Pacific theatre as well as additional tanks and 
munitions. IDvatt's discussions with Churchill, seemed, in 
the eyes of' the Australian High Commissioner, S.M. Bruce, to 
have convinced him that the British government was paying more 
attention to Australia's interests than had been believed in 
Australia. 'It is clear', Bruce noted at the time, 'that 
21. For a reference to IDvatt's achievements on this trip by 
the Prime Minister see C.P.D., vol •. 171, 4 June 1942, pp. 
2185-86. 
22. J .M.A. Gwyer and J .R .M. Butler,H __ i... s._t ... o-..:;;.!:... .  Y:-.....o-f'...._,..t ... h .... e .. _S __ e_.c ... o.,.n""d ...__ W_.o""'r""'l-.d= 
War, United Kingdom Military Series, Grand Strategy, 
vol. III, June 1941 - August 1942, London, H.M.s.o., 
1964, p.496. 
?'L Ih;rL 
I J. 
9. 
Winston has exercised his charm and unquestionab1e astute-
ness upon Evatt 1 • 24 
And, indeed, Evatt's statement to Parliament following 
his return to Australia contained no reference to difficulties 
in Anglo-Australian or Allied consultation. The problem of 
Anglo-Australian consultation was soon to re-appear as one )-
Evatt1 s central concerns, however, as he turned his mind to 
the formulation of post-war foreign policy. It was in this 
area of policy that Evatt 1s antipathy towards Britain, and 
the United States, was to deve.lop progressively in the years 
prior to San Francisco. Failure to consult in matters of 
war-time strategy, though irritating, was, in his view, 
excusable. He was to make no such allowance .with regard to 
neglect of consultation in plans for the peace. Curtin's 
differences with Churchill on matters of strategy should not 
be seen as the fundamental dynamic of Australia's independent 
war-time foreign policy, 25 for although Curtin 1 s differences 
with Churchi.1.1 were to continue, he was always to be more 
moderate on questions of Commonwealth and Allied relations 
than his Minister for External Affairs. 
24. Edwards, op. cit., p.345. 
25. Sir Alan Watt seems to attribute considerable significance, 
in this context» to Ang.lo-Australian strategic differences, 
¥lthou~h he makes passing reference to 'the desire of such 
LGreatJ Powers to determine the substance of the post-war 
settlements'. (p.lOJ) Watt, op. cit., pp.60-l and 102-J. 
10. 
Prob.lems of consultation presuppose differences of 
viewpoint. In the case of military and strategic differences 
the cause was c.learly Australia's pre-occupation with the 
Pacific rather than the European war. Problems of consu.l ta-
tion in connection with Australia 2 s foreign po.licy for the 
post-war world were to reflect a simi.lar Australian emphasis 
on the Pacific - though this emphasis emerged only gradual.ly 
in Evatt 1 s speeches on the subject, and it was not unti.l 
October 1943 that it led to a major difference with Britain 
and the United States. This difference involved a major 
failure of consultation. It led Evatt to revive and re-
emphasize his notion of Dominion status. 
During the months that Evatt had been abroads that is 
from March unti.l mid-June 1942, American and Australian 
forces won notable victories over the forces of Japan in the 
Cora.l Sea, Midway, the So.lomons and Mi.lne Bay. Evatt was 
consequently able to assure Parliament on JSeptember 1942 that 
the outlook in the Pacific theatre of the war was much brighter 
than had seemed possible six months previously. 26 And in this 
26. C.P.D., vo.l. 172, 3 September .1942, p.83. Evatt did not 
mention that he was speaking on the third anniversary of 
the outbreak of war in Europe. 
11. 
vastly improved military situation he was able to turn his 
attention from the immediate problems of war to policies 
which would govern the coming peace. The Prime Minister, by 
contrast, was to remain throughout the war primarily and 
almost totally occupied with the immediate defence of his 
country. 
Evatt saw that a clear formulation of post-war objectives, 
besides being necessary in itself, was also of benefit to the 
military effort. 
It is becoming more and more c.lear that the military 
overthrow of our enemies, although our primary aim, 
will in no way be obstructed but wil.l be assisted if 
positive plans are now laid as to the course to be 
pursued in the post-war period.27 
It was at once evident that the Atlantic Charter was central 
to Evatt's initial post-war policy. He recalled to the House 
that while in London he had met members of a Soviet de.legation, 
28 led by Molotov, which was negotiating the Anglo-Soviet Treaty. 
After pointing out that, because the Soviet Union and Japan 
were not at war, the Anglo-Soviet Treaty was directed very 
specifically at Germany, he argued that its more important 
provisions were those containing broad declarations reaffirming 
the Atlantic Charter and thus directed to the post-war 
27. Ibid., p.82. 
28. Ibid., p.81. 
12. 
29 
settlement. Despite the fact that while in America he 
had found many who 1 were particu.lar.ly anxious to have 
promulgated a specia.l charter covering the future of the 
peoples of the Pacific and South East Asia. Why not, it 
was said, establish a Pacific and Asiatic Charter on the 
JO 
.lines of the Atlantic Charter? 1 , Dr. Evatt strongly 
maintained that the Atlantic Charter was universal in 
application. He held this view despite Churchill's statement 
to the House of Commons on 9 September 1941 that at their 
Atlantic meeting Rooseve.l t and himself 
had in mind primarily restoration of the sovereignty, 
se.lf-government, and national life of the States and 
nations of Europe now under Nazi yoke, and the 
princip.les which would govern any alteration in the 
territorial boundaries which might have to be made.Jl 
Even Evatt himse.lf was to admit on a later occasion 
To be sure those directly concerned with the prepara-
tion of the Charter had Europe primari.ly in mind at 
the time and this fact appears in certain aspects of 
the wording of the Charter.J2 
29. Ibid. 
JO. Ibid., p.82. 
Jl. Par.liamell!.§!.I~ates, 5th Series, House of Commons, 
vol. J74, 9 September .194.1, Colo 69 o 
J2. The occasion was an address to the Overseas Press Club, 
New York, 28 Apri.l, 194J. This is reprinted as 'The 
Post-War Settlement in the Pacific 1 , Department of 
Externa.l Affairs, Canberra, Current Notes on International 
A~fairs~ (hereafter referred to as C.N.I.A.) 
vol. 14, no. 5, 15 May 194J, p.146. 
13. 
Evatt argued that the word 'Atlantic' referred to the 
area in which the instrument was signed and was not to be 
read as .limiting the extent of its application. The twenty-
eight nations which had subscribed to it extended around the 
globe. 33 The dec.laration was universal in its scope and 
application. The broad area of the Pacific and South East 
Asia was thus to be governed by the principles of the Charter. 
Evatt's statement to this effect foreshadowed by some weeks a 
similar announcement by President Roosevelt. 35 Evatt's 
advocacy of the Atlantic Charter was no doubt related to its 
contents - he was to make frequent reference to Article 6 in 
his domestic campaign, as Attorney General, for adequate 
Commonweal th powers in the fie.ld of post-war reconstruction36 
and also to his concern lest the war effort in the Pacific 
would continue to be regarded as secondary to that in the 
Atlantic. 
34 
33. C.P.D., vo.l. 172, 3 September 1942, p.82. Australia had 
adhered to the Charter at the Al.lied Conference, St. James's 
Palace, London, 24 September 1941. C.N.I.A.~ vo.l. 12, 
no. 1, 1 January 1942, pp.7-8. 
34. This general argument had been argued by Professor Julius 
Stone in June 1942. See J. Stone, 'Peace P.lanning and the 
Atlantic Charter', Australiau_g_uarterly, vol. xiv, No. 2 
June 1942, p.5, footnote l. For later comment by Stone on 
Evatt's arguments see Julius Stone 'The Atlantic Charter 
and the Problems of South East Asia and the Pacific', 
Australia and the Paclii.£., Princeton, 1944. 
35. On 27 October 1942. New York Times, 28 October 1942. 
36. 
Roosevelt would probably have made an earlier announcement 
if he had not restrained himself at Churchill's request. 
See below p. 27 footnote 72. 
14. 
Evatt p.laced particular emphasis on Articles 6 and 8 of 
the Charter. Article 6 referred to 'freedom from fear and 
want' and here Evatt's primary emphasis was very clearly on 
military security - freedom from fear. 'The first principle 
which must be applied is that of military security 1 • 37 In 
this connection, Artie.le 8 of the Charter had referred to the 
establishment of 'a wider and permanent system of general 
·t ' JS secur1 y • Evatt's initial comments on the organization of 
post-war military security were similarly vague. He referred 
to 'a system of general security which will be as effective 
in the Pacific and Asiatic regions as in all other parts of 
the world. Pending the establishment of such a system', he 
continued, 'the aggressor must be disarmed 1 • 39 Although Evatt 
saw aggression in terms of the Japanese 'the only Pacific 
power which since 1931 has systematically employed its armed 
40 forces for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement', he 
37. C.P.D., vol •. 172, 3 September .1942, p.S2. 
JS. This was inserted at Churchill's suggestion. The 
generality of expression is a ref.lection of Roosevelt's 
reluctance to commit himself on the subject of post-war 
world organization. Gwyer and Butler, op. cit., p.121. 
39. C.P.D., vol •. 172, 3 September 1942, p.82. 'Asiatic' was 
the contemporary Australian usage. An example is the title 
of the journal of the Australian Institute of International 
Affairs, Victorian Division, from 1937-1946 - Austral.-
Asiatic Bulletin. 
40. C.P.D., vol. 172, 3 September 1942, p.S2. 
15. 
made no reference in this statement to any post-war Asiatic 
and/or Pacific regional defence and security zone. His 
statement that the general system would be effective in the 
Asiatic and Pacific regions does not imply that post-war 
world security would rest on a regional basis. 
Evatt's comments on 'freedom from want' indicate 
his concern for the social and economic, and therefore 
political, future, in addition to the military security, 
of the peoples of South East Asia and the South West 
Pacific. He rejected the notion that the 'post-war order 
could be for the so.le benefit of one Power or group of 
41 Powers.' 'If freedom from want means anything it means 
th t th f f . 1 't t' . r 42 a e age o un air exp oi a ion is over o Future 
Pacific policy, he argued, must be founded on the doctrine 
of trusteeship for the benefit of al.l Pacific peoples. He 
appeared to envisage an extension of the mandate system of 
the League of Nations, under which Australia had administered 
New Guineao 
In short, we must found future Pacific policy on the 
doctrine of trusteeship for the benefit of all the 
Pacific peoples. That doctrine the Commonwealth has 
endeavoured to carryrut in New Guinea under the Mandates 
system of the League of Nations. Japan's record as a 
mandatory power only proves that a solemn trust can 
be betrayed.43 
41. Ibid. 
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibid., p.SJ. 
16. 
In the course of these comments on 'freedom from 
want' Evatt had shown some awareness of the Pacific and 
indeed the South West Pacific as being particularly vital 
to Australia's post-war security but the idea was still 
germinal. And Evatt here had also, if only by implication, 
envisaged the continuance of some general world organization 
on the .lines of the League of Nations. 
Evatt developed these pre.liminary comments on the nature 
of the peace during his second mission abroad from April to 
August 1943. Before he left Australia, Parliament had, in 
February 1943, passed an Act 44 al.lowing conscripts to be 
sent to serve outside Australia in an area of the South West 
Pacific bounded by the Equator on the North, by the .110 
meridian of East Longitude on the West and by the 159 meridian 
of East Longitude on the East. 45 This was an area considerably 
smaller than the South West Pacific command zone which had 
also inc.luded the portion of' Borneo north of the Equator and 
the Phi.llipines o John Curtin had struggled to have the 
extension of conscription to even this limited area sanctioned 
by his Party. The Opposition, under R.G. Menzies, had initially 
urged the adoption of a wider area, but after sensing that, 
44. Defepce (~itizen ~il,itarY...E..g,rces2 Act, 1943. 
45. C~., vol. 173, 3 February .1943, p.264. 
in view of' Curtinvs difficulties within his own party, such 
opposition might .lead to the complete fai.lure of his scheme, 
were content t t . t 46 o suppor i • That the area which was 
approved was seen as vital to Australia's war-time security -
a necessary condition for her territorial impenetrabi.li ty47 
48 in the then state of' aircraft technology - was made c.lear 
in a letter which John Curtin sent to President Roosevelt 
through the Austra.lian Legation in Washington, on .18 March 
1943. 
The commencement of this letter and part of an 
accompanying note are quoted as i.Llustrations of a 
continuous consultative friction between Curtin and 
Churchi.11 arising from their different strategic priorities. 
Curtin was, as usual, arguing for the Pacific. 
Curtin's letter began 
46. Sawer, op. cit. pp.138-9. 
47. 'Impenetrabilityv is used here with the significance 
attributed to it in John H. Herz, Int~~2-~2~ 
Pol~tics in_!he.,..!~o~ic Age, New York, 1959. 
48. A table giving the maximum range in miles of a bombing 
p.lane in 1943 (1,200 miles) may be found in Haro.ld and 
Margaret Sprout, Foundatio~s of Internatio~!i..£..§., 
Princeton, 1963, at p.253. 
18. 
On 19 January I addressed to Washington for trans-
mission to Mr. Churchill and yourself a cahlegram 
urging, in view of the lessons of the use of air 
power in the New Guinea campaign, that 1,500 
additional operational and 500 additional transport 
aircraft be made avai.lable to the South West Pacific 
Area as soon as possible in 1943. Mr. Sumner Welles 
undertook to transmit the messages to both of you 
but I have had no rep.ly from either Mr. Churrchill 
or yourself.49 
A.S. Watt, First Secretary of the Legation, in an 
accompanying note which he had written to Sumner We.l.les 
explaining references in Curtin' s .letter, made the problem 
of consultation even more obvious. 
You wi.11 no doubt remember that, on 20 day of January, 
Sir Owen Dixon handed to you copies of messages from 
the Australian Prime Minister to the President and 
Mr. Churchil.l. At that time it was not known that the 
President and Mr. Churchil.l were meeting at Casablanca 
and the Australian Government forwarded the message to 
Washington on the assumption that Mr. Churchi.1.1 had 
come to the United States. I understand you informed 
Sir Owen Dixon that you would be g.lad to transmit the 
two messages immediately. Sir Owen Dixon passed on 
this information to Australia.50 
The relevance of Curtin' s .letter to the de.lineation of 
an area of vital strategic concern to Australia in the war is 
clear from the fo.Llowing extracts. 
49. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. 
P.P.F. 8459. Rooseve.lt had returned to Washington from 
Casablanca on Jl January. 
50. Ibid. 
Inte.l.ligence reports have recent.ly indicated that 
the Japanese are intensively consolidating an arc of 
air bases extending through the Netherlands East 
Indies, Portuguese Timar, New Guinea, Rabaul and the 
North Solomons to the Marshall Islands. •••• the 
renewal of attacks on Darwin and reconnaissance of 
the North West Coast indicate the paramount importance 
of sufficient strength being available to ensure air 
superiority along the whole .line of contact with the 
enemy.51 
Dr. Evatt showed a similar Australian concern for this 
island arc in two statements made in New York in Apri.l and 
June 1943. But for Evatt the significance of the arc was 
not merely re.lated to immediate strategy and defence: he 
was led to assumptiorn about the post-war sett.lement and 
its application to the Pacific. 
Evatt's statement to the press in New York on 19 April 
194352 dealt firstly with strategic problems of the war. 
After remarking that he found in the United States a far 
deeper interest in the Pacific than he had found one year 
before, he regretted that .little was known of Australia and 
51. Ibid. 
52. 'Post-War Pacific Po.licy', C.N.I.4., vo.l. 14 1 no. 6, 
15 June 1943, pp. 2.14-5. 
20. 
New Zealand, except their great war efforts.53 Evatt's 
object was to stress the importance of the Pacific war in 
relation to the war being fought against Germany. The war 
against Japan, he argued, should not continue to be merely 
a ho.lding and defensive war; offensive campaigns were 
necessary to prevent Japanese consolidation and a consequent 
spread of 'Japanese "culture"' throughout the territories 
which she now occupied. 54 
53. Ibid. p.214. For similar, though earlier, comment 
on this theme by an Austra.lian academic see Fred. 
Alexander, 'What Americans think about Australia', 
Austral-A~ic Bulletin, vol. 4,no. 5, December-January 
.1940-1, pp.6-7. For doubts as to the extent to which 
Australian war efforts were recognized see C.E.W. Bean, 
'The "Christmas Books" of our Fighting Services, 
1915-1943', Australian Quarterly, vo.l. xvi, no. 2, 
June 1944, pp.70-6. At p.72 Dr. Bean comments on 
events in 1943. 'Possibly the Australian forces as 
a whole have never fought more constantly and 
vigorously, certainly they have never been more effect-
ive in action. But the eyes of the great world have 
been concentrated on other events, and even when the 
Australian effort has been achieving some of its more 
important results, those results are comparatively 
seldom in the world news, or when they get there, are 
not generally recognized as due to Australia's efforts.' 
54. C.N.LA., vol. 14, no. 6, .15 June .1943, p.2.14. 
Japanese culture, Evatt urged, was at least as great a 
threat to 'our civilization' 5 5 as German culture: 
The beat Hitler first policy is a strategic policy. 
21. 
It does not mean that Germany of'f'ers the more dangerous 
threat to the European or the Australian or the American 
way of life. On the contrary, in6such respect, the 
greater threat comes from Japan.5 
In the fight against Japan, Australia and New Zealand should 
be regarded as 'the trustees f'or democratic civilization in 
the South Pacific'.57 This specific reference to the South 
Pacific rather than to South East Asia and the Pacific, and 
in a military rather than the social and economic context of' 
September 1942, is significant. 
55. Ibid. 
56. Ibid. 
57. Ibid. When he reached London Evatt spoke of' Australia 
and New Zealand as 'trustees for the United Nations, 
particularly for the British Commonwealth of' Nations.' 
He made this reference to re.la ti on to fighting r in the 
Pacific'. As will be shown below, Australian emphasis 
on the South and South West Pacific was primarily 
relevant to her post-war relations with the United 
Stateso The London speech is reprinted as 'The War in 
the Pacific', B.B.C. Postscript Broadcast, 27 June .1943, 
C.N.I.A., vol. 14, no. 7, 15 August 1943, p.238. Admiral 
Ernest J. King in a memorandum to the President dated 
5 March 1942 had given a different reason f'or Australia's 
and New Zealand's importance - 'Australia and New Zealand 
are "white man's countries" which it is essential that we 
shal.l not allow to be overrun by Japanese because of' the 
repercussions among the non-white races of' the world.' 
Ernest J. King and Walter M-uir Whitehill, ~tl....Admira.l 
King, A Naval Record, London 1953, p.176. 
When he turned to the prohlem of the post-war settlement, 
Evatt followed a restatement of his September 1942 arguments 
on the applicability of the Atlantic Charter with a restatement 
of his imprecise views on the nature of the proposed World 
organization envisaged by Article Eight of the Chartero 
Accordingly, in keeping with the eighth principle of 
the Charter, there should be estab.lished a system of 
systems of general or regiona.l security which will be 
as effective in these Pacific and Asiatic regions as 
in others.58 
But he had now added to his September views on post-war security 
the idea of regional security even if he had not made his notion 
of the relationship of regional security to the world 
organization at all clear. 
This renewed reference to 'Pacific and Asiatic regions', 
the language of his September 1942 statement, although now with 
obvious relation to regional security, was followed, in this 
press statement of 19 April .1943, by a reiteration of his 
awareness of the importance of the South West Pacific to 
Australia in his comments on the concept of 'freedom from 
want 1 • 
Therefore Austra.lia, as a .leading nation of the South 
West Pacific zone, wi.Ll have a very special concern in 
economic, as well as in strategic arrangements in that 
zone.59 
58. C.N.I.4., vol. 14, no. 6, 15 June 1943, p.215. 
59. Ibid. 
Thus in this Press statement Evatt had not only referred to 
a post-war 'system or systems of' general or regional security' 
but had spoken of' a South West Pacific strategic and economic 
zone, in which Austr~lia was to play a special part. Trustee-
ship for democratic civilization in the South Pacific, it 
would seem, conferred a right to protect in the post-war 
wor.ld as wel.l as to be protected in the war then raging against 
Japan. 
If' it was pos sib.le to draw from Evatt' s September reference 
to 
60 
1 a system of' general security' and advocacy of' a mandate 
system for the Pacific the inference that he favoured a post-
war general security organization similar to the League of 
Nations, the same reading cannot be given to these comments 
of' April 19430 Indeed the increased imprecision of' his views 
on post-war world security was indicative of' the growing 
strength of' regional security concepts in his thought. Evatt 
had, in these comments, made specific reference to post-war 
regional security. What he had not made clear was whether 
60. 'A system of' genera.l 
in these Pacific and 
parts of' the world. ' 
security which will be as 
Asiatic regions as in all 
See above p. rt:,, 
effective 
other 
24. 
he saw these regional groups as a 'substitute for a world 
'61 ' t 62 plan or as an app.lication of a world plan , and, if the 
latter, whether the world plan was to rest primari.ly on 
regional security groups or alternatively use them as adjuncts 
to a collective security system. 
63 On 28 Apri.l, in a second address in New York, Evatt' s 
increasing interest in the post-war settlement was ref.lected 
in the fact that his entire talk was devoted to this subject. 
It was centred on 'some fundamentals of the post-war settlement, 
particular.ly so far as the Pacific is concerned' • 64 Australia's 
special part in such a settlement was reaffirmed. 
It has needed the war to force upon the Australian 
peop.le the ful.l consciousness of the fact that their 
responsibility and ~ights are primarily those of a 
key Pacific nation.u5 
61. W. Macmahon Bal.l in his introduction to H. V. Evatt, 
op. cit., p.xii. 
62. Ibid. 
63. Delivered at the Overseas Press C.lub. Reprinted as 
7 The Post-War Settlement in the Pacific~, C.N.I.A., 
vol. 14, no. 5, 15 May 1943, pp.145-152. 
64. Ibid. p •. 145. 
65. Ibid. 
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Post-war wor.ld security, Evatt urgued yet again, would be 
based on the universal app.lication of the Atlantic Charter. 66 
And again, his primary emphasis was clearly upon mi.litary 
security - 'The first and outstanding principle which must 
be applied is that of security'. 67 After stating that a post-
war system of security must be universal 'or everyone would 
be insecure', Evatt, whi.le now removing any suggestion that 
he favoured a mul tip.le and regional 'substitute' rather than 
a sing.le world-wide international organization, left no doubt 
as to the value he placed upon regional security within a 
universal system. 
66. Ibid. pp.145-6. 
67. Ibid. p .146. There is a noticeable overal.l consistency 
and continuity - one might even say repetitiveness - in 
Evatt's foreign policy statements in the years 1942-5. 
Hasluck tends to give an opposite interpretation. 
'A close and ana.lytical reading of his published speeches 
wi.11 often reveal contrasts in emphasis. One examp.le is 
found in speeches delivered abroad in Apri.1-August 1943 
and the speech to the Australian Par.liament in October, 
1943'. Paul Hasluck, 9 Australia and the Formation of 
the United Nations: Some Personal Reminiscences 1 , 
Journal,and Proceeding§..J_ Rqyal.Aust];'alian Historical 
Society, vol. XL, part IIT 9 .1954, p.148. 
This does not mean however, that within a system 
of general wor.ld security there will not be ample 
scope for the development of regional arrangements 
both for the purpose of the preservation of that 
security and for the handling of ordered change 
within the region.68 
26. 
A region of crucial Australian interest was then identified. 
When an adequate general p.lan is prepared for security 
against aggression, the United Nations in the Pacific 
will have to be assured of their own security. In 
this respect, Australia wi.11 naturally regard as of 
crucial importance to its own security the arc of 
islands lying to the north and north-east of our 
continent. While Australia will be anxious to build 
a universal international systeID......Q.f sec~_,;i;:_ity a'!!!:!..J&. 
play its part in the general c:i...nd regional o~za.!i.Q.n 
of such a system, it will, particularly before such 
a system is establishedcand proved to be in good 
working order, be vitally concerned as to who shall 
live in, develop and control these areas so vital to 
her security from aggression.69 
It was thus made quite clear, in addition, that the post-war 
regional security zone in the South West and South Pacific, 
in which Australia would have a crucial interest, was not 
seen merely as a supplement to the proposed general world 
security organization. It was, at least until the general 
organization was successful.ly established, the necessary if 
not the sufficient condition for the effective defence of 
Australia. And Evatt's reference to who should 'live in, 
develop, and control' these island areas clearly indicated 
his interest in questions of territorial sett.lement and 
68. C.N.I.A., vol. 14, no. 5, 15 May 1943, p.146. 
69. Ibid. pp.146-7. Emphasis added. 
sovereignty in this crucial South Pacific region. 
It was in keeping with these deve.lopments in Australian 
foreign policy that a start was made at this time (mid 1943) 
in the Department of External Affairs, in association with 
the Department of Defence, upon a systematic study of problems 
associated with the peace sett.lement and the armistice. 70 
Although there had been previous planning for the peace in 
Australia, 71 it had been predominantly concerned with 
domestic post-war reconstruction72 and, in the international 
sphere, with an economic policy based upon world-wide full 
73 
employmento A post-war section had been estab.lished in 
the Department of External Affairs ear.ly in 1942. It was 
ini tia.l.ly staffed by P oMo C. Has.luck who concurrently continued 
70. Hasluck, op. cit., p.146. 
71. 'On September 25 [1941] a despatch was received from our 
Legation at Canberra enc.losing a document on Australian 
preparations with respect to "reconstruction" with a 
request for any simi.lar materia.l on United States 11 Post-
Defence Planning".' United States Department of State 
Post-war Foreig11 Poli~!'epa£ation. 1939-45 Publication 
3580, Genera.l Foreign Policy Series 15, Washington, 1949, 
p.57. 
72. Evatt was c.lose.ly invo.lved in the constitutional aspects 
of this po.licy in his addi tiona.l office of Attorney-General 0 
On domestic reconstruction 1942-5 see L.F. Crisp, Ben 
Chifley, Melbourne, .196.1, ch. XIII, 12.a~· 
73. See below Chapter IV. 
28. 
to perform other duties within the Department. Hasluck was 
joined .later in the year by W .D. Forsyth74 whose interest 
in South East Asian and Pacific affairs had been reflected 
in his membership of the editorial board of the Aust~ 
Asiatic Bulletin. Forsyth was especially interested in 
post-war colonial policy. 
On J June 1943, Evatt, who was then in Washington 
forwarded the fol.lowing message from Australia's Prime 
Minister, John Curtin, to President Rooseve.lt. 
I would like to convey to you on behalf of the 
Australian people our appreciation of the deep 
significance of your joint decision, as announced 
by Mr. Churchi.Ll, that the war in the Pacific wi.11 
be prosecuted with the same vigour as the war in 
Europe. We trust that it wil.l not be so very long 
before final victory is in sight.75 
74. Hasluck, op. cit., p.14.1. 
75. On 8 June Roosevelt asked Evatt to convey the following 
message to Curtin, 'Thank you for your message conveyed 
to me by Dr. Evatt. Our aim has always been to hit each 
of our enemies as hard as we could whenever we could. 
As you know the trend of the war now makes it possib.le 
to hit each of those harder and oftener. We share your 
confidence!' Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, 
New York. P.P.F. 8459. Churchil.l had spoken on this 
theme in his address to a Joint Session of Congress, 
19 May 194J. Congressional Record, vol. 89, part 4, 
p.46.19. 
On his return from this second mission, Evatt was ab.le 
to devote a major portion of his statement on International 
Affairs made on 14 October 1943 to the problem of the post-war 
sett.lament. The increasing.ly favourable course of the war 
from Australia's viewpoint had been established by the 
Governor-General in his speech at the Opening of the newly 
elected 76 Seventeenth Par.liament on 2J September 1943 o 77 
Evatt began with an assertion and a question. 
Australia's right to take part in al.l aspects of the 
post-war settlement being undoubted, 7~he question is, 
what genera.l views should we favour? 
76. CurtinYs narrow majority in the previous parliament 
appears to have disturbed Roosevelt. On 11 February 1943 
he wrote to Revo Ao Phelps Stokes 'I am writing to you 
very confidential.ly, of course, but the fact is that 
Australia at the present time is for us in a somewhat 
difficult position. Unlike most countries in the war 
they have no coa.li ti on or na tiona.l government o The 
Labour Party is in power by a very narrow margin and only 
members of that party are in charge of prosecution of the 
war.' Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New 
York, PoP.F. JJ29. As a result of the elections held 
on 21 August 1943 Labor gained outright majorities in 
both Houses. 
77. C.PoDo, vol. .176, 2J September .194J, pp.8-11. 
78. C.PoD., vol. 176, 14 October 194J, p.570. 
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A general world security organization - 'a strengthened 
League or Association of Nations', 79 Evatt argued, shou.ld 
succeed the League of Nations. Strengthened Al.lied support 
for the new organization would ensure the effective use of 
force against states breaking their international obligations. 
The League had fai.led because its members had fai.led it. 
In my opinion, nothing has been more unfair, or more 
superficia.l than the stream of criticism to the 
effect that the League of Nations failed becuase it did 
not prevent the outbreak of the present war. Some 
critics speak of the doctrine of collective security 
as though it were something outside the purview of 
the League. But the theory of collective security 
was contained in the Covenant of the League. The 
League Covenant c.learly provided for the use of force 
by the League against states breaking their international 
ob.ligations under the Covenant.SO 
Evatt left no doubt of his support for the theory of 
S.l A co.llective security. ustralia, he added, had retained full 
membership of the League and was s til.l paying the annua.l sub-
sidy required by the rules. He then, however, after stating 
Australia's c.laim to participate in the European peace settle-
ment, asserted her special position in the broad South-East 
Asia-Pacific area. He was looking, again, to regional security 
but in a new context. 
79. Ibid, p.572. 
SO. Ibid, p.571. 
S.l. For a critique of col.lective security, a critique which 
questions the type of argument used by Evatt that the 
League t contained' the theory of co.llective security see 
Inis L. C.laude Jr. Power a,nd-1.n:!:;.&.I:na ti.Q.Dal_B~_t.i™' 
New York, 1962, Chapter 5. 
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Because of Australia's specia.l geographical position 
and our growing responsibility and power, we can, and 
should, make a very special contribution towards the 
establishment and the maintenance of the peace settle-
ment in South East Asia and the Pacific.82 
At the commencement of his reference to the post-war 
sett.lement in this October statement, Evatt referred to 'all 
aspects of the peace settlement'o It would seem that, in that 
reference, unlike these references in the paragraph just 
quoted to Europe and South East Asia and the Pacific, Evatt 
was using 'peace settlement' in a wide sense to include h2.!h. 
the estab.lishment of a general world security organization 
on the one hand, and the distinct armistice and peace settle-
ment discussions on the othero In his second New York state-
ment on 28April 1943, Evatt had shown a particular interest 
in questions of South and South West Pacific sovereignty. This 
tendency towards a concern, based on a strong regional security 
consciousness, with matters of territorial sovereignty, matters 
touching the armistice and peace sett.lement in the Pacific, 
rather than with problems of the new world security organization, 
becomes fully evident in the detailed ana.lysis which Evatt next 
proceeded to make of Australia's strategic relationship to 
specific neighbouring islands in the South Pacific zone. 
82. C.P.D., vol. 176, 14 October 1943, p.572. 
320 
A vita.1 and immediate interest in the Pacif'ic armistice and 
the peace settlement as distinct f'rom the proposed world 
security organization is a major characteristic of' Australia's 
post-war f'oreign policy preparationo It is one which is 
easily overlooked. 
Without referring specifically to an 'arc of' islands', 
Evatt argued that as a result of' her wartime experiences, 
Australia must show a particular interest in the welf'are and 
system of' control 'of' those is.lands and territories which lie 
83 
close to our shores'. In his subsequent references to the 
individual constituent islands of' this group, it becomes 
clear that Evatt's thinking in regard to Australia's f'uture 
r e.lations with her South Pacif'ic neighbours was governed 
primarily by security and strategic considerations. Yet 
security f'or Evatt was not merely a matter of' arms and alliances; 
he saw and urged in his emphasis upon 'f'reedom f'rom want' in 
April 1943 that a lasting peace could only be built upon 
economic and social progress. 84 Freedom f'rom want, nonetheless, 
always appears in these speeches to be subsidiary to f'reedom 
f'rom f'ear. As he put it in this October statement -
83. Ibid. 
84. C.N.I.A., vol. 14, no. 5, 15 May .1943, p.147. 
33. 
In short the guarantee of security against aggression 
is the necessary condition precedent to the attainment 
of such objectives as improved ~tandards of living in 
all the countries of the world. 5 
Of the administration of the Solomon Islands Evatt spoke 
strongly and scathingly: 
85. C.P.D., vol. 176, 14 October 1943, p.572. In this same 
statement Evatt also commented 1 Realizing that satisfactory 
economic relations and a planned development will greatly 
strengthen mutua.l defence and help to secure the mutual 
welfare of the peoples of this region, the Commonwealth 
Government contE)mpl~tesa general understanding covering 
commercial matters, transport and general reconstruction 
in the post-war period. 1 Ibid. p.574. In New York 
in April, although he u~ged that peace could only be 
built on social and economic progress, he was clearly 
conscious of the need for military security. 1 And 
yet the primary prob.lem of the post-war world will be 
that of freedom from fear - i.e. fear of aggression -
in short the problem of security.' C.N.I.A., vol. 14, 
no. 5, 15 May 1943, p.150. Has.luck, however, takes a 
contrary view of Evatt's position. He writes of Evatt 1 s 
views on world organization in .late 1942 as follows 
1 ••••ministerial interest was not in the great inter-
national questions of power and military security and the 
composing of the interests of national states, but with 
what was termed "economic security" and "social justice". 1 
After recognizing that Evatt was at this time primari.ly 
concerned with domestic reconstruction Hasluck continues 
1 What I want to suggest, however, is that this outlook 
persisted nearly three years later whm Australia had 
to give her attention to proposals of rather a different 
kind. When the Dumbarton Oaks Conference presented us 
with a p.lan for an international organization, which was 
essentially an organization to maintain the security of 
the nations by the use of power, we heard the echoes of 
earlier ministerial argument about post-war reconstruct-
ion in Australia'. Hasluck, op. cit., pp.139-40. 
34. 
When war broke out 9 the Solomons actually became a 
menace to Australia, and there was a lack of adequate 
contact between the Australiag and British administra-
tion in relation to defence.8 
Australia therefore, he continued, had a definite interest 
after the war in seeing that these islands should maintain 
sufficient bases and be developed along lines which would 
make them not a liability but an asset in the defence of the 
South West and South Pacific. 
The New Hebrides, administered jointly by Great Britain 
and France, were referred to in simi.lar terms. Before the 
war, these islands, like the Solomons, were 
a defence liability because of the lack of deve.lop-
ment. The system of condominium or joint control was 
considered in many quarters as not conducive to the 
progress of the group o••• Their future is a matter 
which concerns Australia in par~icular and the South 
West Pacific region as a whole. 7 
New Caledonia, likewise, was 'of vital concern188 to Australia. 
Its resources and strategic position, Evatt claimed, made it 
'an important placet 89 in the future security of the South 
86. C.P.D., vol. 176, .14 October 1943, Po573o For similar 
sentiments., see W.C. Groves, 7 The British Solomon Islands', 
Australia-Asiatic. Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 3, August-September 
1940, pp •. 15-16. At p.15 Groves comments 'Indeed, it 
appears to have been regarded, officially as well as 
popularly, as a tropical Co.lonial backwater'. 
87. C.P.D., vol. 17~, 14 October 1943, p.573. 
88. Ibid. 
89. Ibid. 
West Pacific. Australia, he added, 'envisaged the restoration 
90 
of fu.Ll French sovereignty in New Caledonia'. 
It is extremely unlikely that this reference to the 
restoration of French sovereignty was gratuitous. Dr. Evatt 
measured the words af his major speeches with the eye of an 
eminent constitutional lawyer. Although he invariab.ly worked 
from a basis of drafts prepared by his departmental officers, 
these frequent.ly underwent total transformation in the course 
of three or four redrafts to meet the Minister's intentions. 91 
This reference to sovereignty and Evatt's earlier reference 
to a vital Australian concern as to who should 1 live in, 
develop, and control' the is.lands of the security arc shou.ld 
be seen in the context of President Roosevelt Y s anti-colonia.l 
. 92 d views an , in particular, his suggestion to the British 
90. Ibid. 
91. Hasluck, who himself wrote drafts, is inc.lined to 
emphasize the influence which departmental drafts had 
on Evatt. Has.luck, op. cit., p.148. 
92. Foster Rhea Dul.les and Gera.ld E. Ridinger 'The Anti-
Co.lonial Po.licies of Franklin D. Roosevelt 1 , Po.li tics;tl 
Science Quarterly, vo.l. LXX, March 1955, passim. 
That Evatt was aware of Roosevelt's views is probab.le 
in the light of his reported comments to the New Zealand 
High Commission in Canberra in the same month (see below 
p •. '),~-, ) and in the light of the examp.les of Roosevelt 1 s 
comments at meetings of the Pacific Counci.l in March and 
September 1943 subsequently cited by the Austra.lian 
Government (see be.low p. h • ) • 
36. 
Foreign Secretary, Mro Eden, in Washington during March 1943 
concerning the future placing of French colonies under 
international trusteeship and the possibi.li ty of an inter-
national trusteeship for Timor. 93 It should also be seen 
in the light of Rooseveltts plans for a ring of internation-
alized strategic air and naval bases encircling the g.lobe with 
the possibility of a base in the Solomonso 94 
An Australian concern for Timar was to be expectedo 
'If properly placed within the zone of Australian security, 
it would become a bastion of our defence' • 95 Similarly, 
Dr. Evatt p.laced the Netherlands East Indies within the arc 
of specia.l concern to Australia. 96 His reference to these 
islands - Solomons, New Hebrides, New Cal<edonia, Timar and 
the Netherlands East Indies - was fo.llowed by a general 
declarationo 
93. Woodward, Sir L.lewellyn, History of the Second World War, 
Bri ·~Jsh Foreign Poli.£y__in the Second World War, London, 
H.M.S.O., 1962, pp.440-.1. See also United States Depart-
ment of State, Foreign_Relations of the United States 
(hereafter 1G.fu.IJ.S.), 1944, vol. III, The British Common-
wealth, Eastern Europe and the Far East, Washington, 1963, 
p.39. 
94. Corde.Ll Hu.11, 'I'h_§_~emoirs of Corqtl!_Hull, New York, 1948, 
vo.l. IT, pp.1305 and 1596. Wil.liam D. L,eahy, I Was ... ~'I'h.~, 
New York, .1950, p.3.14. 
95. C.P.:Q_., vo.l. 176, 14 October 1943, p.573. 
96. Ibid. 
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Al.l of these adjacent islands, together with Australia 
and New Zealand, form a zone of mutual interest. It 
would be b.lindness not to recognize their complementary 
relationship. As in the case of New Caledonia we 
visualize the restoration of former sovereignty. 
Here again it will be essential that the islands 
should be grouped in the same defence zone as 
Australia and that special efforts within the zone 
shall be made in relation to air transport and 
economic betterment.97 
A c.lose reading of the remainder of Evatt 1 s statement 
supports the previous suggestion that it whould be seen as 
discouraging United States sponsored internationalization and 
United States claims to sovereignty in this narrow arc of 
crucial Australian concern. 
Evatt first of all went on to refer to New Guinea, which 
he, of course, also included in his defence zone. 
I visualize New Guinea, both Australian and Dutch, as 
an integra.l part of the Pacific zone with which Australia 
will be vitally interested in collaboration with Britain 
and New Zealand on the one hand, and the Dutch, French 
and Portuguese on the other. The Commonwealth Government 
is convinced that, in order to prevent future aggression, 
measures should be concerted for the permanent defence 
of this area as one of the zones of security within the 
international system that must be erected.98 
The ommission of the United States in this context of area 
co.llaboration could hardly have been accidental. 
97. Ibid. p. 57 4. 
98. Ibid. 
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In this zone of crucial concern to Australia, co-operation 
between Australia and New Zealand would be 1pivotal'. 99 
Other authorities concerned in what I have called the 
Austra.lian defence zone are the British Colonial 
Administration, theNetherlands and Portuguese 
Governments 58d a French National Committee of 
Liberation. 1 
Then comes reference to the United States. 
As well as our immediate neighbours, there are other 
powers in North and South America, and on the Asiatic 
mainland, concerned in the future of the Pacific. 
Our great ally, the United States of America, is 
playing, and is destined to play, a major part. On 
many Pacific battlefie.lds, Americans and Australians 
have borne the brunt of the fighting against Japan. 
It is certain that our co.Llaboration with the United 
States wil.l be extreme.ly close. Similarly the 
Dominions of Canada and Australia have many common 
interests both as fellow members of the British 
Commonweal th and as 'small nations 1 •. lO.l 
But 1 extreme.ly c.los e co.llaboration t with the United States 
and, simi.lar.ly, Canada did not necessari.ly imp.ly that these 
two countries were seen by Evatt as closely involved in the 
Australian South Pacific zone of crucial interest. This 
reference to 'extreme.ly c.lose collaboration with the United 
States' has been taken by an American scholar as one of the 
three overaLl characteristics of Australia's approach during 
99. Ibid. p.575 • 
. 100. Ibid. 
101. Ibid. 
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1943-5 to post-war security in South East Asia and the 
Paci. fi" c .102 . He is led, as a consequence, to minimize 
Australia's reservations with regard to American participation 
in the South and South West Pacific zone.103 Evatt's 
October statement suggests, and this reading is supported in 
102. H.S. Albinski, Australia's Search...!.Q.!: Regiopal Security 
in Southeast Asia. unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Minnesota, 1959, p.106. 
103. Ibid. pp.120, 129. A simi.lar view is held by Starke. 
Both these writers tend to look backwards from the close 
Australian-American relations of the l950's and 60's. 
J.G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Allia~, Melbourne, 1965, 
pp. 9, 11, 12. Speaking genenally of Evatt's proposals 
for a Pacific security p:tct from April 1943 until he 
ceased to hold office in 1949, Starke wrote on p.9 
'••••there was at all times to be collaboration 
with Britain, and particularly, with America; the 
participation of the United States was regarded as 
essential to any general Pacific regional security 
arrangement, and American leadership in the Pacific 
was specifically acknowledged, in time of peace as in 
time of war.~ More recently John J. Dedman has supported 
this interpretation. He maintains that co-operation 
between Australia and America from Deceni>er 1941 until 
the end of the war 'was of the closest and more intimate 
character and operated at al.l levels from the Presidency 
and Prime Ministership downwards 1 • J.J. Dedman, 
'Encounter over Manus', Australi.i!n Outlo.Q!i9 vo.l. 20, no. 
2, August 1966, p.137. Broad, brief, but generally 
accurate comment on wartime Australian-American 
relations is contained in a pre-Anzus Treaty study 
by the American scholar, Werner Levi. Werner Levi, 
~rican-A~alian Relations, Minneapolis, 1947, 
pp.159 sq. 
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the following chapters of' this thesis, that these comments 
should be taken as applying to co-operation in the Pacific 
north of' the equator and in South East Asia; and that within 
the area of' crucial concern to Australia - the South and 
South West Pacific - the notion of' 'extremely close collabora-
tion' would extend only to matters not directly invo.l ving 
any additional territorial or strategic (in the sense of' 
mi.litary base) presence for the United States which already 
had a base at Tutuila in Western Samoa. The force and 
ambition which marked Australia's concept of' her post-war 
security role and interest in the South Pacific region thus 
begin to become clear. 
The remainder of' Evatt's October statement was concerned 
with the problem of' Commonwealth consultation. It is 
significant that Evatt in this October statement which was 
primarily concerned with questions rela~ed to the future Pfill£.!2. 
settlement, should have dealt in such detail with this question 
of' consultation. 
Broadly speaking, Evatt argued, there were two means 
open for the expression of' the Australian Government's views 
on international affairs. One was by consultation within the 
British Commonwealth with a view to joint action. The other 
41. 
was by the exercise, when that was thought appropriate, of 
Australia's distinct international statuso 'Both these means 
of expression', he added, 1 have to be used to ensure that 
A t 1 . . t t. f. t 104 reasonahle us ra. ian requiremen s are sa is ied o The 
dissatisfaction which Evatt then expressed with the former 
method was a portent of his increasing reliance on the latter. 
After allowing that there was 'undoubtedly, a considerable 
degree of communication between Canberra and London',l05 
that information was readily forthcoming, and that 'as a 
1 106 general rule , there was an opportunity for Australia to 
explain her views in advance of decisions taken, the lack of 
enthusiasm for the consultation system inherent in these 
comments became quite plain in his further analysis of the 
working of the system. The British Government, he said, would 
place a certain proposal before each of the self-governing 
dominions. Each dominion would then express its opinions on 
the proposal and forward it, through the Dominions Office, 
to the appropriate ministry in London, or, on occasion, to 
the Cabineto Yet there were times, Evatt continued, when the 
Dominions were bound to differ among themselves. 
2..:.E.:J2., vol. 176, 14 October 1943, pp.575-6. 
Ibid. p.576 
Ibid. 
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In the result, the fina.l action has often been taken 
by the British Government on its exclusive responsibility. 
There is an easily understood tendency towards acquies-
cence and conformity. General consultation of the 
Dominions on the political level is usual.ly out of the 
question, especially in the emergency of war, when time 
presses and great decisions may have to be taken with 
despatch.107 
Evatt said that he was not complaining but merely describing 
the background against which the question of closer consulta-
tion would have to be considered. 
* * * 
Dr. Evatt's first statement as Minister for External 
Affairs in November .1941 had given preliminary indication of 
three emphases which were to continue or reappear when he was 
able to turn his thoughts from the immediate conduct of the 
war to development of a post-war foreign policy towards the 
end of 1942. His brief argument for arrl.approval of the 
At.lantic Charter and Roosevelt 1 s Four Freedoms in November 
1941 were indicative of an attachment to the social and 
economic principles of the Australian Labor Party - principles 
which had partial.ly led him subsequent.ly to advocate trustee-
ship for the peop.les of the Pacific. A second preliminary 
indication had been the problem of Ang.lo-Australian 
consultation, and, to a .lesser extent, of Allied consultation 
in general. Just as Evatt's interest in consultation in 
107. Ibid. 
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November 1941 had sprung from regionally oriented strategic 
divergences between Australia and the United Kingdom and 
between Australia and her Al.lies in general, so also when 
the problem of consultation reappeared in a context of post-
war planning it was to indicate the increasing prominence 
which Evatt was giving to post-war South and South-west 
Pacific regiona.l security in which, he argued, Australia 
would p.lay a major ro.le. The fact that regional security 
was seen as ultimately subordinate to and supplementary to 
a general world security organization founded on the theory 
of collection security did not lessen the force of Evatt 1 s 
ambitions for Australia 1 s post-war ru.le in the region• These 
ambitions, in their turn, gave a vital importance to the 
Pacific peace settlement. 
Evatt' s pre.liminary reference to dominion status in 
November 194.1 and his subsequent insistence on the legal forms 
of Austra.liats status had been seen by the Opposition as 
having simi.lar.ly nationalistic overtones. As R. G. Menzies 
was to put it in January 1944. 
A Dominion that carries the Balfour Declaration to 
the ultimate and contracts independently on the 
issues of peace and war with foreign powers runs 
the risk of destroying the Empire or at least of 
driving itself out of that Empire.108 
Menzies no doubt also had in mind the fact that Evatt had 
successfully urged adoption by Australia of sections 2-6 of 
the Statute of Westminster in December 1942, ·109 al though, 
as the Australian correspondent of the Round Table reported, 
Evatt' s action was in ful.l accord with the principles of 
110 
Dominion Status as understood in Canada and South Africa. 
In October 1943, Evatt had set out the two means, which, 
in his opinion, were available for expressing Australia's 
foreign policy. One was the use of Commonwealth consultation, 
the other was the distinct assertion of AustraliaYs inter-
national status. In the following months a major fai.lure in 
Commonwealth and Allied consultation on a matter affecting 
the Pacific peace settlement and, because it dealt with the 
peace, free from the mitigating circumstances of strategic 
urgency which Evatt was prepared to recognize in military 
108. R.G. Menzies, 'Post-War International Relations. 
The Nature and Ii:nportance of the Problem', in D.A.S. 
Campbell (ed.), Post-War Reconstructi~n in Australia, 
Sydney, .1944, p.25. 
109. Sawer, op. cit., p.132 • 
. 110. Round Tab!..§_, vo.l. 33, March .1943, p •. 176. 
matters, was to be fo.l.lowed by increasing Australian resort 
to assertion of her distinct international status. Inter-
national status was to become a central concern in Evatt's 
foreign po.licy and was to remain so both before and at the 
San Francisco Conference. 
CHAPTE8....il. 
AUSTRALIAN_R~ACTIO~ TO_.ALI::IED. PEAQE PLANS 
1. The Mos.cow Conference. 
The strong emphasis upon regionalism which had been 
apparent in Evatt's statements on post-war world security 
from September 1942 until October 1943 had !1Q.! led him to 
advocate a post-war system of world security which would 
consist of, and function through, a number of regiona.l 
security associations. Although Evatt saw Pacific and 
especially South West Pacific security zones as vital to 
Australia ts defence unti.l a new world organization was 
46. 
effectively established and as one of the instruments which 
that world body might subsequently employ for the preservation 
of peace, his emphasis on regionalism was within the framework 
of a firm commitment to a universal world organization. 
This world body would be similar to the League of Nations in 
breadth of membership, yet would be supplied with effective 
military power to enforce its co.lle cti ve sanctions. 
It was by no means certain during the early months of 
1943 that Churchill and Roosevelt would favour a single 
universal post-war wor.ld organization. Churchill, 
particularly, showed marked enthusiasm for a system of three 
regional councils, of Europe, the American Hemisphere and the 
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Pacific, which would be linked by a presiding council of 
the Big Three. 1 Churchill sent his views to Roosevelt on 
2 February 1943 in a paper enti t.led Morning Thoughts 2 which 
he amplified during a luncheon speech in Washington on 22 
May 1943. 3 In March 1943 Roosevelt's ideas, as conveyed 
to Eden in Washington, embodied a similar predominance for 
the Great Powers and regional counci.ls al though he envisaged 
a world organization to discuss non-security matters. 4 
The influence of Cordell Hull Y s ideas became increasing.ly 
obvious in State Department planning during the latter half 
of 1943. In August a departmental memorandum, prepared under 
his guidance, stated strong general objections to the use of 
regionalism as a basis fbr international organization. This 
memorandum stated, inter ~' 
l~ The prominence of regionalism in Churchill's early plans 
for post-war security has been emphasized in G.L. Goodwin, 
~ritain and the United Nations..__New York, 1957» pp.4 sq. 
2. Winston S. Churchill, The Second.Jfg,rld War, vol. IV, 
London, 1951, pp.636-7~ 
3. Ibid. pp. 7.17-8. 
4~ F.R.U.S. 1943, vol. ITI, British Commonwealth and Europe, 
p. 39. 
(1) that the basis of international organization 
should be world wide rather than regional; 
(2) that there were grave dangers involved in 
having the world organization rest upon the 
foundations of previously created, full 
f.ledged regiona.l organizations; and 
(J) that while there might be advantages in 
setting up regional arrangements for some 
purposes, such arrangements should be 
subsidiary to the world organization and 
shou.ld flow from it. 5 
Subsequently the Department obtained Presidential approval 
for a Tentative Draft of a Joint Four-Power Dec.laration. 
This draft stated in article 4 
That they [the signatories] recognize the necessity 
of estab.lishing at the earliest practicable date a 
general international organization, based on the 
principle of the sovereign equality of a.Ll nations, 
and open to a.11 nations, large and sma.11, 
and in article 5 
That for the purpose of maintaining internationa.l 
peace and security pending the re-establishment of 
law and order and the inauguration of a general 
system of security they will consult and act 6 jointly on behalf of the community of nations. 
Hul.l took this draft to the Quebec Conference and there handed 
it to Eden on 2.1 August. Eden and Churchi.Ll agreed that it 
5. Quoted in Ruth B. Russe.11 and Jeannette E. Muther, ! 
His£or_y of the United Nat~ons Charter ~h~o.l§.._of_1hQ 
United State~ .... l..2.fl:0-1945, Washington, 1958, p.121. 
6. Po~µ Pql_icy....!:repa;r'ation, p.553. 
was acceptable as a basis for negotiations with Russia. 7 
Subsequently, Australia and New Zealand were 'consu"l ted 
during September on the draft of the declaration 2 • 8 
Five days after Evatt's 14 October statement to the 
Austra.lian parliament, the foreign secretaries and mi.li tary 
leaders of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet 
Union met at the Kremlin. In the words of Secretary of State 
Hull to a Joint Session of Congress on 18 November 1943 
following his return, they met to 'hasten the end of the war, 
to plan for its immediate aftermath, and to lay the foundations 
of the post-war wor.ld' • 9 At the Moscow Conference Russia 
was interested above all in hastening the end of the war. 
7. Hull, op. cit., pp.1238-9. 
8. F.L.W. Wood, The_~ew Zealand Peop.le a,.t War, Political and 
Ext§.f:p.a.l Affairs, Wellington, 1958, p.312. Professor 
Wood's vo.lume of the 0fficia.l History of New Zealand in 
.:th.§. Second Wor.ld War J:.2..12.::J.21.J:...2., is based on t libera.lly 
administered' access to a 'vast mass of official documents 
(p.v.). There is no corresponding volume of the official 
Australian History, Aus~,lia in,_ihe_War ..... Q,f ... 1..9-19-1945, al-
though Paul Has.luck's projected second vo.lume in the Civi.l 
Series may devote more space to foreign policy than that 
given to it in his first volume, The Government ~th§. 
peop.le, .1939-194.1, Canberra, 19 52. 
9. Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carro.Ll (eds.) Docum~n.:t.§. 
.Qll_Ame:£i££:!.!Ll'ollign Relations, Vol. VI, July, 1943-June 
1944, Boston, 1945, p.12. 
Her Foreign Minister, Mo.lotov, who arrranged that the question 
of' the proposed date f'or the British and American invasion of' 
10 Northern France should be f'irst item on the agenda, seemed 
satisf'ied with the assurance he received f'rom these powers 
that the landing would take place in the spring of' 1944011 
Britain's interests, on the other hand, centred on the 
immediate af'termath of' the war in Europe and the proposed 
surrender terms f'or Germany. Churchill's strong interest in 
European regional security had been indicated by the length 
at which he discussed it during his vist to Washington in 
12 May 1943. Early in 1943 the British Foreign 0f'f'ice had also 
considered in some detail plans f'or a new World Organization 
as well as proposals f'or the f'uture of' Germany. Here again 
post-war European regionalism predominatedo 
10. "Record of' the Second Meeting of' the Tripartite 
Conf'erence held at the Guest House of' the People's 
Commissariat f'or Foreign Af'f'airs, Moscow, October 20, 
.1943, 4.00 porno", F.R.U.S., 1943, vol. I, General, 
pp.583-8. 
ll. Ibid. p.588. 
12. Churchill, op. cit. pp.717-8. 
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The general tendency, however, in the Foreign Office 
and in the War Cabinet, was to concentrate upon the 
more immediate question of obtaining agreement with 
the Russians and Americans on the form of an armistice 
with Germany, the means of putting it into effect, and 
the machinery for maintaining order in Europe. 1 3 
At Moscow it was the Americans who had a particular interest 
in post-war world organization and a fear of premature invo.lve-
ment in the details of European settlement.1 4 
When Australia: had been consulted, by Britain, in 
September, her general views on the draft declaration are 
reported to have inc.luded an objection to China's participa-
tion as a signatory to the proposed declaration, and the 
desire that the British Commonwealth, rather than the United 
Kingdom alone, should participate as one of the resultant 
15 Big Three. At the Moscow Conference, Russia also objected 
to Chinese participation in the declaration arguing that China 
was not represented at the Conference» but American views 
were so strongly held on this point that the Soviet representa-
tives yieldedo16 Indeed Roosevelt and Hull had agreed before 
Hull's departure for Moscow that 'the four-power concept 
should be preserved even at the cost of getting no agreement 
at this time 1 • 17 Australia's desire for Commonwealth signature 
13. Woodward, op. cit., p.443. 
14. Hull, op. cit o, pp.1279-1283~ F.R.u.s., 1944, vol. III, 
p.194. 
15. Wood, opo cit., Po312. 
p .1265. 16. Hull, op. cit., p.1281. 17. Ibid. 
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of the Declaration, like her objection to Chinese participation, 
fai.led to influence the course of the Conference. Though 
permitted to p.ledge her support for the objectives of war 
in the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1942, 
Australia now found herself exc.luded, as were most of the 
United Nations, from the Dec.laration which was setting the 
course of the peace. 
It is significant that Australia's detai.led comments on 
the artic.les on the Tentat_::j,yQ_Draft in September, as these 
comments have been reported, centred upon article 5 which 
dealt with interim peace keeping arrangements; significant 
because the ordering of an interim peace, like the specific 
questions of terri toria.l disposition which had engaged Evatt 
in October, was related more to the armistice and peace settle-
ment than to the planning of a universal security organization. 
Australia's interests in the peace were, like Britains, being 
conditioned, though not in an identical fashion, by a pre-
occupation with post-war regional security. 
AustraliaYs desire to participate in the interim peace-
keeping proposals envisaged by draft article 5 may have been 
at .least partly responsible for an alteration which was made 
in the wording of this draft article at Moscow. Australia's 
comments on draft article 5 have been reported thus -
53. 
If they were to agree to the clause foreshadowing 
joint action to maintain security, argued the Australian 
Government, Australia should be included as one of the 
parties to act on behalf of the community of nations, 
either separately, or as part of the British Common-
wealth. Nor would they rest content were this merely 
achieved in practice;._ they asked that it be formally 
recognized as well.l~ 
Draft article 5 had proposed that the four signatories should 
'consult and act jointly on behalf of the community of 
nations',l9 to maintain peace after the cessation of hostili-
ties pending the restoration of law and order and the 
establishment of a general system of security. At Moscow, 
the British Foreign Secretary claimed that the small nations 
and in particular the Dominions especial.ly Canada felt that 
the wording t consult and act joint.ly on behalf of the 
community of nations' was open to the interpretation that 
it would estahlish an indefinite four power security 
t h . t"l th . t• ~ t" . 20 die ators ip un 1 e new organiza ion was iunc 1on1ng. 
Article 5 of the ~ow Declaration of Four Nations 
on General Security, signed on JO October 1943, took 
account of this British Commonwealth objection and declared 
18. Wood, op. cit., p.Jl2. 
19. See above p. If~. 
20. "Summary of Proceedings of the Third Session of the 
Tripartite Conference, October 2.1, 1943, 4.00 p.m.", 
F.R.u.s., 1943, vol. I, p.598. 
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'that the sponsoring powers wil.l consult with one another 
and as occasion requires with other members of the United 
Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community 
f t . y 2.1 o na ions o 
That this Australian interest in transitional post-war 
security arrangements was clear.ly related to her preoccupation 
with post-war regional security in the South-West Pacific, 
is shown in a te.legram which Australia, jointly with New 
Zealand, forwarded to the United Kingdom following the 
Moscow talks. In this te.legram, the two countries stated 
their wish that, in the arrangements which would immediate.ly 
fo.llow the ejection of the Japanese, Australia shou.ld have 
ful.l responsibility for po.licing Portuguese Timor and the 
Solomons and a share in the po.licing of the Dutch East Indies 
and the New Hebrides. The two Pacific dominions further 
declared 
As regards Pacific islands in general south of the 
Equator we be.lieve that responsibi.li ty for policing 
should primarily be with the United Kingdom, Australia 
and New Zealand, though it is realized that regard must 
be paid to the position of the United States which 
already has a naval base at Tutuila. 22 
21. The text of the Moscow Dec.laration is printed in C.N.I.-4:,., 
vol. 14, noo 9, PoJ15o 
22. Wood, op. cit., p.JlJ. 
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While this telegram demonstrates a definite Australian inter-
est in the po.licing of the South Pacific, and is consistent 
with the argument of the previous chapter that Australia 
had strong reservations with regard to post-war American 
territorial presencein the South and South West Pacific, 
it appears to yield precedence if not primacy in these 
policing operations to the United Kingdom. The te.legram 
would thus appear to contradict Evatt 1 s claim on 14 October 
1943, that Australian and New Zealand cooperation wou.ld be 
1 pivotal 1 for the post-war security of the area. 
This te.legram should be read, however, in the .light of 
Evatt's reported remarks in October 1943 to the New Zealand 
23 
High Commissioner in Canberra. By Wood 1 s account, 
When Evatt launched a series of talks between the 
two governments in October 1943, he told the New 
Zealand High Commissioner that 'Australia and New 
Zealand in cooperation should be the foundation of 
the British sphere of influence in the South and 
South West Pacifico The future prosperity of the 
two Dominions depended on their having a decisive 
voice in those areasY. He was also 'inclined to 
suggest that it would be wise for Great Britain 
to transfer all British colonies in these areas 
to Australia and New Zealand, Australia gradually 
to take the So.lomons area, and New Zea.land to take 
23. Referred to in t Aust. Minister for Externa.l Affairs 
to New Zea.land Minister of External Affairs", 
25 Jan 1944. Quoted by Wood, op. cito 1 p.3.13. 
Fiji, etc.'. At the same time he frankly expressed 
'some uneasiness as to the future possibilities of 
the American po.licy in the Pacific t. 2 4 
That Australia and New Zealand's decisive voice was to be 
obtained not only at the expense of the United States, 
for Evatt spoke of a British sphere of influence, but also 
at the expense of the United Kingdom, is an indication of 
Australia's post-war ambitions within this security zone 
and of the importance which she attached to it. 
The Moscow Declaration announced in article 4 the agree-
ment of the four Great Powers to the establishment of 'a 
general international organization based on the principle 
of the sovereign equality of al.l peace-loving stat es, and 
upon the membership of all such states, large and small, 
for the maintenance of international peace and security 1 • 25 
Evatt's support for such a body had been clearly indicated, 
as has been already seen, 26 in his 14 October statement. 
He also made reference on that occasion to proposals which 
had been put forward for a Three or Four Power management 
24. Wood, op. cit., p.312. 
25. C.N.~., vo.l •. 14, no. 9, p.315. "Peace-loving" was 
inserted during the Conference at Eden's suggestion. 
F.R.u.s., .1943, vol. I, pp.597-8. 
26. See above p. 
57. 
of' the peace 'a post-war settlement carried into ef'f'ect 
exclusively as a result of' a treaty of' alliance between the 
three great military powers •o•• to which "Big Three" may 
subsequently be added China 1 • 27 Evatt thought that an 
amalgamation was possible. 
It may, however, be possible to combine the two 
concepts, which do not seem to me to be in necessary 
conf'lict. The experience of' the League of' Nations 
shows the necessity f'or clarif'ication and amendment 
of' some of' the important provisions af'ter which the 
leadership of' the League would natura~ly be assumed 
by the three Great Powers mentionedo 2 
Evatt's acceptance of' the principle of' three or four power 
privilege and .leadership within the new organization was to 
remain unmodified until the month before the San Francisco 
Conference. But if' he was to accept three power privilege 
in the new world security organization he was, at most, 
reluctant to acknowledge it in respect to the European 
armistice and peace settlement, and, as will be seen, 
strongly opposed to it fu the Pacific armistice and peace 
settlement preparations. The extent to which the Great Powers 
intended to make the European peace had been indicated at 
Moscow, both by the f'orm of the Dec.laration and by the 
decision to establish the European Advisory Commission. 
27. C.P.D., vol. 176, 14 October 194J, p.572. 
28. Ibid. 
58. 
The Ang.lo-Soviet-American Communique of 1 November 
1943, issued at the conclusion of the Moscow Conference, 
referred to a decision to set up machinery 'for ensuring the 
closest cooperation between the three Governments in the 
29 
examination of European questions arising as the war develops'. 
A European Advisory Commission was therefore to be established 
in London 'to study these questions'JO and to make joint 
recommendations to the three Governments. The nature of 
the 1 European questions 1 was made slight.ly more clear by 
Cordel.l Hull in his address to Congress on 18 November 194J. 
It is to deal with non-mi.li tary pro bl ems relating to 
enemy territories and with such other problems as may 
be referred to it by the participaxing Governments. 
It will provide a useful instrument for continuing 
study and formulation of recommendations concerning 
questions co~nected with the termination of 
hostilities. 1 
In fact, the Commission, which first met in London on 15 
December 194J, 32 made recommendations for the terms of 
Germany's unconditional surrender, for the zones of occupation 
in Germany and Austria, and for the inter-a.Llied contro.l 
29. The text of the Comtgunig_~ is printed in C. N. I .A., vo.l • 
. 14, no. 9, November 1943, pp.JlJ-4 1 This quotation is 
on p.J.14. 
JO. C.N.=!;,.:.!.., vo.l. 14, no. 9 1 November .194J, p.Jl4. 
Jl. Goodrich and Carroll (eds.), op. cit., p.11. 
32. The Times, .16 December, 1943. 
h . . th t . 33 mac inery in ose coun ries. It was at Hull's insistence 
that the purview of the Commission was limited, immediately 
following its establishment, to questions of the armistice 
and surrender. 34 The British, who had proposed the establish-
ment of the Commission, reflected their interest in European 
regional security by the contention at Moscow that the 
Commission, in addition to considering the European armistice 
and surrender, should be able to make recommendations for 
35 the general political settlement of post-war Europe. 
In his Ministerial Statement of November36 on the 
results of the Moscow Conference, Evatt welcomed the establish-
ment of the Commission by what he saw as perhaps 'the most 
significant decision of the conference 1 • 37 After having 
warned that 'the advisory character of the Commission is a 
fact on which other United Nations not represented in the 
Commission are entitled to insist', Evatt continued 
33~ Woodward, op. cit., pp.476-70 
34. 'The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United 
Kingdom', 23 December 1943, F.R.U.:.§_., 1943, volo I, 
pp.812-4. 
35. F.R.u.s., 1943, vol. I, p.605, p.6200 
36. C.N.I.A., vol. 14, no. 9, November 1943, pp.317-8. 
37. Ibid. p.318. 
In accordance with the realities in Europe, the 
decisions of the Moscow Conference have been made 
60. 
by three Governments only, but made essentia.l.ly in 
the name of all the United Nations who are at war 
with Germany. 'I'hey are not to be taken as indicating 
an intention to set up an exclusive three-power 
management for Europe, and other United Nations, 
inc.luding other members of the British Commonweal th, 
have certainly the ful.lest right to expect that the 
final execution of the Moscow agreements will not be 
undertaken without prior reference to them and agree-
ment by them.JS 
Australia's rights to participate in the European settlement 
were therefore maintained, yet in an analysis in which Evatt, 
though apparently unaware of the limitations on the Advisory 
Commission's range of discussion,J9 seemed prepared to defer 
40 
to 'the realities in Europe'. 'I'he fact that Austra.lia had 
been consulted prior to the Moscow talks, however, presumahly 
made Evatt's insistence on future prior reference and agree-
ment something more than the expression of a pious hope. 
JS. Ibid. 
J9. 'I'hus he referred to 'consultations covering the 
who.le range of practical questions which now confront 
the United Nations in Europe, and which will rapidly 
increase as the war progresses. An important point to 
note is that no area or so-called sphe~e of interest 
is excluded from the range of consultation'. Ibid. 
40. Ibid. 
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The strength of Australia's interest in the Pacific, 
as compared to the European, armistice and peace settlement 
was to be indicated by her reaction to the Cairo Conference. 
At their meeting in Cairo from 22-26 November 1943 'to 
consider war and peace problems in the Far East', Roosevelt, 
Chiang Kai Shek, and Churchill agreed that Japan should be 
stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she had 
seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World 
War, and that all the territories which Japan had 'stolen 
from China', such as Manchuria, Formosa and Pescadores, 
should be restored to the Republic of China. Korea, in due 
course, was to become free and independent and Japan was to 
be expelled 1 from all other t~rritories she had taken by 
41 
violence or greed'. Decisions were taken at Cairo, therefore, 
which would directly affect the peace settlement in the Pacific. 
41. 'Statement issued following the Conference of President 
Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and Prime 
Minister Churchill', Goodrich and Carro.11 (eds.) 
op. cit., pp.232-3. 
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What is more, they were decisions on detai.led questions of 
territorial disposition, questions which at the Moscow talks 
America had argued should be left to a genera.l peace settle-
ment, yet in which she was known to be strongly interested 
as regards the Pacific. The Australian Government subsequently 
.listed some examp.les of this American interest during 1943 
to the Secretary of State on 25 February 1944. 
For instance at the Pacific Council on March 31, 
.1943 the President said he had discussed with 
Mr. Eden different island territories in the Pacific. 
The President expressed opinions not only as to 
sovereignty, but as to proposed economic coordination. 
The President added that he had also discussed with 
Mr. Eden the question of Japanese mandated islands 
and of Timor. 
Subsequently, on 29 September 1943, a.lso at the 
Pacific Council, the President referred to the 
Marshal.l and Caro.line Islands and other islands 
east of the Phillipines. He indicated the existence 
of plans to determine what post-war policy should be 
adopted for the maintenance of peace in that part of 
the Pacific.42 
Australia's strong interest in territorial disposition in 
the South and South West Pacific has been established. While 
it is true the decisions taken at Cairo related to the settle-
ment in the Pacific north of the Equator, the possibility that 
similar decisions would be taken on a three-power basis 
affecting the South Pacific must have seemed very real to 
Australia. The great power approach applied to the European 
42. F.R.u.s., 1944, vol. III, p.187. 
63. 
peace at Moscow, was transferred to the Pacific at Cairo. 
In this Pacific region in which Australia had claimed the 
right to 'make a very special contribution towards the 
establishment and maintenance of' the peace settlement', 43 
Australia was not only uninvited to talks affecting the 
settlement; she had received no prior consultation and 
had learnt of' the conference decisions from the newspaperso 
As Evatt, on behalf' of' the Australian Government, comp.lained 
to the Secretary of' State on 25 February, 1944 
We feel strongly that Australia and New Zealand are 
entitled to the f'ul.lest degree of' preliminary con-
sultation, especially in re.lation to Pacific matters. 
At the recent Cairo conference decisions affecting 
the future of' certain portions of' the Pacific and 
vitally affecting Australia and New Zealand were not 
only made but publicly announced without any prior 
reference to either the Australian or New Zeala:p.d 
Government. Actua.l.ly the f'i rst news the Australian 
Government received of' t~~ Cairo decisions was through 
the medium of' the press. 
43. See above Po Jlo 
44. F.R.U.S., 1944, vol. III, p.187. This recalls W.M. Hughes' 
1 comment to Lloyd George at the 1921 Imperial Conference, 
'I think I ought to tel.l you, Sir, that it is rarely that 
one does not read in the newspapers, sometimes a day, 
sometimes more than a day, before receiving your telegrams, 
a very good imitation of' their substance', quoted in 
H. Wo.lf'sohn, 'The Evo.lution of' Australia in World 
Affairs', Australian Outlo.Qk, vol. 7, March 1953, p.20. 
Evatt's recation to the Cairo Conference is embodied in the 
Australian New Zealand Agreement of January 19440 
From Monday .17 January until Friday 21 January a New 
Zea.land de.legation headed by the Prime Minister of New 
Zealand, Peter Fraser, and an Australian delegation headed 
by the Prime Minister, John Curtin, met at Parliament House, 
Canberra, to discuss common prob.lems of foreign policy. On 
the final day of the talks both de.legations signed the 
Australian-New Zealand Agreement, 19440 4 .5 
Although Curtin presided over the Conference and made 
the major public statements of Government policy, the proposal 
46 to ho.ld the Conference, the content of the agenda and the 
drawing up of the subsequent Agreement al.l centred upon Evatt 
and officers of his Department of External Affairs. 47 Indeed, 
4.5. The text of the Agreement may be found in C.N.IoA., volo 
1.5, noo 1, January 1944, pp.2-9o 
46. Ibid. p.12o 
47. The Address by John Curtin at the signing of the Agreement 
on 21 January contained the fo.llowing references to EvattY s 
role. 'I also consider that the success of the conference 
and the high degree of agreement which has been reached is 
not only a tribute to what I shall describe as the common 
sense which has marked our deliberations, but has been 
materially aided by the very great abi.li ty which marked 
the preparatory work performed by the Ministerfor External 
Affairs of the Commonwealth in arranging for the conferenceY. 
Ibid. p •. 18. 
there were doubts among Evatt 1 s officials as to how Curtin 
would react to the detailed conference agenda when it was 
presented to him and consequently some 'very great activity 
on the eve of the Conference, after the New Zealanders had 
actual.ly reached Canberra, to make sure that he would be in 
favour for what it was intended to doo In fact he received 
the ideas for the agenda quite readi.ly and delivered an 
eloquent opening speech t. 48 
When the New Zealand delegation reached Canberra on 
15 January it was presented with papers setting out the 
Australian views. 49 Two days .later, when the Conference 
opened, New Zealand fe.l t that seventy-five per cent of the 
Austra.lian proposals could be agreed to without discussion 
and that of the remaining twenty-five per cent the matters 
which would caLl for discussion were large.ly concerned with 
detaii. 50 
In his Opening Address the Austra.lian Prime Minister 
48. Has.luck, op. cit., p.150. 
49. Wood, op. cit., p.J.14. 
50. 'From the time the agenda was circulated and pre.liminary 
submissions were compared, it was apparent that 75 per 
cent of unanimity a.lready existed and of the other 25 
per cent, matters ca.lling for dis cuss ion were large.ly 
those of detail.' Press Statement by the Prime Minister 
of New Zealand at the closing of the Conference, C.N~., 
vol. 15, no •. 1, January 1944, p.22. 
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stressed the re.lation of the talks to Austra.liaY s post-war 
foreign policy preparation. 
The pattern of international re.lations after the war 
is being already delineated by decisions on current 
matters, while current decisions themselves are being, 
or should be, influenced by accepted post-war object-
ives. From the standpoint of the Austra.lian Govern-
ment, this conference wi.1.1 be an important stage in 
the elaboration of post-war po.li tical plans which 
have been under study here, particularly in the 
Department of External Affairs, for a period dating 
back even to the time when sheer defence of this 51 
country from attack was the overriding necessity. 
Evatt said of the Conference, at its close, that it had 
discussed 'the foreign policy of both Governments and their 
future p.lans for the peace, order and good government of the 
region to which they be.long'. 5 2 In diplomatic correspondence 
the Australian Government expressed the view that t a.11 
matters covered by the Austra.lian-New Zealand Agreement have 
post-war relevance and some wil.l form the main content of the 
post-war settlement in this part of the world'. 53 
The Agreement, as might be expected, renewed Australia 2 s 
commitment to a universal world organization. Under Article 
14 the two goverrnnents dec.lared that they regarded it 'as a 
51. C.N.I.A., vo.l •. 14, no. 1, January 1944, pp.12-3. 
52. Ibid. p.24. 
53. E.:.&.!!-!§ .• , .1944, vo.l. 3, p .186. 
matter of cardinal importance that they should both be 
associated, not only in the membership, but also in the 
planning and establishment, of the General International 
Organization referred to in the Moscow Declaration of October 
1943 which organization is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all peace-loving States and open to 
membership by al.l such States, large or small, for the 
maintenance of international peace and security'. 5 4 The 
preceding Artie.le 13, furthermore, established that regional 
security was seen as linked to the new world organization. 
The Two Governments agree thats within the framework 
of a general system of world security, a regional 
zone of defence comprising the South-west and South 
Pacific areas shall be established and that this zone 
should be based on Australia and New Zealand stretching 
through the islands north and northeast of Australia, 
to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands.55 
Artie.le 34 announced the .intention of the two governments to 
call, as soon as practicable, a conference of properly 
accredited representatives of the Governments with existing 
territorial interests in the South-west Pacific Area, or in 
the South Pacific, or in both, namely, in addition to 
the two governments, the governments of the United 
Kingdom, the United States of America, 
54. C.N~ .. ll vol. 15, no •. 1, January 1944, p.4. 
55. Ibid. pp.3-4. 
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the Netherlands, the French Committee of National Liberation 
and the government of Portugal, to allow a frank exchange of 
views on the prob.lems of security, post-war development and 
native welfare. 56 
The emphasis on regionalism inherent in these artic.les 
led Cordell Hul.l, in a message to John Curtin on 1 February, 
to express the fear that the Australian proposals for regional 
security would prejudice the establishment of a general security 
system. He took particular exception to the proposed conference 
under Article J4. 
In our opinion, it is necessary to agree upon arrange-
ments for a general international::security system before 
attempting to deal with problems of regional security. 
Any attempt to deal with regional security in the 
Southwest Pacific in advance of agreement on a general 
security system might wel.l give rise to efforts on the 
part of other regional groups to make their own 
exclusive arrangements for security. Thus such a 
conference as is proposed might in the end result in 
a'number of independent regional systems and seriously 
interfere with efforts to achieve a general system of 
world security.57 
The Australian Government's rep.ly to Hull, sent over Evatt' s 
signature, makes Australia's views of the relationship of 
regional planning to the general international organization plain~ 
56. Ibid. 
57. F.R.u.s., 1944, vol. J, p.177. 
The message under rep.ly rather assumes that Australia 
and New Zea.land wished problems of regional defence to 
be dealt with prior to and irrespective of arrangements 
for a general international security system. This is 
not so. The agreement between Australia and New 
Zea.land makes the position very clear. Article 13 
speaks of a regional zone of defence 'within the 
framework of a general world plan of security'. 
Further, the obvious intention both of Australia and 
New Zealand was that any discussions of regional 
defence should be related at all times to p.lans for 
the General International Organization referred to in 
the Moscow Declaration of October 1943.. With that 
organization Australia and New Zealand desire to be 
associated at the p.lanning stages· and before any 58 
definite proposals are formulated, Y.!.Q& Article 14. 
Yet whi.le Evatt and the Australian government were committed 
to the gener~l world body and saw regional security as 
subordinate to it, the predominant emphasis in the Agreement 
is' nonetheless upon probl.ems related to regional security -
regional security which Evatt had indicated in the previous 
58. Ibid. p.186. The view of the New Zealand Government 
had been clearly and publicly expressed by Peter Fraser 
at the opening of the Canberra Conference. 'Lack of 
moral resolution was the fundamental weakness, and not 
any technical or mechanical fault, which caused the 
failure of the League to prevent wars of aggression of 
the nineteen thirties. We see no reason to modify in 
any fundamental sense the proposals the New Zealand 
Government put forward at Geneva in 1936 for the 
effective operation of the League. I should like to 
stress at the outset of this Conference that we entertain 
considerable doubts as to the practicability of regional 
bodies for the preservation of world peace, though we are 
entirely in accord with the idea of a system of regional 
defence. It has always been our viewpoint that, just 
as peace is indivisible :;io the machinery for the preserva-
tion of peace should also be world-wide •••• In particular 
there is everything to be said for a world organization 
C.N.I.A., vol. 15, no. 1, January 1944, p.16. 
April was vital to Australia 'particularly before such a 
[general international] system is established and proved to 
be in good working order'. 59 
Thus questions of sovereignty had been referred to 
specifically as one of the subjects which would be discussed 
at the regional conference proposed under Article 34; and 
the strong interest which Evatt had in regional territorial 
issues at the time had been further indicated in a number of 
c.lauses of the Agreement. 
Both governments stated, in Artie.le 16, that they accepted 
as a recognized principle of international practice that the 
construction and use, in time of war, by any power, of naval, 
mi.li tary or air installations in any territory under the 
sovereignty or control of another power, did not, in itself, 
afford any basis for terri toria.l c.laims or rights of sovereignty 
or control after the conclusion of hostilities. 60 Articles 
26 and 27 maintained that the interim ad~inistration and 
ultimate disposal of enemy territories in the Pacific was of 
vital importance to Australia and New Zealand, and that any 
such disposal should be affected only with their agreement and 
59. See above p.29. 
60. C.N.I.A., vol •. 15, no •. 1, January 1944, p.4. 
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P 61 as a part of a general acific settlement. 
Although it is not clear from these articles themselves 
that they were intended to limit American territorial 
expansion in the South and Southwest Pacific, and although 
Evatt and Curtin denied, both during and after the talks, 
that these provisions were aimed at any particular power, 
the likelihood that they were aimed at the United States is 
increased by the fact that the Australian Government had 
received new evidence, in the days before the Canberra talks, 
of continued Presidential interest in the Pacific islands when 
Evatt, it wil.l be recal.led, had expressed in this context in 
the preceding October, 'some uneasiness as to the future 
possibilities of the American policy in the Pacific'. 
Very recently, at the meeting of the Pacific council 
on January 12 last, the President communicated his 
views regarding the future of the Pacific Islands both 
north and south of the equator. With reference to the 
latter, he spoke of the possibility of 'some arrangement' 
for their future allocation. 
In the course of the meeting of January 12 the President 
referred specially to the question of what should be 
done with the French islands. The President stated that 
he had told Mr. Churchil.l that the French should not have 
New Caledonia back under any conditions and that he 
believed that the people of Australia and New Zealand 
would back him up. 
It is realized that the President may not have been 
speaking definitively on these matters but they are 
61. Ibid. p.5. 
72. 
the fact that, in matters cited as illustrations of 
of tremendous consequence 
post-war arrangements are 
United States government. 
dealt with in a way6which 
Pacific settlement. 3 
to Australia and New Zealand, 
under consideration by the 
We fear that they may be 
can prejudice harmonious 
The evidence available strongly supports the conclusion 
that these Artic.les (26 and 27) of the Agreement were intended 
to limit or restrain American territorial expansion in the 
South and Southwest Pacific. The official New Zealand war 
historian states that in their report to Britain on the 
results of the Canberra talks, the two dominions, with New 
Zealand as the moderating influence, decided not to say in 
so many words that they would 'under no circumstances agree 
to the establishment of a condominium with the United States 
as a party in New Ireland, New Britain, the Solomons$ New 
Caledonia, the New Hebrides, the Cook Islands or Western 
64 Samoa'. It may be felt that Australia's objection here was 
to the administrative device of the condominium as such rather 
than to an American territorial presence per §.it, and that the 
association of America with condominiums was based on 
Roosevelt 1 s preference for a system of international admini.-
stration of colonies. 6 5 While Australia probably did regard 
63. F.R.u.s., 1944, vol. III, p.187. 
64. Wood, op. cit., p.315. 
65. See below p. 14'1. 
73. 
the device of the condominium as unsatisfactory, there is 
evidence that she was prepared, at this time, to assume the 
responsibility for the British share of the condominium with 
France in the New Hebrides. 66 
Evatt's notion 'that Australia should, with New Zealand, 
have 'a decisive voiceY in the South and Southwest Pacific 
regions had already .led him, as has been shown above, to 
seek a reduction of the United Kingdom's territorial presence 
in the area. Evatt had spoken, in October 1943, of trans-
ferring t al.l British colonies in these areas to Australia 
and New Zealand, Australia gradua.l.ly to take the So.lomons 
area, and New Zea.land to take Fiji etc.' • 67 
Evatt continued to pursue this objective also at the 
time of the Canberra talks. It is reported that, in the 
course of discussions on the contents of their'joint report 
to the United Kingdom on the resu.lts of the Canberra talk:l, 
New Zea.land refused to support an Australian suggestion that 
the administration of the Solomon Is.lands should be trans-
ferred to Australia, together with the British share, or 
possibly the whole, of the Franco-British eondominium of 
66. See below Po 
67. See abovepP.55-60 
74. 
. 68 the New Hebrides. This report is confirmed by the Australian 
Confer~nce Pc;tI!ers. From these papers it can be estab.lished 
that, in addition to the above proposals, Australia also 
felt that Australia and New Zealand should take up with the 
United Kingdom the question of obtaining complete contro.l 
of the New Hebrides either by purchase or by exchange of 
territory, after the war. 
It is submi.tted that agreement might be reached 
as follows: 
(.1) That Australia should offer to undertake 
responsibility for the administration of the 
British Solomon Islands. 
(2) That Australia should offer either 
(i) to undertake the British share of 
responsibi.li ty under the condominium 
in the New Hebrides, either jointly 
with New Zealand, or alone, or 
(ii) that Australia and New Zea.land take 
up with the United Kingdom government 
the question of obtaining complete 
control of the New Hebrides either 
by purchase or6exchange of territory 
after the war. 9 
That there is evidence of Australia's desire at this 
time, to assume the territorial responsibi.li ties of the United 
Kingdom in the Southwest Pacific suggests that Evatt's 
objections to an increased American territorial presence in 
the area was not who.lly anti-American gua American. For 
68. Wood, op. cit., p.315. 
69. P. W.R. 44/735/168/4, Pacific CQ.ll.Du;:.fill..£.!?_Rgpers, Agendg,. 
75. 
AustraliaYs proposed post-war acquisition of British 
territories in the region invo.lved more than a recognition 
of BritainYs inability to participate fully in the future 
security of the area - a resultant, as it were, of the 
notion that 1 for many years prior to 1942 Britain was heavily 
over-committed in.this part of the world. that her 
responsibi.li ties were much greater than her resources Y • 70 
It involved in addition Evatt's view that Australia should 
have a dominant voice in the region. Just as dissatisfaction 
with the strength of British interest in the Pacific undoubted-
ly influenced Evatt's attitude, so a.lso, in the case of 
America, there were possibly Australian fears of a return 
to iso.lationism and a definite dis satisfaction with recent 
t d t . t" 71 ra e nego ia ions. But there was an addi tiona.l factor in 
70. W. Macmahon Ba.Ll in his introduction to H.V. Evatt, 
op. cit • , p. xi. 
7.1. 1 To my remark that China looked upon Formosa as Chinese 
territory occupied by Japan, Evatt replied that, never-
the.less, he fe.l t Australia should have been invited to 
participate in a conference which discussed such a matter. 
Evatt then entered upon a long series of complaints re-
garding the treatment of Australia. He referred to his 
disappointment that Australia had been put off in regard 
to its desire to negotiate a trade agreement with the 
United States.' 'The Minister in Australia (Johnson) 
to the Secretary of State', 22 January, 1944, F.R.U.S., 
1944, vol. III, pp.174-5 at p.175. For earlier trade 
difficu.l ties see Raymond A. Es thus. From :Enmity __ t.Q. 
ALlianc.§ ... 1_JL&•..A:Jilstralian Relations, .1931-41, Melbourne, 
1965. 
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Evatt 1 s attitude to the post-war presence of both countries 
in the Southwest Pacific and that was an ambitious small-
power nationalism, a 'positive Austra.lianism 1 , springing 
from his own outlook and the continuing experience of a 
Pacific war. That Evatt and the Australian government had 
stronger objections at this time to an .American than to a 
British post-war presence, however, reflects not only the 
fact·that it was the .Americans, after all, who were building 
bases in the Pacific but also the continuing strength of 
that very system of Commonwealth or Empire relations with 
which Australia was now dissatisfied. As regards Australia's 
attitudes to both countries on this question of territoriality 
it must be said that although these attitudes reflected 
difference it was clearly difference between friends and 
allies, if it was not, in Australia's view, difference between 
prospective Southwest Pacific neighbours. 
The fact that Evatt had such an assertive and expansionist 
(in a conservative rather than imperialist sense) interest 
in territorial disposition in the South and Southwest Pacific 
is an indication both of his nationalism and, more significantly, 
of the fundamental importance he attached to post-war regional 
security. 
77. 
A similar assertiveness is evident in the references 
to interim post-war regional policing arrangements in the 
Australian-New 'Zealand Agreement. Evatt's comments at the 
time of the Moscow Conference had urged that South and South-
west Pacific policing should be primarily in the hands of 
the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, though with 
some regard being paid to the position of the United States; 
had referred to a'British sphere of inf.luence' ·in the South 
and Southwest Pacific; had expressed 1 some uneasiness as to 
the future possibilities of American policy in the Pacific'; 
and had claimed a decisive voice for Australia and New 
Zealand in the security of the area. Under Article 15 of 
the Australian-New Zealand Agreement, the two governments 
declared that pending the re-estab.lishment of law and order 
and the inauguration of a system of general security, they 
were vitally interested in tl;te action on behalf of the 
community of nations contemplated in Article 5 of the Moscow 
Declaration of October 1943. The two governments claimed, 
furthermore, that it would be proper for Australia and New 
Zealand to assume full responsibility for policing or sharing 
in policing such areas in the South and Southwest Pacific as 
78 • 
. ht 72 mig be agreed upon. 
While there is no evidence of' any Australian desire 
to exclude other countries f'rom participating in these 
policing activities and in the general security of' the area, 
there is evidence that Australia desired overall responsibility 
f'or po.licing arrangements therein. At the time of' the Canberra 
talks the Australian papers suggested that a note might be 
sent to London presenting the case f'or the assumption by 
Australia of' initial responsibility f'or policing arrange-
men ts :in the South and Southwest Pacif'ic zone. 73 Af'ter the 
talks the two dominions are reported to have 'decided not to 
say in so many words that they objected to the United States 
being given the duty of' policing the Pacif'ic south of' the 
equator'. 74 
Australia's ambitious concept of' her f'uture policing 
role in the South and Southwest Pacif'ic indiates, like her 
territorial assertions, the strength of' regionalism in her 
approach to post-war security. 
Just as a strong British interest in European regional 
72. C.N.I.A., vo.1. 15, no. l, January 1944, p.4. 
73. P.W.R., 44/735/168/4, Pac!f'i.£.._Conf'erence Papers, Agenda. 
74. Wood, op. cit., p.315. 
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security was accomr)anied by a preoccupation with matters 
related to the European armistice and peace sett.lement at 
Moscow, so the Austr~lian-New Zealand Agreement shows the 
centrality of Australia's interest in the Pacific armistice 
and peace settlement. Some years later Evatt, speaking of 
this period, stressed the relationship of the armistice to 
the peace settlement. 
The coni.tions of surrender and armistice terms would 
plainly have a big influence on the .later stages of 
the peace negotiations. If the terms were too 
specific or too limited it wou.ld be difficult if not 
impossible to introduce changes at the peace-treaty 
stages.75 
The Australian-New Zealand Agreement in Articles 7-11 sets 
out a strong general claim for Austra.lian participation in 
all armistice and peace settl einent s. Under Article 7 the 
two goverr:nnents dec.lared that they had 'vital interests in 
all preparations for any armistice ending the present 
hostilities or any part thereof and a.lso in arrangements 
subsequent to any sucha:mistice, and agreed that their 
interests should be protected by representation at the highest 
level on all armistice planning and executive bodies 1 o Under 
80. 
Article 8, the two governments claimed that the final .peace 
settlement should be made in respect of all enemies after 
hostilities with all of them had been concluded; 76 while 
Article 9 announced their intention to seek agreement with 
each other on the terms of any armistice to be concluded~? 
In Article 10 the two governments declared 'that they should 
actively participate in any armistice commission to be set 
up' 78 and Artie.le .1.1 announced that each of the two govern-
ments would establish armistice and post-war hostilities 
planning committees.79 
These clauses, it is true, maintain Australia's claim 
to participation in all armistice arrangements, i.e. 
Europeanmd Pacific, rather than emphasize her claims to 
special consideration in the Pacific armistice and peace 
settlement discussions. That these Articles in fact 
reflected Evatt's special concern with the Pacific may be 
inferred from the strongly regional emphasis of the Agreement 
as a whole; and from thefact that the claims made here for 
'representation at the highest level on all armistice planning 
76. C.N;i.A., vol. 15, no. l, January 1944, p.J. 
77. Ibid~ 
78~ Ibid. 
79. Ibid. 
81. 
and executiv-e bodies' and for active participation in 'any 
armistice commission' to be set up far exceed the claims which 
Evatt had made in those comments on the Moscow Conference 
80 in which he acknowledged 2 the realities in Europe'o 
Australia's special concern with the Pacific settlement was 
made explicit, furthermore, in a letter which John Curtin 
sent to the New Zealand Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, during 
the Canberra talks to inform him officially, of recent 
decisions of the Australian War Cabinet'· 
The following principles were reaffirmed:-
(a) It is of vital importance to the future of 
Australia and her status at the peace table in 
regard to the settlement in the,Pacific that her 
military effort should be on a scale to guarantee 
her an effective voice in the peace settlemento 
(b) If necessary, the extent of this effort should 
be maintained at the expense of commitments in 
other theatres. In the interests of Australia 
and the British Empire in the Pacific, it is 
desirable that this view should be understood 
by the U.K. and the oth§r dominions, especially 
New Zealand and Canadao 1 
Evatt's prescriptions for 'freedom from fear' in the 
post-war world, as these were embodied in the Australian-New 
Zealand Agreement, were given the approval of the Australian 
80. See above po6o. 
81~ 44/735/168/8. ~.z. Conference. Drafting of !greement. 
82. 
Government when the Agreement was ratified at a meeting 
of Full Cabinet in Canberra on 24 January 19440 Although 
acknowledging the necessity for a universal security 
organization, Austra.lia in this Agreement was preoccupied 
with problems of regional security in the South and Southwest 
Pacific. If AustraliaYs post-war regional security zone was 
seen as c.lose.ly re.lated and subordinate to the proposed world 
organization, there was, nonethe.less, allied to this pre-
occupation with regional security, a concentration on 
problems of regional territoriality and interim post-war 
policing. Strong and assertive regional and territorial 
interests were accompanied by a correspondingly strong 
interest in Pacific armistice and peace settlement arrange-
ments rather than by an active interests in preparations for 
a universal world security organization~ 
* * * 
Artic.les .1-4 of the Australian-New 'Zealand Agreement do 
not expand the exposition, given in other articles of the 
Agreement, of Australia's view on post-war security. But they 
do show, although only when placed in historical context, 
the extent to which these views were accompanied by a 
dissatisfaction with the process by which the United 
Kingdom formulated British Commonwealth foreign policyo 
To a lesser extent, they also show Australian dissatisfaction 
with Great Power consultation in general as it had functioned 
in respect to planning for the peaceo 
An indication of Australia's dissatisfaction with the 
manner in which the United Kingdom consulted the dominions 
when formulating po.licy on behalf of the Empire had been given 
by Evatt in his statement on 14 October 194.Jo In this state-
ment, which was otherwise devoted to, and:is therefore taken 
to imply a connection with, problems of post-war security, 
he had commented on the process whereby the Dominions Office, 
in the formulation of joint Commonwealth policy, had on 
occasions, when Dominion opinions differed, taken the final 
d . . •t "b"l"t 82 ecision on 1 s own responsi 1 1 y. That Evatt made this 
complaint in October, after the British Government had 
consulted Australia on the contents of the Moscow Declaration, 
is, furthermore, an indication that his prime:interest was in 
82~ C.P.D., vol. 176, 14 October 194.3, p~576~ 
84. 
securing recognition for Australia and New Zealand's regional 
view-points in planning for the Pacific peace. Britain's 
subsequent failure to consult Australia and New Zealand prior 
to the Cairo Conference would, therefore, have made a further 
statement of Australian policy on this subject of consultation 
not at all unlikely. It might also have been expected to 
have .led to an assertion of her distinct international status. 
In Article l of the Agreement, the two governments agreed 
to afuller exchange of information between themselves in 
matters of common interest. Artic.les 2-4 read as fol.lows:-
2. The two Governments give mutual assurances that, 
on matters which appear to be ofcommon concern, 
each Government will, so far as possible, be 
made acquainted with the mind of the other before 
various views are expressed elsewhere by either. 
3. In furtherance of the above provisions with 
respect to exchange of views and information, 
the two Governments agree that there shall be 
the maximum degree of unity in the presentation, 
elsewhere, of the views of the two countries. 
4. The two Governments agree to adopt an expeditious 
means of consultation by which each party will 
obtain directly the opinions of the other.~3 
These articles, and indeed the Agreement as a whole, 
were publicly interpreted by Curtin, Evatt, and Fraser during 
and after the talks, as embodying the desire of both governments 
83~ ~I.A., vol. 15, no •. 1, January 1944, pp~2-3. 
to improve their mutual consultation and coordination of 
policies as neighbouring members of the Commonwealth. The 
emphasis, that is, was placed on the desire for mutua.l 
consultation ratheri;han on the object of that consultation -
the 'maximum degree of unity in the presentation, elsewhere, 
of the views of the two countries'. 
Thus, the United States Minister in Australia reported 
to the Secretary of State on 22 January 1944, the day after 
the talks had ended 
All the publicity had been centred upon the negotia-
tions as an effort to set up machinery for ~~tual 
consul tat ion on matters of mutua.l interest~ 
John Curtin had indeed given adequate grounds for such a 
view in his speech at the Opening Ceremony~ 
Above all, I hope the conference will be the means of 
instituting some improved arrangement for consultation 
and exchange of opinions and infonnation between our 
two countrieso In this respect it may well prove to 
be of deep interest in the history of British Common-
wealth relations. The normal processes of consulta-
tion have applied between us for aperiod of several 
years, consisting in the main of governmental telegrams 
exchanged either direct or through London, and of 
occasional ministerial visits. To this has recently 
been added an exchange of High Commissioners both of 
whom, in the persons of Mr. Berendsen and Mr. D'Alton 
are here today. 
It wi.1.1 be among the most important tasks of the 
conference to decide whether the facts require these 
84. F.R.u.s., 1944, vol. III, p.175. 
existing means to be supplemented by some machinery 
enabling continuous collaboration at all administ85-
tive as well as political and ministerial levels. 
86. 
The corrnnents of the New Zealand Prime Minister at the Opening 
Ceremony reinforced Curtin's remarkso 
In view of the many common problems which confront 
us, both in this area and in relation to world 
affairs, it is obviously essential that our two 
countries should maintain the closest relationships 
with each other. 
The objective of this conference is to define those 
common problems and to lay down, if possible, agreed 
principles of permanent cooperation both for the 
present and for the immediate post-war period. We 
must not only understand each others' viewpoint, but 
machinery should be devised for continuous consulta-
tion for supporting each other in matters of common 
interest.86 
It is hardly surprising therefore that the Agreement 
was favourably received by the British press and by the British 
govermnent. The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, in 
a telegram to the New Zealand Minister for External Affairs 
on 12 February 1944 welcomed 1 any steps which might lead to 
a strengthening of ties between members of the British 
87 Commonwealth'. SirAlexander Cadogan, British Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, when consulted by the United States 
85~ ~~., volo 15, no. 1, January 1944, p.12. 
86~ Ibid. p.14. 
87~ Quoted in Wood, op. cit. p.317. 
Embassy in London was reported on 18 February 1944 to have 
said that -
The British Government's attitude toward the agree-
ment was that in gener~l they welcomed many of the 
provisions of the agreement itself as they supposed 
was the case with the American Government~88 
An official of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs 
in the State Department noted in a memorandum on l February 
1944 that it seemed 'all too likely that the British may 
heartily support the Australian and New Zealand proposals 
89 
contained in their agreement'. He also noted that 'for 
some time it has been evident that the British Government is 
apprehensive lest Australia and New Zealand come too closely 
under American influence 1 • 90 Some academics have claimed 
that the Agreement touched (and by implication that it 
justifiably touched) American sensitivity on the question of 
British Commonwealth representation in international affairs. 
These commentators argue that the Agreement foreshadowed to 
the Americans an increasing exercise of Dominion status on 
international bodies which would give the United Kingdom 
additional votes and support on these bodies: The assertion 
88~ F.R.u.s., .1944, vol. III, pp.184-5: 
89. Ibid. p •. 178. 
90'. Ibid. 
88. 
of Dominion status as embodied in the Agreement was therefore 
seen by Americans, these writers suggest, as a device by 
which the United Kingdom could strengthen its voice in 
t t . l ~~ . 91 in erna iona aiiairs. 
The fact that the Agreement was favourably received in 
Britain, and consequently seen from the United States as 
pro-British, was possibly related to the publicity which 
John Curtin's views on the post-war Commonwealth had 
received in Britain between August 1943 and January 1944 
when the Canberra talks were held. For to the extent that 
91~ A contemporary example is E.A. Olssen, 1 'I'he Austra.lian-
New Zealand Agreement', Australian Quarterly, vol. 16, 
September 1944, pp.18'.:""9• 'American statesmen have long 
been suspicious of the Statute of Westminster. They 
have seen in it a constitutional device by which members 
of the British Commonwealth of Nations will outvote 
America at international conferences, and to guard 
against this have insisted that members of that Common-
weal th should arrive at a common understanding on inter-
national matters and vote as a single Commonwealth. 
In the Canberra Pact, America probably detected a 
practical assertion of sovereign rights on the part of 
two Dominions, and she no doubt feared that this might 
be the prelude to further claims in post-war settlements. 1 
For a recent re-statement of this view see Trevor 
R. Reese, 'The Australian-New Zealand Agreement, 
1944, and the United States 1 , Journal of Commonwealth 
Political Studies, vol. IV, no. l, March 1966, p.12~ 
1 'I'he Agreement as a whole touched American sensitivity 
on the question of the British Commonwealth which the 
United States Government viewed with suspicion and 
feared might become a British device for outvoting the 
United States at international conferences'. 
Curtin's interests at this time moved beyond the conduct 
of the war and domestic post-war reconstruction they centred 
on the post-war nature of the British Commonwealth. 
In a speech given in Adelaide on 14 August at the height 
of the 1943 Australian election campaign, Curtin predicted 
that an imperial consultative body would emerge from wartime 
international re.lationships. He believed that 'the Mother 
Country could not manage the Empire on the basis of a 
Government sitting in London'. These remarks, when published 
in The Times of London on 14 August, provoked a considerable 
and distinguished correspondence during tne remaining weeks 
of August and the early days of Septembero 
On 8 September The Times published an amplified version 
of Curtin1 s Adelaide remarks. This amplification, in which 
Curtin expanded his plan for an imperial consultative body, 
had been obtained by the newspaper's own correspondent in 
Canberra. Curtin proposed that the council would be a means 
'through which representatives of the Dominions could regularly 
consult representatives of the United Kingdom Government'o 
The Dominions' representatives could be the High Commissioners 
who could be replaced at appropriate intervals by Ministers of 
90. 
the Dominion Governments'. The council was to be served 
by a permanent secretariat. The long first .leader in the 
same issue of The Ti~ discussed Curtin's 'remarkable 
speechY of 14 August and noted with approval that 'Mr. 
Curtin •• ~ gives his formal adhesion to the principle of 
consultation for the determination of a joint foreign policy 
and for providing its necessary sanction, a joint system of 
defence' • 
On J November Curtin's views were raised in a debate 
in the House of Lords. The discussion there showed more 
awareness than that in The T,i~ of the implied criticism 
of existing Commonwealth consultation inherent in Curtin's 
14 August reference to the Mother Country governing the 
Empire from London. Curtin 1 s emphasis had, however, been 
overwhelmingly on his proposed solution which clearly 
envisaged the survival of joint Empire policy in the post-war 
world. Australia's loyalty to the Empire had been further 
illustrated in November 1943 when the newly elected Curtin 
Government welcomed the appointment of the Duke of G.loucester 
G G 92 as the next overnor- eneral. Then in December at the 
92~ E.ill.:.U.S., 1944, vol. III, p.179. 
91. 
Federal Conference of the Australian Labor Party Curtin 
renewed his caLl for an Empire council and secretariat in 
a speech which the Leader of the Opposition, R.G. Menzies, 
a staunch supporter of the Imperia.l connection, derided 
as being merely an attempt 'to restate at great length the 
principles on which Empire re.la tions had been based for 
many years t. 93 
Evattrs Australian-New Zealand Agreement, must, however, 
be seen despite any impression created by Curtin's Commonwealth 
speeches as embodying and expressing not only dissatisfaction 
with Great Power consultation in general but also Australia's 
particular annoyance at the manner in 1ihich Britain had been 
conducting Dominion consultation, most notahly in relation to 
the Cairo Conference. The extent to which the Agreement was 
critical of British management of Commonwealth consultation 
can be established by an examination of the manner in which 
it was concluded; its provisions, in context; and its form. 
In an important signed article on 14 February 1944, the 
Editor of the Melbourne Her~-~' Sir Keith Murdoch, criticised 
the Agreement for its effects on Commonwealth relations. 
93~ Ibid. pp.175-6. 
92. 
Murdoch claimed that the British people were 'puzzled by 
Mr~ Curtin's assertion of unilateral Anzac Policy'; he 
referred to the 'well-kept secret of the Australia-New 
Zealand Conference. 'I'his was introduced as conforming with 
the Empire pattern of the future, but no other country, 
Murdoch continued, 'was consulted about its convocation or 
agenda'. Murdoch returned to this point in the same newspaper 
on 24 February when he wro·te that there had been no known 
expression of the British Government's view at the conference 
and that it was not informed of the proposals to be made. 
'I'he United States Charge' near [sic] the Netherlands 
Government in Exile in London reported to Hull on l February 
1944 that he had been told by the Dutch Foreign Minister, Van 
IUeffens, that the Netherlands Government had not been 
'approached in any way by the signatories prior to Or. since 
the conclusion of the Agreement. He referred to the assert-
iveness of Australia in matters of foreign policy towards 
Britain particularly, and said Australia had of course taken 
the initiative in this matter. 'I'he agreement was a sort of 
"declaration of independence" in foreign affairs by Australia 
and New Zealand and he was not sure it was not ultra vires ~' 
'I'b.e American Minister in Canberra reported to Hull on 22 
January 1944 that the 
Conference opened 17 in utmost secrecy and at no 
time were we officially informed of agenda or 
intentions although we had easy access to super-
ficial knowledge of some of the general subjects. 
I was informed by the Netherlands Minister, who 
showed his resentment of the whole procedure by 
refusing to attend the public signing ceremony» 
that he had not been informed or consulted on any 
point although he knew or felt they were discussing 
territory and peoples over which the Netherlands 
Government c.laimed complete sovereignty. British 
represen ta ti ve apparently al so not consul ted.93 
Although it cannot be established that Britain was not 
consulted prior to these talks there thus are definite 
indications that she was not. 
930 
Artic.les 1-4 of the Australian-New Zealand Agreement, 
even if read only in conjunction with Evatt's critical 
comments on Commonwealth consultation in his 14 October 
statement can reasonably seem to express more than a desire 
for improved mutual consultation between Australia and New 
Zealand. For this improved consultation was associated in 
the Agreement with an objective, 'the maximum degree of unity 
in the presentation, elsewhere 9 of the views of the two 
t . ~ 94 coun ries • This impression has been strengthened by an 
examination of the circumstances of the conferenceo It is 
placed beyond doubt by Australian Conference_ Pape:r:.~- and by 
93. Ibid. pp.175-6. 
94. 2.!E.2.-~., vo.l. 159 no. 1 9 January 1944, p.3 
Evatt' s ministeria.l brief at the Conference. 
In the Australian Co.~p.C~L..Ea12er2. the following were 
included as objectives of Australian-New Zealand cooperation: 
4o A more expeditious means of correlation than 
the present round about procedure whereby one 
government frequently .learns the opinions of 
the other via the Dominions Office. 
5. Based on the above exchange of views and informa-
tion the maximum degree of unity in the presenta-
tion of views by the two governments at London, 
Washington and elsewhere.95 
Minister expands these points in a list of the general 
objectives of the talks which includes: 
2. There have been p.lenty of instances in which the 
presentation of a view in London by New Zea.land 
without reference to Australia has weakened the 
presentation of our view, either by anticipation 
or more often, by revealing a difference of opinion 
which has enabled London to discount both. 
3. The essence of our case is that there should be in 
general no reason for difference on matters of 
external po.licy between two countries so nearly 
identica.l in outlook and with local and world 
interest so closely similar. 
4. It is necessary that approximation of views should 
be attained generally under Australian lead and 
initiative. This process wil.l probably .look after 
i tse.lf if New Zealand can be got to accept view in 
paragraph three above. 
4. A strong reinforcement of the case for full 
Australian-New Zea.land consu.l tation with a view 
to join{t presentation of views is to be found in 
strong evidence of 
95. P.W.R. 44/735/168/4, Pacif1..£.....Q.~;£fil1£.e, Papers, Agenda. 
(a) strong tendency on part of United Kingdom 
Government to overlook or omit Dominion 
consultation in many current matters; 
(b) marked trends in the last six months towards 
Big Three (u.K. - u.s. - u.s.s.R.) or Big 
Four (u.K. - U.S. - U.S.S.R. - China) handling 
of affairs al.legedly as a preliminary stage but 
in fact often tantamount to decision taken 
without reference to other members of the 
U .N. The Australian Government has strong.ly 
resisted these tendencies. It is in the 
obvious interest of New Zealand to resist 
them a.lso. Such resistance will c.learly be 
the more effective the more closely Australi96 
and New Zealand themselves think in concert. 
Thus, not only was the overriding importance of the 
objective of the mutual consultation (as distinct from the 
mutual consu.l ta ti on i tse.lf) made clear but that objective was 
shown to arise primari.ly from a dissatisfaction with the 
manner in which the United Kingdom conducted Empire consulta-
tion. It arose, also, it is clear, from failures on the 
part of the Great Powers in general to consult with other 
members of the United Nations especial.ly during the preceding 
six months. The brief subsequently made specific reference to 
the Cairo Conference. 
That Australiai s feelings as embodied in the Australian-
New Zealand Agreement amounted to dissatisfaction with Britain 
96. P •W.R. 44/735/168/9/1, Notes :(.m;::_th~inis.ter. 
was indicated contmnporary al.legation that Australia 
fai.led to consult Britain in advance of the talks; has been 
confirmed by Evatt's brief; and is further confirmed by the 
very form of the Agreement itselfo The significance of the 
Agreement as an agreement in the field of inter-Dominion 
relations was set out in a contemporary opinion by Ju.lius 
Stone 
The treaty-making power of the Dominions is, of course, 
well-established. Nor is there anything novel in 
inter-Dominion agreements which have even become common-
p.lace during the present waro It is not nove.l for two 
Dominions to make agreements without the participation 
of the Mother Country. Nor is it any longer spectacular, 
since the outbreak of the present war, to find members 
of the Commonwealth taking political decisions independ-
ent.ly of the Mother Country, even to the point of peace 
and war. What is more striking is that the Australian-
New 'Zealand Agreement deals with po.litical matters of 
first import, extending to some of the terms of peace-
making, in a war engaging virtually the who.le Common-
weal th, and in some of which the United Kingdom and 
other Dominions were deeply concerned; and that on such 
~atters the two Cominions~ independently of Commonwealth 
or even United Kingdom action, formally took a position 
Yi.§. a vis not only the United Nations as a whole but 
Yi.§. a Yi.§. the United Kingdom and the other Dominions 
as well. It is no doubt to be presumed that the other 
members of the British Commonwealth who might be 
concerned were informedo97 
·97. Julius Stone, tHarmonies and Disharmonies in Intra-
Commonweal th Re.lat ions', Aus:tr~.1-Asiatip Bulletin, 
vol. 6, September 1945, Po25. 
970 
It could be presumed today, on the contrary, that they were 
not. 
Evatt in his 14 October statement had spoken of the 
two ways open to Australia for participation in international 
affairs. One was Commonweal th consu.l tation with a view to 
joint Commonwealth action; the other was the assertion of 
her distinct international status. The annoyance which 
Australia now fe.lt with the fountainhead of the Commonwealth 
is indicated by the fact that it was against that fountain-
head that she dramatically exercised her distinct international 
status through the Australian-New Zealand Agreement. 
It would seem probable~ furthermore, that Evatt' s 
strong dissatisfaction with the manner in which the United 
Kingdom consulted other members of the Commonwealth in the 
formulation of post-war Empire policy would be followed by a 
continued reliance, in his future planning for the peace, on 
direct assertion of international status. For a concern for 
Pacific armistice and peace sett.lement arrangements, based on 
an acute awareness of Australia's need for post-war regional 
security, albeit within the ambit of the proposed world 
organization, had made it imperative that Australia's 
independent voice be heard and heeded at the highest inter-
national levels. That Evatt's dissatisfaction with Commonwealth, 
98. 
American and Allied consu.ltation was directly related to 
problems of the peace rather than to questions of military 
strategy and p.lanning is inferred from the prominence given 
to this question of consultation in an Agreement otherwise 
devoted to planning for the peace, just as attention had 
been given to it, in a simi.lar context, in his statement of 
14 October l94Jo This inference is supported by a report 
from the United States Minister in Canberra, of the 
annoyance which Evatt had expressed to him atAustralia's 
exclusion from the Cairo Conference. The Minister's inter-
view with Evatt took place on the final day of the Canberra 
talks. In the course of the interview 'he made it abundantly 
clear that the Commonwealth Government had been extremely 
irritated because it had neither been consulted nor invited 
to attend Cairo Conference 1 0 98 
While continuing differences of emphasis between the 
Australian and British governments on military and strategic 
questions rather than on matters related to post-war foreign 
policy might have been sufficient to explain Evatt's, and 
therefore Australia's, aggressive posture towards the Great 
98. F.R.u.s., 1944, vol. III, p.174. 
99. 
Powers in the Australian-New Zealand Agreement and later 
at San Francisco, the history of the Agreement suggests that 
it was not to difficulties in military consultation that 
Evatt was reacting, although his attitude was no doubt 
reinforced by those difficulties, when he chose to assert, 
through the Agreement, Australia's distinct international 
status. Indeed Curtin, who was primarily concerned with 
immediate defence and strategy, had, despite his continuing 
differences with Churchi.11, maintained a more moderate 
position on the Commonwealth relationship than had Evatt. 99 
Hasluck, it has been noticed, was apprehensive of Curtin 1 s 
reaction to the Conference agenda. That Curtin apparently 
99. For example, the New Zealand High Commissioner in 
Canberra, after he had visited Curtin to tell him 
of New Zealand 1 s intention to keep her troops in the 
Middle East, wrote to his own Prime Minister on 17 
May 1943 'The Prime Minister obviously felt strongly 
on this matter as indicated by incidental remarks 
during the discussion, for example 1 That is precisely 
the line that Churchill and Roosevelt took with me, 
and if I had listened to them we would have lost 
NewGuinea' and 1 it's tough that we should be asked 
to supp.ly munitions to New Zealand while New Zealand 
troops are sti.11 in the Middle East 1 , Docl!!!!ents 
Relatin~ New Zealand's Participation in the Second 
World War, vo.l. IT, Wel.lington, Government Printer, 
1951, pp.289. 
100. 
accepted it and lent his presence to the Conference suggests, 
in combination with his emphasis on the armistice in his 
letter to Fraser, that he also attached considerable 
importance to Australia's post-war Pacific security even if 
he was not .led, as a consequence, as was Evatt, to modify 
the external image of Australia's Commonwealth connection. 
CHAPTER III 
THE WELLINGTON CONFERENCE. 
1010 
In May 1944 John Curtin attended the British Common-
wealth Prime Ministers? meeting in London. By his own 
account, the ta.lks while primarily concerned with the 
conduct of the war also included discussion of 'post-war 
I .1 problems of an Empire or international nature o At the 
strategic leve.l Curtin heard assurances from Churchil.l on 
an increased British role in the war against Japano Although 
the transfer of the main British effort would have to await 
the defeat of Germany, Curtin told the House of Representa-
tives fo.llowing his return from London, .large and powerful 
forces would become availahle Ythis year' while the 'planning 
of the whole British effort' was being 'vigorously pursued'o 
Curtin quoted Churchill's summary of the projected British 
Pacific strategy. 
Though we might have to begin in a smal.l way, we 
intend to pour all our forces into that struggle 
to which ~e are p.ledged by honour and fastened by 
interest. 
Curtin' s imperia.l sentiments could scarcely have been 
weakened by these avowals. Indeed Curtin 1 s reported state-
ments in London on the post-war nature of the British 
1 o ~ • , VO .1 o 179, .1 7 J Ul y .19 4 4, p o J 2 • 
2. Ibid o p. 34. 
Commonwea.l th show that same emphasis on a common Elmpire 
policy which had marked his speeches during the previous 
twelve monthso On May 4, during the London talks, Curtin 
reportedly told a press conference that 
although Australia has the right to say whether 
it should come into a war or not, if the King is 
at war then the enemy may decide for us. As a 
practical matter, when any part of the Elmpire 
is at war the Commonwealth as a whole is 
invo.l ved. J 
It was precisely this view of the Commonwealth which 
Evatt 1 s Australia-New Zealand Agreement had seriously 
challengedo 
Curtin's emphasis during the London talks was again 
upon improved Commonwea.l th consultation. Towards this end 
he proposed the creation of an Empire Council and 
Secretariat4 - a proposal which won no sympathy from 
Canadians suspicious of Imperial centralization.5 Although, 
J. Manchftster Guardian, 5 May 1944. 
4. He had out.lined this scheme at a dinner in Adelaide in 
August 1943, The_Tim~ . .§., .16 August 1943. See also 
The Times, 6 September 1943 -~A Council for the Elmpire• 
Mr. Curtin's Plan - Adelaide Proposal Amplified'. 
5. Mansergh, SurviZY, pol83. Curtin ~remarked in evident 
a.llusion to Canadian opposition, that it was better to 
go forward with three brethren than with none 1 o 
lOJ. 
as Mansergh observes, Curtin's proposal was most probably 
made with the intention of strengthening Australian and 
dominion influence on Commonwealth policy in the face of 
separatist tendencies, 6 the fact remains that his proposals 
envisaged the continuance of common Imperial policy. An 
'official British spokesman' is reported to have told the 
Press during the London talks that agreement among the 
Dominions as to how the world could and should be organized 
was one of the most essential preliminary steps towards 
the peace. 'We are trying to avoid five or more British 
voices speaking at the peace conference advocating five 
different kinds of organization,' he said, 'If we can get 
together on one pattern it will be an example and a model 
for others' 7• The Ti~ had as a question of the hour 'Is 
the Commonwealth to speak as a recognized team in world 
councils - a team with a single policy on major problems?' 8 
Curtin's answer could surely have been deduced from his 
proposals for Commonwealth consultation. It was duly given 
6~ Ibid. p .169. 
7. New York Tim~, 2 May 1944. 
8~ The Times; 5 May 1944. 
in his report on the London talks to the Australian House 
of Representatives on 17 July 19440 
Curtin's comments on proposed world organization, in 
this report, stressed both ,the important role of a General 
Assembly and the need for 'armed force to be at the 
disposal of the world body'. Australia's role in the 
proposed body was seen in terms of her membership of the 
Commonwealth. 
•••• it is as an integral part of the British 
Commonwealth that Australia can most influentially 
express itself in world organization, and I have 
no doubt whatever that unity of the British Empire 
will, in the problems of the future, give to His 
Majesty's subjects everywhere an authority in their 
consultation with other countries that will enable 
our concept of life to influence greatly the 
decisions which have to be made so that all we 
have fought for can be achieved. •••• Our readi-
ness to associate in a world organization does not 
lessen the realism of our membership of the British 
Commonwealth. It is requisite for all the Dominions, 
and also for the Mother Country, that the subjects 
of the King should find not only means of consulta-
tion and agreement, but also the unity of declaration 
which will maintain for the British Commonwealth that 
range of influence we believe it should have.9 
'Ihe problem of whether Curtin's privately expressed 
. official views on Commonweal th unity were as pro-Imperial 
as those he supported public.ly must await its solution through 
9: C.P.D., vo.l. 179, 17 July 1944, p.41. 
the eventual publication or availability of confidential 
sources. That there was in fact a real as well as a 
pub.licly expressed difference of viewpoint on this question 
between himself and Evatt is indicated, however, both by 
his suggested institutional innovation and by his choice 
of advisers for this London tripo Curtin's choice of Sir 
Frederick Shedden, Secretary of the Department of Defence, 
and General Sir Thomas Blarney, Chief of Staff, could be 
explained in tenns of the predominantly military nature of 
the talks. What is not explicable is Curtin's failure to 
take any advisers from the Department of External Affairso 
Curtin's action was seen at the time by Paul Hasluck, then 
one of Evatt's External Affairs advisers, as a 
studied disregard by the Prime Minister of his 
Minister for External Affairs and that impression 
was confirmed both by the annoyance of the Minister 
for External Affairs at the time and by some remark8 
made to me on a subsequent occasion by Mro Curtin.1 
Hasluck is further of the opinion that 
most of Curtin 1 s advice came from and the chief 
influence on his mind was the Secretary of the 
Department of Defence, Sir Frederick Shedden, and 
the statements which Mr. Curtin made during and 
after the Prime Ministers' meeting were along what 
might be called orthodox lines •o•~ The gist of 
10. Hasluck, Journal and Proceedings, p.154. 
I_: 
Curtin's statements at the Prime Ministers' 
meeting was that Big Three co-operation was 
necessary for an 'effective security system, 
the British Commonwealth was an outstanding 
example of an effective association for security, 
and continued co-operation within the British 
Commonwealth would help effective membership of 
a world security systemo11 
106. 
And al.l this was in a context in which the Defence Depart-
ment, as contrasted with the Department of External Affairs 
was 'the stronghold of orthodoxy in Australian foreign 
1 t . I .12 re a ions • 
If Has.luck was clearly pointing to differences in 
policy rather than in personality there is the additional 
circumstance that relations between Curtin and Evatt had been 
strained from the moment Evatt entered Federal Labor 
politics. L.F. Crisp records an early instance of friction. 
In the 1940 elections it became highly probable, during the 
counting of votes, that Curtin would be defeated in his 
Fremantle electorate. While the issue was still unresolved 
there were daily 
11. Ibid. 
12. Has.luck suggests that this was the prevalent 
'External Affairs' view of 'Defence', although 
he did not share it. Ibid. 
soundings and solicitings of aspirants for the 
leadership which would be vacant if the final 
count went against Curtin in the West. The most 
ebullient and vocal of these aspirants was Evat~ 
who had not yet been sworn in as a new member of 
the House of Representatives. He was receiving 
nation-wide publicity for statements on policy of 
a sort which are normally made by the Leader of the 
Party. 1 3 
Shortly after the Canberra talks, on 3 February 1944, the 
United States Minister in Australia, Nelson Johnson had 
reported to the Secretary of State an incident which is at 
least consistent with strained Curtin-Evatt personal 
relations. 
I presented text of message to Prime Minister 
Curtin at noon today. Apparently Minister External 
Affairs had not informed Prime Minister of my 
conversations with him on January 21 communicating 
our ideas •. 14 
While Curtin was travel.ling to the London meeting he had 
talks with Cordell Hull in Washington on 24 April 1944. 
Hull's notes of a discussion which centred on the Australia-
New Zealand Agreement include the following 
I once more said that we frankly did not appreciate 
the attitude of Dr. Evatt on this and other matters 
and I referred particularly to Dr. Evatt 1 s action 
in recording in a formal document a private conversa-
tion with the President. The Prime Minister referred 
to persons with ambitions in a vague sort of a way.15 
lJ. L.F. Crisp, op. cit., p.lJl. 
14~ F.R.u.s., 1944, vol. III, p.180 • 
. 15. Ibid. p .194. 
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If distrust of an ambitious colleague was not all that 
distanced Curtin from Evatt, it must, to a man of Curtin's 
d . t . . t ·16 h b p th nervousness an sensi 1v1 y, ave een a rome ean 
irritant o 
Evatt's comments in the debate which had been initiated 
by Curtin on July .17 certainly showed that he differed from 
the Prime Minister in the importance which he attached to 
the British Commonwealth's role in the proposed general 
security organizationo He ignored that role comp.letely. 
His speech referred to the fact that two days previously the 
United States Secretary of State had announced that a 
conference of the Great Powers would be held to undertake 
preliminary planning of the general world security organiza-
tion to be established in accordance with Article 4 of the 
Moscow Declarationo17 Instead of remarking on a Commonwealth 
.16 0 'Curtin's nerves frayed more readily than those of many 
less sensitive and imaginative men~ He had shown in 
Canberra as early as May 1940 (during the previous 
Parliament) j that he reacted very sharply and emotion-
ally to what he felt to be undue or unfair pressure 
upon himself, or unconcerted and unauthorised moves, in 
or out of Par.l iament emanating from within his Party. 
He was far from wel.l and had been under recurrent 
£r~ssure from Evatt since the e.lection in September. 'I 
• .I!. Crisp, Opo cit., pJ..J.lo 
C.P.D., vol. 179, 19 July 1944, p.2JO. 
role Evatt reiterated the importance of regional security 
in conjunction with the world body. 18 But although he 
made this reference to regional security he did not develop 
the arguments, familiar in his speeches before the Australicn-
New Zealand Agreement and in the Agreement itself, for 
Australian post-war prominence and territorial interest in 
a South West Pacific region, though he was careful to note, 
after denying that the Agreement had been 'aimed against 
the United States', that ~in the demarcation of post-war 
authority in the Pacific, it has a.lways appeared to me that 
in the post-war period, the United States interests will lie 
predominantly in those islands, formerly Japanese, ~h~~ 
!!Q!:,th of th~ Egua:tor' ; 19 The prohlem of the Pacific 
Armistice received only passing reference. Evatt did 
emphasize, however, the importance of socia.l and economic 
bases for a lasting peace - and theme which was to gain 
increasing attention in his speeches unti.l the time of 
the San Francisco Conference. 
The views of the United Australia Party Opposition were 
18. Ibid. p.235. 
19. Ibid. pp.235-6. Emphasis added. 
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expressed by its .leader, R.G. Menzies, in the same debate. 
Menzies stressed the importance of power - 'there must be 
. 1 1. t. t 20 power in internationa po. i ics • After apparently 
supporting the concept of a new world organization on the 
pattern of the League of Nations, but an organization in 
which power would form a real component of a collective 
security system 'power politics, which have been rather 
contemptuously treated by some debaters, must now be given 
a co.llecti ve quality 2 21 Menzies appeared to doubt whether 
the new League should be seen as the foremost guarantor of 
Austra.liat s post-war security. He was not at all·· sure that 
the League of Nations had not tried 'to run before it had 
learned to lk ' 22 wa • Although a revived and strengthened 
League was an ideal worth striving for, the basic world 
organization, from Australia's viewpoint, was the one then 
in existence - the British Empire. 
I believe that after the war a strong British Empire 
wi.11 be more than ever vi ta.l to Australia •••• A 
strong chain which is to bind the world to peace 
20~ Ibid. p .103. 
21. Ibid. pp.104-50 
22. Ibid. p •. 105. 
_, 
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must have strong links, and for us the first and 
strongest .link is with the British Empire, the 
.link which joins us to the other British countries 
of the world. 23 
Thus whereas Curtin spoke in terms of Empire policy 
within a world body, Menzies conceived of the Empire as an 
alternative to that body. Evatt had spoken only of the 
relation of Pacific regional security to world organization. 
Pacific regionalism was evident also in Evatt's comments 
that 'Australia and New Zealand were the two Great 
Dominions which must uphold British civilization in this 
24 part of the worldi. As the Australian-New Zealand Agree-
ment had indicated, and as he was to make fully explicit in 
London on the eve of the San Francisco Conference, 2 5 Evatt 
saw the notion of upholding British civi.lization in the 
Pacific, not as the regiona.l promulgation of a common 
Empire policy, but as the right to act and speak on behalf 
of the Commonwealth on matters affecting the Pacific region. 
On 12 August 1944 in an address given aboard a 
destroyer in the Puget Sound Naa.l Yard at Bremerton, Washing-
ton, President Roosevelt, who had just returned from a visit 
23. Ibid. 
24. Ibid. p.235. 
25: See below PP• 
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to Hawaii and Alaska, made it clear that the United States, 
although decidedly interested in the acquisition of post-war 
'forward bases nearer to Japan than Hawaii lies', did not 
contemp.late c.laiming any possessions of the United Nations 
in the South Pacific. There were~ he said 
hundreds of islands in the South Pacific that bear 
the same relation to South America and Central 
America as Hawaii bears to North America~ These 
islands are mostly in the possession of the British 
Empire and the French. They are important commerci-
ally just as they are from the defence point of 
view, because they lead to New Zealand and Australia, 
the Dutch Islands and the South Philippines. With 
all these places we are going to have a growing trade. 
We have no desirg to ask for any possessions of the 
United Nations.2 
This Presidential statement supported remarks which Cordell 
Hull had made to Curtin in Washington in April 1944. 27 
The fact that Evatt's speech of 19 July contained 9 by 
constrast with the Australia New Zealand Agreement, only 
26. Goodrich and Carroll (eds.), Do9_11rn.ents on American 
F.oreign R~la tions, vol. VII~ July 1944 - June 1945 
Boston, 1946, p.821. 
27. 'I said that any casual or any informal remarks on this 
subject [allotment of territory] by officials of this 
Government naturally related to the post-war period and 
were not intended to bring up such question for considera-
tion or for final decisions during the fighting period. 
I said that this Government has not been a party to any 
proposed local or regional p.lans or movements relating 
to the Pacific area, especially in the area of 
Australia and New Zealand.' 'Memorandum of Conversation~ 
by the Secretary of State Y ~ F .R.0I~·, .1944, vol. ITI, 
p.193. 
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passing references to Australia's position and territorial 
interests in the South Pacific and to the prob.lem of the 
Pacific armistice, should be seen as a reflection of this 
progressive clarification of America's post-war territorial 
intentions o On .19 Ju.ly, al though he presumably knew of 
Hull's assurances to Curtin, Evat~while welcoming American 
post-war co-operation in Pacific securit~ had been careful 
to emphasize, in a prescriptive sense, that he saw American 
post-war territorial interests as being predominantly !!Q!:th 
of the Equator •. 
In his Ministerial Statement of 8 September 1944, Evatt 
not only referred to Roosevelt's Puget Sound address, but 
did so in a context which illustrates that, since he now 
had Presidential denial of any American post-war territorial 
claims in the South Pacific, he could welcome American post-
war co-operation in the Pacific in almost fulsome terms. 
Both in development of the Pacific region and its 
security further British and United States partici-
pation will be absolutely essential·. For this reason 
we have wannly welcomed President Roosevelt's important 
statement made at Puget Sound in which he indicated how 
wide a region the United States contemplates in 
considering arrangements for the future security of 
the Pacific from the American point of view~ These 
arrangements would cover the use of bases over a large 
114. 
area, including the former Japanese mandated islands 
captured by the United States by some remarkable 
and heroic feats of' arms. The concern both of' 
Australia and New Zealand is that the arrangements 
finally made should give a sure and certain hope of'8 
a .long period of' stability in the Western Pacific. 2 
This speech of' 8 September 1944 therefore maintained the lack 
of' emphasis, evident in Evattrs July comments, on questions 
of' South West Pacific territoriality and the Pacific armistice. 
Evatt spoke, however, at considerable length, on the nature 
of' the proposed world organization. His increasing interest 
in this subject, which representatives of' the Great Powers 
had been discussing at Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, since 
21 August, was shown both in his comments and by the co.llect-
ion of' relevant speeches and statements by Allied powers 
which formed an annexe to his statement: 29 Evatt spoke, 
as he had in July, of' the importance of' small powers to the 
new body even though there must be Great Power leadership. 
Curtin in July had sought to give the small powers inf'.luence 
through the General Assembly and would presumably, although 
he did not say this, have been content to allow Britain to 
represent the Commonweal th interest at the executive .level. 
2s: C.Pd2_., vo.l •. 179, 8 September 1944, p.612: 
29. Stq,tement, Ibid. pp.601-12. Annexe, ibid. pp.612-28. 
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Evatt, in September, developed an argument for small power 
representation on the executive council~ A so-called small 
power, Evatt said, may in certain areas and in special 
circumstances possess great, if not decisive, influence. 
Therefore within ihe world organization almost every power 
would have a significant contribution to make 'at any rate 
in re.lation to regional matters or to particular subjects' .JO 
After noting that the proposed organization would comprise, 
in addition to an assembly representative of all member 
states, an executive authority consisting of the larger 
powers together with a selected number of smal.ler powers, 
a permanent secretariat, and a permanent court of justice, 
he dwelt at .length on the composition of the executive 
authority. 
One important point is that the representatives of 
the smaller powers on the executive authority shou.ld 
be adequate to ensure a balanced outlook on world 
affairs and so increase confidence in all executive 
decisions. Further the executive should be so 
constituted that no distinct region of the globe 
and no important group of nations should be .left 
unrepresented on it.Jl 
The implication that Australia might represent the Pacific 
JO~ Ibid. p.604. 
Jl. Ibid. 
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or South Pacific region is not difficult to draw. Dr. Evatt 
was thus again concerned, as he had been in the Australian 
New Zealand Agreement, with the assertion of Australia's 
distinct international status. As he had commented on 19 
July, 
Whether or not one agrees with every clause of the 
Agreement, it is necessa:ry to get rid, once and for 
all, of the idea that Australia's international 
status is not a rea)ity, and th~t we are to remain 
adolescent forever. 2 
But it has been the argument of this thesis that Evatt's 
assertion of Australia's status had been largely the product 
of a failure of Commonwealth and Allied consultation on 
questions related to the armistice and pe_ace settlement 
in general and, above all, on questions related to the 
Pacific armistice and settlement. Evatt's assertion of 
Australia's territorial claims in the South West Pacific, 
and consequent reservations with regard to an American, and 
to a lesser extent, a British presence in the region, have 
been taken as evidence both of the importance which he 
32: C.P.D., vol. 179, 19 July 1944, p~229~ 
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attached to the South West Pacific in Australia's post-war 
security and of his interest in questions related to the 
armistice and peace sett.lemento Dr. Evatt's continued 
assertion of Australia's international status in Sept ember 
1944, on this occasion with respect to membership of the 
executive council of the world body, had not been accompanied 
by any emphasis in his speeches on questions of Pacific 
territoriality or on the Pacific armisticeo Tb.at the 
Australian and the New Zealand Governments had a continuing 
and vital interest in the Pacific armistice and a continuing 
dissatisfaction with Great Power consultation on armistice 
];?£.fil2§:.!'.atigns is made clear by a close examination of the 
We.Llington Conference, which has hitherto not been the 
object of scholarly attention. 
.l.18o 
The fact that a continuing preoccupation with the 
Pacific armistice had similarly not been evident in the 
public statements of the New Zealand Government at this 
time is evidenced by a report from the United States 
Minister in New Zea.land, Kenneth S. Patton, -to the Secretary 
of State on 25 October 1944, informing Hull of the discussions 
which were about to begin between Australia and New Zealand 
in We.llington. Patton said that there was no forma.l 
agenda but it was understood that discussions wou.ld concern 
chiefly 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Pacific Welfare, heal th, etc~ 
Dumbarton Oaks proposa.ls. 
the Australiamwish discuss joint schemes of 
industrial deve.lopment under Article 35 ( c) 
of the Canberra agreement but T am confidentially 
and frankly informed New Zealand has no such 
p.lans or schemes to discuss so wishes to 
minimize this.33 
Apparently unknown to Patton, the two Governments had agreed 
between themselves on a significantly different agenda. 
Proposals for holding the We.llington talks and a 
preliminary exchange of agenda items took place in September 
and October .1944, that is scarce.ly more than six months prior 
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to the San Francisco Conference. Article 37 (a) of 
the Australiaµi,.New Zealand Agreement had provided that there 
should be 'conferences of Ministers of State·to be held 
alternately in Canberra and Wellington, it being the aim 
of the two Governments that these conferences be held at 
least twice a yearv. 34 It was, therefore, the prerogative 
of the New Zealand Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, who was 
to be subsequently chairman of the New Zealand de.legation 
at San Francisco and of Committee II/4 (Trusteeship) of 
that Conference, to suggest the convening of such talks 
between the two countries. On 4 September 1944 Fraser 
suggested to Curtin that a meeting might be held in 
November. Fraser cabled that because of the rapid 
development of events both in Europe and in the Pacific 
during the preceding months such a meeting was desirab.le 
in the near futureo November was the earliest convenient 
time because he would not be clear of the current session 
. of Parliament or of the Labor Party Conference unti.l then. 
Fraser's tentative suggestions for a conference agenda were 
as follows: 
34~ C.N.I.A., vol. 15, no. 1, January 1944, p.8. 
(a) Armistice and post hostilities planning 
particularly in the Pacific. 
(b) Collaboration in matters affecting the 
welfare and advancement of the native peoples 
in the Pacifico 
(c) Co-operation in security and defence: 
(d) Development of trade and joint planning of 
industrial developmento35 
From the first, Dro Evatt handled the Australian end 
of the negotiationso He told Fraser on 9 September, the 
day fol.lowing his [Evatt' s] Ministerial Statement, that he 
welcomed the invitation but felt that, in view of the 
urgency of the matters which it was proposed to discuss, he 
was giving f'urther consideration to the question of the 
most suitable date for the talks. 36 Two weeks later he 
suggested to Fraser that i:he meeting might be held in the 
week commencing on 9 October.37 On the following day he 
cabled Fraser -
We feel that three questions are too urgent to be 
postponed, vizo 
(a) measures to ensure Australian and New Zealand 
participation in Armistice and post hostilities 
arrangements in the Pacific 
(b) the reaching of agreement on our objectives in, 
and procedure for obtaining an early employment 
conference. 
35: 44/630/5/1/11/8. Prelimin£!.!:,LArrangements. 
36: Ibid: 
37: 23 September 1944. Ibido 
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(c) definition 0£ object~~es at British Commonwealth 
Aviation Con£erenceo 
It will be at once apparent that both countries gave 
priority to the question 0£ the Pacific armisticeo It is 
significant also that both countries gave prominence to 
matters affecting the economic and social foundations 0£ a 
post-war world. In New Zealand's case there was a strong 
interest in trusteeship whereas Australia proposed full 
employment. On both 0£ these subjects Australia and New 
Zealand, acting in concert, were to make a substantial 
contribution at the San Francisco conference': It is 
therefore intended to examine separately the development 
0£ Australia's ideas in these fields in some detail in the 
following chapter. 
Evatt required that there should be at least the 
appearance 0£ a formal conference whereas Fraser would have 
been content with Ministerial talks. 
As Patton told Hull 
Am definitely informed by Secretary £or External 
·Affairs that although this may be played up as a 
formal conference such would be only 'window 
dressing' as it actually will be only talks £or a 
day or two, that is informal exchange of views 
only with no definite formal agreements anti-
pated • .39 
1 22. 
Evatt' s desire to have at least the semblance of a formal 
conf'erence again reflects his concern for international and 
dominion statuso That the Wellington Conference was not in 
fact to .lead to a publicly announced and signed Agreement; that 
the British and Canadian High Commissi.ore rs were invited to 
and did attend the opening and closing proceedings; that 
there was a moderation in Evatt's public assertions on 
questions of territoria.li ty and the Pacific armistice 
subsequent to the Canberra talks; all these indicate the 
extent to which the Cairo Conference and fears of .American 
terri toria.l claims in tile South West Pacific had disturbed 
Evatt and the Australian Government immediately prior to the 
January Canberra talks and had provoked them to dramatic 
diplomatic action in which they successfully enlisted the 
support of New Zealand. But if the Wellington talks were 
to be conducted in an atmosphere of greater calm and 
restraint there was still a real concern and fear on the 
part of both countries for their role in the Pacific armistice • 
.39. On 25 October 1944, F.R.U.s., 1944, vol. III, pol96. 
l 
The Australian High Commissioner in We.llington had 
told Evatt on 22 September that 'New Zealand could not 
agree to conference before Novembero I would emphasize 
again,t the High Commissioner continued, 'the importance 
placed by the New Zealand Prime Minister on discussions 
with yourself of the matters of Pacific policy at the 
earliest possible date.r 40 Dr. Evatt he.ld out for formal 
discussions o Fraser in due course suggested that the 
Civil Aviation talks could be held separately in Wel.lington 
during the week beginning on 9 Octobero 41 These ta.lks, at 
which Australia was represented by the Minister for Air 
and Civi.l Aviation, A.So Drakeford, duly took p.lace as 
suggested and resulted in comp.lete agreement between the 
two countries. 42 
On 12 October a member of the diplomatic staff at 
the Australian High Commission in Wel.lington cabled 
Evatt -
it is the wish of the Prime Minister to have general 
conversations rather than detailed technical dis-
cussions. In fact he says that he wants mainly to 
talk to Dr. Evatt. Hence suggested 12roposals do 
not caLl for any .large staff party.4J 
40. 44/ 630 / 5/1/11/8. Prgl im..;i,.nary Ar:rangements. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Syd~Y:..l!or~ Herald~ 13 October 1944. 
43 • 44/ 630 / 5/1/1.1/8. Prel imina.:i;:y_ .. Ar:i;::~~~· 
The fact that Dro Evatt was hand.ling the Australian arrange-
ments for the talks and that reports from New Zea.land were 
stressing Fraser's desire to speak to Evatt reflects 
Curtin' s inability to attend these discussionso It was 
forma.lly announced in the Australian press on 5 Oct ob er 
than Curtin was unable to go to the talks and that he 
would be represented by the Deputy Prime Minister, F.Mo 
Forde. Dro Evatt, it was announced, wou.ld also represent 
the Australian government. As the Arggs ha,d it 
Mr. Forde, Deputy Prime Minister and Army Minister 
will lead the Australian De.legation to New Zea.land 
at the end of this month for a resumption of the 
ta.lks which resu.l ted in the signing of the Anzac 
Pact some months ago. He wil.l be accompanied by 
Dr. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs. 
In the same newspaper four days later, the Canberra 
correspondent Crayton Burns, who was subsequently to write 
distinguished reports from the San Francisco Conference, set 
out his understanding of the reasons for Curtin Y s inabi.li ty 
to attend the talks. 
Al.l through the recent Parliamentary sittings and the 
Premiers~ Conference Mr. Curtin was so absorbed with 
the developments taking shape in the Pac.ific that he 
was prepared to subordinate al.l internal political 
considerations to them. Mr. Curtin has made it clear 
that he cannot personal.ly spare the time to attend 
the British Commonwealth Convention on Civil 
Aviation at Ottawa orthe Anzac Pact discussions in 
New Zea.land. He wil.l be represented in Canada by 
Mr. Drakeford and in New Zealand by Mr. Forde, who 
will deputize for him as Prime Minister, and 
Dr. Evatt, who wi.11 conduct the discussions as 
Minister for External Affairs. 
On 19 October the Australian press announced that the 
Wellington Conference would be held from JO October. 
12.5. 
By his decision not to attend the Wellington talks~ 
Curtin had prepared the way for Dr. Evatt 2 s control of the 
Australian delegation at San Francisco. In the first place, 
by giving priority to his interest in immediate defence 
matters - on 17 July he had described the war as r the 
predominant and overriding preoccupation of the country 2 44 
even though he had recently attended talks in London. which 
dealt, in part, with proposals for post-war wor.ld organiza-
tion, Curtin made it not unrikel y that he would take a 
similar decision at the time of the San Francisco Conference. 
Second.ly, even if Curtin had decided to attend San Francisco 
in company with Smuts, MacKenzie King and Fraser, and if he 
had continued his po.licy of re.lying on advisers distinct from 
those of the Department of External Affairs, it is highly 
unlikely, fol.lowing the Wellington talks, that he would have 
been any match for Evatt and his team of post-war experts 
at San Francisco. The January Canberra talks had taken their 
44. ~~·, vol. 179, 17 July .1944, p .J.L 
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inspiration and organization from Evatt 1 s department, as 
Curtin himse.lf acknowledged. Although these talks had 
centred on problems of post-war foreign policy, it has 
been seen above that they paid .limited attention to 
international organizationo At Wel.lington, greater, if 
stil.l preliminary, consideration was to be given to this 
subject of international organization in addition to the 
questions of trusteeship and ful.l employment which were to 
interest Australia strongly at San Franciscoo It is 
possible that if Curtin had attended the We.llington talks 
with his separat<> of'fi cials, who both there and subsequent.ly 
would have developed interest and expertise in the necessary 
range of post-war international policy, he might have felt 
more able, if he had been interested to do so, to attend the 
San Francisco talks. 
At San Francisco, as wi.1.1 be shown be.low, a dispute was 
to arise as to the leadership of the Australian delegation. 45 
At San Francisco~ as at Wel.lington, Australia's two ministerial 
delegates were F.M. Forde and H.V. Evatt, yet at Wellington 
ihere was no sign or report of ministerial discord. Forde at 
45. See below pp. 
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'Wel.lington, however, was not merely Deputy Prime Minister, 
he was c.learly deputizing for his Prime Minister. Curtin, 
by attending the Canberra talks, had established with Fraser 
the precedent of formal discussion between the two countries 
at Prime Ministerial level - a fact recognized by FraserYs 
initial invitation to Curtin and by the way in which Forde 
was welcomed at the Wel.lington talks as Curtin' s deputy. 
Forde was, however, Minister for the Army and like Curtin 
primarily concerned with defence. He was f'urthermore 
a man of .limited po.li ti cal capacity. Don. 'Whi tington, a 
Canberra political journalist of long experience has described 
him as an amiab.le, friendly» but uninspired professional 
1 . t• . 46 po 1 1c1an. L.F. Crisp has a similar impression - 'An 
able, likeable politician, he had neither the intellectual 
power and range nor the ready command of the various branches 
of Government business t© compare with Curtin or Chifleyo' 4 7 
In Hasluck' s view, Forde at We.llington was t quite innocent 
of the subject matter of the meeting, went visiting defence 
establishments and factories, and» being accompanied by his 
own public relations officer, Mr. Ken Hardy, got nearly a 
46. Don 'Whitington, The House Will Divide, Melbourne» 1954, 
pp.57-So 
47. L.F. Crisp, op. cit., p.219. 
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co.lumn in the .local papers every day. t 48 The records of 
the Conference indicate that Forde did not take a major 
part in private discussions. Fraser's great interest in 
having talks with Evatt is therefore not surprising. 
Forde at Wellington, as at San Francisco, was a 
figurehead. At Wel.lington, however, once he had read the 
requisite formal public opening address as Curtin's 
representative, he could quietly .leave discussions to 
Evatt and his experts. The San Francisco conference made 
no provision for figureheads. The Chairmen of national 
delegations were not only titular heads, they were also 9 
by virtue of their office, members of the Steering Committee 
of the Conference and potential candidates for the prestig-
eous Executive Committee. At San Francisco it thus became 
vital for Evatt to establish himse.lf if not as leader9 at 
.least as co-leader of the Australian delegation. It was 
thus that conflict was to arise at San Francisco; and it was 
to arise in a situation in which Forde's leadership of the 
Australian de.legation rested more on party and cabinet 
seniority than upon a c.lear mandate from his Prime Minister. 49 
48. Has.luck, op. cit., p.156. 
49. See below pp. 
129. 
'Ihe Wellington talks commenced on the morning of 
Wednesday 1 November, in the presence of the full New 
Zealand Cabinet, and the British and Canadian High 
Commissioners, in the Cabinet Room of Parliament House 9 
Wellington. Forde and Evatt were joined by the Australian 
High Commissioner, the Hon. T.Ga de L. D'Alton, as an 
additional manber of the delegation. 'Ihe advi~ers to the 
Australian party included three young post-war experts from 
theDepartment of External Affairs, Dr. John Burton, who had 
a strong interest in fu.ll employment policy and trusteeship, 
W.D. Forsyth, now head of the department's Pacific Section 
aid principal adviser on trusteeship policy, and Paul Has.luck 
who had taken a close interest in post-war organization and 
regional security. 'Ihese three men were to be subsequently 
among Dr. Evatt's-closest advisers at San Francisco.50 
'Ihe final agenda for the talks incorporated a number 
of additions to Fraser and Evatt 2 s original proposals. 
l. World Organization. 
2. Exchange of views on armistice and post-
hostilities. 
3. Pacific Quest ions. 
4. Futur.e of Mandates.; and Colonial Policy. 
5. Establishment of South Seas Regional Commission -
Objectives, Procedures and Tactics. 
50. C.N.I.A., vol. 15, no. 11, November 1944, p.JlJ. 
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6. Economic Relations. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
International Economic col.laboration inc.luding 
discussion on an emp.loyment conference. 
Economic co-operation between Australia and 
New Zea.land including means for attaining 
objectives of 35 C of A.N.Z. Agreement. 
Means of continuous col.laboration on 
economic matterso5l 
The publication of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals on 7 October 3 
rather than a sense of immediate importance may explain the 
presence and position of rworld Organizationi. This subject 
was not to be dis cussed in detail or at .length during the 
ialks. On the other hand the diplomatic correspondence 
surrounding the September proposa.ls for an agenda suggests 
that the priority accorded to the Pacific armistice in those 
proposals reflected the immediate interest of both countries 
in discussing that question urgently and in detail. 
Fordets public opening address to the Conference fore-
filadowed the emphasis which was to be given to the Pacific 
armistice in private discussion. 
When we met in Canberra in January, for examp.le3 
the German grip on Western Europe had not been 
broken by the invasion which has since freed 
France and Be.lgium, and carried the forces of the 
United Nations into the very territory of Germany 
itself •••• It is only a matter of time before 
Germany must submit. Already there have been 
51. 44/630/5/l/ll/9, 
armistices with lesser enemy states. The settle-
ment with Germany must soon be worked out between 
the United Nations.52 
Forde then placed his major emphasis on the Pacific 
annistice. In the Pacific as in Europe, he said~ the 
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aggressor was being thrown back. The Australian and New 
Zealand governments, while still maintaining a total war 
effort, would have to prepare to face the questions which 
would govern their relations with Pacific and Asiatic 
states and which would arise as soon as discussions began 
on the Pacific settlement. 'I need not labour the fundamental 
importance of these questions to both countries.' 53 The 
influence of Australia and New Zealand in the peace and 
post-war settlements should be commensurate with their 
cant~ibution to the victory which was within the grasp of 
the United Nations.54 
Fraser, in his opening address, spoke of the value of 
co-operation between Australia and New Zealand who, in his 
opinion, had never been closer together. 11 It is also true 
that never were we closer to our Mother Country and the other 
Dominions than we are at the present moment, and we believe 
52. C.N.I.A., vol. 15, no. ll, November 1944, p.326. 
53. Ibid. p.327. 
54. Ibid. 
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that our thrashing out of the Pacific problems and of the 
world problems wil.l be helpful to our sister Dominions and 
the United Kingdom.~55 While the latter half of this 
quotation no doubt reflected the sentiments of the Wellington 
talks, the first half was hardly applicable to the British 
Commonwealth of Nations in regard to post-war planning, 
however much it might have been true of current mi.li tacy 
developments o For in private ministerial talks at the 
Conference it soon became clear that the questions of 
Pacific regional security and the Pacific armistice were 
not only of central concern; they also continued to give 
rise to dissatisfaction with Commonweal th and Allied consul ta-
tion and a consequent f'urther movement to direct assertion 
of international status. 
At the first private meeting of the ful.l Conference, 
before it separated into a number of sub-committesj Evatt 
made some general comments on Australia's views.56 His 
recorded comments on the world organization were on the 
need for small power influence in the new body, the importance 
55. Ibid. p.323. 
56. The following account of Evatt's and Fraser's and Nash's 
comments is taken from 44/630/5/l/ll/l7, Proceedings. 
lJJ. 
of Russian membership, and the need for a greater role for 
the General Assemblyo Of Pacific security he said that 
one result of the Australia-New Zea.land Agreement was that 
America did not appear to seek changes in sovereignty south 
of the Equator. It seemed to be accepted that American 
control would be limited to ex-Japanese mandated islands. 
He feared that the example of an ineffective Australian voice 
in the European armistice would be followed by a similar 
occurrence in the Pacific unless Australia and New Zealand 
worked together. He felt that there was a definite chance 
of the Dominions having less real say in the peace settlement 
than they had under Lloyd George in 1919. On commonwealth 
relations Evatt commented that action must be taken to prevent 
the development of a tendency by the United Kingdom not 
entirely to bypass the Dominions but to reach decisions and 
to infonn the Dominions when it was no longer possible for 
their views to be taken into accounto 
Fraser's comments on world organization referred to the 
importance of Russian membership of the proposed bodyo On 
the question of the Pacific armistice Fraser suggested that 
Evatt might visit the United States to press Australia and 
New Zealand's case for participation in discussionso 
Dr. Evatt, he felt~ would do more good in Washington than 
lJ4. 
any other man from the Pacific. Fraser felt in agreement 
with Evatt on Commonwealth consultation. While there was 
some justification for the Dominions being overlooked when 
the United,Kingdom representative had to act without even 
consul ting his co.lleagues, he felt that when it came to a 
series of events that meant practical exclusion the time 
was ripe for protest by Dominion governments. Walter Nash 
ofNew Zealand said he had no doubt that the Australia-New 
Zealand Agreement had decided the Americans to withdraw 
from the South Pacific. Fraser and Evatt agreed that the 
Agreement had been successful in this. Fraser said that 
Cordell Hull had dismissed any notion of changes in sovereignty 
of the Pacific Islands without consultation. 
Fraser's reference to the need for Evatt to visit 
Washington was directly related to Australia's proposals 
for ensuring adequate representation in the drafting of the 
Pacific armistice. The Australian conference paper57 showed 
that Dr. Evatt had proposed exercising Australia's distinct 
international status in the cause of the post-war regional 
security. Fraser's suggestion was ·by way of a counter 
proposal. The Department of External Affairs, which authorized 
57. Approach to Pea~£1bb._Set~!!liU!..1, 44/6J0/5/l/ll/l6, 
Confe~ence Papers,_!gen:la Papers, .Q.Qnclu§j.Q.ng_. 
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the Australian conference papers, 58 felt that since the 
Anzac Agreement had been signed in the previous January the 
trend towards the handling of United Nat:i.ons affairs on a 
ihree or four power basis had continued even more markedly 
than before. In Europe the result had been the effective 
exclusion of any countries except the United Kingdom, United 
States, and the U.S.S.R. from most of the significant aspects 
of the European settlement, in particular the Armistice and 
post-armistice control of Germany. 'If the same thing 
happens in the Pacific region, Australian and New Zealand 
policy over the .last year would lose meaning in probab.ly 
its most vi ta.l aspect.' 59 
The Department had reasons to believe that some 
technical post-hostilities planning for the Pacific region 
had commenced in London and probably also in Washington. 
Experience with Europe and the Cairo Conference had shown 
that even if it were possible for Australia and New Zealand 
agencies to take part :in preliminary technical planning for 
.the Pacific armistice there was still far from adequate 
assurance that arrangements would not be agreed on at any 
time, with litt.le warning, between the principal governments. 60 
58. 
59. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
60. Ibid 0 
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It was thus that Austra.lia, in this conference agenda paper~ 
proposed the establishment of a Pacific equivalent to the 
European Advisory Commission. The Pacific body should have 
a broader membership than the European but could not include 
r h J 1 61 all the belligerents in t e apanese war. .It was thus 
proposed thats on the basis of a real war contribution, such 
a Commission could be limited to eight members - Netherlands, 
France, India, Australia, New 'Zealand, U.K., U.S. and China. 
'Better still would be a commission of U .K., U .s. and China 
with Aus tra.lia representing the smal.ler powers, and for this 
62 in fact a strong case could be made out. Y 
The Austra.lian paper further suggested that the proposed 
South-west and South Pacific Regiona.l Conference, envisaged 
under Artie.le 34 of the Australia New 'Zealand Agreement, 
should now be convened for the purpose of establishing such 
an Advisory Commission. It was admitted, however~ that it 
was possibly too early to make such a move and that 'direct 
and if necessary personal representations in London and 
Washington could be initiated wi1thout delay, as a preliminary 
to the holding of such a conference. t 63 Fraser, in effect, 
had seized on this suggestion of personal representation and 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
63 0 Ibid. 
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was to be successful at the talks in having this method 
adopted as the means by which both countries would seek 
representation in Pacific armistice discussions - nots as 
ihe Austra.lians had intended, as a means of arranging the 
calling of a Pacific Conference which would lead to the 
establiShment of an Advisory Commission. 64 New Zealandfs 
.lack of enthusiasm for the .latter schemes was perhaps in 
part the result of a shrewd assessment of the minor ro.le she 
would play within themo 
Section II of the Conference conclusions consequently 
reads as follows:- 65 
64. The Australian High Commissioner had warned Evatt, 
on Evattt s arrival in Wel.lington, that New Zealand 
would be likely to fo.llow this course o t The New 
Zealand Government would probahly fee.l that a special 
United Nations body such as a Pacific Advisory Commission 
might not be necessary and that a direct approach to the 
United Kingdom and the United States would be a preferable 
way of expressing our viewso' Notes on the Agenda for 
the fo rt he om i !11L.Q onf er enc e -12!.:.§ll~Q__Qy_...:th~._!us t ral i .fill 
Hig]], Commi§.§.i™u-Wel.lington, 44/630/5/1/11/9, 
~_g_endao 
6 5. 44/ 630 / 5/1/11/16, Conference !,l.?l2.~.I.fu..._b.~nd£!_!?.§tJ2Q!:.§., 
QQ.n..gJJ!St211.§.o In the text of the Conclusions handed 
to the British and Canadian High Commissioners at the 
close of the Conference on 6 November and, between 
11 and .17 November to the American Minister in 
Canberra for transmittal to Washington, Articles II 4 
and Section III were appropriately omitted. 
1J8. 
II. Armistice Arrangements • 
. 1. The conference has noted the communications which 
have been exchanged on the subject of Armistice 
arrangements in Europe. It considers that the 
Dominions and other nations which have been 
actively engaged from the beginning in the war 
against the Axis powers, and have contributed 
materially to their defeat both on the European 
fronts and in other theatres of war, are 
enti t.led to an effective voice in the conclusion 
of the European Armistice and thepreparation for 
the Peace Settlements and participation in their 
own right in the contro.l of armistice machinery. 
2. In the interests of the solidarity of the United 
Nations, both Australia and New Zealand have felt 
obliged to acquiesce in their exclusion from these 
arrangements in Europe even though settlements of 
vital concern have been involved, but they cannot 
acquiesce in a similar situation in the Pacific 
and the Far East. 
J. Australia and New Zealand are agreed that they 
should take the strongest possihle action to ensure 
that their governments are consulted in regard to 
1J9o 
the drafting of armistices with Japan and Thailand 
and that they have the right of participating in 
armistice control arrangements. 
4o As a step in promoting this agreed policy the New 
Zealand representatives proposed and the Conference 
approved that the Australian Minister for Externa.l 
, 
Affairs should visit the United States and the 
United Kingdom for the purpose of making personal 
representations on this matter in appropriate 
quarters. 
5. Noting c.lauses 7 to .Ll of the Australiai New Zealand 
Agreement and the work already done, the two 
governments agree that they will proceed further 
with the co-ordination of their armistice and 
post-hosti.li ties p.lanning. 
Part III of the Conclusions referred to the South and 
South West Pacific Conference envisaged under Artie.le 34 of 
the A.N .z. Agreement. This was to retain its origina.l 
purpose and to remain a South and South West Pacific Conference 
rather than be expanded, as the Australian paper had implied~ 
to cover the area of the Pacific Armistice. 
140. 
III P .f. Q t• 66 • aci ic ues ions. 
The Conference has considered the procedure for 
summoning the Internationa.l Conference relating to 
the South and South West Pacific provided for in 
c.lause 34 of the Australian New 'Zealand Agreement. 
The New Zea.land representatives proposed and the 
Conference approved that in the first instance the 
Australian Minister for External Affairs should take 
the earliest opportunity of discussing in Washington 
and London the convening of the Conference at an ear.ly 
date. 
On 26 March 1945 officials in the State Department 
in Washington concluded the preparation of a loose-leaf 
This vo.lume was based 
on the period~ therefore, before the powers had formal.ly 
submitted their proposed amendments for consideration at 
the San Francisco Conference. Every extract re.lating to 
66. Ibid. 
67. United Nations Archives, New York. !m:Q.!~_g_ra.l File, 
Box 5, Dumbarton Oaks - fQilll.!!.fil11S~.:£9J20Sals and 
AmendmeQ.i§_. 
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Australian comments and suggestions comes from Section I 
of the Wellington Conference Conclus~ with the significant 
exception of one extract from Evatt's Ministerial Statement 
of 8 September 1944 which epitomized his argument for small 
power and regional representation on the executive authority 
of the world organizationo That the Wellington conclusions 
on World Organization did not contain this important aspect 
of Australia's policy at San Francisco can be easily 
explained in terms ofthe limited immediate appeal of such a 
proposal to New Zealand. It is also a useful caution against 
regarding the Wellington proposals as anything more than a 
very preliminary statement of some elements of Australia 2 s 
policy at San Francisco. 
The Wellington conclusions on General International 
Organization were as fo.llows: 
I. General International Organiza,j;~Q!!.o 
1. Australia and New Zealand desire to play their full 
part in establishment of a General International 
Organization for the purpose of preserving peace 
and security and promoting human welfare. 
2. In order that such Organization may bring into 
being an effective and lasting system of co.llective 
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security, all the members should pledge themselves 
to co-operate in carrying out by force, if need 
be, the decision of the Organization for the 
preservation of the peace. 
J. T.he Charter of the Organization should make clear 
to the peoples of the world the principles on 
which the action of the Organization is to be 
based. 
4. It should be a positive principle of the Organization, 
openly declared and binding on all members that the 
territorial integrity and political independence 
-
of members should be preserved against change by 
force or threat or force from another power.' Provision 
should be made by the Organization for facilitating 
the orderly change of situations, the continuance of 
which migh~ endanger the peace of the world. 
5. T.he Charter of the organization should embody the 
essential principles of the Atlantic Charter and the 
Philadelphia Declaration. 
6. T.he Organization should be open to all sovereign 
states subject to approval of their admission by 
the Assembly. 
143. 
7. The success of such an Organization will depend 
upon the leadership of the Great Powers, but it is 
essential that all manbers should actively participate 
in the general control and direction of its affairs. 
To this end, the powers and functions of the Assembly 
should be such as to enable it at any of its meetings 
to deal with any matter within the sphere of action of 
the Organization, subject only to the executive powers 
of the Security Council in regard to the settlement 
of disputes and the action to be taken against an 
aggressor. 
8. There should be the maximum employment of the 
Inte:rnational Court of Justice for the ascertainment 
of facts which may be in dispute. 
9. The Security Council should be limited in numbers, 
while being as representative as possible, and for 
the purpose of preserving security, should be vested 
with wider powerso 
10. The specia.lized bodies set up separately for various 
purposes of international welfare should be brought 
within the framework of the Organization. 
l44o 
ll. Powers responsible :for dependent territories should 
accept the principle o:f trusteeship, already applicab.le 
in the case of mandated territories. In such mandated 
territories the purpose of the trust is the welfare 
and advancement of the native peoples. Colonial 
powers should undertake to make regular reports to 
an international body ana.lagous to the Permanent 
Mandates Commission, set up within the framework of 
the General Organization. This body should be 
empowered to publish reports of its deliberations 
and to inspect dependent territories. 
12. For the new Organisation to fulfil its task, the 
condition underlying all others is that members 
should fu.l.ly honour the obligations they assume. 68 
Evatt was later to speak of these conclusions 'as a 
valuable basis for the international policy to be applied at 
68. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Unit.fill 
Nations ConferenlliL,.Q.!L.!!!ternational nrganization Held at 
San Francisco, U.S.A. from 25 April !Q.....£6 June. J.21L2.. 
Report_Q;( th~ Australian Delegates~e Righi_!!Q,nourable 
F.M. Forde M.P:;,:::r:D.epull...E!:.i.IDJLMini~;i;:__aus!_Nini~r for 
the Arm--Yl:O and the Right Honourahle H.V. Evatti_~., 
M.P. Atto£.!!~Generaland Minister for External 
Affairs Canberra, 1945, (hereafter Austr£1,lian R~ort 
.2.!LU•!!•C.I.O.) p 0 60 0 
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the international conference at San FranciscoY 69 but 
subsequent to this assessment of 22 February; 1945 there were 
to be a number of fundamental additions to Australia's 
po.licy as finally argued at San Francisco. Perhaps his 
most accurate appraisal was made in a Ministerial Statement 
on the Wellington Conference tabled in the House of 
Representatives on JO November 1944. 
At the We.llington Conference attention wa~ given 
to the genera.l princip.les imp.lied in the LDumbarton 
Oaks] proposals. The Conference was able to agree 
on matters which the two Governments fe.l t should 
form part of the broad planning for a general 
international organization, of which the two 
objects will be, first, to maintain peace and 0 
security, and second to promote human we.lfare. 7 
But in this Statement, as in his radio broadcast to the 
_people of New Zealand from Wellington on the night before 
the talks had ended, 71 Evatt' s greatest emphasis was upon 
the pro bl em of the Pacific peace settlement and armistice. 
Barely five months before the San Francisco Conference was 
to open Evatt asserted to the Australian Par.liament that 
690 C.P.D., vol. 181, 22 February 1945, p.66. A similar 
assessment may be found in Norman Harper and David 
Sissons, Aus:,tralia and the United Nations, New York, 
1959, p.4J. 'The reso.lutions of the Conference, adopted 
by the Australian Government on .10 November .1944, became 
the basis for Australian po.licy at San Francisco. t 
70. C.P.D., vo.L .180, JO November .1944, p.25J4. 
71. The text of this talkis printed in ~N.I.A., vol. 15, 
no. Ll~ November 1 , PP• 
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Whatever may be said in relation to Europe 1 we have 
a right to expect that the Australian and New Zealand 
Governments will have a fu.11 share in all the arrange ... 
ments to be made at all stages of the planning for the 
armistice and post-armistice period of the war against 
Japan eoo all must realize that the claim we have made 
to take a ful.l share in all decisions and arrangements 
affecting the Pacific region is not only reasonable 
but incontestable.72 
72. CoPoDo~ vol. .180, JO November 1944, p.2536. 
CHAPTER IV. 
AUSTRALIAN POST-WAR TRUSTEESHIP AND INTERNATIONAL 
FULL EMPLOYMENT POLICY, 1942-1944. 
1117. 
The At.lantic Charter 9 of 14 August .194.1, had affirmed, 
in Artie.le 3~ a respect for the right of a.11 nations to 
choose the form of government under which they would live. 
It had a.lso spoken, in the same Article, of a 'wish to see 
sovereign rights and se.lf-government restored to those 
who ba ve been forcihly deprived of them'. Churchill's 
subsequent statement to the House of Commons on 9 September 
1941 that this Artie.le was not intended to apply to India 
and Burma but only to European nations occupied by the 
Nazis, 1 should perhaps be seen more as an i.llustration of 
Lord Hailey's claim, made in 1938, that British co.lonial 
policy 'is indeed cbaracteri zed as a series of improvisations 
which depend for success not on a logical outlook, but on 
the exercise of a tradi tiona.l ski.Ll in accommodating 
princip.les to circumstances Y, 2 than as an i.Llustration of a 
British disregard for the interests of her colonies. Indeed 
the Colonial Welfare Act of 1940 had permitted an annua.l 
expenditure of five mil.lion pounds for a period of ten years 
1. 374 H.C. Deb. 5s. cols. 67-9. 
2. Lord Hai.ley, An Af:i;.:;i,._£1!!!_ Survey~ StyQy_Q.f_Problem§. 
Arisi:gg_in, __ !fri ca Sou th of the Sahara, London, 1938~ 
p .143. 
on schemes of welfare and development in dependencies 
which had hitherto been largely expected to finance them-
selves. Churchill's statement did aptly characterize 9 
nonetheless, British conservatism in the matter of progress 
towards co.lonial self-government or independence. It 
was this aspect, particularly, of British colonial policy 
which llaS to be severely chal.lenged in the United States 
during 1942. 
For the speed with which the Japanese had been able 
to establish contro.l over Southeast Asian and Pacific 
colonies, notably Malaya, had given rise to substantial 
criticism of British co.lonial administration. As a 
contributor to the Round Table saw it in December 1942 9 
incidents which have[occurred in thecourse of the 
(Japanese] invasion in the Far East] have brought 
into question not only the character of the admini-
stration of our possessiorain the Far East and the 
Pacific~ but the policy which has been followed in 
our Co.lonial Empire at .large.3 
Much of this criticism came from the United States where 
not only President Roosevelt, but also his Under Secretary 
of State, Sumner Welles, had strongly anti-colonial outlooks 
which were shared by influential sections of press and 
J. Anon~ 'Future of the Colonies', Round Table, vol. JJ, 
no • 129 , p • l 0 • 
149. 
university opinion. In May 1942, Roosevelt had indicated 
to Molotov, during Molotov's visit to Washington, that he 
had a strong interest in the post-war establishment of 
international trusteeship for various occupied dependencies 
in Southeast Asia. 2 'I'he President then pointed out that 
acceptance of this principle would mean the abandonment of 
the mandate system'. 4 Roosevelt here referred to his 
preference for joint international administration of these 
territories rather than administration by a single nation 
on behalf of an international body as was the case under 
the League mandate system. Roosevelt spoke to Molotov of 
this joint administration continuing for about twenty years 
until these detached colonies were ready for self-government, 
a state which he equated with independ~. Roosevelt also 
mentioned during this conversation with Molotov that some 
islands and possessions, of strategic importance, might be 
held under international trusteeship for a longer peJ:'iod. 5 
4. Memorandum by Samuel H. Gross, Professor of Slavic 
Languages at Harvard University, who acted as an 
interpreter at the meeting. The memorandum is printed 
in Robert E. Sherwood, .'.!he White House Papers of Harry 
L. Hopkins, London, 1949, p.577. 
5. Cross memorandum, Ibid., pp.577-8. 
In the same month, Sumner Welles placed a similar emphasis 
on political independence, if' not on international administra-
tiono In a pub.lie address he spoke of' the end of' the 2 age of' 
I 
. . l" t 6 1mper1a ism • 'Our victory must bring in its train the 
liberation of' al.l peoples'. 7 This same emphasis was apparent 
in the Draft Protocol on Trusteeshin prepared in the State 
Department under his direction in the summer and autumn of' 
1942. A trusteeship system would be app.licable to all 
non-se.lf'-governing territories with a general international 
organ as the judge of' when and whether any particular people 
8 
was ready for independence or self-government. The American 
'Committee on Africa, the War and Peace Aims' according to 
the Round Table, at th:is time published views on the application 
of' the Atlantic Charter to the future of' the American colonieso 
'The Committee seems to have been less impressed with the 
virtue of' an immediate right of' self-determination than with 
that of' the international c~ntrol of' dependencies'. 9 
6. United States Department of' State, Bul.letin, vol. 6, JO 
May, 1942, p.4880 
7. Ibido 
8. Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision, New York, 1944, 
pp.J8J-4. 
9. Anon. 1 Future of' the Colonies', Round '.fa]2le, vol. 33, 
no. 129, p •. 11. 
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Evatt, in his first major statement on post-war aims 
in September 1942 9 had not spoken at .length on the question 
of trusteeship although this would c.learly be a subject of 
direct post-war interest to Australia, Which since 1920 had 
administered the Territory of New Guinea under a League of 
Nations C Class Mandateo The territory was contiguous to 
Aus tra.lia' s own co .1 ony of Papua o Since 1942 both New Guinea 
and Papua had been under the unified military administration 
of the Australian-New Guinea Administration Unit, although 
a committee under F.W. Eggleston:1 had, in 1939, rejected 
joint administration as a peacetime possibi.li ty •10 Egg.leston rs 
knowledge of trusteeship questions was to be at Evatt's 
disposa.l during the San Francisco Conference a.l though he was, 
from 1941 until 1944 Australian Minister in Chungking. That 
Evatt in September 1942 said litt.le on the subject may be 
ei:plained by the fact that Papua and New Guinea had been in 
peace-time the concern of the Australian Department of External 
Territories. Evatt's chief trusteeship adviser, prior to and 
at San Francisco, W.Do Forsyth, did not join External Affairs 
until December 1942 after a period as a Coordinator of 
Intelligence in the Department of Informationo From 1938-41 
10. A.Ho McDona.ld (ed.), Trust~.~sht.£ in the Pacifies Sydney, 
1 9, p. 
l.)2o 
he had been Research Officer in the Australian Institute of 
International Affairs. Forsyth spent some time after he 
joined External Affairs preparing papers .on the future of 
Malaya, Portuguese Timor, and Indo-China before concentrating 
his interest on the future of the co.lonial system o What Evatt 
did say on the subject in September 1942 was, however, 
si.gnificant. Firstly, he placed no strong emphasis on self-
gav ernment or independence. He .looked forward to Indian 
self-gavernment11 - but under the form of Dominion status 
at a time when Gandhi was leadir.g, to the acute discomfort 
of the British Government, passive resistance campaigns for 
immediate ful.l independence. 12 Secondly, Evatt stressed 
'freedom from want' - 2 if freedom from want means anything 
it means that the age of unfair exp.loi tation is over'. Evatt 
then argued that if the attainment of a higher and better 
standard of life for a.Ll the Pacific peop.les involved any 
changes in forms of government either as a means of progress 
or as a consequence of iti the United Nations must be prepared 
to make the necessary changes • iin short we must found future 
. ll. C.P.D., volo 172, J September 1942, po82. 
12. See, for examp.le, the comments of Corde.ll HuLl, 
Memoirs of Corde.11 Hull, volo II, New York, 1948, 
PPel486-9-o ------
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Pacific policy on the doctrine of trusteeship for all the 
Pacific peoples' •13 But what did Evatt mean by 'trusteeship'? 
Roosevelt equated it with a type of administration, similar 
to the League Mandate system in its responsibility to an 
international body, but going beyond that system with his 
proposals for joint international administration instead of 
administration by a single power. Evatt seemed to have in 
mind an ext.fil!.sio!L...Q.£ the League system whereby all Pacific 
colonies would be administered by single powers under 
international supervi.§.i.Qn. 'That doctrine of [trusteeship] 
the Commonwealth has endeavoured to carry out in New Guinea 
under the Mandate System of the League of Nations. Japan's 
record as a mandatory power only p:roves that a solemn trust 
14 
can be betrayed'. 
What the wartime British government -qnderstood by the 
term 'trusteeship' became clear in the closing months of 1942. 
That it was most certainly llQ.i seen as involving the right to 
early self-determination was again emphasized by Churchill in 
his reaction to an article, advising Britain to divest herself 
13. C.P_&. vol. 172, 3 September, 1942, p.83. 
1.4. Ibid. 
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of the Empire, which appeared in Life magazine in October 
1942. Churchil.1 announced in November that he had no intention 
of presiding over the dissolution of the British Empire.15 
On 3 December» Lord Cranborne, who had been replaced by 
Oliver Stanley on 23 November as Colonial Secretary, had 
made direct reference in the House of Lords to the concept 
of trusteeship. 'In the nineteenth century the idea that 
as an advanced nation we had a moral responsibility for 
tbe welfare of backward peoples of the Empire came to be 
generally accepted as the basis afBritish Colonial Policy. 
Old ideas of exploitation had given place to a new doctrine 
of trusteeship.' 16 On 21 December Oliver Stanley spoke 
of an ob.ligation to foster political development in colonies, 
to raise their standard of living, and to provide them with 
adequate social services. He added that he hoped to see in 
'tbe colonial sphere the con ti nuance of wa ti2.!ll!:,l §.2.Yerei~ 
which should be combined with the principle of international 
co-operaii..Qn. of which he said the Anglo-Caribbean Commission 
17 
might be taken as an example. The British view of trustee-
ship, 
l.J. 
16. 
17. 
then, was centred on the voluntary benevolence of 
The Tim~, ll November 1942. 
Quoted in C,N.I.A , vol. XIV, no. l, January 1943, p.60 
Ibid. 
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colonial powers who would continue to maintain sovereignty 
over their territories. Poli tic al deve.lopmen t was to be a 
long term and gradual process. No mention was made of the 
mandate system of the League to which Australian proposa.ls 
were closely re.lated. Internationa.l supervision was to be 
replaced by international cooperation. What Stanley had 
foreshadowed in his reference to the Anglo-Caribbean 
Commission, he made explicit early in 1943 when he explained, 
as Lord Hailey had done at the Institute of Pacific Relations 
Conference in Quebec some months earlier, 18 that internationa.l 
cooperation was to operate through !:§.giona.l 12_;:trtnershi120 19 
In January 1943, Cu!:L~Jit Notes, the official organ of 
the Australian Department of Externa.l Affairs, introduced a 
selection of the views of various governments on colonial 
questions with the comment i Current discussion has already 
shown tbat the future of dependent territories wil.l be one 
of the main questions of the post-war international settle-
20 
ment'. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the British 
.18. Institute of Pacific Re.lat ions, :!Jar and Peace in the 
f'acific, (A Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference 
of the Institute of Pacific Re.lations on the Wartime and 
Post-War Co-operation o.f the United Nations in the Pacific 
and the Far East, Mont Tremb.lant, Quebec, December 4-14, 
1942), New York, 1943, pp.12-5. 
19. 391 H.C. Debo, 5s. cols. 47-9. 
20. C.Nd~·, vol. XIV, noo l~ January 1943, p.17. 
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Cabinet had accepted (subject to the agreement of the 
Dominion governments) a draft declaration on future colonial 
l . 21 po icyo 
suggests, 
They considered this declaration necessary$ Woodward 
'in view of opinion generally in the United States 
and of' the President's large though somewhat vague ideas about 
trusteeship'. 22 The British had in mind a unilaterial 
declaration but Lord Halifax, the British .Ambassador in 
Washington, reported that Cordel.l Hull favoured a joint Anglo-
.American statement possibly supported by other co.lonial 
powers. 23 Halifax handed a British draft text to Hull on 
4 February 1943. Hull gave an American redraft to Anthony 
Eden at the end of Eden's visit to Washington (12-30 March) 
on 29 March 1943. 24 Hull's redraft entitled Dec.laratio!!..l2.Y, 
the United Nations on Nationa!....f~J2Qndence, dated 9 March 1943 9 
and forwarded to the President for approval on 17 March$ 25 
21. Woodward, op. cit.» p.440, footnote 2. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Ibid. See also 'Memorandum of Conversation, by the 
Secretary of State', 29 March 1943, F.R~. 1943, vol. 
III, p.40. 
25. Text in United States Department of State, Post~ 
For~_Policy_frep~:ti-.2!!.L.J-.939-45, Washington, D.c., 
1955, pp.470-2. 
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al though more moderate than Wel.les ~ Drs_ft P:r:otQ.Q.21., contained 
a concept of trusteeship markedly different to that held by 
the British. 
Under C.lause I 1 (ct) of the Hu.11 Declaration the 
signatory nations undertook fto fix, at the earliest 
practicable moments, dates upon Which the colonial peoples 
shall be accorded the status of full independence within a 
f 1 . t ' 26 system o genera securi y • They also undertook to 
set up under Clause I 3, regional commissions Which wou.ld 
provide for continuous consultation and col.laboration between 
and among the nations which were direct.ly responsible for 
various colonial areas and other nations which had substantial 
interests in the regions in which such areas are located'o 27 
Such a proposal sounds notdissimilar to British proposals 
for regional colonial partnership. But in addition to these 
commissions~ the Hull proposals provided in Clause II, .1 and 
2 for an Y International Trusteeship Administration~ j to 
assume, in respect to detached territories of the previous 
war and of the war then being fought, r a special responsibility 
analogous to that of a trustee or fiduciary'. 28 The Administra-
26. Ibid. p.471. 
27. Ibid. pp. 4 71-2. 
28. Ibid. p.472. 
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tion, i tse.lf composed of Y representatives of the United 
Nations and of al.l other nations which now, or which may 
hereafter, cooperate in carrying forward and applying the 
provisions of the Atlantic Charter'~ 29 was to 'operate 
through regiona.l counci.ls composed of representatives of 
the nations having major interests in their respective 
regions'. JO What is not c.lear from the text of the Hul.l 
proposal is whether the detached territories under the 
fiduciary care of the Trusteeship Administration were to 
be administered by a single nation, as in the Evatt and 
League concepts, or by a joint administration of the kind 
favoured by Roosevelt. Roosevelt had shown continuing 
interest in this administrative concept when he spoke to 
Eden on 27 March 194J. He suggested that international 
trusteeship be established for Korea, French Inda-China~ and 
T . Jl 1mor. tMr. Eden told the President that experience in the 
New Hebrides had shown the practical difficulties of inter-
national alli~inistration~ even under trusteeship, and that it 
would be desirable to hand over administration to a single 
29. Ibid. 
JO. Ibid. 
Jl. Woodward~ op. cit., pp.4J9-4l. Hull, op. cit. 9 p.12J7. 
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trustee.' 32 
The Hul.l document is unclear, furthermore, on the 
question of' whether the proposed regional colonial commissions 
under I 3 were to be independent of', or subsidiary to, the 
International Trusteeship Administration which was to have 
its own regional councilso There seems to be little doubt 
that, even if' the regional colonial commissions were seen 
as independent of' the Administration, they were not to be 
merely centres for cooperation and advice on the British 
regional model. When Hull gave his redraft to Eden he 
explained, by his own account, that it was intended to 
provide for extensive international observa,tion of' co.lonies 
still under the control of' parent governments 
I remarked on that occasion that our draft contemplated 
international supervision over dependent peoples except 
in cases of' parent governments and their, colonies; and 
even in those cases we proposed that international 
agencies might observe the entire operations of the 
parent government relating to each colony and make 
pub.lie any and all facts that it would have the public 
know.33 
It would seem that Hull was contemp.lating a degree of' inter-
national supervision; for colonies still under parent contro.l 
which went beyond the degree of' supervision exercised under 
32. Woodward, op. cit. p.441. 
33. Hull, op. cit., p.12340 
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the League Mandate system. Observation of the 'entire 
operations' of the parent government would seem to imply 
the possibility of visits and inspection by an international 
body in addition to the reporting procedures required under 
the League system 0 34 But whereas Hull's draft had provided 
for two types of supervisory bodies involving two types of 
trusteeship the Australian views while also, as will be seen, 
invo.lving two types of trusteeship, were centred on one 
general international colonial commi§.§.i.2!!. 
In an address at the Overseas Press Club, New York, on 
28 Apri.l 1943, Evatt gave a further public indication of 
Australia's views on post-war trusteeship. The League of 
Nations Mandate System had 1 the germ of the right approach1 o 3 5 
It had not been entirely successful 'partly because of its 
limited application, partly because the undertakings given 
by the countries concerned were not sufficiently precise, and 
partly becausei in some cases, the undertaking actually given 
was not carried out'o 36 As in his September 1942 speech, 
34. Article 22 (7) of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
read 'In every case of mandate, the mandatory shall 
render to the Council an annual report in reference to 
the territory committed to its charge'. 
35. C.N~.~ vol. XIV, no. 5, May 1943, p.147. 
36. Ibid. 
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Evatt in New York did not place emphasis upon political 
<level opment o 
ooo in analysing the application of this trusteeship 
to the actual problems of colonies, the major attention 
has up to the present been placed upon the po.li ti cal 
aspects of development, that is 2 it has been emphasized 
that the trustee country has an obligation to educate 
and develop the peoples under its control along the 
road to self-governmento Australia feels that emphasis 
should also be placed on the economic factor. In 
short the principle of trusteeship also implies that 
the trustee power wil.l ensure that the economic develop-
ment of the colonial areas is conducted in a way which 
is not opposed to the interests of the peoples of the 
worldoJ7 
There are grounds to believe that the private views of the 
Australian government on the question of trusteeship in the 
early months of 1943 were, like the views expressed by 
Evatt, much closer to the American than to the British 
position. An Australian policy paper38 at the Wel.lington 
Conference referred to Anglo-Australian exchanges of views 
on trusteeship in the first half of 194Jo 
J7. Ibid. ppo.147-80 
J8. 'Colonial Policy and the Future of the Mandates System, 
Agenda Notes submitted by the Australian Delegation', 
44/6J0/5/l/ll/16o (Wellington Conference) Conference 
Papers, Agenga Papers, Concl.!:!§.i:Q!!o 
I 
I" 
i ,, 
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The exchanges between the United Kingdom and the 
Dominions at this time revealed some differences of 
opinion on the question of international supervision 
of colonial administrationo The Australian government 
emphasized the importance of colonial powers being 
accountable to the general international community. 
The Australian view was that both the accountabi.lity 
of colonial powers and the expression of general 
world opinion and 'third party' interests of non-
colonial powers in colonial questions should be 
provided for in the form of a general international 
co.lonial commission comparable to the Permanent 
Mandates Commission, the function of which would be 
to exercise a general supervision of administration 
of all non-self governing territoriesoJ9 
On 25 March 1943, Sir Owen Dixon, who had succeeded RoGo Casey 
as Australian Mini st er in Washington, told Corde.1.1 Hul.l that 
his government had seen the British proposal to this 
government in regard to trusteeships in relation to 
dependent peoples. He said his goverrunent was in 
accord with the British proposal. He then added that 
his government would in fact be willing to go a little 
furtherand provide that a suitab.le international 
authority to oversee the matidate operations should also 
have authority to deal likewise with colonies and their 
parent governments. He said that a second more advanced 
position than the British, which his country favors, 
would be for an international authority to be clothed 
with more power to supervise backward peoples and the 
operation of the government authorities in relation 
to them. I thanked the Minister and said that I had 
subnitted all the avai.lable data on the colonial 
questions to thePresid~8t, who has the matter 
immediately in charge. 
While differing from the American emphasis on self-government 
and iniependence and on the desirability of joint international 
39. Ibid. 
40. 'Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State', 
25 March 1943~ ~.U.So, 1943, vol. I, p.889. 
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administration of trusteeship territories, Australia, 
nonetheless, through its adherence to an extended Mandate 
system, which Evatt had now in New York made public.ly and 
quite clearly central to his trusteeship policy, joined 
America in accepting the principle of universal international 
accountability. Australia believed that accountability of 
mandatory and colonial powers, the expression of general 
world opinion and !third party' interests of non-colonial 
powers in co.lonial questions, should be provided for in the 
form of a general international co.lonial commission 
comparab.le to the Permanent Mandates Commission. The 
function of this general co.lonial commission would be to 
exercise a genera.l supervision of administration of all 
non-self-governing territories. 
That the British Government was 'unab.le to accept' 
Hull's Decl.£1.ratiQll of March 1943 apparently did not become 
known to the United States Government unti.l August of the 
same year. 4 ·1 By the official British account, the United 
41. Woodward, of· o cit., p.440, footnote 2. "Mr. Eden gave 
Mr. Winant 'United States Ambassador in London] an 
~~!!!Q.ire on the subject on May 26 1943. Mr. Winant 
promised a redraft of his own, but did not produce it. 
He also seems to have omitted to send the aide-memoire 
to Washington." Ibid. 
Kingdom government 'was unable to accept this redraft since 
it called, e.g. for the :fixing of dates, as soon as was 
practicable~ for the grant of full independence to all 
colonies, and made no distinction between dependent 
territories and territories which had lost their indepen-
42 dence'. The latter objection is overlooked in Hul.1 11 s 
account of his informal interview with Eden at Quebec. His words 
when Eden gave him news of the British rejection of the 
draft, stress the importance of the British objections 
to 'independence'. 
••• the Foreign Secretary said that, to be perfectly 
frank, he had to say he did not, like the draft very 
much. He said it was the word 'independence' that 
troubled him, he had to think of theBritish Empire 
system which was4built on the basis of Dominion and 
colonial status. 3 
But Woodward's reference to British objection to a lack of 
differentiation in thetl'.'eatment of detached and dependent 
territories points to Britain's conservatism on the question 
of international accountability and supervision. It has 
42. Ibid. 
43. Hul.l, op. cit. p .1237. 'At the end of the long discussion 
that followed, Eden's position remained unchanged. His 
irremovahle objection was to the word "independence".' 
p .1238. 
already been noted that British statements on trusteeship 
had stressed national sovereignty and regional cooperation. 
T.his same emphasis was evident in Oliver Stanley's statement 
on Colonial po.licy to the British Parliament on July 13 
1943. 44 Again Stanley made no mention of the Mandate 
System. In the United States» the Universities Committee 
on Post-War International Problems saw the implications of 
British policy o 
Great Britain wil.l welcome advice, but will remain 
solely responsible for the development of her 
colonial domain. T.his attitude may reflect a 
stiffening imperia.l po.licy in the present world 
situation; it'.;may also indicate a judgement that 
the mandate system was not in the judgement of 
the present British Government wholly satisfactory.45 
Australian colonial policy during 1943 and 1944 developed 
largely in a context of British-Australian rather than 
Australian-American discussiono In circumstances where 
Australian views were not dissimilar to the British on 
the question of se.lf-determination and political independence» 
the differences between the two countries centred on the 
prohlem of international accountability and an extension of 
44. 
45. 
391 !i!.20 Deb. cols.47-9. 
Universities Committee on Post-War International 
Problems, Colonies~ Dependent Areas, Boston, .1943, 
P• 21 o 
166. 
the mandate systemo While an examination of Anglo-American 
colonial po.lici es has revealed British sensitivity on the 
question of 'independence', the Anglo-Australian differences 
illustrate above all the conservatism of British policy on 
the question of international accountabilityo Australian 
colonial policy in these years (1942-mid 1944) in fact formed 
a middle way between the British and American positions 
of conservatism and reform respe ctive.ly. 
The Australian-New Zealand Agreement gave only small 
consideration to the problem of trusteeship. However, it did 
embody the first detai.led public statement of Australian 
post-war colonial po.licy. In Article 28 of the Agreement 
the two countries declared 
that in applying the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter to the Pacific~ the doctrine of 'trusteeship' 
(already applicable in the case of mandated territories 
of which the two governments are mandatory powers) is 
applicable in broad principle to all colonial 
territories in the Pacific and elsewhere, and that 
the main purpose of the trust is the welfare of the 
native peoples and thei;: social, economic and 
political development.4° 
This statement clearly carried the application of 'trusteeship' 
beyond the Pacific. But just what was involved in the applica-
tion 1 in broad principle' of the mandate system is not at all 
evident. Because the two nations here speak of the mandatory 
46. Q_ili.I.A., vol. 15, no •. 1, January 1944, :pp.5-6. 
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they referred to theirown status as mandatory powerso Did 
they intend that they and other parent nations should after 
the war hold their co.lonies as mandates, that they should 
administer them in addition to their existing mandates, as 
appointed trustees of an international agency, or did they 
mere.ly mean that they should be liable as parent powers to 
a similar degree of international accountabi.li ty as was 
now, and would be, required of mandatory powers? 
British colonial policy, in April 1944, appeared to have 
moved closer to American proposa.ls, which in turn, however, 
ceased to emphasize the general requirement of political 
independence. 47 Thus British foreign office officials and 
the Colonial Secretary in interviews with Stattinius in 
London, expressed willingness to accept a degree of inter-
national supervision through the regional co.lonia.l commissions. 
Stattinius reported that twe and the British found ourselves 
much closer in our thinking at the end of our several talks 
48 than we could have hopedr. He had extensive conversations 
47. James N. Murray, Jro The Uni .. :t~J;L_Nations Trustee~h,;iQ 
Sys:tfil!!., Urbana~ .19 57, pp. 24-6 o 
48. 'Report on Conversations in London, Apri.l 7 to April 29 
1944 1 • FoR.U.S. 1944, vol. III, Po21. 
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with Stanley in the course of which they decided not to 
proceed with the project for an Anglo-American declaration 
of colonial policy. 
At the end of the conversation, Co.lone.l Stanley 
summarized under four heads the genera.l situation, 
as he saw it, as follows: 
(1) Any statements of colonial policy should become 
part of a section on dependent peoples in the 
structure of wor.ld organization and should not 
be a joint declaration. 
( 2) The princip.le of regional commissions is 
acceptable to the British if they are not 
executive in character but are set up to study~ 
recommend and advise. On them should be 
represented not only parent nations but nations 
that have major economic and strategic interests 
in such areas. 
(J) Loca.l branches of functional world organization 
should be linked up to the regional commissions 
in the fields of health, nutrition, labor, etc. 
The functional organizations would consu.l t on 
the recommendations of the regiona.l commissionso 
(4) A definite obligation to publish annual reports 
on each area shou.ld be assumed. This shou.ld be 
an obligation on all the co.lonial powers. Such 
reports should be sent to a control body where 
they would.be avai.lable and interchangeable o 49 
Thus Stanley, whi.le stil.l showing no interest in mandatory 
administration and its concomitant of supervision by a single 
international body was prepared to allow for a degree of 
colonial accountability by reports to regiona.l commissions o 
49. Ibid. p.22o 
The ambiguity in the Australian and New Zealand refer-
ences to the mandate system under the Australian-New Zealand 
Agreement were removed with a major private clarification of 
colonial policy at Wellington in November 1944. Both 
countries reached agreement at Wellington on policies which 
would be the basis of Australia's draft chapter on colonial 
issues at San Francisco. Article .11 of Part I of the 
Wellington conclusions reads as follows: 
Powers responsible for dependent territories should 
accept the principle of trusteeship, already 
app.licable in the case of mandated territories. 
In such dependent territories the purpose of the 
trust is the welfare and advancement of the native 
peoples. Colonial powers should undertake to make 
regular reports to an inteniational body analagous 
to the Permanent Man.dates Commission, set up within 
the framework of the General Organization. This body 
should be empowered to publish reports of its 0 
de.liberations and to inspect dependent territories.5 
This 'public' statement (the Wellington resolutions were 
not pub.lished at the time of the talks but were circulated 
to the Governments of the United ,States, the United Kingdom 
and Canada51 leaves the 'mandate' ambiguity unsolved. 
50. The text of Part I only of the Wellington Conclusions 
is published in the Australian Report on U .~.I.O., 
p.60. Emphasis added. 
51. See above p. /3) fv· 66". 
Were colonies to be administered as mandates or were they 
only to be subject to a 1 mandatoryt system of international 
accountability? What was apparent in this record of 
Conference resolutions, however, was (a) a lack of emphasis 
upon po.li tical independence and (b) the empowering of the 
internationa.l body to inSQect as we.ll as receive reports on 
a1l dependent territories. This provision went beyond the 
supervisory powers of the League Mandate System which could 
only require reports. It clearly went beyond Oliver Stanley's 
requirements for regional commissions to merely study, 
recommend and advisee 
In private discussions at Wellington it became clear 
that Australia and New Zealand were agreed in their continued 
support for an International Colonial Commission to replace 
the Permanent Mandates Commission as the supervisory body 
for mandated territories~ o.ld and new, as wel.l as for a.ll 
colonial peop.les o Both countries agreed that the present 
mandates held by the United Nations should be confirmed and 
that the functions of the Permanent Mandates Commission in 
respect of mandated areas should be transferred to the 
Interna tiona.l Co.lonial Commission. It was thus decided at 
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Wellington that the extension of the mandate system 
envisaged by Australia was to be primarily related to 
accountability rather than administration. Existing and 
new mandates were to be transferred to the administration 
(through a single trustee) and inspection by the new body; 
co.lonies were to be subject to the stringent requirements 
of inspection only by the same body. 
The reso.lutions of the Wellington Conference sub-
committee52 on Colonial Policy were as follows: 
Co.lonial PolicL.= Ma~~. 
The Australian and New Zealand Governments agree: 
1. International ColQ.!!i.al Commission. 
(a) That the principle of trusteeship involves 
accountability to an international body. 
(b) That in pursuance of this principle an 
International Colonial Commission should be 
set up, under the authority of the world 
organization, having a general supervisory 
function in regard to adninistration and 
welfare in all dependent territories. 
(c) That the I.c.c. should as a general rule make 
public its reports and findings. 
2. Regional Commissions. 
(a) That the security of dependent territories 
should be provided for as part of world 
52. 44/630/5/1/11/16. (Wellington Conference) Proceedings. 
'. 
security arrangements and should not be a 
responsi bi.li ty of regional commissions. 
(b) That regional commissions should be concerned 
with co.l.laboration for pu:rp oses of we.lfare and 
economic deve.lopment 1 but not with the super-
vision of co.lonial administration, which 
should be the function of the I.c.C. 
(c) That regional commissions should make avai.lahle 
their reports for the information of the I.c.c. 
3. Mandates. 
172. 
(a) That the present mandates held by the United Nations 
should be confinned. 
(b) That the functions of the Permanent Mandates 
Commission in respect of mandated territories 
should be transferred to the I.c.c. 
Al though Article .1.1 of Part I of the Wel.lington 
Conclusions had made no reference to regional commissions, 
the Conclusions had, in Section IV, 53 provided for the 
establishment of the South Seas Regiona.l Commission, 
previous.ly proposed in tbe Australian-New Zealand Agreement 1 
which would perform the co.Llaborative functions associated 
with health and welfare referred to by the sub-Committee. 
Regionalism the re fore played a part, but a part that was 
clearly subsidiary, in Australia 1 s post-war trusteeship 
policy. 
53. 44/630/5/1/1.1/16. (Wellington Conference) Conference 
Pape!:.§....::,....!~nda Papers Conc.lusions. 
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The pub.lie account of conference decisions on colonial 
policy was given in the closing statement on Monday~ 6 
November 1944 by the Prime Minister of New Zealand who in 
effects paraphrased Article 11 of Part I of the Conclusions 
except that he substituted, at the request of the British 
High Commissioner,54 'visit' for iinspectt in the reference 
to supervision of the dependent territories by the inter-
national bodyo ~This body should be empowered to visit 
dependent territories and to puhlish reports of its 
deliberations. We believe [Fraser added] that this is a 
natural imp.lication of the spirit of t trustee ship t for 
dependent peop.les, and, for our part, we are willing to 
subscribe to a general undertaking to that effect as 
regards both Co.lonial and Mandated areas'. 5 5 On 14 November 
the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Lord Cranborne~ 
informed the Australian Government of British disp.leasure o 
We have .learned with considerahle surprise and 
concern of the statement issued on behalf of 
Austra.lian and New Zealand Governments at the con-
clusion of the recent Conference on the subject of 
co.lonial administration in "Which they dec.lare their 
support for the idea of an international supervisory 
body with power to visit dependent territories and 
54. Wood, op. cit., poJ21. 
55. CoN.I.A.s VO.lo 15s no. lli November 1944, p.JJOo 
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publish reports on its deliberationso As you will 
be aware, from the discussion of the subject at the 
meeting of Commonwealth PoMo's in May this year, 
tm U .K. Government held strongly the view that 
such contro.l by a central international body would 
be most undesirable and that its establishment 
must be contrary to the interests both of the 
dependent peoples and of parent nations and in 
particular of the British Empireo Indeed we 
understand from what passed at the meeting on 
9 May that Mr. Curtin shared our view (see minutes 
of 10th meeting, Po5). Recent proposals of this 
character have been ventilated in the United States 
and in view of this we were about .to address to the 
American Government a communication setting out our 
views in detail, as to the future system of securing 
international cooperation in relation to colonial 
affairs in a fonn which we hoped would be acceptable 
to the Dominion Governments, and also to the United 
States government. This matter is of vital 
importance to the U.K. having regard immense extent 
of our Colonial responsibilityo In our view, in a 
matter of this kind, al.l members of the British 
Commonwealth ought to take every care to coordinate 
as far as possible their respective views before 
entering upon public declarations of policy. We 
can only express our regret that this public 
announcement has been made on behalf of the Australian 
and New Zealand Governments without any prior 
consultation with Grwarning to us. We feel that it 
may well lead to serious difficulty and embarrassment 
in our discussions with the U.So govennment and in the 
future treatment of the question. In view of what has 
occurred we fear that it may become necessary for us 
to make some public statement indicating our own 
attitude with regard to future policy towards colonial 
territories. This will necessarily imply, even if it 
does not directly state, our inability to accept the 
views put for~ard at the recent AoNoZ. Conference on 
this matter.5 · 
Evatt, in a personal reply to Lord Cranborne, commented 
56. 44/6J0/5/l/11/22. (Wellington Conference). Action (b). 
International Co.lonial Commission. 
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'Telegram .325 recalls Colonial Office despatches of the 
distant past'. 57 In a subsequent te.legram58 to the Dominions 
Office he sent a long, reasoned, answer to Cranborne's 
telegram of 14 November. In this he pointed out that 
Australian-New Zealand po.licy had been cons is tent. The 
United Kingdom government had been informed of Australian 
and New Zealand views in the terms of Article 28 of the 
Australian-New Zealand Agreemento This policy, Evatt 
. cla·imed, had not been varied by either government since. 
'While Evatt's claim was true as far as the policy of 
his Department of External Affairs was concerned, Cranborne 
was on strong ground in his reference to Curtin's views 
in London in May 1944. The Australian High Commissioner in 
New Zealand, in a memorandum prepared for Evatt on his 
arriva.l in Welli!lg'ton, had made the following. observation. 
A point of difference in interpreting the princip.le 
of trusteeship appeared at the London Conference of 
Prime Ministerso Mr. Fraser took the view that 
trusteeship involved reporting to a supervisory 
authority. Mr. Curtin, on the other hand, apparently 
supported the British Colonial Secretary's view that 
the trust should be exercised by the Colon~~l power 
only, without reference to outside bodies. 
57. 18 November .1944, Ibid. 
58. Exact date not known; but "between 18/11/44 and 25/.11/44 
when Evatt informed Eggleston that he had sent the 
te.legram and gave an account of its contents. Ibid. 
59. 44/6.J0/5/l/ll/9. (Wellington Conference). Agenda. 
176. 
John Curtin's own report to the House of Representatives on 
17 July 1944 is consistent with Lord Cranborne' s al.legation. 
The discussion on colonial questions was primarily 
focused on the establishment of regional bodies 
along the lines of the South Seas Regional Comm-
ission provided for in the Australian-New Zealand 
Agreemento General agreement was expressed with 
the value of such bodies as an aid to Colonial 
administration, and in giving effect to the 
doctrine of 1 trusteeship' which has as its aim the 
welfare of native peop.les i"Bd their social, economic 
and political development. 
Cranborne might a.lso have quoted to effect Fraser's comments 
in a press statement on the final day (21 January 1944) of 
the Canberra Conference, on the trusteeship clauses of the 
Australian-New Zealand Agreement. 
Both countries have made their position c.lear in 
regard to any changes in contro.l orsovereignty of 
Pacific Islandso They have embodied in the Agree-
ment their fi:r:m belief in the application of the , 
princip.le of trusteeship. In this, their views are 
in the c.losest harmony with the policy and practice 
of the British Government with whom they wil.l 
continue to give and receive utmost cooperation in 
the admigistration of the island territories of the 
Pacific. ·1 
Evatt continued his reasoned rep.ly by countering Cran-
borne' s charge of lack of consultation with the assertion 
trot the British government fai.led to consult the Australian 
government prior to Stanley's statement on British Co.lonial 
60. C.P.D.~ vol. 179, 17 July 1944~ p.40. 
61. C.N.e._!.A., vo.l •. 15j no •. 1, January .1944, p.23. 
.177. 
policy to the House of Commons on 13 July 1943. Evatt 
al so pointed out that the British High Commissioner in 
Wellington had been consulted before the re.lease of Fraser's 
final statement at Wellington to the press. Evatt conc.luded 
by assuring Cranborne that although Australia and New Zealand 
did favour supervision by a general international body they 
favoured supervision and not contro.1. 'We distinguish between 
internal 11 control 11 and "supervision". We favour supervision 
not contro.1?. Such supervision 'would in no way interfere 
62 
with the sovereignty ofparent statest. The Secretary of 
State for Dominion Affairs t reply63 to Evatt was conci.liatory. 
He felt that there must have been a misunderstanding. He was 
sure that the countries were quite c.lose to agreement on 
supervision. 
An immediate result of this exchange with Britain 
appears to have been an attempt by Evatt to win United 
States support for the Australian predominantly non-regiona.1 
mandatory approach. On 25 November he instructed the Australian 
Minister in Washington, Sir Frederic Eggleston, to hand a copy 
62. 44/630/ 5/1/11/22. (Wellington Conference) Act;i.on _(Ql. 
Int§..._ru_g,:t;;h,Qnal Co.lonia.1_ Comm~.§_§ion. 
63. 27 November 1944~ Ibid. 
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of the text of the Wel.lington Conclusions to the Acting 
Secretary of State drawing his attention to Artie.le 1.1 which 
set out po.licy on dependent territories. 'I rely on you to 
support with him al so the other important princip.les endorsed 
by the Australian and New Zealand governments in this 
document 1 • 64 This was despite the fact that a copy of the 
Conclusions had a.lready been handed to the American Minister 
in Canberra who had sent them to the State Department on 
November .17. 6 5 The State Department had received on 8 
November from the United States Minister in New Zealand a 
resume of Fraser's remarks at the conc.lusion of the Conference 
on 6 November. Patton conc.luded his covering remarks as 
fol.lows: 
Editorial comment referred to expression of many 
admirab.le sentiments but no decisions. Considerable 
interest in proposed general international organiza-
tion to which colonial powers should report on 
administration of their colonies.66 
64. Ibid. 
65. r'I'he Minister in Australia (Johnson) to the Secretary 
of State', 14 November 1944~ .E.!E:.U.S., 1944, vol. ITI, 
pp.198-9. Footnote 37 on J]•l98 reads 'A copy of the 
minutes of the Conference lnot printed) was received 
by the Department asan enclosure to dispatch No. 943, 
November .17 ~ not printed Y. 
66. F.R.U • .§_., .1944, vol. III, pp.197-8. 
179. 
On 20 November, a State Department telegram to the Charge 
in the United Kingdom, gave the full text of Fraser's 
references to colonial policy on 6 November and appended as 
a departmental request. 
The Embassy is requested to keep the Department 
advised of any reactions in the United Kingdom to 
this declaration, which seems rather advanced in 
comparison with British Colonial policy. The 
reactions of the Colonial Office would be of 
particular interest. 67 
Egg.leston in due course carried out Evatt' s request 
though when he met Stettinius it was no .longer as Acting 
Secretary of State. Stettinius had succeeded Hull on JO 
68 November. Eggleston reported to Evatt on 7 December as 
follows -
The appointment with the Secretary of State was 
postponed for his convenience until this morning 
when I handed him confidential part of A.N.Z. 
statement. He read it and said did it mean that 
responsibility should be that of one power? I 
said 'Yes' but accountability to the general 
internationa.l authority. He said that this was 
in conflict with the President's views who 
thought that the Trusteeship should be in the 
United Nations and that they should govern 
jointly, I put the view that the single responsi-
bility of a mandatory was a valuable principle as 
its prestige was invo.lved securing satisfactory 
government and instanced the failure of a condom-
inium in the New Hebrides. I said that our po.licy 
67. Ibid. p.201. 
68. Hull, op. cit., p.1719. 
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differed from that of Britain which required 
Regional Councils without being clear where accounta-
bility rested. He took notes and said he wguld have 
a chat with tbe President and see me again. 9 
The significance of this despatch from Eggleston is 
the impression conveyed therein that United States trustee-
ship po.licy cou.ld be equated with Presidential views. State 
Department trusteeship policy had in fact undergone 
substantial modification during the latter ha.lf of 1944, 
.large.ly as a result of pressure from the armed services 
which were anxious to preserve United States post-war 
strategic interests. 70 Stettinius al.luded to tbe se develop-
69. H/45/102.L Co!..2!1.ial Pol~. 
70. James w. Murray, Jr. op. cit., pp.25-6, summarizes these 
deve.lopments as follows 'By July 1944, the United 
States' position on a possible trusteeship system had 
undergone considerable modification. In preparation for 
the forthcoming Dumbarton Oaks Conversatio~ a series 
of 'Tentative Proposals for a General International 
Organization' was prepared by the State Department, 
and a section on 'Arrangements for Territorial 
Trusteeship' was included. These Arrangements differed 
from the original Hul.l proposals in three fundamental 
respects differed to the extent, indeed that they 
constituted almost a change in kind rather than in 
degree. 
First the scope of the system was now confined to 
ex-enemy territories and areas under mandate. Other 
territories were envisaged as possibly coming under 
tbe system 11 by action of the Assemb.ly" but only "if 
requested by member states having control over such 
territories". 
Second, the objectives of the system, while otherwise 
about the same as originally, now did not include 
independence as a goal for the territories. 
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ments in a letter to Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, 
on JO December 1944. 
Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to a letter to me of 
August 3 1944 from Genera.l Marsha.11 and to my rep.ly 
of August 5 1944, on the subject of international 
trusteeship. In deference to the wishes of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff we were glad to eliminate 
this topic from the Dumbarton Oaks conversationso7l 
The British had 9 however, raised the subject at Dumbarton 
Oaks and were told that the United States had an exchange 
of papers in mind. The British said that they would be 
willing to participate in such an exchange. 72 
Contd. 
70. •••• Finally the organizational framework was consider-
ably modified. Where the origina.l proposals had 
provided for a decentralized administration operating 
through regional counci.ls, the responsibi.lities of 
trusteeship were now to be placed in the Generally 
Assembly operating through a Trusteeship Council 
composed of representatives of states administering 
periodical.ly by the General Assemhly'. The documents 
referred to by Murray are printed in Postwar Foreign 
Po.l;k_Qy__Preparation at pp.595-606 and pp.606-7 
respectively. A detai.led account of the deve.lopment 
of United States trusteeship policy is given in 
Ruth B. Russell assisted by Jeannette E. Muther, 
A History of the United N.ations Ch~rter9 the 
Ro.le of the United State~,SIJ!Q::J.211:..5., Washington 9 
DaCa, Chs. IV 9 VITI, and XIII. 
71. United States Department of State, Postwar FoL~ 
Po.lic~.!:~Q.§r~tion, 1939-.1945, p. 660. 
72. Ibid. 
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As a result of this undertaking a major statement of 
British colonial policy was prepared by the Co.lonial 
Secretary, Oliver Stanley. The paper, ~rnational A~tl§. 
of QQ.lonial Policy, 73 was circulated to the Dominions, 
for comment, on 27 December 1944. 74 It appeared to mark 
an important change in British thinking .in that it embodied 
a move away from a purely regional system towards a degree 
of general international supervision through functional 
agencies to be attached to the general world body. 
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
recommend the ?doption of a general system of 
international L co.lonial] collaboration (a) on a 
rel?ional basis~ through Regiona.l Commissions, and 
(bJ by the creation of further central functional 
bodies, such as the International Labour Organiza-
tion, attached to the World Organization. 
Supervision by these centra.l function agencies was provided 
for as follows: 
Every state member of the Wor.ld Organization must 
agree in advance to publish periodical reports 
both in respect of its metropolitan area and in 
respect of any dependent territories for which it 
is responsible; and to forward copies to the agency 
concerned; these reports to cover points laid down 
as being essential to the proper discharge of that 
agency's functions. 
73. CD. 14814/11/44 in H/45/1021. ColQ.!!ial Poli.£.Y:o 
74. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Minister 
f.or External Affairs, 27 December 1944, Ibid. 
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This Stanle~~Q..!:Snd1!!!!,, however, provided, in addition, 
that the mandate system be abo.lishedo 
Experience of the administration of mandated 
territories has convinced His Majesty's Government 
that the objectives which the mandate system sought 
to achieve can be better realized for the future 
under a comprehensive system, on the basis outlined 
in Part II and Part III of this paper, which would 
be applicable to all dependent territories and would 
not invo.lve the creation of a specia.l international 
status fcir some of themo 
Whi.le Evatt was able almost to applaud this, albeit 
preliminary, move towards the Australian proposals for 
accountability by colonial and mandatory powers to one 
Colonial Commission under the authority of the world 
organization, he was concerned at the proposal to abolish 
the Mandate system. Nonetheless, his overall reaction to 
Stanley's paper can only be described as favourableo Thus 
he told the Dominions Office that 
Co.lonel Stanley's paper on the International aspects 
of colonial policy seems to mark a definite advance 
towards some of the main objectives set out in 
paragraphs 28-31 of the Austra.lian-New Zealand 
Agreement of January .1944. 7 5 
* * * 
75. Referred to in Evatt to Fraser, 31 January 1945, 
H/45/l02lo Colonial Policyo 
i. 
In February 1945~ Evatt's understanding of' United 
States trusteeship po.licy was most probab.ly sti.ll in terms 
of' Hull's ~la~li,Q!! of' 1943 and Roosevelt's personal 
views. Eggleston in a despatch from Washington on 11 
December 1944~ four days after his report of' his visit to 
Stettinius, gave a survey of' American colonial po.licy as he 
understood it. His points included the fol.lowing 
From the various conversations I have had and my 
reference to the f'i.les I would sum up the various 
views as follows 
American PoliQY.. 
Independence to be granted to dependencies wherever 
possible. 
The President evident.ly thinks it should be given 
to Ma.laya and Burma. 
A date to be fixed for the granting of' future 
independence. 
An International Authority for governing countries 
inhabited by backward peop.les liberated by the war. 
There is some doubt whether this is President 
Roosevelt's personal view or that of' the public. 
as a whole. Many think the public are becoming 
imperialistic. 76 
Stanley's memorandum combined with this .limited knowledge 
of' American policy could be expected to have given Evatt 
hope that Australia and New Zealand'' s proposals for 
accountability by all colonial parent powers to a Commission 
76. Egg.leston to Evatt, 11 December 1944, H/45/1021. 
Colonial Policy. 
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under the authority of the World Body would have some chance 
of being adopted at San Francisco, even if he may well have 
been apprehensive on the question of continuation of mandates. 
At the Yalta Conference in February 1945 both the extent 
to which United States po.licy had been influence by pressure 
from the Armed Services and the chasm which separated 
Churchill's views on post-war co.lonial policy from those 
expressed in Stanleyt s memorandum became plain. Thus when 
Stettinius at Ya"l ta referred to ··machinery in the World 
Charter for dealing with t errit oria.l trusteeship and 
dependent areas in a Plenary Session of the Conference, 
Churchi.11, in St ettinius' word, 'exploded' o 77 He said that 
'under no circumstances would he ever consent to forty or 
fifty nations thrusting interfering fingers into the life's 
existence of the British Empire' o 78 
Stettinius then explained, in Roosevelt's presence, United 
States po.licy. This was by now so moderate that Churchill, 
after some assurances, as able to agree to what were to become 
77. Edward R. Stettinius, Jro, Ro~:yel t ... J!.!llt the..J3:1!§ . .§.i§:!!§..: 
~lt_g, Co~~' New York, 1949, p.2J6o 
780 'Yalta Conference, Sixth Plenary Meeting, February 9, 
1945, Bohlen Minutes', ~!....'Q.:.§_a, 1945, ThQ..,.,fonfe~~ 
of Malta and Yalta, Washington, DaC., 1955, po844. 
the Yalta proposals on trusteeship. These provided that 
territorial trusteeship would only apply to 
(a)'exist;ing mandates of the League of Nations 
(b) territories detached from the enemy as a 
result of the present war 
(c) any territory which might vo.luntarily be 
placed under trusteeship. 
(d) no discussion of actual territories is 
contemp.lated at the forthcoming United Nations 
Conference or in the preliminary consultation 
and it will be a matter for subsequent agree-
ment which territories within the above 
categories will be placed under trusteeship?9 
The text of these decisions reached Australia from the 
Dominions Office two days before Evatt left for the United 
States on 15 March 1945. 80 
79. 'Protocol of Proceedings of the Crimiea Conference', 
ll February, 1945, Ibid., p.9770 
80. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs·. to Minister 
for External Affairs, H/45/1021. Q.Qloni&_Policy 0 
In a previous telegram the S.OaS.D.A. had told 
Evatt, on 24 February, that the subject of 
Trusteeship had been raised at the Crimea Conference 0 
Ibid. 
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2. ~rnational ful~mployment Policyo 
If Australia's post-war trusteeship policy hads since 
Evatt's early statements, been developed in reference to a 
proposed general international organization, her post-war 
international full anployment policy was related primarily 
to future wor.ld trade agreements o Australia was, nonetheless, 
to play a part in having the 'full employment pledge' 
incorporated into the United Nations Charter at San 
Francisco since her wider international economic strategy 
required the commitment of the nations of the world to 
policies of domestic full employment. 
A concern for post-war domestic full employment in 
Australia was to be expected from a Labor,Government coming 
to power in the .long shadows of depression, even if it was 
not until JO May 1945 that the White Paper Full Emplovme!.!.i 
in Australia was to be presented to Parliamento 81 Late in 
81. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
Full ~plol'.l!!~~ Australia, presented by command 
JO May 1945 in Commonwealth of Australia.a.-11!rliamentary 
Papers, General and Finan~.....§.filision 1245-46, 
vol. IV, pp.1139 sq. 
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82 1942, however, Evatt, as Attorney-General, arranged 
for the ho.lding of a Constitutional Convention in Canberra 
to allow representatives of State Governments to agree to 
support the reference of additional powers by the Parliaments 
of the States to the Commonwealth for post-war reconstructiono 
The case for post~war reconstruction was outlined by John 
Curtin at the opening of the Convention, when he spoke of 
the depression of .1930-3 'when one in every three of the 
working population of Australia was out of work'. 83 
Article 5 of the Atlantic Charter, Curtin pointed out, had 
spoken of 'improved labour standards, economic advancement, 
84 
and social security in the post-war world.' It seemed 
82. Commonwealth of Austra.lia. QQ.nvention of.....Eepresentatives 
of the Commonwealth and ~e Parliaments on Proposed 
Alteration of the Commonwealth Constitution held at i 
Canberra.1-~November to 2 December 1942, Canberra, .1942. I 
On page 2 Curtin said of Evatt 'up to the present, my 
colleague theAttorney-General (Dro Evatt) has had the 
labourin8' oar in the preparations for this Convention. 
It is he who bad endeavoured to focus attention upon 
the necessity for action now to strengthen our constitu-
tional framework for the special crisis, or series of 
crises, which will face us during the post-war period'. 
83. Ibido p.4. 
84. Ibid. 
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to him that Australia's post-war planning must centre on 
three similar objectives (1) Emp.loyment; (2) Development; 
and (3) Improved standards of .living. Yit is only natural 
to place the greatest emphasis on employment. That is the 
matter in which our people are most concerned for the post-
war period.' 8 5 Curtin al so spoke of full employment 
In relation to employment, I think it is certain 
that there wi.11 be need for organization for fu.11 
employment on a national scale. In one aspect the 
problem of ful.l employment is the crux of the 
problem of post-war reconstruction.86 
'Organization for full emp.loyment' apt.ly describes the 
emphasis of LaborY s domestic post-war reconstruction plans. 
But the Atlantic Charter had contained in Artie.le 4 a 
most decided anphasis on international free trade 
Fourth they will endeavour, with due respect for 
their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment 
by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, 
of access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw 
materials of the world which are needed for their 
economic prosperity. 
This same emphasis on free trade and consequent bias against 
tariffs and preference had reappeared in Article VII of 
the Mutua.l Aid Agreement between the United States and the 
85. Ibid. 
86. Ibid. 
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United Kingdom signed at Washington on 23 February 1942. 
This article provided, inter alia, 
In the final determination of the benefits to be 
provided to the United States of America by the 
Government of the United Kingdom in return for and 
furnished under the Act of Congress of March .11 
1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be 
such as not to hinder commerce between the two 
countries, but to promote mutually advantageous 
economic re.lations between them and the betterment 
of world-wide economic relations. To that end they 
shall inc.lude provisions for agreed action by the 
United States of America and the United Kingdom~ 
open to participation by a.1 .. 1 other countries of 
like mind, directed to the expansion, by 
appropriate international and domestic measures 
of production, emp.loymen t and the exchange and 
consumption of goods, which are the material 
foundations of the liberty and welfare of all 
peop.les; to the elimination of al.l forms of 
discriminatory treatment in international commerce, 
and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade 
barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of 
al.l the economic objectives set forth in the Joint 
Declaration made on August 12 1941 by the President 
of the United States of America and the Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom.87 
It was in response to the problems posed in this 
projected post-war free-trade environment fer Australia» a 
country higbJydependent on trade and traditionally given to 
88 policies of tariff protection and Empire preference, that 
87. Text is printed Post~!:....Eor~i_g-~;i...cy_P:i;::eparatiQ.U, 
pp.463-4. 
88. For a brief account of pre-war trade policy see Members 
of the Canberra Branch, Australian Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, t Australian Commercial Po.licy in 
Re.lation to Article VIT of the Mutual Aid Agreement' 
Austral-Asiatic Bulletin2 ~cial NumberJ.2£Q.Q!Jlli!§._o:i' 
War and Peace in the Pacific, February .1943, pp.76-80. 
(This issue contained the Australian Data Papers presented 
at the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference, Quebec, 
December 4-.14, 1942). 
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the fu.11 employment approach to post-war trade was formulated. 
Tne policy was first developed in a brief memorandum prepared 
89 by Dr. HoC. Coombs, an economist in the Commonwea.lth Treasury. 
The memorandum was prepared for Dr. Ro.land Wi.lson, who from 
1936-40 had been Commonwea.l th Statistician and economic 
adviser to the Treasury and, from 1940, Secretary of the 
Department of Labour and National Service, when Wilson went 
to the British Commonwea.lth talks in London on the economic 
imp.lications of Article VII in October 1942. Coombs' views 
had apparent.ly found great favour with his Minister, 
J.B. Chif.ley, Treasurer in the first Curtin Government. 
At a.11 events, when a separate Department of Post-war 
Reconstruction was established under the second Curtin 
Government in 1943 Chifley added this portfolio to the 
Treasurership and Coombs became Director of Post-war Reconst-
ruction concerned with domestic reconstruction, but it was in 
the very nature of Coombs t theory that the crux of the problem 
of Australian domestic reconstruction, full emp.loyments was 
dependent upon the adoption of simi.lar policies by other 
nations, particularly the major industrial nations. 
89. L.F. Crisp, 'The Australian Ful.l Emp.loyment P.ledge at 
San Francisco,t Aust!'.alian Outlools.,_ vol. 19, no. 1, 
Apri.l 1965. 
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As Evatt was to point out on 8 September 1944 the 
Austra.lian Government first advanced its international ful 
employment theory at the Hot Springs Conference on Agricul 
90 in July 1943. Australia's princi pa.l representative at 
Hot Springs, Dre Coombs, gave .little indication in his Rep 
on the Conference either of the content of Austra.lia' s cas 
or of its success, or otherwise, at Hot Springs. Coombs' 
1943 Report, which was tabled by Evatt as Appendix A to hi 
Statement on International Affairs of 14 October 1943, is 
litt.le more than a brief summary of conference proceedings 
d d . . 91 an ecisions. It is of interest, however, that two otb 
members of the Australian delegation at Hot Springs, J.B. 
Brigden, Financia.l Counse.Llor at the Washington Embassy, a 
Dr. John Burton~ were to be subsequently in the Australian 
delegation at San Franciscoo 
An extended statement of Coombs' views is contained i 
900 C.P .• Q .• , vol •. 179, 8 September 1944, p.6060 
91. Printed in CoN._!.~!·, vol. XIV, no. 1, October 1943, 
pp.263-6. 
92. H.C. Coombs, 'The Economic Aftermath of War' in D.A.E 
Campbe.1.1 (ed.) Post-Wa;r.,_R~construc tiorL.i!i_Aus t;r.s~, 
Sydney, .1944, pp. 67-..99. 
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to the Australian Institute of Political Science in Januar~ 
1944. Coombs argued that the transition of a wartime to a 
peacetime economy would be accompanied by difficu.l ties, 
'the problems of adapting a war-time economy to peace 1 , 93 
requiring the retention of substantial controls of prices 
and consumption. Among these domestic problems would be 
accumulated purchasing power which at the end of the war 
might be expected to result in a demand for goods and 
services greatly in excess of current production. t In the 
absence of strict controls of prices and consumption this 
excess purchasing power could lead only to an inflationary 
rise of prices. 1 94 This problem would be compounded by the 
fact that there had been, in the past, a close relationshi] 
between the level of imports and the level of national 
income which could be expected to continue in the post-war 
period. 95 Coombs was doubtful that, in the immediate post. 
period, demand for Australia's exports, particularly demanc 
from the United Kingdom, would be sufficient to finance 
93. 
94. 
95. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
p.84. 
p.74. 
p.72. 
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increased importso The necessary consequence would be 'a 
. d .p ha t . t 96 perio oi exc nge s ringency • 
The kind of' post-war Australian society envisaged by 
Coombs was the same as that described by Curtin in his 
address to the Constitutional Convention. Coombs agreed 
that Yany plan f'or a post-war world must, if' it is tobe 
based realistically upon the desires of' thepeople, place a 
high and stable .level of' emp.loymen t first among its 
objectives'. 97 And again 
Everybodyt s vision of' the New Jerusalem is, of' 
course, dif'f'erent f'rom his neighbourt s, but 
through them al.l, or at .least through the vast 
majority of' them run common themes which may be 
summed up in the objectives of' emp.loyment, risigg 
standards of' living, development and securityo9 
The same arguments which he had previously used in regard 
to problems of' the transition of' a wartime to a peacetime 
economy were now related specifically to the problem of' 
maintaining post-war domestic f'ull employment, which was b 
implication, an end suf'f'icient to justify otherwise arguab 
means. Thus he pointed out that f'ul.l employment was a 
policy which cou.ld not be pursued by a trade dependent 
96. Ibid. 
970 Ibid. pp.78-90 
980 Ibid. p.78. 
195 
country like Australia without serious regard for its 
balance of trade, a balance which could not be expected to 
be favourab.ly maintained in the .likely post-war climate of 
excessive demand for imports without tariff and/or quota 
and/or exchange restrictions on those imports unless there 
was adequate demand on the part of the major industrial 
nations for Australia's exports. 
Our capacity to pay for imports of course depends on 
aur sale of exports~ which in turn depends primarily 
upon the level of employment and income in the great 
industrial countries of the world, such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom.99 
Doubts about post-war demand in the United Kingdom 'the 
difficulties which the United Kingdom wil.l experience be cm 
of her lower overseas i.."1.come may adversely affect their cap< 
,100 
to buy our products related to his claim that 
as .long as the fear of unemp.loyment, spread from 
other countries remains a dominant influence in 
dependent economies, they will, I be.lieve, insist 
on retaining whatever protective measures are 
necessary bo insulate themselves from depression 
overseas. 1 1 
It would be possible to conclude from this line of 
argument that Australia's emphasis on the overriding impori 
ance of domestic ful.l anp.loyment, when such an emphasis wa: 
99. Ibido p.93 • 
. 100. Ibid. p.72. 
10.1. Ibid. p.95. 
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made in relation to post-war international trade patterns, 
would be no more than an attempt to justify Australia's 
retention of tariff and/or quota controls on imports in th~ 
post-war world. Indeed, this was 12art of Australia's po.lie 
as was clear.ly indicated by Coombs' comments, in this 
address, on Article VII of the Mutua.l Aid Agreement. In 
these comments Coombs stressed what he called the 'posi ti VE 
aims embodied in the Artie.le at the expense of what he termE 
the 'negative' aims • 
• • • by it [Article VII] the participating countries 
undertook to take agre~~tion (the form of which is 
still unspecified) to increase employment and the 
production, exchange and consumption of goods, and, 
secondly, to reduce trade barriers and to eliminate 
discrimination in internationa.l trade •••• It has too 
readily been assumed that the means to achieve the 
positive aims of increased production, exchange and 
consumption are those indicated in what I cal.l the 
negative aims, i.e. the reduction of tariffs and the 
elimination of discrimination, I believe that this 
approach is a wrong one, and that it wil.l fail to 
fulfil the hopes of both world-wide economic re.la tioni 
which have been roused by the agreement to which I 
have referred.l02 
If these comments illustrate part of Australia's internatic 
full emp.loyment po.licy they a.lso foreshadow another, funda· 
mental~ aspect of that policy, an aspect which might be teJ 
the crux of Coombs Y case and of the Australian 1 full emplo~ 
approach' to interna tiona.l trade. For Coombs saw the adop1 
Ibid. p. 92. 
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of full emp.loyment policies as a means by which world trade 
could be expanded through the stimu.lating effects of 
employment and incomes on demando An overall expansion 
of world trade as a result of this increased demand would, 
in due course, allow tariffs and quotas t'O be reduced, if 
not totally removed, in a c.limate of international 
economic stability. After pointing out that the first 
requirement for expanding world trade was 'a system of 
Lmilitary] security based upon joint action which makes 
1 ff . . d . . . b 1 t .10 se f-su 1c1ency unnecessary an aggression 1mposs1 . e , 
Coombs continued, 
The second requirement is a high level of demando 
It has for the last ten years been generally recogniz 
in respect of domestic economies that the most signif 
cant factor determining demand is the general level 
of employment and incomes. This view has not yet bee 
fully app.lied to the field of international trade, 
where our economists stil.l continue to p.lace the 
greatest emphasis on factors affecting relative price 
such as tariffs, subsidies, and other forms of protec 
ive devices. If this view is correct then the second 
main requirement of expanding world trade is a high 
level of employment and income:) particularly in those 
countries which are largely engaged in world trade.IC 
This relationship of domestic ful.l employment to an increa 
in the volume of world trade had been argued by Chifley in 
103. Ibid. 
104. Ibid. p.93. Emphasis added. 
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newspaper article during the previous month. He noted tha 1 
1 amongst trading nations the vo.lume of trade has usual.ly 
more to do with the .leve.ls of emp.loyment and incomes than 
with the leve.ls of tariffs' 0 105 
In the Australian-New Zealand Agreement of January 19l 
however, the objective of fu.11 enployrnent received .li tt.le 
prominenceo Both countries agreed under Article 35 (ct) till 
'there should be cooperation in achieving ful.l employment 
in Australia and New Zealand and the highest standards of 
social security both within their borders and throughout tl 
islands of the Pacific and other territories for which the~ 
may jointly or severally be whol.ly or partly responsihle' •· 
Full employment appears here mere.ly as a desirahle objecti' 
for both countries' to pursue internally and in the territo: 
under their contro.lo Elvatt?s statement to the press at thi 
conc.lusion of the Canberra talks is consistent with this 
ana.lysis. 
Another important aspect of the Agreement is the 
new and permanent machinery for collaboration and 
cooperationo This is aimed at cooperation for 
defence, collaboration in externa.l policy, the 
deve.lopment of commerce between the two countries 
.10 5 o Syd.ney Morning_Herald, 12 December 1943 • 
. 106. C.N.I.A., vol. 15, no. 1, January .1944, P•7o 
1990 
cooperation in achieving ful.l employment and 
social security~ and cooperation in encouraging 
the work of Christian missionaries throughout the 
Pacific.1o7 
If full emp.loymen t as an approach to international trade 
was not considered at the Canberra Conference itself, this 
was probably because there were to be subsequent talks bet1 
the two countries on the subject. These talks invo.l v ed an 
exchange of views and of notes; an exchange designed to wii 
New Zealand support for the Australian approach. Australi< 
views, in these discussions, were that Australia and New 
Zealand should 
press for an order in which the [international 
economic] agreements are discussed and brought 
into effect, giving a higher priority to employment 
agreements and to certain aspects of the monetary 
discussions and commodity arrangements; and putting 
aspects of commercial policy such as tariffs, etc. 
low down on the listo Our suggestion should be 
that commercial po.licy agreements invo.lving 
reductions or modifications of protection should 
not be concluded until after the war when we are 
confident that full emp.loyment is being maintained, 
not only in Aus tra.lia~ but in other parts of the worl< 
If we adopt this approach, it is not necessary to rai: 
a storm by questioning the broad princip.les on object: 
of Article VII. We merely state that in our considerE 
opinion, the best way, and in fact the only way, of 
achieving the objects of Article VII is to seek first 
those conditions of expanding production and ful.l 
employment, set out in that Artie.le, and then when 
Ibid. P• 26. 
this has been substantially achieved, to consider 
the remaining matters associated with commercial 
policy.108 
200. 
Evatt's first statement of the full employment approac 
to international trade was in a speech, on 17 March 1944, i 
which he announced the conclusion, on 9 March in Ottawa, of 
the Canadian Mutual Aid Agreement. He began by quoting 
Article X of the Agreement which, he said, was 'in strict 
accordance with the Austra.lian Government's views as to fu1 
international economic col.laboration'. 
T.he Governments of Canada and the Commonwealth of 
Australia reaffirm.,.their desire to promote mutually 
advantageous economic relations between their 
countries and throughout the world. T.hey declare 
that their guiding purposes include the adoption of 
measures designedto promote employment, and productio1 
and consumption of goods, and the expansion of commer< 
through appropriate international agreements on 
commercial policy, with the object of contributing 
to the attainment of all t.he economic objectives set 
forth in the declarati8n of 14 August .1941 known as 
the Atlantic Charter.I 9 
Evatt then argued that this reference to the Atlantic Char1 
was clearly to Article 5 and that 'the United Kingdom - Un: 
States of America Agreement contained an article - Article 
not dissimilar to this Artie.le X'. llO Evatt was clearly 
108. P.W.R. 44/735/168/16. Austral;i,Ja!!;::New~ealand Exchan~ 
of Notes on Economic Negotiations. T.his extract is 
from the Australian agenda papers. 
109. C.P.D., vol •. 178, 9 March 1944, p.1554. 
110. Ibid. 
putting into practice the Australian policy of stressing 
those aspects of both the Atlantic Charter and the Master 
Lend Lease Agreement which related to the promotion of 
~mployment, production and consumption at the expense of 
those aspects of the two documents which dealt with commer< 
policy. But he also made reference to the longer term 
objective of Australian po.licy - the provision of an 
alternative approach to the development of world tradeo 
Our view is that it is by maintaining high levels of 
emp.loyment and consumption throughout the wor.ld, and 
especially in the major countries, that prosperity, 
increased consumption of goods, and expansion of 
trade can be effected, and the economic objectives 
of the At.lantic Charter fulfi.l.led.111 
Evatt made the further point in this speech that he was 
inclined strongly to the view that it was not by internati• 
force alone that peace would be made secure in a wor.ld tor: 
almost apart by two world warso 'You can only be sure of 
peace if you remove the temptation of national leaders to 
embark on acts of agression against other countries becaus 
of internal social discontent. t It was this more general 
argument which he was to associate more closely with advoc 
of internationa.l ful.l employment as the San Francisco Conf 
111. Ibido 
20 
grew c.loser and the details of international trade less 
immediately relevant. 
In April-May 1944 Australia was represented at the 
26th Conference of the International Labour Organization 
of the League of Nations he.ld at Phi.ladelphia. The Govern-
ment De.legates, J.A. Beas.ley, Minister for Shipping and 
Supply, and H.C. Barnard, M.P., had Dr. John Burton as one 
of their two advisers. Here, Australia's attempt to win 
international commitment to a binding full employment 
agreements an attempt supported in the early stages of the 
Conference by the United States Delegation under Secretary 
of Labour, Frances Perkins, was argued in terms of 'the 
Australian Government's foreign economic policy as had 
already been outlined by the Minister for External Affairs 
in a statement ••• on the occasion of the Canadian Mutual 
A 0 l.12 id Agreement•. Australia's proposal was final.ly defeai 
after the United States Delegation, acting, according to tl 
112. Parliament of the Commonweal th of Australia~ Interngj 
Labq,µr _Organization of the League _of Nation~Tw~nty­
Sixth _Conference he.ld at Philadelphia, 20 ~i.l._to 
ll_:l'ie.Y......l2.~-R§.!2Qtl§....£f_the_.Australian_. Delegates, 
in Commonwealth of Austra.liaj Parliamentary _Papers, 
Genera.l.._§.u£._Fin~ce, _Sessig.11.§. __ lliJ..=!±.ul19.....ft.4-£l.2, vo 1, 
II, pp.1523 sq. 
Austra.lian Report, on ins true tions from the State Departme1 
h d "thd "t t 113 a wi rawn i s suppor • Australia then proposed, wi· 
success, that an inter-governmental conference be held to 
d . d t" l" . f 1 t ll4 iscuss omes ic po icies o emp oymen • In simi.lar ve: 
at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, he 
at Bretton Woods from 1-22 July .1944, the chief Australian 
delegate, L .G. Melvi.lle, Economic Adviser to the Commonwea: 
Bank Board, continued the Australian argument for a bindin1 
international agreement to maintain ful.l employment, a.l th01 
once again, the Australian proposal to this end was defeatc 
Melvil.le fe.lt able, nonetheless, to conc.lude his Report to 
the Australian Par.liament on a note of optimism. 
113. 
114. 
It appears that declarations of[the Australian Govern· 
mentrs attitude on this matter international full 
emp.loyment agreement] which have been made from time 
to time by the Minister for External Affairs, and the 
case made at the Hot Springs Conference, in British 
Commonwea.l th Discussions in London, at Phi.ladelphia 
and at Bretton Woods have made a considerable impress: 
There now seem to be good prospects of securing wide-
spread support for an emp.loyment agreement as part of_ 
a programme of international economic collaboration.L 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
p •. 1525. 
p •. 1526. 
115. Parliament of the Commonwea.lth of Australia, Doc!l!J!Qn.: 
re.la ting to the Q!li.ied Nations Moneta:£.Y:......£!!!d F:i,.,nancia.: 
Conf~~held at Bretton Woogs 2 U~ited States of 
Amer;j..ca,__,f£Q..!!!J_July_j;:Q_22_l.u.ly:_l.2.!±fl, in Commonweal tl 
of Australia~ ?a:rl;!.amentary Pap~X.§. General and Finan~ 
Session£._1.2,~~-~nd ~.l!.::lL:i, vol. IT, pp.1583 sq. 
This quotation is from p.1592. 
Discussion of Full Employment at the We.llington 
Conference in November 1944 reflected yet again, the, by 
then, we.11 defined Australian approacho Paragraph 2 of 
Section V, Welfare Relations, of the Conference Resolutions 
contains an international emphasis which was completely 
absent in the corresponding reference to full employment 
in the Australian•New Zealand Agreement. Under paragraph 
the two countries reaffirmed the understanding reached in 
116 
exchange of notes of 24 January 19440 Paragraph 2 read: 
as follows -
Employrnent__&gree"!!!.fil!.i. 
We regard an employment agreement by which signatorie: 
undertake.- to pursue internal policies of full employm1 
and improved living standards as fundamental to the 
success of all aspects of international col.laboration 
designed to promote human welfare. The calling of an 
Employment Conference with this objective in view 
should take precedence over all other international 
economic discussions. We propose, therefore, to 
approach the United States Government with the propose 
that a Conference be called by the United States Gove: 
ment, in conjunction with the United Kingdom~ Austral: 
and New Zealand Governmentso 117 
Recognition of the weight of the Australian approach to po: 
war international economic collaboration, albeit obtained 
through the agency of the New Zealand Minister in Washingt1 
is reflected in the following extract from President Roose' 
116. 44/6JO/ 5/1/11/16. (Wellington Conference). Co.ufe!:_fil 
Papers - Agenda Pa:ruu::s CQilclusion. 
1170 Ibido 
correspondenceo 
Office of the Vice-President, Washingtono December 1 9 .1941 
The President, 
The White House. 
Dear Mro President, 
Walter Nash of New Zealand has sent me a statement ma< 
by Peter Fraser in October of this year on the occasion of 
the A.N.Z. Conference. Two of the outstanding sentences 
of this statement are the following 
Experience since the last war has demonstrated to 
the world that the level of consumption, in other 
words standard of living, depends more on the level 
of employment throughout the world and less upon 
international trading agreenents than is generally 
recognized. 
* * * 
The most important first step towards attaining these 
objectives would be for each government recognizing 
its obligation to its own people and to the people 
of every other country to join in an international 
agreement pledging itself to follow an appropriate 
domestic policy of ful.l employment by means which 
wil.l make the greatest possible contribution to the 
maintenance of employment in other countrieso 
The Australians and New Zealanders have in my opinion done 
some of the most advanced thinking on this fundamental prol 
of fu.1.1 employment - world wide o 
Respectfully yourso 
H.A. Wallace.118 
118. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. 
O.F. 264. 
CH.APTER V. 
THE DELEGATION. 
Churchil.l, Roosevelt and Stalin had agreed at Yalta 
in February 1945 on a place and a date for the United Natic 
Conference on International Organization.1 Almost at once, 
on 13 February, Roosevelt had released the names of those 
whom he proposed to invite to become members of the United 
States delegation at San Francisco. Roosevelt Y s .list 2 was 
headed by the Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius Jnr. 
it is therefore hardly surprising, both in view of this 
.1. Herbert Feis, Chu:r£!!illJ ..... J~.Q.2.§..~ . .Ye1:L ....... Stalin, Princeton, 
.1957, p.556. 'The American government was eager that 
it should be he.ld in the United States, not later than 
April. The others cheerful.ly assented. The text of 
the invitatinns to be sent out was approved. April 2~ 
was fixed as the date; San Francisco was named as the 
place. t 
2. United States State Department, News Relea§..§., l March 1 
"On February thirteenth the President announced that he 
would invite the fol.lowing to be members of the United 
States delegation to the United Nations Conference on 
Apri.l 25, 1945 at San Francis co: Secretary of State 
Stettinius:il Honorable Cordel.l Hull, Senator Connally, 
Senator Vandenberg, Representative Bloom, Represent at iv 
Eaton, Commander Harold Stassen and Dean Virginia 
Gildersleeve 11 • The Release then gave the text of 
.letters of invitation sent out by the President on 
February 28th. "The letters are identical except for 
the designation of Mr. Stettinius as Chairman and Mr. f 
as Senior Adviser". In the event Corde.11 Hull SJ was una 
because o f il.lness, to attend the San Francisco Confere 
precedent and because of his predominance in the developme1 
of Austra.lia' s post-war foreign policy preparation, that 
Dr. Evatt was at this time ~plann:ing· to lead the Australia1 
de legation. The Australian press predicted his appointmem 
On 15 February the Melbourne Argus noted the precedent set 
by Roosevelt's appointment of Stettinius together with a 
report from Los Angeles that Dr. Evatt was to d.eliver the 
Charter Day Address at the University of California in tha1 
city on .19 March. On the following day the Argus containec 
a report f'rom Crayton Burns headed 'Australia at Security 
Conference. Dr. Evatt to lead big Delegation'; the Sydney 
~ing ~ralg carried a similar caption 'Delegation to U.~ 
Dr. Evatt likely Leadert. Even the London Dai.J..y_Telegraph 
commented on .17 February 'Dr. Evatt 11 Minister f'or External 
Affairs, is expected to lead the Australian delegation to 
the world security conference.' 
The Prime Minister, nonetheless, on the evening of' 
Sunday 19 February, two days before the opening of the Thi1 
Session of' the 17th Parliament, announced to the Press thai 
the Australian delegation of' approximately ten people, wouJ 
be headed by Francis Michael Forde and Herbert Vere Evatt. 
Press reports indicate that Curtin conveyed his intention 
that Forde was to be leader of the de.legationo Crayton 
' 
" 
Burns wrote that the Australian de.legation to the Conferenc 
'would comprise about ten peop.le inc.luding Mro Forde~ 
Deputy Prime Minister, who wil.l be the leader, and Dr. Evai 
Minister for External Affairs.' 3 
The Sydney Morn~~Herald carried a similar report -
The Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Forde and the Minister 
for External Affairs Dr. Evatt will both be members 
of the Australian delegation to the world security 
conference at San Francisco. Mr. Forde being second 
in cabinet seniority wi.11 lead the delegation. The 
Prime Minister, Mr. Curtin, said tonight that he 
had decided on ta balanced delegation.'4 
The Age had interviewed Mr. Forde 
Mr. Forde, who as Deputy Leader of the Government 
wi.1.1 lead the delegation, said tonight that he was 
honoured by Mr. Curtin's selection of Dr. Evatt 
and himself to attend the Conference. Following 
the success of the recent de.legation which he led 
to New Zea.land, he felt that very beneficial 
results in Australia would accrue from the San 
Francisco discussions and from the opportunity of 
meeting representative Americans and the delegates 
from so many other countries.5 
The report from Thc:.t_l'imes correspondent in Canberra, whi.le 
not specifical.ly referring to Forde' s 1 eadership, gave him 
precedence over Evatt. 
J. Ar~, 20 February, 1945. 
4. §:y_tjne,,Y_Mo~ning Herald, 20 February, 1945. 
5. Age, 20 February, 1945. 
Mr. Forde and Dr. Evatt would lead an Australian 
delegation of about ten persons to the world security 
Conference at San Francisco including representatives 
of the Opposition, business leaders and Trade Unionisi 
If Curtin had conveyed Forde~ s leadership to the Presi 
on 19 February, he made no mention of it when he formally 
announced details of the Australian de.legation to Parliame1 
7 ten days later on March l. In announcing the names of thE 
two Delegates Curtin named Forde ahead of Evatt - but this 
was something he had not done when replying to a question 
in the House on 28 February when he said 'I have made no 
decision other than to appoint the Minister for External 
Affairs and the Deputy Prime Minister to represent us at 
the Conference ••• •. 8 Forde's leadership had, however, beE 
mentioned in the House on 22 February. In the course of a 
question to the Prime Minister, H.L. Anthony had referred 
to the Australian de.legationtwhich is to be led we underst< 
by the Deputy Prime Minister'. Curtin, in his reply, did i 
contradict, nor even refer to, Anthony's observation. He 
might therefore be presumed to have agreed with it. 9 
6. The Times, 21 February, 1945. 
7. c.P.D., vol. 181, pp.2JO-Jl. 
8. Ibid. p.153. 
9. Ibid. p.49. 
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Curtin may have felt that Forde's cabinet seniority 
was so obvious and unquestionable that an explicit referen' 
to his .leadership of the delegation would be otiose. 
Curtin may have even overlooked the point at a period 
when he was showing increasingly the nervous burden of 
having led his country through the night of war. Curtin's 
biographer has written of his subject during these months 
Curtin 2 s career was drawing to a tragic anti-climax. 
'Hopeless! Hopeless!' were the ejaculations of more 
than one person in a position of responsibility. 
2 It' s impossihle, t one added .later. 'Almost a.lmost -
one could be glad he's dead so we can do things.' 
2 It was the worst six months of my life 2 said 
Chifley.10 
There can be .li tt.le doubt that Forde would have been stren 
ened in his position at San Francisco if Curtin had more 
explicitly estahlished his leadership of the delegation. 
Shortly after the San Francisco Conference began reference 
was made in the Australian press and Parliament to a 
disagreement as to the leadership of the delegation. 
10. Lloyd Ross, ~Death of a Prime Minister', Quadrant, 
July-August 1965, p.32. This artic.le is an extract 
from Dr. Ross's unpublished biography of Curtin. 
It is regarded as unfortunate that Australia was 
absent from the previous nightYs Conference with 
British leaders at which Lord Halifax and Lord 
Cranborne were also present. It is understood 
that differences of opinion had arisen between 
Mr. Forde and Dr. Evatt regarding .leadership of 
the Australian delegation, an unhappy situation 
which has now been resolved with the affirmation 
of Mr. Forde's leadership.11 
Hasluck draws a stronger picture -
It has to be recorded frankly as one of the facts 
of the who.le of the Australian de.legation at the 
San Francisco Conference that it was divided into 
two camps and that there was a perpetual contest 
21. 
for effective leadership between the two ministers -
the contest being won by Dr. Evatt. Perhaps when I 
am a much o.lder and .less responsible man I may one 
day tell some of the stories of San Francisco which 
have a bearing on this point.12 
Curtin's motives in sending Forde as leader of the 
Australian delegation may have been more re.lated to his 
11. Crayton Burns, ~us., 27 Apri.l 19450 On .1 May Curtin 
was questioned on a simi.lar §.ydney Morumg_,j!§.rald rep 
He denied al.l knowledge of friction between Evatt and 
Forde. C.P.D., vo.l. 181, p •. 12.10. It has been sugges 
to the writer by members of the delegation that Curti 
confirmed FordeYs leadership by telegram. Forde 
described himself as 'Leader of the Australian 
Delegation to the United Nations Conference, San 
Francisco, Apri.l 25, 1945', in Who'& Who .1.2§..1, 
London, 1963, p.1053, whereas in Who'.§._.'Nho ig_Austra;J,,. 
Melbourne, 1962, p.308, he chose 'Delegate to the 
United Nations Conference~ San Francisco, 1945'· 
12. Hasluck~ Journal and Proceed_in_g§, loc. cit., p •. 160. 
21 
concern for Australia's posture rather than her policy at 
the Conference. Forde could be counted upon to take a mor, 
moderate and co-operative attitude towards Great Britain 
and the United States than might have been expected of 
Evatt. Persona.l differences between Curtin and Evatt may 
have led to the desire to have as .leader of the delegation 
one who could be re.lied on to report fully and progressive. 
on Australia's role at the talks. Curtin may also have 
wished to strengthen the position of the Defence departmen· 
in policy formu.lation by giving pre-eminence to a Defence 
minister. Curtin advised Forde and Evatt before they left 
for San Francisco that as the Defence Department was 
responsible for Defence Policy, service officers with the 
delegation would be viewed as attached to the Defence 
Department in their capcity as Advisers on Defence matters. 
He requested that any important proposa.ls which might rela; 
to Australian defence po.licy should be referred to him 
urgent.ly by cab.legram as Prime Minister and Minister for 
Defence. 1 J 
13. H/45/771/7. Australian De.lega!;ion, Misce.llan§Q1!§_ 
Prep§rati.Q!L..£UlSL!3:enr~ntatiQ!l. Minister of Defence 
to Forde and Evatt, 2 March 1945. 
21~ 
On .19 February Curtin had indicated that the del egatic 
would comprise, in addition to the two members named, aboui 
eight other Delegatesa By 28 February, however, when he We 
questioned in the House by CaAaA. Morgan on the compositior 
of the delegation, Curtin had decided that there would onl) 
be two Delegates - the remainder would be assistants. AftE 
saying that he had made no decision other than to appoint 
the Minister for External Affairs and the DeputyPrime 
Minister as Australia's representatives, Curtin added that 
he was goii..ng 
to attach to the delegation that will go to San 
Francisco such competent aid as I think will enable 
the delegation not only to represent Australia 
adequately, but a.lso to assist in laying the 
foundations of world securityo 
Whereupon R.G. Menzies remarked 
The executive delegates will be the two Ministerso 
That is unquestionable. 
and Curtin replied 
Yes, the delegates will be the two.Ministers whom 
I have named. The others will be assistants. The 
Ministers will have such assistance as I shall 
arrange •1 4 . 
On March 1, Curtin, in addition to formally naming 
the two Delegates, had read also the names of the 
14~ CaP.D., vol. 181, pal5Jo 
Assistants and Consultantso He 'referred to the entire 
group as 2 the delegation'o It.is not surprising that at 
least one consultant when he was being sounded, prior to 
this announcement, as to whether he wished to join the 
delegation to San Francisco had thought he was being offerE 
a place as one among ten Delegateso 
The Assistants and Consultants were a varied company 
and deliberately chosen so to be. From the outset, Curtin 
had c.laimed that these Assis tan ts were not to be chosen on 
any basis of state or group representation but solely as 
individuals who would be able to make a useful contributio1 
as members of the delegation. On 22 February, at a time w] 
it was still commonly thought that these additional member: 
would be full Delegates, Curtin had stated that no outside 
(i.eo non-governmental) bodies would be asked to nominate 
representativeso Non-government groups and interests woul1 
not be represented as suchol5 On March 1, at Question Timi 
prior to his announcement of the delegation, Curtin refuse1 
a request from Rowland James that the Co-operative Consume: 
Society, which James claimed represented some J50s600 fami: 
should have representation on the de.legationo James asked 
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the Prime Minister whether the Chamber of Commerce and the 
Chamber of Manufactures~ as we.Ll as some other private 
organisations, would be represented at the Conference. 
2 No other bodies or interests of a sectional nature will 
16 be represented thereY. 
In this Curtin was largely right. Apart from the 
few Unofficial Representatives of Intergovernmenta.l 
Organization17 at the Conference, most of the members of 
delegations were po.li ticians, government officials, technic 
. 1 t .18 experts and dip. oma s. The United States delegation, it 
is true, had the assistance of forty-five representatives 
of national organizations such as the American Bar Associa; 
Kiwanis International, American Jewish Committee and the 
16. Ibid. p.230. 
17. Uni t.§d Nations Conference on Internation&_Qrganizati< 
San Fr.a.nci§.Qfu.....12~ Documents, vols. 1-22, London, 
New York, 1945"55(hereafter ~N.C.I.O. Documents) voL 
pp.54-5 • 
. 16. United Nations Conference on International Organizatic 
Membe!:§__of --ihLDelegation§.i_0ffic ers of the....§g;:§.t.§£~ 
Reyised to May 4th, San Francisco, .1945, Doc. 49 G/J 
'"(l), UolioC.I.O. Document~, vol. 1, pp. 
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American Federation of Labor. 1 9 Although these representa-
tives were called Consultants they were not members of the 
United States Delegationo The irony is that, despite 
Curtin's protestations, the Australian delegation at San 
Francisco was to stand alone in the extent ol' sectional 
representation within ito Mexico was to be the only other 
country with obvious.ly sectional representation in its 
delegationo 
19. United States Department of State, For t!.!!L.Press, 
No. 376, April 21, 1945. This rel ease lists organiza· 
tions which had agreed to send representativeso At a 
Press and Radio News Conference in the State Departme1 
on 10 April fol.lowing announcement of the decision to 
invite representatives, 'A correspondent inquired if 
the .list mentioned inc.l uded .labor on a consul ting 
basis, and the Secretary replied in the affirmative. 
[The 1ist referred to was Press Release No. 323 of 
.10 April] Asked just what that meant the Secretary 
referred the correspondent to the paragraphs co ntaine~ 
in the release reading as follows "The American 
Delegation, which consists of the eight delegates, 
together with their professional and technical advise 
must be kept to the smallest possible number. T.h.e 
Consultants would. be avai.lable for consul tat ion at 
the request of the Delegation and would be kept as 
closely informed of the work of the Conference as 
possibleo An effort had been made, in inviting organ 
tions, which, taken as a whole, constitute a fair cro 
section of citizen groupso It has not been possible 
extend consultant invitations to all organizations 
interested in the work of the Conference'. United St 
Department of State, MeID.Q.!:fil:ll!um of Press and Radio Ne-
Confer~, No. 28, Tuesday, April .10, 1945. It has · 
suggested that the State Department, by inviting Cons 
ants on such a large scale, strengthened popular supp 
for United States participation in a world organizati 
John C. Campbell and the Research Staff of the Counci 
on Foreign Relations, The Uni:t§.!.1....§.tates in Wo~ld Aff~ 
1945-J..!lll2, New York, 1947, PPo2l-2o 
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For some of Curtinss appointments seemed to show at 
least as much intention of giving representation to 
organizations or interests as of se.lecting outstanding 
indi vidua.ls o E. V. Raymont, Genera.l Secretary of the Returr 
Soldiers', Sai.lors t and Airmen ts Imperial League of 
Australia, Mrs. Jessie Street, official.ly described as 'a 
leading member of Australian Womens Organizations', 20 and 
O.D.A. Obergi a Sydney Timber merchant 21 and President of 
the Australian Council of Employerst Federation seem 
sectional representativeso 
On .1 March Obergis appointment was the subject of a 
question to Curtin in the House from F.M. Daly who asked 
whether the Prime Minister was aware that for some time 
Oberg had spoken regularly over certain New South Wales 
Qommercial radio stationss viciously attacking the po.licy 
20. Jessie Street described herself in Who~s Who_in 
~' Melbourne, 1947, as a "Sydney feminist and 
of Women's Organizations". She contested the Wentwort 
seat for the A.L.P. in the Federal Election of 19430 
Lady Street's account of her participation in the San 
Francisco Conference forms Chapter 20 of her autobiogr 
Truth or Ren~, Sydney, 1966. 
21. O.D.A. Oberg of Sydney had been President of the TimbE 
Development Association of Australia since 19370 He " 
Chairman of Directors of Thatcher and Oberg Ptyo L,td., 
timber merchants. 
and legislation of the Commonwea.lth Government while 
advocating that the people should vote against Labor 
candidates at the next Cmmnon:wea.l th elections. Curtin 
rep.lied that he had chosen Mr. Oberg because 
he considered that, as he ho.lds the view which the 
Honourable Member has indicated, it would be a good 
thing to inc.l ude him in the delegation as the 
representative of the view which is held to some 
extent in Australia.22 
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This explanation, so obviously at variance with Curtin' s 
earlier assertions, wou.ld no doubt have encouraged other 
bodies who were active.ly seeking representation. Tll.e 
Associated Chamber of Manufactures, the Australian League 
of Nations Union and Primary Prod:.icers unsuccessful.ly 
sought representation, 2 3 as did the Ironworkers 1 Union 
which sent a telegram to Curtin urging that theTrades 
Union Movement be given official representation at San 
. 24 Francisco. 
The inc.lusion of Mrs. Jessie Street was challenged by 
H.L. Anthony who asked whether she had been selected becau~ 
22. C.P.D., vol •. 181, lMarch 1945, p.230. 
23. C.P.D , vol. 181, 7 March 1945: p.366. 
24 ~ H/45/771/7. Australian Deleg_gtion, Misce.llaneous 
Preparation and ~§.J2reqent atioQ..._ Secre"tary..:_IronworkerE 
Union, Melbourne to Prime Mini st er 7 March 1945. 
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of her social position or because she was a defeated Labor 
candidate. Curtin replied that he considered the names of 
number of women in order to ensure the selection of one whc 
would be capable 
of giving excellent assistance to the delegation 
in dealing with certain aspects of matters that 
are to be dea.lt with at San Francisco. I regarded 
Mrs. Jessie Street as a very competent and cultured 
woman, one who has a broad view which is shared by a 
large section of the people of Australia as was shown 
by the fact that she was chosen by a great organizatic 
to be a candidate for Parliament and po.lled very we.11. 
Curtin presumab.ly did feel that some groups and intere 
in Australian society could be useful.ly represented at the 
Conference since it was impossible for the Government to 
a delegation of a size26 which would permit comprehensive 
group or interest representation, he took refuge in his the 
of the useful individual. Thus he was able to rebuff a 
complaint by Dr. Gaba that Tasmania was unrepresented in th 
delegation. 
25. C.P.J?.., vol. 18.1, 2 March 1945, pp.27J-4. 
26. Transport, rather than cost, appears to have been the 
factor .limiting the size of the delegation. Expenditu 
on both the Apri.l Empire Meeting in London and the San 
Francisco Conference by Australia up to JO June 1945 
amounted to £17, 485. Commonwea.lth of Australia 9 
Par.lia!!rnll!?.rY.~~!'~§i.... Gell.~:r.al and F:!,!illnce, .. ...fui§,~2.ll 
.§., vo.l. IV, p.279. On 21 March Curtin claimed that 
transport difficulties were a contributing factor in a 
decision not to send six typists from Canberra to San 
Francisco. C.P.:q_., vo.l. 181, 21 March 1945, p.770. 
"Last week, 11 Curtin replied 9 "I intimated that 
people who would attend the San Francisco Conference 
had been selected because of their experience and 
competence to assist Ministers. 'Ihe fact that they 
had been associated with any particular body did not 
mean that the body was being represented in the 
de.legation. It was as competent persons that they 
had been chosen to go to San Francisco. No state, 
political party, or any body of employers or 
emp.loye es has been given represent a ti on in the 
de.legation. 11 27 
H.A.M. Ca.mpbel.l, Editor of the Melbourne Age and 
w. Macmahon Ball, Head of the Department of Political Scie1 
at Melbourne University aroused no parliamentary controven 
Campbe.11 might be regarded as re pre sent ing the Fourth Esta-I 
at the official level. H.A. McClure Smith, Editor of the 
§.y__d.Qey Morning. Hera.ld, which had been strongly attacking Ct 
in the early months of 1945, 28 also went to San Francisco~ 
but in a private capacity as reporter for his newspaper. 29 
Maciriahon Ball had spent two months early in 1945 editing a 
volume of Dr. Evatt ts speeches, which Evatt wanted, and in 
27. c.P.D.j voL 181, 7 March 1945 9 p.365. 
28. Lloyd Ross, Quadrant, loc. cit., pp.Jl-2 o 
29. U .s. Government Printing Office, Di~or_y_<2,:[_Pr~ 
Periodical.2-Radio and News~photograpl!-ic~~ntat:!..Y..§ 
~~ted_ to~N .c. I.O., California, .1 May 1945. 
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in fact had, ready in time to distribute to other Delegate 
at San Francisco. Macmahon Ball, who had no previous clos 
connection with Evatt or Burton 9 had been telephoned by Jo: 
Burton from Canberra and asked to undertake the edi toria.l 
task as a matter of urgency. He agreed - was fl own to Can· 
and Sydney where he was given departmental officers to ass 
him. He selected the speeches and wrote the introduction 
three weeks. Within a further three weeks the book30 ·had 
been pub.lished. 
Defence advisers were also included in this group of 
Assistants and Consultants. In his formal announcement on 
March .1 of the delegation, Curtin said that the two Delega· 
would be 'attended by' Sir Frederic Eggleston, Australian 
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the 
United States and the defence advisers. He then continued 
'I have a.lso invited, as assistants to the delegation Y, arn 
named the remainder of the Assistants and Consultants. 31 
30. H.V. Evatt, Foretgn Po.licy....2.£._Austra.,lia, Sydney, 1945. 
31. C.P.!!2_., vol. .181, .l March 1945~ pp.230-1. The emphas: 
which Curtin gave to Eggleston and the defence adviseJ 
may exp.lain why The....1_ime12_ reported on 2 May 1945 that 
Australian delegation as announced by Curtin included 
only Evatt, Forde and these five men. 
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This perhaps again reflects the importance Curtin attached 
his own Defence Department and its views. The defence adv: 
were the H.ead of the Australian Service Mission in Washing· 
Lieutenant-General Sir John Lavarack, a former Chief of th1 
Australian General Staff; the Air Member of the Service 
Mission, Air Marshal Richard Williams, a former Chief of t1 
Air Staff; and the Naval Attache in Washington, Commander 
S.H.K. Spurgeon. The Assistant-Secretary of the Departmen· 
of Defence, P. E. Coleman was also a Delegate and he, .like 
Lavarack and Williams, was a graduate of the Imperial Defe1 
32 College. 
In some important general observations to Parliament < 
foreign policy on 28 February, 33 the Prime Minister had sh< 
the dominance which defence policy he.ld in his thoughts on 
the post-war world - in fact the references which he made 1 
Government policy at the coming San Francisco Conference WE 
primarily concerned with defence policy and the effect whi1 
32. Coleman and the Defence Advilers served as Alternate 
Dele&'ates on Committees I (Structure and Procedures), 
III (Enforcement Measures) and IV (Regional Arrangeme1 
of Commission No. 3 (Security Council) at San Francis< 
33. C.P.D., vol •. 181, 28 February 1945, p.172. Debate on 
the Address-in-Reply. 'I now .look for a moment at thE 
foreign policy of this Government, a foreign policy wl 
in the very nature of things must always be in harmonJ 
with that of the British Commonwealth as a whole'. 
discussions at San Francisco would have on Australia's 
future military security which he continued to see as beinE 
strong.ly dependent on the Commonwea.l th connectionc In the 
course of this speech, Curtin was asked whether he propose( 
to inform the House of the princip.les to be espoused by thE 
Australian delegationc Curtin replied 
I do: I intend to state them nowc I wish to be 
precise in my statements, otherwise there might be 
misunderstanding here or in other places prior to 
the meeting of the Conference, and because of such 
misunderstanding, the Conference might be prejudiced. 
The aims of the Governments t post-war po.licy in regard 
to national security are an adequate defence policy, 
the development of maximum co-operation in defence 
among members of the British Commonwealth~ and the 
establishment of defence and security policy on an-all 
party basis.34 
Curtin dwe.l t at length on the need for all party suppo 
for defence po.licy, 
The achievement of an adequate defence policy and the 
maintenance of continuity in regard to it, will depend 
on whether or not the po.licies that govern local and 
Empire defence, and participation in the world securit 
organization are broadly based and command the genera.l 
support of the Australian peop.le. The po.licies must 
be truly national in character and should be sponsored 
by all po.litical parties, irrespective of which party 
may be in power. I cannot imagine the defence of a 
country being effectively developed if, upon a change 
of government arising as the result of differences of 
opinion in regard to social, economic, and other matte 
there should be some violent interruption of the plan 
defence previously laid down.35 
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid. 
2. 
Representatives of the opposition parties were theref 
included in the delegation as wel.l as representatives of t 
Labor Movement. Opposition members in the Rouse felt~ how 
that their representatives should be more than mere Assist 
and Consultants. It was suggested that they should be all 
to take part in the preliminary Commonwealth talks in Lond 
It was further suggested that members of the Opposition sh 
join Forde and Evatt as Australian Delegates. On 7 March 
J.P. Abbott quoted in the House the examp.le of the United 
States in having Delegates from both parties. Was Austral 
he asked, going to differ from Britain and the United Stat 
in that its official representatives would be confined to 
Government members? 37 Curtin commented 
"I do not model everything that we do on what is 
done by the United States of America", 
and he went on to say 
"al.l I know is that a representative of the Republicn 
Party has been included in the list of those who wi.l 
attend the Conference. The Honourab.le Gentleman, I 
believe, wi.1.1 discover that the Secretary of State 
wil.l be the representative of the United States 11 .JS 
J6. Ibid. See al so Crayton Burns in the Argus, l March l 
'Mr. Menzies expressed the view .last night that the 
ancil.lary representatives of Australia should be 
participating in the discussions with corresponding 
representatives of Great Britain and the Dominions be 
the World Security Conference.' 
J7. C.P.D., vo.l. .lSl, 7 March 1945, p.365. 
JS. Ibid. 
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Curtin was mistaken.. All eight United States Delegates, w 
included in their number three Republicans, represented th 
United States at San Francisco (with the exception of the 
former Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who was in hospit 
al though it was not until the tenth of' April that Stettini 
announced that decisions of' the America delegation at 
San Francisco would be made by a majority voteo 39 On 9 Ma 
four days after the United States Government, on behalf of 
China, Great Britain, Russia, and itself, had issued f'orma 
invitations to forty-six nations to attend the San Francis 
Conference, the Prime Minister of Canada announced that th 
Canadian delegation would contain members of the Oppositio 
40 
as full Delegates.. On March 22 Churchill announced that 
the British delegation would contain members of all three 
parties though olily Conservative and Labour members were a 
41 the principal Delegates. It possibly seemed ironic to E 
though it was realistic in the circumstances of the Coalit 
390 New York Times, 11 April 19450 
40.. New York Times, 10 March 1945 o 
41 o Washington, Po.§.t, 23 March 19450 The principal Brit is 
Delegates were Amthony Eden, Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman; Clement Attlee, Lord Presi 
of the Council; the Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of 
for Dominion Affairs; and the Earl of'Halif'ax, Ambassa 
to the United States. 
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Government, that in the British delegation, the Deputy Pri1 
Minister~ Clement Attlee, was not appointed Chairman of thi 
delegation. Churchi.Ll argued that Anthony Eden, who had 
personal responsibi.lity for foreign affairs, must be 
Chairman. 
In defence of a one party or government group of De.le 1 
Curtin had argued on 28 February that 
"the state of law provides that no alliance, treaty, 
or agreement can be made between nations except 
through the Governments of those nations as the 
contracting agents." 
The high contracting authority, he said, was the Governmen· 
of the day. 
"obvious.ly, Ministers of State are the persons who 
must engage in the actual negotiations of the 
contract, or whatever it may be. 11 42 
While Curtin could rightly stress that the contracting par· 
would be governments or heads of state, he avoided the ver~ 
real possibility that these entities could, and at the Corn 
were to empower individuals who were not Ministers of Stat1 
represent them at the Conference and sign the Charter on tl 
42. C.P....!120 9 vol. 181, 28 February .1945, p.173. 
behalf'. 43 Curtin, clearly, f'elt that it was political.ly 
convenient to have government De.legates only: what is morE 
he was in a suf'f'icient.ly strong parliamentary position to 
have his way. 44 
The Liberal Party was thus represented only among the 
Assistants and Consultants. Its Leader in the Senate, Sen< 
George McLeay, joined the Deputy Leader of' the Country Par1 
John McEwen, Senator R.H. Nash and R.T. Po.Llard M.H.R. of' 
the Labor Party. The Labor movement was further representE 
by J .F. Wa.lsh, Federal President of' the Australian Labor 
Party. While it was not .likely that the Prime Minister, ei 
if' he had been wel.1 9 would have .lef't his country f'or the 
period of' the Conference as the Pacific War as moving to i1 
tragic climax 9 the decisions of' R.G. Menzies, Leader of' thE 
Opposition and A.W. Fadden, Leader of' the Country Party no· 
join the delegation are .less obviously understandahle. 
4J. The question of' whether Full Power to sign the Charte: 
should be given to Delegates by their respective Head: 
State or their Governments arose among Secretariat of': 
ials earl,y in the Conference. The Austra.lian Ful.l Poi 
dated 8 June 1945, were signed by Norman Makin, Actin1 
Minister f'or Externa.l Af'f'airs. Most U.N.C.I.O. Deleg< 
however, received their Powers to sign the Charter f'r1 
Heads of' State. United Nations Archives, New York 9 
U.N.C. 10 Gene:r:§l.l~!ile., Box 2~ Credentials - Ful.l Pojt~ 
Reports. 
44. A comparison might be made with Canada when there was 
f'ull scale parliamentary debate on the question of' wh 
the country should send a delegation to San Francisco 
F.H. Soward~ Canada in .. World Af'f'2,i:r:s - From Norm~gy:__; 
Paris 194u-J.L6-;-Toronto, 195~pp.IJr=). 
On Monday 27 February it was reported in the Age that 
Fadden had declined an invitation to attend the Conference. 
Mr. Fadden stated that it was essential for him to 
attend Parliamentbecause of the type of legislation 
to be dealt with. Mr. McEwen, he added, would 
represent the Country Party at San Francisco. 
Menzies was reported to have sought to postpone discussion 
contentious legislation - he was 
putting out feelers that such matters should be held 
in abeyance to allow him to attend the San Francisco 
Conference. 
The Parliamentary Liberal Party is reported to have urged < 
22 February that Menzies should attend. However, no decisj 
was reached pending an examination of Parliament ts legisla1 
programme. The feelers to the Government then followed; 01 
28 February Menzies was reportedly able to persuade his 
party that he should not go. He wished to .lead the Opposi i 
fight in Parliament against proposed banking legis.lation ar 
the attempt to nationalize interstate airlines. He also w] 
to consolidate the recently formed Liberal Party throughoui 
Australia. 45 On 31 March his interest in this task was 
illustrated by his reported decision 1 not to accept fresh 
briefs nor to practise again for some months so that he ma) 
give a.1.1 his time to fostering the Liberal Party. ,46 
45. Crayton Burns, Argus, l March .1945. 
46. Syd.nev Msu:ning__Herald, 31 March 1945. 
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The Labour Government pressed ahead with its legislati 
programme o On 9 March the Commonweal th Bank Bil.l 19454 7 
and the Banking Bill 194548 were read for the first time. 
Th.e Banking Bill, 49 which placed the banldng system under 
the control of the Commonwealth Bank through a reserve 
deposit system and control over interest rates also sought 
prevent non-government Trading Banks from conducting busine 
for States and State authoritiess save with the consent of 
the Federal Treasurer - this provision was later held to be 
unconstitutional.50 Shortly after the San Francisco Confer 
ended, the Australian National Airlines Bi.1.1 was introduced 
This Act, which with both Banking Acts, received Royal Asse 
on 29 August5 2 set up Trans-Australia Airlines as a goverrnr 
instrmnentali ty~ established an Airlines Commission and 
provided for the terrn.ination of privately owned interstate 
air services - this final provision was also subsequent.ly 
47. C.P.J?.., vo.1. 181, 9 March 1945, p.51.,.6. 
48. Ibid. p.553. 
49. A long Second Reading d,ebate commenced on 21 June - fi 
days before the conc.lusion of the Conference. C.P.D. 
vo.l. 183, 21 June 1945, P·• 3457 o 
50. The State Banking Case 1947. See Geoffrey Sawer, op. 
p 0 2.11. 
51. C.P.D.~ vol. 183s 18 July 1945, p.4178. 
52. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Vot~~ 
Proce~dingsL-House of Re2resentative~ird_~~ssi.Q11, 
Sevent~h Parl.!.EJ!l .. fil1:.b vol. I, p.223. 
held to be unconstitutional.SJ 
A further controversial Bil.l, and one which·with the 
Banking Acts was debated while the San Francisco Conference 
was in progress 3 was the Re-estab.lishment and Employment A, 
which gave rights to re-employment~ or preference over othe 
in employment, to members of the armed services. The 
Opposition fought to have the preference made more extensi' 
and of longer duration. 
Such a .legislative programme would provide a plausible 
explanation for R.G. Menzies' reluctance to journey to San 
Francisco. It is also possible that he was sufficiently 
astute to foresee the dominance which Dr. Evatt was to 
exercise over the entire delegation. 
* * * 
The delegation, as announced by Curtin on March 1st, 
contained several whose allegiance pri.!lli!, facie., could be 
assigned to Forde and almost none with obvious allegiance 
Evatt. Forde would be supported by Coleman, his defence 
officers, and Ro.land Wilson; 5 5 Evatt by Eggleston, as an 
53. 
54. 
Airlines Case .1945, see Sawer, op. cit., p.179. 
First Reading, 23 March 1945. C.P.D., vol. 181. 
Assent, 28 June 1945, Vot~ ang Proceedings, loco 
p.172. 
55. See above P• 
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officer of his Department of External Affairs, and by 
Macmahon Ballo For the rest of the delegation primary 
loyalties were possibly to the organization which they 
represented. These non-departmental Assistants and Consul· 
ants, could not 9 as a group, be considered as being informe' 
upon or even cognizant of, the detai.led development of the 
Government's thinking on the post-war world. 
The assistants and consultants were each provided wit 
a mimeographed vo.lume of background papers which contained 
inter ~' the text of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals with 
British, American, Russian and Netherlands comments; se.le c 
speeches stating the Governments' views on "world organiza 
for peace and security", a "Summary of Australian Official 
Views 1939-44"; and finally texts of the Atlantic Charter, 
Moscow Declaration, Philadelphia Declaration of the Inter-
national Labour Organization, the British Commonwealth Pri 
Ministers Declaratinn, May 1944, the Franco-Soviet Treaty 
of Alliancej December 1944, and the Crimea Declaration, 
December 19440 Thesej and the remainder of the documents, 
were of a public natureo 
It is no doubt possible that some, if not all, of the 
non-departmental Consultants and Assistants could have pla 
23: 
an active and creative part in po.licy formulation and 
definition both before the delegation left Australia and 
after it finally assembled at San Francisco o But to p.lay 
this part f'ul.ly they would have required access to confide 
departmental background papers, cabinet minutes, telegrams 
and memorandao T.he very nature of' these materials would, 
in even the most harmonious delegation, have tended to 
restrict their circulationo 
The ~en~imental officials in the delegation might we 
have expected some access to such inf'ormationo Of' the Assi 
and Consultants the departmental officers, as: has been see 
were Eggleston, Co.leman, Wi.lson, and, for the purposes of' 
the Conf'erence 9 the defence adviserso Yet even with regar 
to these departmental officials there were serious dif'f'icu 
in the circulation of' information. 
T.he difficulty created by this situation,(Hasluck wro 
of' the rivalry for leadership in the delegation) 
was added to by the fact that, while the general 
mass of' the 'consultants 2 had no particular allegianc 
except to the organizations or parties from which thE 
were drawn, the officials were, from the commencement 
very c.lear.ly attached either to Mr. Forde or to 
Dro Evatt. T.he strength of' what ought to be called 
the 'Evatt team' lay in the fact that they knew more 
about the subject matter of' the conference and, 
perhaps more important.ly 9 that they were in possessic 
of' most of' the documents o We were discouraged f'rom 
sharing either our knowledge or papers.56 
But who were the 'Evatt team'? - f'or the delegation a< 
announced by Curtin contained f'ew whose primary loyalties 
were to Evatt; Evatt's support at San Francisco was not 
limited to Egg.le st on with the assistance of' Macmahon Ba.11. 
The f'orm in which Curtin announced the deJ.su::iatj_on to the 
It is understandable that the Prime Minister chose not to 
name the secretarial, press and clerical staff' who were to 
f'il.l twenty-two p.laces in a delegation total of' f'orty-seve1 
it is f'ar less c.lear why he should have f'ai.led to name the 
group of' seven departmental of'f'icials, who, in the 0f'f'icia~ 
List of' the ~ustralian Delegation57 forwarded by Sir Fredei 
Eggleston f'rom the Australian Legation in Washington to thE 
Secretary of' State on 17 April, and subsequently in al.l 
relevant Conference documents, are described by the separa· 
head 'Advisers' and are listed immediately below the Assis· 
56. Has.luck, :L2l!mal.......ill:!Q.._Pr~ed,ings, pol60o 
57. United Nations Archives, U.N.!..C..!..!..:.~:::_!;i£D&.ra.l_File, B. 
D e.l ~ge_.!_!_Q.!L Lists o 
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and Consultants., It is possible that Curtin had hopes, whi 
were not to be fulfilled, of the group's insignifance. 58 
Tb.is group, with the exception of the young L.F. CrisI 
from the Department of Post-War Reconstruction llll!.§....QQ.mpoE,g£ 
entirely ~f officials from both of Dr.!--~att's depar~ments, 
It was these Evatt men who through their brilliant and dyne 
leader, their knowledge, and contro.l of information, were j 
fact to represent Australia at San Francisco., It must be 
stressed, however, that Forde, Wilson and Crisp~, as a gro1 
did some most valuab.le work in representing Australia on tl 
Social and Economic Committee and were largely instrumentaJ 
58. It appears that these Advisers had been chosen at the 
time of Curtin's speech. At the foot ofa report in tl 
Argus on the composition of the delegation on 2 March 
following paragraph was appended in smaller print 'It 
understood that Dr. Evatt' s staff will include Mr. W .] 
Forsyth, who is at present in charge of the secretari< 
administering the A.N.Z. Agreenent; Dr. W0 [sic] Burt< 
liaison officer to U.N.R.R.A.; Mr. Paul Hasluck, and] 
Keith Waller former~::ecretary at the Australian Minist: 
at Chungking. 
59. Born 1917. 
with Canadian assistance, in ba ving r full employment t wri t1 
into the Charter in Articles 55 and 56. 60 But this was, aj 
a.11, a policy to which Evatt and Burton were also strong.ly 
committedo 
There was, as one would suppose, some cooperation bet~ 
the two groups • 
I think it would be improper, and probably quite poini 
less, for me to discuss the re.lations between the two 
Ministers, but I should like to confess to a treason 
of the clerkso Two or three of us in the Evatt team 
and two or three in the Forde team habitually worked 
in touch with each other to try to help the two camps. 
I don't think we could have got through the ConferencE 
if we had not done soo61 
K.H. Bailey, Professor of Public Law in the Universit) 
of Melbourne and, since 1943, a Consultant in the Attorney 
General's Department was the only official from that depari 
The remaining Advisers, al.1 from the Department of External 
Affairs, were Alan Watt, Counsellor at the Australian Legai 
in Washington, JoBo Brigden, Financial Counsellor at the 
Legation; Paul Hasluck, who in the Post Hostilities Divisic 
had made a close study of the Dumbarton Oaks Draft and had 
accompanied Evatt to Wellington; William Forsyth, who had ~ 
60. See LoF. Crisp, 'The Austra.lian Full Employment Pledge 
San Francisco', ~tralian Out~, vol. 19, noo l, 
April 1965, pp.5-19. 
61. Hasluck, ~rnal and Proceedi~, pol73. 
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been with Evatt to Wellington and who shared with Sir 
Frederic Egg.leston a particular interest in, and knowledge 
of, trusteeship, and John W. Burton, Dr. Evatt's secretary 
also a Wellington adviser, who had been drafting departmeu-
papers on international economic policy. The secretary of 
the delegation, Keith Waller, was also an officer of the 
62 External Affairs Department. 
There was briefly an eight advisero On 20 Apri.l 
Egg.leston wrote from the Legation to the Secretary of StatE 
that L.R. MacGregor, Director-Genera.l of the Australian WaJ 
Supp.lies Procurement Mission63 in the U.S.A., was to act 
as an additional Adviser to the delegation. 64 MacGregor wl 
62. In 1941 the Editorial Board of the &J~:tral-A~,t~ 
:§..ulletin:. (see above p had been chaired by Sir 
Frederic Eggleston. It included W.D. Forsyth and w. 
Macmahon Bal.l; K.H. Bai.ley contributed to vol. 5, no. 
June-July 1941. 
63. Mr. Samuel Atyeo, classified as an Assistant Secretar) 
to the Australian Delegation~ was attached to the War 
Supplies Procurement Division. He served as a genera] 
personal assistant to Evatt~ who had known him as a 
painter in Melbourne. Evatt~s progressive role in 
Melbourne art politics in the 1930 2 s is described in 
Bernard Smith, Au§.:tra],,ian Painting:, 1788-1960, Melbou:r 
1962, Ch.7. 
64. United Nations Archives, New York, y_.N.Qd.•0•.....=....Q-.~~ 
File, Box 4, Delega:tiQ.n l:i§.1..§.. 
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had previously been Australian Trade Commissioner in Canad 
and North America was known to be a friend of Dro Evatt. 
In the first edition of the Provisional List Qf_Members of 
the Delegations and Officers of the Secretariat published 
21 April MacGregor heads the list of Australian Adviserso 
However, in a revised version of this list forwarded by 
Wal.ler to the Conference Editor on 29 April MacGregor's 
name no longer appearso 65 MacGregor became Australia's 
first Ambassador to Brazi.l shortly after the Conference an 
wished to prepare himself for this new appoini:ment. 
A graphic illustration of the split in allegiance wit 
the delegation is provided by an ana.lysis of the accommodat 
of the Australian delegation at the SirFrancis Drake Hotel 
San Francisco, during the Conference. T.his shows that Eva 
office on the seventeenth floor was shared by Eggleston, 
Ball, Bailey, Brigden, Burton, Forsyth, Hasluck, Watt and 
Evatt's personal assistant, Samuel Atyeo - Forde's office 
on the eleventh floor was shared by Wilson, Coleman and 
Crisp, while Lavarack, Williams and Spurgeon had offices 
65. United Nations Archives, New York, U.N.C.IoOo - Gene~ 
~' Box 4, Document P;rod1!£.i!..!2.!!• 
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on the same floor. The detailed analysis 66 is as follows: 
Evatt 
Mrso Evatt 
Eggleston 
Ball 
Bailey 
Brigden 
Porde 
Mrs. Forde 
Lavarack 
Williams 
McLeay 
Nash 
McEwen 
Pollard 
SEVENTEENTH FLOOR 
Office Residence 
1707 1709 Burton 
1711 Forsyth 
.1707 .1701 Hasluck 
.1707 .1.110 Watt 
.1707 1705 Wa.ller 
1707 .1706 Atyeo 
ELEVENTH FLOOR 
Office Residence 
1133 1129 Campbell 
l.128 Walsh 
1115 1114 Oberg 
1126 1127 Raymont 
6.16 1103 Street 
6.16 1119 Wilson 
616 .1106 Co.leman 
616 1107 Spurgeon 
Crisp 
Office 
.1707 
1707 
1707 
1707 
l.122 
.1707 
Office 
6.16 
616 
616 
616 
616 
1133 
1133 
.1122 
1133 
The work of the Conference was divided among four 
.171; 
171~ 
17ll 
.170l 
170~ 
61: 
Re~_:; 
.1.101 
.111: 
.lll.J 
lll~ 
110] 
112: 
113.J 
.1.10: 
110~ 
Commissions - Commission I, General Provisions; Commission 
Genera.1 Assembly; Commission III, Security Counci.1; and Cou 
ission IV, Judicia.1 Organization. Commissions II..., III ea cl 
had four working Committees to consider specific areas of 1 
subjects which had been assigned to the Commissions. Comm: 
66. Based on Te.lephone D~ctQtl....f.2.1.:~l!ni:t!Zd NagQll.§.....QS 
erence on International. O;i:::g_gni~tion. San Francisco, 
Californiao Third Issue, 17 May 1945• 
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I and IV had two Committees. It was in these twelve worki 
Committees of the Conference that the detailed debate took 
placeo Forde and Evatt were AustraliaYs formal Delegates 
on all Committees except those of the Judicial Commission 
IV to which Evatt alone was accreditedo 67 On each Committ 
the two Delegates were assisted by two Alternate Delegates 
and in addition four or five of the Advisers and Assistant 
and Consultants were assigned to each Committee. 
On all Committees at least one of the Alternate 
Delegates was one of Dr. Evatt's officials and there was 
usua.1.ly at least one other of his team among the group of 
four or five delegation members who were assigned to sit i 
on discussions. Some of the non-departmental Assistants a 
Consultants were named as Alternate Delegates but 
When a committee got down to technical detail, the 
Alternate Delegate probab.ly had to .leave the argu-
ment to one or other of the eager officials because 
he himself had not had the chance to become familiar 
with the detai1.68 
670 Annex G of the Australian Report on U.N.C.:.f_&., sets 
out in full Australian representation on Committees o 
the Conferenceo 
68. Hasluck, ~nal_end Pr~di:ggji, p.170. 
Hasluck concluded 
It is no disrespect to those 'consultants' who were 
named as YalternatesY to say that they had little to 
do and I think most of them would agree they were 
given little opportunity for anything except 
attending.69 
EvattYs well and exclusively informed officials, then: 
were strategically deployed on the Committeeso In additi01 
he had his officials appointed as the Executive Officers o: 
the Australian representatives on each of the Commissions · 
Commission I, Mro Forsyth; Commission II, Dro Burton; 
Commission III, M7C Watt; and Commission IV, 
Professor Bailey. 
The 12.~Frnent officials alone were empowered to attenc 
the sessions of any Commission or Committee as required. 71 
This gave them a decided advantage over the non-department;: 
men who had to remain in the Commission and Committees to 
which they were accreditedo Evatt presumably felt quite 
strongly on this pointo In his letter of 3 May to the 
Secretary General setting out Austra.lian representation or 
Conference Committee, the Secretary of the Australian Delel§ 
was specific on the matter. 
69 o Ibid. 
70. Australj._@....B.fillQ.rt Q.!1~_:,Q. I • .Q.., po 71 o 
7.1. Ibid. Emphasis added. The Defence officers were not 
'permanent officials'. 
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It is our wish that members o:f our delegation should 
be regarded as el igihle to attend all meetings of the 
Committees set up under the ;r&.~,i.:!,.Y.Q, Commissions to 
which they have been nominated, and that the Q.fficia~ 
~§..§..!:.§.. should be ab.le to attend~ Committee of th 
Conference where their services are required. If it 
is necessary foF the purposes of the Secretariat, the 
names of their Lthese?] officia.ls (which wi.11 be 
supplied if reqHested) may be p.laced on the list of 
our representatives on each of the Committee.72 
This letter was somewhat more generous to those perma 
officia.ls (Wilson, Coleman and Crisp) outside the Evatt gr 
than the Secretary's previous letter of 1 May with which h 
had forwarded 
a list of the members of the Australian delegation to 
serve on the four Commissions to be set up in 
connection with thework of the United Nations 
Conference or International Organization. 
At the conc.lusion of that .list the following !yas appended 
It is intended that the External Affairs Advisers 
(namely Mr. Watt, Mr. Hasluck~M~~~---Forsyth, and 
Dr. Burton) together with the Consultant to the 
Attorney-General (namely, Professor Bailey), should 
attend aLl four Commissions as their services may be 
requirect.73 
This was the real core of the Evatt team: these men canst: 
the rea.l power and policy centre of the Austra.lian Delegat: 
at San Francisco. They moved in the shadow of a leader whi 
was as energetic as he was brilliant -
72. United Nations Archives, New York, ~ .. ~ .. I.•0• . ...::.-9:fil!Ql.:i 
hle, Box 4, Delegation Lists. Emphasis has been add< 
73. Ibid. 
By the time of the Conference, he was so wrapped 
up in the Charter that he could move from point 
to point, and at a few minutes notice enter into 
a new fight on any article in the draft. It was 
24 
an amazing display of physical en7~gy and combative-
ness on a dozen different frontso 
Newspaper reports from the Conference told, as has been se 
on 27 April of a dispute as to the leadership of the deleg 
which had been settled with an affirmation of Forde' s 
leadershipo Yet Dro Evatt clearly exercised effective 
control of Australia ts policy and posture at San Francisco 
and was to be her representative on the Executive Committe 
of the Conference. Dr. Evatt and his Advisers acted as if 
tbeAustralian delegation was headed by Co-Chairmen, one of 
whom was little more than a figurehead~ As in Annex F of 
the Australian~port on U.N.c.r.o. so in the ~&!.!..Q• 
Documents neither is referred to as Leader or Chairman 
though the Documents clearly list a Chairman of every othe 
delegation • In the Pictorial Record ot:_theDelegates to_:tl! 
.!lulled Nations Conferen~ on Internationa;t, Organization 
pub.lished by the Photographic Offices of the International 
Secretariat on l June 1945 tmDelegates of each country ar 
74. Has.luck, Journal & Proceedings, po.1700 
listed beside a group photograph of the Delegates (and in 
some cases Consultants/Advisers). On each country's page 
there was also a photograph of the Chairman of the 
Delegation - except in the case of Australia where the 
page contained separate photographs of Forde and Evatt 
neither of whom was described as Chairman. 
CHAPTER VI 
AUSTRALIA AT THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH MEETING, 
~ON, APRIL !.21i..5.• 
2 
Forde and Evatt, with Burton 9 Forsyth, Hasluck, Colema: 
and Wilson as consultants and advisers, left Sydney in an 
R.AoFo Transport Command Liberator on 15 March 1945 for 
pre.liminary British Commonweal th discussions in Londono 
Forde' s reported comments on arrival in San Francisco, at 
the end of the trans-Pacific section of their journey, bor' 
no relation to the purpose of his trip to London or the 
imminent San Francisco Conference. He simp.ly praised his 
friend, Douglas MacArthur - '.No military .leader stands 
higher in the Aus tra.lian mind than General MacArthur. He : 
h . ! 1 one of t e outstanding mi.litary leaders of the age o Tb.a· 
Evatt was much more concerned with, and able to discuss, 
1. CalLlh;!lletin~ San Francisco, 19 March 19450 Th.is pror 
an Australian iti cal ~journalist to compose the f'oll< 
t letter' from Forde to Curtin - 'Dear Jack, Just a huri 
line to let you know that we are in America after a go< 
flight across the Pacifico On the plane there was somE 
discussion as to who should have the window seat 9 but 
after all I am Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of the 
Delegation o. o. I gave a successful press interview on 
my arrivalc Bert unfortunate.ly was not present. My 
praise of Genera.l MacArthur was featured in the Frisco 
newspapersc I think I will praise him again next week; 
he is a very fine general oc••' J.D. Corbett, 'CanberJ 
Commentaryt, !._rgu~, Melbourne, 24 March 1945. 
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issues related to the San Francisco Conference is indicate, 
by a report in the San Francisco press on 22 March of his 
opinion that, although the major powers would have a speci; 
position in the new organization, lesser powers must be 
2 given a significant place. His objective of an Australiai 
seat on the Security Council was clear.ly in sight. In 
furtherance of this objective Evatt also, two days later 
in his Charter Day Address on the Berkeley Campus of the 
University of Ca.lifornia, was to praise MacArthur - but 
only before going on to quote to his advantage MacArthurts 
praise of Australia -
No nation in the world is making a more supreme war 
effort than Australia ••• it has unanimously and 
completely supported me in my military commands and 
the harmony and cooperation between Australians 
and Americans in this area is inspirational.J 
Evatt regarded his Charter Day Address highly - he wai 
.later to specifically request its inclusion in the officia: 
Australian Report on U.N.~~. 4 - and at least one of his 
2. CalJ. Bulletin, San Francisco, 22 March 1945. 
J. The full text of theCharter Day Address is 
Aus~ralian RepQLi on U.N.C.I.o., pp.79-84. 
is from p.82. 
4. H/45/776. RepQ];'t....Q.f Aus!ral~an g_eleg~. 
printed in 1 
This quota1 
advisers found him totally preoccupied with it during the 
four days which the Australian party had spent on the west 
coast, .large.ly in Los Ange.les, prior to the day of the 
address o 5 This major speech is c.losely argued, ably 
constructed, and, as such, a revealing summary of Evatt 1 s 
policy one month before the United Nations Conference 
begano 
Evatt 2 s only specific reference to the Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals in this Charter Day Address was to Chapter IX, 
Economic and Social Cooperationo He argued that this shou: 
contain 'the plain statement of convincing economic object: 
set out in Article V of the Atlantic Charter 1 • 6 These 
objectives, he said, clearly implied a commitment to fu.11 
emp.loyment for allo 7 He reiterated the case which he had 
first public.ly maintained two years previously on the occa: 
of the signing of the Canadian Mutual Aid Agreement. His 
emphasis, now as then, was upon full emp.loyment in relatim 
to international trade. 
5. Hasluck~ Journal and PrQ.Qg§.~, p.1620 
6. AustI:S1.i..~!!...£kl2.9rt ._on U oN o C. I. 0., p. 83. 
7. Ibid. 
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Our view has been that international coll.aboration 
with the object, say, of reducing trade barriers, wilJ 
not in itself fulfil the hopes of the people of the 
world unless each nation's domestic policy marches 
in step with those of others towards the supreme goal 
of full employment and increased consumption. At 
any rate, it is of importance that the economic clausE 
of the proposed world organization should be based 
upon the clear language of the objectives stated in 
the Atlantic Charter by Mr. Churchill and President 
Roosevelt and should also endeavour to establish 
machinery to carry these object~ves into effect. 
They are of supreme importance. 
And as, in his Canadian Mutual Aid speech9 and again on 8 
10 September 1944, he had linked irtternationa.l full anploymE 
with 'freedom from want' in the post war world by arguing 
that a lasting peace cou.ld not be bui.l t on military force 
alone, so now he went on to claim that 'the truth is that 
the real stabi.lity of the post-war world can be achieved 
only by carefully building an organization that will do ib 
utmost to assure to the peoples of the world a ful.l opportl: 
of living in freedom from want as well as in freedom from 
t l . ' ll ex erna aggression • 
8. Ibid. p.84·. 
9. See above p. 
10. In the course of a Ministerial Statementon foreign polj 
Evatt remarked 'Whether international affairs are regal 
from the point of view of Australian financial, indust1 
or export interests, or from the point of view of crea1 
conditions that will help to remove causes of aggressic 
we invariably return to the conclusion that it is of 
crucial importance that the nations should pursue domef 
policies of maximum employment'. C.P.D., vol. 179, 
8 September 1944, p.606 • 
. ll. Australian Report on :!l.!E•C• I .O., p. 84. 
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The major emphasis i~ Evatt's Berkeley address was 
centred upon a policy, embodying an assertion of Australia 
distinct international status, which he has enunciated in 
September 19440 Although he did not refer specifically 
to the Dumbarton Oaks draft, his argument, by implication, 
for Australian representation on the Security Council of t 
world body foreshadowed paragraph J of Australia's amendme 
12 to Chapter VI A of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Chapte 
A of the Proposals, dealing with the composition of the 
Security Council, had provided that 
The General Assembly should elect six states to fill 
the non-permanent seats. These six st,ates should 
be elected for a term of two years, three retiring 
each year. They should not be immediately eligible 
for re-election. Tn the first election of the non-
permanent members three should be chosen by the 
General Assembll for one-year terms and three for 
two year terms. 3 
120 U.N.C~O. Documents, vol. J p.550. 'The General 
Assembly shall elect six members to non-permanent 
seats. The election shall be made to the non-permane 
seats from among those members which by their past 
mi.litary contribution tothe cause of world security, 
have proved able and willing to assume substantial 
security responsibilities, or which are willing, and 
by virtue of their geographical position in relation 
to regions of primary strategic importance are ab.le, 
to make a substantial contribution tothe maintenance 
of international peace and security. 
lJ. Ibid, p.8. 
24~ 
Evatt began with a summary of the Pacific war efforto He 
emphasized Australia's contribution at Milne Bay, in the O, 
Stanleys, at Wau, Salamaua, Lae and Finschafen. 
Until .late in 1943 the Australian Army pfovided the 
greater part of the land forces and did sic] the 
brunt of the fighting on land in the suceessful 
Papua and New Guinea land campaigns~ At the same 
time, as I have said, the American air units under 
General Kenny performed magnificently 0 l4 
He then claimed that seldom, if ever, had history evidence< 
a finer example of military cooperation between a great pm 
and a lesser power than that between Austra.lia. and the Uni1 
States forces in the area ofthe Southwest Pacific. This 
cooperation should continue 'throughout the post-war perioc 
so that in the new world organization all nations seeking 
representation should be prepared to contribute a share to 
the physical force needed to restrain aggression.1 5 
Evatt acknowledged that in the post-war world the gre~ 
preponderance of military power would remain in the hands 
of the Big Three. But these powers, he said, would be 
bound by the constitution of an organization which could nc 
succeed unless all its members were given the right to plaJ 
.14. ~tralian Report on U.N.c.r.o., p.82. 
l5o Ibido p.83. 
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their part and make an effective contributiono Having thu 
argued the case for small powers in general in relation to 
organization as a who.le he went on to press Australia's ca 
in relation to 'the various executive councils of the worl 
organization'. 
It is a fact that even the so-called small powers 
may have an important and even decisive influence 
in certain regions and in special circumstances. 
Part.ly for this reason, it is necessary that Powers, 
other than the great Powers, which are included in 
the rnious~§.£1!.!:k.Y~Q.1!!!~.....Qf.._!~ worJ...£L..Q!:ganizat 
shall be selected so as to ensure a fairly balanced 
outlook in world affairs. Evexy_Q.isti!!.Q~gio!l,_Q.f 
the .. ..,g:lobe should be considered and no important group 
of nations should remain unrepresented upon such 
executive bodies o Regard shou.ld, of course, be paid 
to the claims of these al.lied nations who have, both 
in this war and in the last, lar~lY:..-Q~i!:i:Quteq to 
the overthrow of the aggressors .1 
Evatt J!Jad then added to his argument of 8 September 1944 f 
regional representation the notion that a substantial 
contribution to the overthrow of the aggressors was a 
criterion for membership of executive bodies of the wor.ld 
organization. His primary emphasis still remained~ howeve 
on regional representation, an emphasis which would~ of 
course, . favour Australia in a contest with, for instance, 
Canada. He had also broadma:lhis reference of 8 September 
Ibid. Emphasis added. 
to 2 the Executive Authority' so that he now referred to 
'various executive counci .ls i o His re:fere nee to the Exe cu ti 
Authority in September showed, in context, that he was clea 
speaking o:f what was to be the Security Council o What othE 
bodies he now envisaged as iexecutive councils~ can only bE 
conjectured. He had made mention o:f a Secretariat and 
Permanent Court o:f Justice in his September speech and may 
have sti.11 had these in mindo It might seem, in addition, 
that Evatt in this Address was also arguing the case :for 
Australia's inclusion on the Executive Committee o:f the 
:forthcoming Conference. The availab.le evidence suggests, 
however~ that he was unaware o:f the powers and :functions of 
this Committee unti.l a:fter his arrival in London. This is 
possible even though, immediately prior to his arrival in 
London, Evatt had spent three days in Washington, during 
which he spoke to the Secretary o:f State, Edward Stettinius 
On 10 April, ten days after he was to arrive in the United 
Kingdom, Evatt asked Sir Frederic Eggleston, the Australian 
Minister in Washington, to thank Stettinius :for his telegram 
(date riot given) to Evatt and to inform him that while Evat 
had no objections to his p.lans :for committees and commissio 
at the Conference he assumed that there would be provision 
for adequate discussion at a general session at the commen< 
ment of the Conference and at regular interva.ls during it o 
Evatt then asked Eggleston to ascertain the powers and 
functions of the Steering Committee of the Conference; to 
consider 'the general question of tactics and procedure'; 
and to try to win United States support for electing 
Australia to the Executive Committee which he referred to 
as the ?Steering Executive'. 1 7 
Forde and Evatt arrived in Washington from San Franci ~ 
on 27 March18 after a train journey from Dal.las where they 
had decided to leave their aircraft because of poor flying 
conditions. While in Washington they held a press conferer 
and addressed a group of Senators and Representatives, incl 
manbers of the Foreign Relations Committee,·19 at an informa 
gathering. At the press conference Forde reportedly 'spoke 
warmly of the value of the bond of fri@idship between Presid 
170 H/45/771, British Commonwealth Meetingo The telegram 
from Stettinius was presumab.ly sent after Evatt had 
left Washington for London on JO March and obviously 
prior to .10 April. 
18. §..Y:9-!!!1Y:, .. lfo:rp_i.ng:,Ji~ .. D:J:·ld, 29 March 1945. 
19. Argus, 29 March 19450 
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Roosevelt and Mro Churchi.11, a relationship, he said, 
that symbolized the friendship between the citizens of the 
British Commonwealth and the United Statesto 20 He is also 
reported to have 'deprecated any suggestion that the forth 
coming meeting in London was in any way designed to create 
a Commonwealth bloc at the Conference2• 21 Evatt is reporte 
to have answered numerous questions from the press; his 
answers would~ no doubt, reflect more the immediate policy 
interests of his questioners rather than those of Evatt 
himse.lf, but they contained some relevance to Australia's 
case as later presented at the San Francisco Conferenceo 
The Times correspondent reported that Evatt Yproved a 
strong advocate of regionalism under the world organizatin 
Forran area like the Southwest Pacific, it was vital 
he LEvatt] said, and he pointed to the need for 
.liaison that was demonstrated when the Japanese 
attacked Pear.l Harbour. He did not in any sense 
visualize a British region there 9 he added~ and he 
would welcome the inclusion of the Netherlands and 
France, which had territorial and other interests in 
the Far East, in that regiono 22 
The Times~ 
conference, 
Washington, 
21o Ibid. 
22. Ibid. 
29 March 1945. The account of the press 
by the newspaper's own correspondent in 
is extensive. 
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Similar echoes of his 1943 and 1944 speeches were apparent 
in his remarks on Great Power privilege in the world body 
and on trusteeshipo On the former subject, he now made 
specific reference to the Security Council veto. Evatt's 
reported comments, only one month before the Conference 
began9 may be read with some dismay in the light of his 
subsequent image at San Francisco o In the words of The Till 
own Washington correspondent, 
Evatt proved a warm supporter of the veto power in 
the Security Council. He said the United States, 
Britain and Russia had to work together or the whole 
organization would break down. A condition of 
success for the organization was tbat the three 
Great Powers should agree, which was another way of 
saying that before force was used against an 
aggressor the Big Three should concuro 23 
It might be added tlBt Evatt had made no reference to the 
Great Power veto in any context in his Berkeley addresso 
On trusteeship his Washington replies dealt with administr~ 
and self-governmento When he was asked whether he thought 
23. Ibid. The decisions on Security Council voting, taker 
at Yalta, were as follows - lo Each member of the 
Security Council should have one voteo 2o DecisionE 
of the Security Council or proceedural matters should 
made by an affirmative vote of seven members. J. Dec 
of the Security Council on all other matters should bE 
made by an affirmative vote of seven menbers includillf 
the concurring votes of the permanent members; providE 
that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and 
under the second sentence of Paragraph I of Chapter v: 
Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from 
voting. U.N.C.I.O. Do£.1!m.fil!i.§., vol. l, pp.1-2. 
that more than one power might join in the administration 
of' a mandated territory, Evatt replied that he thought it 
would be feasible but it would be better to p.lace the 
responsibility flatly on one power. He also 
agreed with one questioner that the whole conception 
of' trusteeship envisaged freedom f'or such territories 
when. the people demonstrated their abi.li ty to govern 
themselves.24 
The Australian delegation, the first group f'rom the 
Empire to arrive f'or the pre-San Francisco meeting, landed 
at an airport 'somewhere near London 1 on 31 March. 2 5 
Forde, and Evatt were to be joined as Australia's f'orma.l 
representatives at the talks opening on Wednesday 4 April 
S.M. Bruce 9 High Commissioner in London. Forde 1 s press 
statement at the airport, as reported, conformed to an 
uninspiring pattern. 
Mr. Forde said that he brought fraternal greetings and 
congratulations f'rom the people and government of' 
Australia to the people of' Great Britain on their 
magnificent ef'f'orts during the war. Al.l Australians, 
he continued, rejoice with you in the magnitude and 
scope of' the victorious drive by theBritish Empire 
and the Allied Forces in Germany. 2 6 
24. Ibid. Emphasis added. 
25. Th~_Times, 2 April 1945. 
26. Sunday Times, l Apri.l 1945. 
All f'lying was an ordeal f'or Evatt; 27 there is no record 
of' any comment by him to the Press bef'ore he lef't f'or 
Grosvenor House. Forde stayed at the Savoyo It was at 
this hotel that Forde and Evatt wereto hold a joint press 
conf'erence on the f'ollowing Monday, 2 Marcho This press 
conf'erence was to f'urther illustrate Fordeis apparent 
inability to comment on issues relating to the Dumbarton 
Oaks draf't or to the f'orthcoming United Nations Conf'erence 
in general o Af'ter thanking Britain f'or her help so f'ar in 
the war ef'f'ort, Forde expressed his con:fidence in the 
Department of' which he was ministerial head. 
The Australian Army today [he was reported to say] 
was a splendid striking f'orce, superlatively trained 
and equipped. He believed it would take a considerabJ 
time to def'eat the Japanese. It was a He28ulean task1 
but the ultimate result was not in doubt. 
He is then reported to have expressed the hope that a numbE 
of' new British companies would help the post-war recovery < 
Australia by investing thereo Finally, Forde spoke of' the 
Australian Government's intention to treble Australia's 
population of' 7,J00,000 'in the shortest possible time'. 29 
270 A number of' members of' the Australian Delegation to 
San Francisco mentioned this in interviews. 
28. Forde's statement was reported, in summary, in The Tin 
J April 1945. 
29. Ibid. 
Evatt in his Savoy statement, which was subsequently 
printed in the Au~tra~ Report on U.N.C.I.O. under the 
title The Dominions in World Affairs, 30 revealed his 
continuing concern for Australia's 'distinct internationaJ 
status'. His statement echoed a report from The Times' 
own Canberra correspondent Which that newspaper had 
published on the morning of the Savoy press conferenceo 
The de spat ch, which had been cabled from Canberra on Sundi 
April 1, reported that concern had been expressed in 
'Government circles' at the suggestion that the Dominions 
might be expected to vote as a solid bloc with the United 
Kingdom Government at the San Francisco Conference~ The 
'Government circles' reportedly felt that it would be 
incongruous if Australia did not vote as an autonomous na· 
while nations Which had not taken part in the war, or whi 
had not been affected by it directly, were tcivote indepen1 
ently. If the British Commonwealth was going to vote as 
one, many discussions between representatives of al.1 the 
Dominions would be necessary before the Conference. This 
Government viewpoint, the report oo ncl uded~ would be pres 
30. At pp.66-7. 
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in London by Forde and Evatto 31 
On the previous Thursday, 29 March, President Roosevej 
then in the last weeks of' his lif'e, had publicly acknowled~ 
af'ter a disclosure by the ~-YQrk Herald Tribune, an agreE 
ment, hitherto secret, which had been made by Britain and 1 
United States at Yalta to support a Russian application at 
the San Francisco Conf'erence to give initial membership of' 
the Conf'erence to the Ukraine and White Russiao United 
States support had been given on the condition that the 
United States reserved the right to claim three votes f'or 
herself' at the Conf'erence. 32 Sherwood later wrote of' this 
episode as 'one of' the worst al.l round botches of' the war 
and a seemingly unnecessary one'.JJ Evatt, in his Savoy 
press statement, argued that this episode had been accompat 
by serious misconceptions about the relationship wi~hin 
the Empire between the United Kingdom and the Dominionso 
Jlo ~ Times, 2 April 19450 
32. Washi~Q.11 P~, JO March 19450 Report headed 'Secrei 
UoSo - Red Pact on Security Votes Admitted, Rooseveli 
accepted Stalin's Plan f'or 3 Each to Balance 6 of' Brii 
Empire'. 
JJ. The White House Papers of' Harry L. Hopkins, po865o 
2. 
For instance, it has been stated in the United States 
that Britain already possesses multiple representatiff. 
through the votes of the Dominions~ This is most 
inaccurate and misleadingo Britain and the four 
Dominions will be separate, distinct, equal, and 
autonomous members of the Organizationo The British 
Commonwealth will not as such be a member at allo 
Nobody who understands the position of the Dominions 
in world affairs would think that their membership 
would amount to multiple representation of the United 
Kingdom 0 34 
and he added 
The fact that the members of the British Commonwealth 
occasionally confertogether is in no way inconsistent 
with their distinct international status 0 s3" for 
that matter, do the nations of the Americaso ~ 
Evatt could speak with some authority on this matter 
as he had been in Washington on the very day that the 
President had made his admission. Reports in the American 
press confi:rm Evatt's observations: there were those who 
misunderstood. For following the President's statements o 
a possible multiple vote for the United States at San 
Francisco, one of the American Delegates, Sol Bloom, Demo-
crat Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee~ is 
reported to have commented 'Certainly if Russia has three 
votes we shall have three votes but I think we should have 
six to match the six of Great Britain1 o36 A political 
34. Australian Report on UoNoCoioOo, po66. 
35. Ibid. 
360 ~bington Post, JO March 19450 
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correspondent wrote in the same newspaper 
No reason for the Russian move was given. Diplomatic 
officials speculated that it probably was prompted by 
a decision of Moscow to have a representation approacl 
ing that of the British Empire. The empire would hav« 
six seats for the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, 
India, New Zealand~ and South Africa.37 
On the day fol.lowing Evatt' s Savoy statement Stettini1 
announced from the White House that the United Sta.tes woul1 
!!Q..t. press its claim for ,three votes. He referred in his 
announcement to 
the interpretation freely made that the Soviet and 
ourselves sought the additional votes to balance 
the six votes held by Great Britain and her 
Dominions - an interpretation which was offensive 
both to Britain and the Dominions.JS 
The reported reaction of the Australian government has 
already been indicated. For Australia's Labor Goveniment 
the notion of the Empire speaking with one voice was 
apparently dead. 
Evatt followed his comments on Dominion status at the 
Savoy conference by immediately referring to the peace 
settlement and regionalism -
In the peace settlement, several of the Dominions 
wil.l have their own distinctive regional interests 
to safeguard within the framework of the General 
37. Ibid. 
J8. Ibid, 4 April 1945. 
2r. 
International Organization~ over and above the more 
genera.l interests that they share in common with othe1 
peace-loving States o One examp.le is the position of 
Australia and New Zealand in the South Western 
Pacifico39 
But Evatt's insistence on AustraliaYs distinct inter-
national status as a Dominion was not, on this occasion 9 
coupled with any specific reference to difficulty in Commo1 
wealth consultationo Indeed, Evatt may be said with the 
Australian-New Zealand Agreement~ to have made a choice 
between what had seemed to him, on 14 October 1943, to havE 
been 'the two means open for the expression of the Austral: 
Government's views on international affairs'. 40 It has be1 
argued in this thesis, however, that Evatt' s wartime asser· 
of Australia's distinct international status, his increasi1 
concentration on Q!!.§. only of the two means which he had sa 
in his speech of October 1943 could be used together~ was 
clo~ely associated with a concern for Australia's particip; 
in the armistice and peace settlement. The emphasis with 
with Evatt now responded to the recent challenge of that 
status in the United States may, in part at least, have 
39 o ~us tr.11.lian Repor_~....Q!!~N. Qo Io 0 o, po 66. 
40 o See above p. If.I. 
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reflected his continuing concern for Australian participat 
in the peace settlement and armisticeo Further evidence 
of' Australian interest in the armistice and peace settleme 
on the very eve of' the San Francisco talks, was provided f' 
days later in a statement, subsequently released to the Pr 
which Forde made to the f'if'th session of' the British 
Commonwealth meeting. 
It will, of' course, be necessary to conclude armistic 
with enemy countries at the time of' surrenderj and to 
set up associated machinery for control, but in our 
view, no arrangements of' a permanant character should 
be made with every single country until all our enemi' 
have been defeated. There should a.lso be f'ul.l oppor-
tunity for al.l the belligerents to participate in 
armistice arrangements~ armistice control, and pre.lim· 
inary arrangements connected with the peace settlemen· 
A second general point in Austra.lian policy is that w, 
are vitally interested in all the arrangements to be 
made in regard to cessation of' hostilities and the pea, 
settlemento41 
Forde added 
While insisting on our interest in European affairs, 
I would refer to a further point of Ausi;;ralian policy 
name.ly» that because of' our situation we have an even 
more direct concern with what takes place in the 
Pacific, South-East Asia and the Indian Oceano4 2 
On 16 April, four days after the London talks had conc.lude< 
and while Evatt and Forde were visiting Paris, a recorded 
410 Aust:r~lian_Ii<'l£..Q..!:.L.on UoJ'i~~LO., p.62. It is unlikel; 
that this speech was written by Forde. 
42. Ibid. 
talk by Evatt was broadcast to the people of Britaino Evai 
again showed his concern that Australia should have an 
'adequate part' in the peace settlement. 
Australia's c.laim to an adequate part in the forth-
coming peace settlement is based not merely on the 
war effort; it is also founded on a combination of 
essential strategic position and a readiness which 
Australia has now demonstrated in two world wars 
to act as a security pi;:twer. 43 
Evatt in this broadcast was clearly applying the same arguTI 
for an adequate part for Australia at the peace settlement 
he had used ear.lier at Berkeley to argue, by implication, : 
an initial non-permanent place for Australia on the Securi· 
Council o 
Evatt's Savoy statement contained argument on a numbe: 
of policies besides Australia ts distinct international sta· 
and the peace settlemento It reiterated his Berkeley argrn 
on ful.l employment (al though now adding a brief reference 
the need for sufficient powers for the Economic and Social 
Council) and his c.laim that Australia, because of her stra 
situation and her contributions to world security should ' 
an important part to play in the security organization 1 0 44 
43. 'I'he._!im~§., 17 April 1945 o In this broadcast Evatt al 
spoke, by this report, of full employment. 'Poverty 
unemployment are the worst menaces to peace,' he said 
44. Austral!~l!...B!:ill.2£.! .... .2.!L..!L~~. C oI~., p. 67 o 
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There was, however, one entirely new policy referred to in 
his statement; and this was in its concluding sentence. 
Evatt there suggested that the British Commonwealth should 
oppose any attempt to delay bringing the organization into 
existence, but at the same time it should endeavour to obt: 
org!lllization. The veto as a problem had finally reached 
Evatt's lips, although only, as yet, by implication~ and 
certainly not with the association which it was later 
customary to expect. 
Evatt, like Forde, made a statement, 4 5 subsequently ma 
public, to the fifth meeting of the London talks on 6 Apri. 
In this he elaborated the reference which he had made to 
charter amendment four days previously. The provisiqns ma 
in Chapter XI of the Dumbarton Oaks Draft, 46 he said, were 
restrictive. The Australians, he continued, attacre d 
45. The full text of this statement is printed in the · 
Australian_Bepor!_on !I..!.N.C.I~., pp.6J-6. 
46. Chapter XIo Amendments. 'Amendments should coneinto 
force for all members of the Organization; when they 
have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the memb 
of the General Assembly and ,rat'i fied in accordance 
with their respective constitutional processes by the 
members of the Organization having permanent membersh 
on the Security Council and by a majority of the othe 
members of the Organization.' 
2< 
l ~onsiderable significance to the revision of the Charter'o 
The Dumbarton Oaks proposals, which gave any one of the 
permanent members of the Security Council an absolute veto 
on any change, appeared likely to cause the Organization '· 
congeal into a narrow mould shaped by the nature of the WOJ 
situation' as it was then rather than to develop into 'an 
active institution capable of serving the needs of tomorro1 
His final pub.lie refennce to amendment was made in a 
speech which he delivered before the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs at Chatham House on 9 Apri1. 49 This 
is a significant speech, not only because it is centred 
upon the difficulty of amending the Charter, but because 
Evatt developed his argument there to show how the issue Oj 
a veto on amendment was related in his mind to the problem 
of a Big Five preponderance in the Security Councilo For 
now made clear in public thoughts which, as will be seen, 1 
had already expressed privately, both to Eggleston and the 
Australian Government, since his arrival in London. Wood 1 
noticed that the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Peter Fras~ 
did not express his very strongly held views on the Securi· 
470 Austra!..!fil! Repor::L.2u._Q~C.I_e.Q., p.65. 
480 Ibid. 
49. For the ful.l text of the Chatham House Address see 
Aus.fil;:al ian Reuort on U .N .c~_I...!Q.•, pp.67-8. 
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Council veto on enforcement measUl'.' es taken under Chapter 
VIII B of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals until after he had 
arrived in London. Wood explains this in terms of Fraser' 
preoccupation with the war. 50 It is probable that Evatt, 
likewise, had not made~ prior to his arrival in Londonp a 
detailed study of the full implications of the Dumbarton 
Oaks draft and the Yalta voting proposals. 
He may have been helped, in such a study, by the 
inclusion in his team of advisers of K.H. Bailey, Professo 
of Public Law in the University of Me.lbourne and ConsultaIJ 
to the Attorney-General's Department. Professor Bailey wa 
already in London when the Australian party arrived; he ha 
been representing Australia at the Third Unofficial ConfeI 
on British Commonwealth Relations which was held there fro 
17 February to J March. Evatt had personally cabled Baile 
from Canberra at the end of February asking'him to stay on 
London so that he could join him as a member of the delega 
50. Wood, op. cit., p.378. 'British delegates [at the 
London talks] moreover, courteously hinted that Frase 
had abruptly and substantially changed his mind since 
New Zealand's earlier acquiescence. This was, in fac 
not quite the case. It seems that up to this point, 
Fraser was, through an odd sequence of events, unawax 
of the exact position; for he had been visiting the 
Pacific Islands at the time when Cabinet had had to 
reach a decision.' 
26' 
to the San Francisco Conferenceo 51 At all eventsj by 9 ApJ 
the Australians had made a detailed if not exhaustive stud~ 
of the implications and meaning of the Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals, for it was on that day that the Australian dele· 
gation completed a long list of some sixty questions arisi1 
from the Dumbarton Oaks draft and the discussion so far at 
the talkso52 These questions were subsequently circulated 
at the ta.lks, apparently after being discussed in a sub-
committee of the Meeting.53 
Evatt's concern with the problem of amending the Chari 
is not altogether surprising. His own experience as a law~ 
particularly as a member of the High Court bench for ten YE 
would have made him conscious of the effects of an entrencl 
constitution on a climate of political and social changeo 
Evatt himself, in 1942, as has been seen above, had been 
51. H/45/771/7. Australian Delegation. Miscellaneous 
Prenaration and Renresentation. 
52. Evatt to Curtin, 9 April 1945, H/45/771. Briti!U!-9.2.!.!'!! 
weal th Meeting;o 
53. The Dominion, Wellington, .13 April 1945· 'IA corresp01 
of the Australian Associated Press says that the basii 
on which the countries of the Commonwealth will strivE 
at San Francisco to achieve amendments to the Dumbart< 
Oaks plan wil.1 mainly be the result of 64 questions wl 
Evatt and his Australian advisers drew up in order th< 
all delegates could have the issues clearly before thE 
See also Australian Report on U.N.C.I.O., p.lO. 
2E 
responsible f'or arranging the Constitutional Convention i:t 
Canberra which was intendedsin view of' the dif'f'iculties of 
popular amendment of' the Australian constitution, to gain 
support f'rom State political leaders f'or the Government's 
proposed Constitution Alteration (Post-War Reconstruction) 
Bill of'1942. 54 
In London also, Evatt spoke of' the need f'or a 
constitution to be subject to change; and he now made it 
clear that what concerned him in the proposed constitution 
of' the new organization was the preponderance of' the Great 
Powerso 
The Dumbarton Oaks draft, Evatt a+gued at Chatham Hou 
(and this is the f'ul.lest statement available of' his views 
London on this subject) bore many characteristics of' a mer 
prolongation into the years of' peace of' the type of' "Big 
Three" leadership which had been found necessary in order 
to win the war. This was the explanation and the justif'ic 
f'or the Security Council veto in the proposed constitution 
At the same time, and f'or this reason, he f'elt that it wou 
be wise to regard such a constitution as being of' a transi 
54. See above p.I 
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rather than of a permanent character. If that were conced' 
the organization would start off in the expectation that tl 
Charter would be progressive.ly modified and altered to fit 
the normal conditions of international relations after the 
period of post-war rehabilitation had been completedo It 
followed, he said, that the constitutional arrangements fo: 
amending the Charter were 'exceedingly important'. 5 5 Whil 
he recognized the danger of extreme flexibility in such a 
constitution, nothing would be less satisfactory, in his 
eyes, than to place the nations of the world under an 
unyielding and over rigid constitutional control • 
• o. tre central difficulty as the plan now stands, 
is that no amendment of the Charter will be possible 
without the unanimous consent of the Big Fiveo5b 
What Evatt had suggested in this pub.lie address at 
Chatham House, he made explicit in his telegram to Egglest< 
in Washington on the following day57 (10 April) wren he to~ 
him that he might not be able to accept 1 the present power: 
of veto' in the proposed Charter unless adequate provision 
was made for amendment of the constitution of the world ·bo 
55. Aus~ralian Report on U.N.C~I.O., p.680 
56. Ibido 
57. H/45/771, British Commonwealth Meet.i!!g_. 
2? 
It is a view which I hold strongly that there can be 
no satisfactory conc.lusion unless the proposals are 
looked at as a whole.as any amendment made in one 
chapter must affect many other aspects of the prop-
osals, for instance we may not feel ourselves able 
to accept the present powers of veto unless adequate 
·provision is made for amendment of the constitution. 
In my view it is vital so to arrange the Conference 
to provide sufficient genera.l sessions for discussing 
the effects of amendments suggested by one committee 
on the work of other committees. 
That Evatt had become increasingly anxious at the strengtl 
of the Great Power veto on enforcement measures under the 
terms of Chapter VIII B of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals iE 
indicated by his report to Curtin58 on the day of his 
Chatham House speech. In this he explicitly mentioned 
Fraser's great concern on the subject of the Security Cour 
veto, and said that in his (Evatt's) view 'the veto' had t 
stand because- the organization would not come into exister 
without it. Evatt then reported that he fe.lt three thingE 
would have to fo.llow from this. Firstly they must seek to 
put limits on the use of the Security Council veto; second 
they Should strengthen the regional arrangements of the C:t 
so that if military action was vetoed in the Security Coun 
it cou.ld be taken independently on a regional basis; and 
thirdly that the process of amendment would have to be frE 
from the veto. 
58. Ibid. 
2' 
On .17 April, five days after the London talks had 
ended, Forde and Evatt reported to Curtin59 that during th 
course of the talks Eden had given an assurance that the 
United Kingdom Government was technically bound by the 
decision on the veto at Yalta but the essence of this 
agreement was that while the Great Powers should possess 
a right of veto this should only be limited to particular 
caseso In Eden's view, as Forde and Evatt saw it, they 
would be free to discuss at San Francisco what these cases 
should beo Furthermore, they reported that Eden had 
indicated his willingness to reconsider the right of veto < 
amendment of the Charter; and that discussion at the talks 
had shown that there was no reason why the veto should app: 
to the examination of a dispute to which a member was not ' 
partyo 
This interrelation of the Security Council veto on 
measures to deal with threats to the peace or acts of 
aggression and the veto on amendment of the Charter appearE 
very clearly in an unpublished memorandum, prepared by Evai 
after the talks had concluded, which gave a far more detai.J 
impression of the London talks than the summary account 
59. Ibid. 
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subsequently published in the ~~!.!_an Renort-2!!...,~9..!_± 
Evatt prepared this memorandum for distribution to members 
of the Australian delegation on arrival at San Franciscoo 
Paragraph 3 of the Evatt manorandum reads in full. 
Voting i!L:!Jl& Security Council 
Throughout discussion on the Yalta voting formula, 
the Australian delegation stressedthat this question 
could not be separated from related questions such 
as revision of the Charter. The removal of the 
Great Power veto on the amendment of the Charter 
would do much to reconcile us to a Great Power veto 
on enforcement action. Discussion regarding the 
veto on the examination of a dispute to which a 
Great Power was not a party revealed that there was 
no reason why the veto should apply in such cases.61 
Evatt was to keep before him this connection of the Securi 
Council veto and the veto on amendments, although at San 
Francisco his fight was to be centred on the use of the 
Great power veto under the terms of Chapter VIII A of the 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. A reporter of the San Francisco 
Call Bulletin wrote on 13 June, the day following the end, 
in defeat, of Evatt's fight to remove the veto on the peac 
settlement of a dispute by a Great Power not a party to th 
dispute: 
60. At pp. 9-.11. 
61. H/45/771, ~tish Commonwealth Meeting,. 
Evatt came from the committee room with a statement 
on his defeat o 'The strugg.le for the .libera.lization 
and improvement of the Charter will go on', he said 
Yuntil libera.lization .or improvement takes place o 
Above all we consider that the extreme rigidity of 
amendment shou.ld be modifiedo' 
2' 
But what did Evatt mean by 'the veto Y during the Lond• 
talks, and, in fact, prior to the first week of the San 
Francisco Conference? It wi.ll be recalled that in his rep• 
to Curtin on 9 April, Evatt said that Fraser was particulai 
concerned with 'the veto' o After supporting the retention 
of 'the veto 2 Evatt had suggested that the veto on amendme1 
should be removedo Clearly 1 the veto' was the veto of the 
Great Powers in re.lation to the resolution of conf.lict bet1 
nations - but the categories of enforcement action, peacef1 
settlement, and examination of a dispute were not distingu: 
However, in this same report to Curtin, Evatt referred to · 
/ 
list of sixty questions (it is nearer to 100 questions whe1 
sub-divisions are taken into account) which the Australian 
deiegation had compiledo The questions relating to Securit: 
Council voting are as follows: 
Que.§tion_~. Voting_in the Secur:i.iY Council. 
(a) Is that part of the Yalta voting formula accep· 
able whicli enables a permanent member of the 
Security Council, when a party to a dispute, t• 
veto enforcement action by the organization? 
{b) Is that part of' the Yalta voting formula 
acceptable which enables a permanent member 
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of' the Security Council to prohibit altogether 
the consideration by the Council of' a dispute 
to which it is not a party? 
(c) Is it desirable to restrict the veto power 
of' the permanent members in other respectg 
(eogo election of' the Secreta:ry-General)? 2 
'The veto' then, in relation to the Security Council, mean 
for Evatt in London enf'orcemen t measures under VIII B and 
the examination of' disputesf under VIII Ao The relevant 
sections of' the Dumbarton Oaks draft for the examination o 
disputes are VITI A 1 and 2. The sections relating to pea 
f'ul settlement are VIII A 3, 4 and 5, and VIII C 1. It is 
extraordinary that the issue of' the Security Council veto 
a Great Power, not party to a dispute, on the recommendati 
of' appropriate procedures or methods of' adjustment for the 
peaceful settlement of' disputes was ignored in this set of 
questionso It .was likewise ignored in paragraph 3 of' the 
Evatt memorandum, written after the talks had concluded, w 
has been quoted in f'ul.l above. In this Evatt referred onl 
to the Great Power veto on enforcement action and on the 
examination of' disputes. It might be argued that Evatt ha 
been misled by Eden's assurances that the veto would be li· 
62. Ibid. 
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to particular cases, and had felt, for some reason, that 
peaceful settlement would not be one of those cases. Eden 
had, however 3 by Evatt's own account, also given an assura1 
on the Great Power veto on anendment of the Charter - yet 
the list of sixty questions included the following~ 
Amendment o;L the Charter 
Should the amendment of the Charter be made easier 
(a) by permitting the Assemhly to make amendments 
without the concurrence of a.11 the permanent 
members of the Security Council? 
(b) by providing for a review of the Charter at 
the end of an initial period of, say, ten 
years or else periodical.ly? 
(c) by dropping the requirements of ratification 
of amendments and providing instead that 
amendments should be proposed at one Assembly 
and submitted for adoption at the next?6J 
And although Evatt be.lieved that discussion had shown that 
there was no reason why the veto should apply to 'the exam: 
tion of a dispute to which a Great Power was not a partyY 
there was also a question on this subject among the sixty. 
The evidence suggests that the prob.lem of the vet..0 on peacE 
settlement had not yet seized Evatt's attention. 
If Eden's assurances cannot explain the absence of an~ 
known Australian reference to the veto on peaceful settlem~ 
they can exp.lain the moderation of Evatt' s utterances on tl 
63. Ibid. 
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veto in London. He had grown increasingly aware in London 
both of the Security Council veto and the veto on amendmen1 
he had linked the two and thereby potentially increased hi~ 
anxiety. However, he had conceded the temporary necessity 
for a right of Great Power veto on enforcement actions, anc 
was now heartened by Eden's willingness to reconsider the 
operation of the veto on anendment. He may also have agreE 
to a temporary veto on the examination of a dispute - therE 
is no way of knowing whether he inc.luded this in his notior 
of the veto when he told Curtin on 9 April that the veto he 
to stand because the organization would not come i'nto 
existence without it. In any event, he was also reassured 
on this aspect of the veto in London, so that even if he we 
not prepared to concede this form of the veto on a temporaJ 
basis, there was a considerable doubt that it would find a 
place in the Charter. 
Evatt' s unpublished memorahdum on the London talks to 
members of the Australian delegation contains extensive co11 
on several other issues besides that of 1 the veto' 
and its relation to the veto on amendment. The connection 
Evatt's earlier statements in San Francisco, Washington, a1 
2' 
London on the ro.le of middle and security powers to his 
Security Council ambitions is further documented by this 
report. In a paragraph dealing with non-permanent members] 
of the proposed Security Council, Evatt wrote that 
Canada· and Australia pressed for better representatio1 
in the Council of 'middle powers', or as we have 
expressed it 'security powers', and the strength of 
their case was generally accepted~ Means of achievint 
this representation were discussed and such criteria 
for selection as war effort, war potential,_ and 
geographical location~ were mentioned. . There was 
general agreement that due regard be paid to the 
contr~but~~n of members to the maintenan.ce of 
security. 
Evatt claimed, furthermore, that this question could not be 
considered apart from the Great Power veto, provisions for 
the future revision of the Charter, and the future negotia1 
of special security agreements under Chapter VIII B 5 of tl 
Dumbarton Oaks proposalso 
Evatt's account of discussions on the subject of the 
powers of the· General Assembly is, .like his report on the 
veto, remarkably restrained in view of his future role at 
San Francisco. This restraint likewise vanished in the fa< 
of rigid Great Power adherence at San Francisco to the 
Security Council veto. Of the London talks, Evatt recordec 
that in discussion on the respective powers of the Assembl) 
64. Ibid. 
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and Council in regard tothe handling of disputes, Australi 
took the position that, while it was desirable to increase 
the powers of the Assembly, the question should be conside 
in re.la ti on to the general cpestion of the composition and 
function of the Security Council and the procedure to be 
adopted in the settlement of disputeso He felt that due 
regard should be paid to the necessity for leaving to the 
Security Council the handling of immediate threats to the 
peace. 
On the question of Economic and Social Cooperation 
Evatt felt able to report that 'the meeting eventually 
reached general agreement on the points put forward by thE 
Australian delegation •••• It was agreed that the Social 
and Economic Council should be one of the principal organf 
of the World Organization'. 65 Australia 
also gained support for the inclusion in the Charter 
of a definite pledge by manbers to take action, both 
national and international, for the purpose of 
securing for all peoples, inc.luding their own, 
improved labour ~tandards, economic advancement and 
social security. 6 
It should be noted that there was no agreement to pursue 
65. Ibid. 
66. Ibid. 
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Y full emp.loyment 2 • Yet Australia was able to gain agre.emE 
at the talks on the need for periodic reports to be made i 
the Organization on the steps taken to carry.out the 
'definite pledge'. 
Evatt also reported in the memorandum that he had 
succeeded in gaining a large measure of support for his 
views regarding the criteria of action of the Security 
Counci.l in the settlement of disputes. These views placec 
emphasis on the territorial integrity and political indepE 
of members. The meeting accepted his proposal to such an 
amendment to Chapter II (4) of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal 
to make them read as follows: 
Al.l members of the organization shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity 
on political independence of another State or in 
any other manner incg~sistent with the purposes 
of the organization. 
He had al so argued for the automatic jurisdiction of the 
World Court in lega[disputes and for its use in the ascer~ 
taining of facts which were of importance for the settlemE 
of disputes. Final.ly Evatt reported that he drew at ten tic 
to the importance which Australia attached to regional 
defence agreements as a second line of defence should the 
67 o Ibid. 
28 
world system of' security f'ail - particularly if' it should. 
f'ail as a result of' the veto. Regionalism, which had 
always been prominent in EvattYs post-war foreign policy, 
had now acquired added pu:rp ose. 
Forde and Evatt in their final te.legram to Curtin 
f'rom London on 17 Apri1 68 noted that the meeting had ended 
after a useful exchange of' views. Most of' the questions 
listed by the Australians had been .lef't open, they said, 
and various delegates would be f'ree at San Francisco to 
express their own views and seek amendments. 'Ihe London 
talks, they f'elt~ had resulted in a clearer appreciation o 
the issues to be faced and a better understanding of' the 
intentions of' various parts of' the Commonwealth. Forde an 
Evatt f'elt that they had gained support on several matters 
of' special importance to Australia. They then proceeded 
to comment on the vetQ.Lamendment issue (these comments 
have been examined above) 69 and, at considerable length, o 
the question of' trust~eship. These were, f'or them, the 
dominant issues at theclose of' the London talks. 
68. Ibid. 
69. See above p. I. 
T:he :fact that trusteeship policy had not been re:ferrE 
to by Forde or by IDvatt during their public speeches in 
London, although IDvatt had made some comments on the subjE 
at their Washington press con:ference, should be seen not c 
an indication o:f an Australian lack o:f interest in this 
question on the eve o:f the San Francisco talka but o:f the 
reverse. T:he Australian silence re:flected the delicacy oj 
current trusteeship policy negotiations between Britain 
and the United States and, once the Commonwealth Meeting l 
commenced, between Britain on the one hand, and Australia 
and New Zealand on the other. Eggleston had advised IDvat1 
o:f the Ang.lo-American position in the previous December. 
At the present junctufe it would be exceedingly 
unfortunate i:f these Anglo-American] di:f:ferences 
were discussed in public and I think the inter-
views I have had show that a di7lomatic exchange 
o:f views would be advantageous. O 
It may be presumed that Evatt arrived in London awarE 
o:f the decisions on trusteeship which had been taken at 
Yalta. 71 But it would not have been at all unreasonable 
70. H/45/1021, .Q.Q!.Qnia,l Policy. Eggleston' s telegram wa~ 
sent on 11 December 1944. 
71. T:he decisions had been cabled :from the Dominions 0:f:fj 
on lJ March two days be:fore Evatt le:ft to the United 
en route to London. I:f he missed them in Australia l 
would probably have had his attention drawn to them 1 
Eggleston while he was in Washington. T:he decisions 
made public by Stettinius in his press statement o:f 
J April in which he announced the President's decisic 
not to seek'additional votes :for the Government o:f tl 
United States in the General Assembly'. United StatE 
Department o:f State, Bulletin, vol. ~II, no. J02, 
8 April .1945. 
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for him to have arrived in London hoping, in the light of 
the Stanley Memorandum, 72 that Britain might agree to 
voluntarily place many, if not all, of her dependencies 
under trusteeship. Some indication of wnat was discussed 
on the subject of trusteeship at the London meeting can 
be gleaned from the official Australian Rep~~:t...,Q.n UoNo~!.:Qo 
That the discussions were regarded as important is indicated 
by the proportion, one quarter, of total comment in the 
Report on the London Discussions which is given to this 
issue. According to the Report, 
Shortly before the delegation left for London, the 
Australian Government had expressed its views on 
certain proposals which the United Kingdom Government 
had circulated in the previous December and which 
seemed to indicate a broad area of agreement. In 
London, however, it was ascertained that the United 
Kingdom Government had entered into discussions with 
the United States and the Soviet Union and proposals 
of a different character were consideredo73 
Australia and New Zealand took the view, the Report continues, 
that no decision on this question 'should be carried into 
effect without the Dominions having been consulted' o 74 
·Discussion therefore took place and 'a frank exchange of 
views resulted in the e.lucidation of the general position 
72. See above Po /g~. 
7J. Australian Report on U.NoC.!..!.:Q., polOo 
74. Ibid. 
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without full agreeITB nt having been reached Y. 75 It was 
final.ly agreed in London Zthat the United Kingdom and each 
Dominion was free to make its proposals at San Francisco 
according to the circumstances of the t 76 case • The 
Australian Repor~ also indicates that Britain wished to 
limit discussions oftrusteeship questions at San Francisco 
and suggests, by saying that Australia and New Zealand 
'urged that parent states should accept a duty to protect 
the welfare of native races in dependent territories and 
that this duty should be accompanied by an obligations to 
submit reports regular.ly to an expert and competent 
advisory body', 77 that this was possibly something which 
Britain was not prepared to do. 
No further information on the nature of trusteeship 
discussions in London was conveyed in Evatt's memorandum 
on the talks for members of the Australian Delegation at 
San Francisco. However, Forde and Evatt's telegram to 
Curtin, sent from London on .17 Apri.l after the talks had 
closed, gives a frank account. 
75. Ibido 
76. Ibid. 
770 Ibido 
The extract from the Australian 
Report quoted above gives the impression that it was not 
until the Australians reached London that they learnt of 
th Y lt d . . 78 e a a ecisions. Tb.is, as has been argued, is possible 
but not likely. What they did learn, according to their 
telegram, at the trusteeship discussions during the first 
two days of the London talks was that the Stanley Memorandum 
'was never submitted to the British Cabinet and would now be 
withdrawn'o Furthermore, the United Kingdom government would 
oppose the Yalta system for the voluntary placing of 
territories under trusteeship and, in the event of this 
being insisted upon and carried by the other powers at San 
Francisco, Britain would !!Q.i put any of her territories 
under voluntary trusteeship. 
New Zealand and Australia protested against a firm 
decision having been taken before the Dominions 
were consulted and pressed the case for trusteeship. 
Before the final session of the Conference the matter 
was put to the United Kingdom Cabinet. 
At the final session of the Conference Cranborne ' 
attempted to crystallize [Cabinet] discussion under the 
fo.llowing heads 
They would agree to mandates being continued where 
there were existing ones and for ex-enemy territories 
of the present waro 
They thought that joint administration of mandates 
was inadvisable. 
They would not surrender any of their existing 
mandates. 
They wanted discussion at San Francisco .limited 
to genera.l formulas. 
They wanted modification of some details in 
existing mandate agreements. 
But al.l details of future of colonies to be 
left for subsequent discussion of colonial 
powers. 
Cranborne also said that Cabinet wanted to go as far as 
possible to meet the Dominion views and would therefore 
accept the principle of the Yalta proposal that parent 
states might vo.luntarily place territories under trustee-
ship. They did not intend, however, to apply this princip.le 
to their own territories. Australia, New Zealand and India 
protested strong.ly that this was not a compromise. 
We pointed out that the United Kingdom Government 
had made a complete departure from StanleyY s memo. 
of last December and we were not content to end 
the debate with a summary of points which for the 
most part had been accepted before the London talks 
began. All the Dominions express.ly reserved the 
right to take their own lines at San Francisco.7' 
* * * 
The genera.l development of Australia's policies during 
the month following Forde and Evatt Y s departure from 
79. Ibid. 
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Australia for the San Francisco Conference showed an 
increasing awareness of, and concentration upon, detai.led 
aspects of the Dumbarton Oaks proposa.ls. This led to an 
increasing preoccupation with polic:Bs embodying an increase 
in the role of small and middle powers in general as has 
been revealed clearly in the study of unpublished documents 
in this chapter. In the public speeches by Evatt, such as 
those at Berkeley, and at the Savoy, made before the London 
talks began; in the speeches to the early sessions of the 
ta.lks which were released to the press; and in the public 
addresses given at Chatham House and on the B.B.C. during 
and after the talks, the same development is revealed 
though to a lesser extent than is revealed in private sources. 
For the London talks were held strictly in camera. Public 
comment on detailed aspects of po.licy discussion was 
thereby prec.luded. The official pub.lie communique rel eased 
at the conclusion of the talks on 12 Apri.l is notable for 
. 80 its vagueness and brevity. Once the Australians had 
80. For the full text of this brief communique see Aus.:trl!~ 
Report on U.N.C.I.O., p.66. Evatt issued a personal 
statement at the close of the talks. It is simi.larly 
uncommunicative. 'The Conference has been successful. 
The Dumbarton Oaks plan is accepted as a basis~ but the 
need for its clarification, improvement and extension 
in certain respects, is acknowledged. The immense war 
effort of the British nations entitles them to take their 
rightful place in the world organization, but the valuable 
work recently done wi.1.1 have to be followed up to a 
successful conclusion at San Francisco.' The Times, 
13 April 1945. 
reached San Francisco, however, they were to show no such 
restraint, in an atmosphere free of Privy Council overtones, 
in the public airing of disputed policies. 
The pub.lie speeches made at Berkeley, in Washington, 
and in London before and during the talks are valuable 9 
furthermore, for their emphasis upon po.licies, embodying 
direct national assertion3 which related to Australia's 
membership of the Security Council 3 and the Executive 
Committee of the Conference. An awareness of this strand 
in Australian po.licy is essential for a proper understanding 
of Evatt' s ro.le at San Francisco, and it is apt to be 
over.looked amid the arguments on points of constitutional 
detail which abound once the Conference has begun. 
2. A Brief Visit to France. 
After the London talks had ended Evatt took further 
steps in his campaign to secln:'e a seat on the Executive 
Committee of the Conference. When on 29 Apri.l, Evatt was 
subsequently able to tel.l Curtin from San Francisco81 of 
his success in this matter he claimed that this e.lection 
81. Evatt to Curt in 3 29 Apri.l .1945, H/45/771/l, Pro.£.&.fil!i.p.g:s 
.5!.lliLAus tr al ian Pol i.£.Y,. 
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had resulted from direct diplomatic measures taken by him 
(Evatt) in Washington, Paris, and London during the previous 
three weeks. His earlier instructions to Eggleston in 
Washington on this matter have a.lr eady been no ti cedo 82 
On .lJApril, Forde and Evatt flew to Paris with Bruce on an 
official visit. The Times of that day had carried a 
statement from Forde to the peop.le of' Britain in which he 
showed his anxiety lest the approaching victory in Europe 
might lead to a reduction of' the Al.lied effort in the 
Pacific war. 
Do not .let us thinkfuat the war is as good as won, 
and that we can divert our who.le efforts to the 
problems of reconstruction the moment the German 
army lays down its arms ooo there must be no 
slackening until the military colossus of' the East 
has been destroyed and struck into the dust. 
My message to you therefore is this: Rejoice 
that our first enemy is tottering, rejoice when 
he f'inal.ly falls to ignominious ruin: but do not 
ungird your loins until our second enemy has been 
dealt as shrewd a blowo 
The same newspaper carried a tribute from Evatt to the late 
President Roosevelt in which he said, 
during the years of' Australia's greatest crisis 
he proved our great and good f'riendo8J 
82. See above p 
SJ. The Times, lJ Apri.l 1945. Roosevelt had died at Warm 
Springs, Georgia, on 12 April. There is still no 
Australian memorial to him. 
On the evening of Friday April 13 the Australian 
. t p . 84 party landed at an airpor near aris. Forde and Evatt 
were almost immediately guests of the Foreign Minister, 
M. Bidault, at the Qua;iD'Orsay. 8 5 Evatt had further talks 
with Bidau.1 t on the following morning. They are reported 
to have discussed matters relating to the Pacific and the 
. 86 
establishment of the Australian legation in Paris. On 
Sunday both Forde and Evatt visited the war cemetery at 
Villers Bretonneux where an Australian memorial, erected 
87 
after Wor.ld War I, though battle scarred, still stood. 
On the following day Evatt lunched with General de Gaulle 
and called on the Minister for Colonies, M. Giacobbi. 88 
An official announcement released that evening reported8 9 
that a measure of agreement had been reached on trusteeship, 
mandates, and the duty of colonial powers towards n'atives 
under their rule. The Times' Paris correspondent, however, 
noted in that newspaper on the following day that 
. 84. The Times, 14 April 1945. 
85. Syd!J£.y_MQ.rning Heral.Q, 16 April 1945. 
86. Argus, 16 April 1945. 
87. The Times, 16 April 1945. 
88. Ibid., 18 April 1945. 
89. Ibid. 
the Australians are perhaps a .little readier than 
the French to see app.lied to colonies that degree 
of international supervision whicll the League of 
Nations exercised in C and B Mandates. 
Most significantly for Evatt's Executive Committee 
and Security Council ambitions, the official announcement 
also disclosed that the French found themselves in strong 
agreement with Australia on the rights and status of what 
they both cal.led 'middle powers t and on what constituted 
such a powero Both countries said that they would like to 
see the middle powers assigned a more definite part in the 
mechanism of the security organizationo Y They [did] not 
consider that powers to whom that part was assigned should 
be chosen for what might be ca.Lled diplomatic motives but 
for their regional and strategic importance and their 
capacity to contribute to the maintenance of peace.'90 
Forde, Evatt and Bruce left Paris on 16 April for 
London, where, on the fo.1.lowing day, they attended the 
manorial service for President Roosevelt at Sto Paul~s 
91 Cathedral. On Wednesday 18 Apri.1 Forde and Evatt le ft 
London by military flight for New York, Washington and 
San Francisco. 
90. Ibid. 
91. §ydp.e:y_Mo£!1~ld, 18 Apri.1 l945o 
92. The Time.§.., 19 April 1945. 
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The Australian delegation to the United Nations 
Conference on International Organization assembled in San 
Francisco on 23 and 24 Apri.l. The delegation arrived, 
appropriately, in separate groups. On 23 April, Forde~ with 
Wilson and Coleman, landed at Hamil ton Fie.ld. 1 Forde had 
spent some days in New York on his return from London and then 
flown, via Washington, to San Francisco. Forde's comments to 
the press on his arrival bore little direct relevance to 
potential issues at the Conference although in this he 
conformed to a pattern established by most other arriving 
delegations. Forde is reported to have said 
The failure of the League of Nations to serve the 
cause of world peace was a wor.ld tragedy but the 
effort, idea.lism and organization of the League 
have not been wasted. The nations at San Francisco 
will be judged not upon what they say but what they 
do. No system of world security can be successfu~ 
if the twin fears of war and unemp.loyment remain. 
On 23 Apri.l, al so, the main body of the assistants and consult-
ants arrived from Australia, 3 after delays to their mi.litary 
.1 ~ San Franc is co Examiner, 24 Apri.l 194 5: 
2~ Sun News-Pictorial, Melbourne, 25 April 1945. Forde 1 s 
reference to unemp.loyment was an augury of the role which 
his section of the delegation was to play in the batt.le for 
a ful.l employment 'p.ledge' at San Francisco. 
3. San .. J"rancis co_!Pxam.infil;:, 24 April 1945. Age, Melbourne~ 
24 Apri.l, 1945. 
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aircraft had made it not unlikely that they would miss the 
formal opening ceremony of the Conference on Wednesday 25 
April. 4 
Evatt characteristically chose ,to travel .largely by 
train. He flew, first of a.11, from New York to Washington 
on Thursday 19 April. During this brief visit he had 
'discussions with the Department of State 15 and met Senator 
Vandenberg who subsequently noted in his diary 'I think he 
is going to be a tower of strength at San Francisco. 16 
On the evening of Friday 20 April Evatt with his London 
party and additional officials, including Sir Frederic 
Eggleston, W. Macmahon Ba.11, and A.S. Watt, left in one of 
a number of special trains taking delegates from New York and 
Washington to San Francisco. Hasluck records that du'ring this 
long journey across the United States, Evatt was able to turn 
his undivided attention to detailed aspects of the amendments 
which Australia proposed to offer to the Dumbarton Oaks 
~·· V• 
Sun News-Pictorial, Melbourne, 23 April 1945 incorrectly 
includes w. Macmahon Ball as a member of this party. 
He had flown to the United States early in April and 
arrived in Washington, D.C. on 16 April~ 
Has.luck, Journal and Proceedings, p.166. 
A.H. Vandenberg, Jr., (ed.). The Private Papers of Senator 
Vandenberg, London, 1953. p.171. 
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Australia's posture and some of her policies were evident 
from the moment Evatt arrived in San Francisco on Tuesday, 
24 April. He called a press conference to which he made 
detailed and specific comments on Australia 1 s proposed amend-
men ts. Evatt's conference was reported in one San Francisco 
newspaper under the headline 'Evatt, Australian Chief, Urges 
8 Smallest Nations be Excluded from Council', for he had argued 
that countries like his own, the Netherlands, Canada and Brazil 
had 'proved their right to representation on this inner 
functioning part of the proposed world organization.' Evatt 
is also reported to have 
opposed permitting any of the Big 5 to veto a change 
in the world charter after it had been approved by 
two-thirds of the votes in the Assembly. He cal.led 
such a grant of power 1 indefensible 1 ~9 
Evatt had thus urged policies of national assertion, by 
emphasizing Australia's c.laim for membership of the proposed 
7~ Has.luck, Journal and Pr~dings, p .166~ 2 On the train 
journey~ Dr. Evatt continued the work on detail which he 
had started in London. Between stops and meals there were 
long sessions with the documents, and he was f'u.lly primed 
when he reached San Francisco.' 
8'~ San Francis co Examin§ 25 Apri.l, 1945~ 
9~ Ibid. 
Security Counci.l, and of genera.l sma.ll power democratization, 
in his questioning of the proposed Great Power veto on Charter 
amendment. The scope for policies of national assertion within 
the ambit of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals was necessarily 
limited - even here Evatt was arguing for places on the 
Security Counci.l for; a number of middle powers besides Australia 
but this must not obscure the fact that for Australia at San 
Francisco assertion of distinct international status was a 
fundamental mo ti va tion of policy and of posture. For Evatt's 
posture (general attitude) was allied to his policy (actual 
points put forward) of national assertion - both had as their 
immediate objective Australian prominence and status at the 
Conference and in the new organization: Both had their roots, 
as has been argued above, in Evatt's wartime dissatisfaction 
with the Great Powers - notably in relation to p.lanning for the 
Pacific peace sett.lement and annistice. Evatt had, at this 
press conference, begun to estab.lish the Australian posture at 
San Francisco. By cal.ling the conference he had shown an 
awareness of the value of the press and publicity which was 
to be a constant feature of his behaviour at the talks. By 
making specific and detailed comments on Australia's proposed 
amendments he had revealed himself as an aggressive~ able, and 
energetic 'outsider'. 
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Evatt's press conference, which was reported in 
. 10 Australian newspapers, was the subject-of a question in 
the House of Representatives on 26 April when A.W. Fadden 
asked the Prime Minister whether he had seen reports to the 
effect that Evatt had not conferred with Forde before making 
these statements. He sought an assurance from Curtin that 
Evatt would do so in future. Fadden further requested an 
assurance that 'this Parliament will have an opportunity to 
discuss the important matters of national security and the 
preservation of the British Empire as these may be affected 
ll by international agreements'. Curtin, in reply, said that 
he had received no communication from the Deputy Prime Minister 
to the effect that Evatt had not consulted him~ Curtin dealt 
12. 
with Fadden's second request by ignoring it: 
At 4.33 p.m. on Wednesday, 25 April, the Conference was 
inaugurated with a brief Opening Ceremony in the War Memorial 
Opera House. This building formed part of a sombre, granite, 
group of official structures in San Francisco's Civic Center. 
10. For example, Arg1.g;, Melbourne, 26 April 1945. 
ll~ C.P.D. vol. 181 0 26 April 1945, pp;1100-llOl. 
12~ Ibid. 
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President Truman2 s address from Washington to the assembled 
delegates of forty-six nations estab.lished an elevated tone 
of moral exhortation and generality. The world, he suggested, 
had experienced 'a revival of an old faith in the everlasting 
moral force of justice 2 • 13 The Mayor of San Francisco 
reminded the delegates that, as the gateway to the front lines 
of the Pacific War, San Francisco had borne, and still bore, a 
heavy wartime responsibility.14 Yet while the Conference met 
in the shadow of the Pacific war, the European battle was 
rapidly drawing to an end. San Francisco newspapers contained 
horrific photographs of the human remnants freed by the Allied 
annies from Be.lsen and Buchenwald. The Conference was, there-
fore, from the start under pressure to conclude its delibera-
tions as rapidly as possib.le. Not only was there a desire to 
have the new organization established while the wartime alliance 
was intact; there was the more immediate prob.lem that senior 
European delegates were likely to be recalled to their countries 
during the following two or three weeks~ 
Fadden' s question in the Austra.lian House of RepresentativesJ 
with its undertone of disagreement between Forde and Evatt, 
lJ. 'Verbatim Minutes of the Opening Session, 25 Apri.l 1945', 
Doc 8, G 5, 25 April .1945, Q~.c.I.O. Document§.., vol. 1 
p.11.10 
.14~ Ibid~, pJl7 
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must have almost coincided with a serious manifestation of 
that disagreement in San Francisco. A meeting of leaders of 
British Commonweal th delegations, presided av er by Anthony 
Eden of Great Britain, took place on the evening of the opening 
day of the Conference. A carefully worded report, appearing 
in a number of Australian newspapers, to.ld how Australia was 
not represented at the talks because 'differences of opinion 
had arisen between Forde and Evatt regarding the .leadership 
of the Australian delegation - an unhappy position which is 
now resolved with the affirmation of Forde' s .leadership Y • l5 
Yet while FordeY s formal .leadership was affirmed, the solution, 
as .later became clear, involved the settling of actua.l and 
visible .leadership upon the shoulders of Evatt~ It would seem 
that the crisis, and its solution, were the product of Evatt's 
impending election to the Executive Committee of the Conference. 
The so.lution arrived at by Evatt and Forde was indicated 
by events during the fol.lowing three days o On the morning of 
Thursday 26 April, thefirst meeting of the Heads of Delegations 
Committee took place~ This Committee, from the meeting of 
l May renamed the Steering Committee, was 'to consider any 
major policy or procedure question submitted to it during 
the Conference by the Co-Presidents or Chairman of any 
Delegation1 o16 Th~s Committee was the penultimate centre 
of actual power in the Conference structure in that it received 
recommendations from the smaller Executive Committee. The 
formal ultimate body, the Plenary Session, was merely the 
collective presence of those delegates whose chairmen constit-
uted the Heads of Delegation Committee': Beyond the Conference 
structure was the inner committee of the Sponsoring Powers and 
France.17 
16'. 'Organization of the Conference', Addendum to Verbatim 
Minutes of the Fifth Plenary Se$sion, JO April 1945, Doc 
42, P 10/a, 6 May 1945, ~.c.I.O. Documents, vol. l, 
p.401. 
17~ 'Another feature of the Conference, which did not appear 
in the plan of organization but which nevertheless was one 
of the significant elements in its work, was an inner 
committee of the sponsoring Powers and France. This was 
formal.ly a group comprised of the four joint Presidents 
of the Conference,i.ee - the chairmen of the delegations 
of China, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United 
Kingdom and the United States - which conferred regularly 
on matters relating to the management of Conference 
businesso In addition, it was the practice for representat-
tives of these four Powers and of France to confer on the 
major issues of policy as they arose in order to maintain 
the Great Power unanimity which had been established at 
Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta. Major issues of the Conference 
were discussed privately at various stages by the Big Five 
and from these private meetings emerged proposals which 
were presented to the Conference as the decisions of the 
sponsoring Powers and France.' Australian ReRQtl_Qll 
U.N.C.I.O., p.14. 
Whi.le the Great Powers in the Heads o:f De.legations 
Committee, and subsequently among themse.lves, were arguing on 
the quest inn, raised by the Soviet Union, o:f joint or single 
presidency o:f the Con:ference, Forde and Evatt was indicating 
their solution to the problem o:f delegation chairmanshipo 
Forde represented Australia at this :first meeting o:f Heads o:f 
De.legations18 and subsequently reported in a persona.l telegram 
to Curtin on the same day. 
Con:ference opened yesterday and each o:fthe Chairmen 
o:f the 46 delegations met today as a Steering Committee 
which is the most important committee o:f the Con:ference. 
As Chairman o:f the Australian De.legation, I was made a 
member with a vote. Arranged :for Evatt to attend as 
adviser when any special matter on which he might like 
to state his views is being considered, but he will not 
have a vote. I:f Australia succeeds in getting one o:fthe 
14 seats on theExecutive Committee, I will ask Evatt to 
represent me on that Committeeo I have a seat on the 
Steering Committee at the top o:f the tab.le next to 
Mo.lotov and two places :from the Chairman, Stettinius, 
then Dr. Soong, China; Eden, U.K.; and Paul Spaak, 
Be.lgium •1 9 
Forde 1 s description o:f Evatt as an adviser is, however, 
misleading. All members o:f the Steering Committee were chairmen 
o:f their respective delegations. The members o:f the Committee 
were able to have advisers present but these did not participate 
in Committee proceedings. Evatt ~permitted to participate 
18: ~Meeting o:f the Heads o:f De.legations to Organize the 
Conference, 26 April 1945i Doc 29, DC/4, 26 April 1945, 
U.N.C.I.O. Documents, vol. 5, p.50. 
19: H/45/771/1, Pro~,dings and Austral;;Lan Pol..i..ml,. 
JOO. 
in Committee proceedings and was thus virtually accorded the 
status of Co-Chairman of the Australian de.legation, al though 
Forde c.laimed his right to exercise Australia's vote and 
thus preserved his formal status. The slightly subordinate 
formal role of Evatt at Steering Committee meetings is 
disguised in the official Australian Report on the Conference 
which notes that 'Mr. Forde and Dr. Evatt both attended the 
Steering Committee 1 • 20 Yet if Forde was asserting his 
seniority Yi§.£:. Yi.§. Evatt on what he c.laimed to be 1 the most 
important committee of the Conference Y, he had at the same 
time conceded, or rather been forced by events to concede, to 
Evatt Australia's probable place on the Executive Committee 
which would be composed, with the possible exception of Evatt, 
entire.ly of Chairmen of De.legations. Indeed, before Forde made 
his formal introduction of Evatt at the second meeting of the 
Heads of Delegations Committee, EvattYs election to the Executive 
Committee had already been approved by that meeting. The ver-
batim minutes of the second meeting of the Heads of De.legations 
on Friday, 27 April, record Forde's introduction~ 
:tf_r, St~ttinius ~ 
Mr~_FordE2,~ 
JOl. 
I recognize Mr: Forde of Australia: 
The Australian Minister of External 
Affairs wishes to raise a point. 
Dro Evatt o 2·1 
The Executive Committee of the Conference was in effect 
a sub-committee of the Heads of De.legations Committee, presided 
over by the same chairman. It was described in the official 
memorandum on organization of the Conference as follows: 
The Executive Committee, which shall be composed of the 
Chairman of the Delegations of the Sponsoring Governments, 
namely, China, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, United 
Kingdom, United States of America, and the Chairman of 
the De.legation of the addi tiona.l Governments, namely, 
Australia, Brazi.l, Canada, Chi.le, Czechos.lovakia, France, 
Iran, Mexico, Netherlands and Yugoslavia~ The Chairman 
of the Steering Committee sha.11 also service the Chairman 
of the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee 
shall make recommendations to the Steering Committee 
for its consideration and shall otherwise assist the 
Steering Committee as the latter may authorizeo When 
considering matters affecting the work of Commissions, 
the Executive Committee sha.11 norma.Lly invite the 
appropriate Presidents of Commissions to sit with it. 22 
Australia's election tothe Executive Committee was poerly 
21: 
22: 
United Nations Archives, New York, Records of the Uni:t_Ell! 
liai!Qll§......QQ..Uf er e!]£_.§......Ql!......!n tfil::na ti ona.l 9 r g:aniz g._filQµ: : {ti:; N • C .:..I.&) 
§.fil! Fr@_£iscQ.i_-1_2lli Verbatim Minµtes of Te.£.hnical q.!!.!! 
~eneral Commdtt~, microfilm (hereafter Verbatim Miputes), 
'Second Meeting of Heads, of Delegations Committee, 27 Apri.l 
1945 v, Running number 29. (Microfilm Reel 9) o A v running 
number' is a quarto page of double space typescript~ 
'Organization of the Conference', Addendum to Verbatim 
Minutes of the Fifth Plenary Session, JO Apri.l 1945: 
Doc~ 42 9 p.10/a, 6 May, 1945, !l.!_N!..Q~.o. DoQ.1!!!!ents, 
pp.401-2. 
puhlicized in the Australian press. The editor of the Sydney 
~ning Herald realized, however, that Australia had strong 
ambitions for Security Council membership evenihough he did 
not link these ambitions to her membership of the Executive 
Committee: McC.lure Smith reported under the heading tAust-
ra.lia's Aim at U.N.C.I.O. - Bid for Seat on The Security 
Council' 
While planning to put forward several amendments to 
the Dumbarton Oaks proposa.ls, the paramount and most 
immediate aim of the Australian delegation to the 
United Nations Conference on International Organiza-
tion is to secure a seat on the proposed Security 
Counci.l • 23 
Evatt certainly saw his e.lection to the Executive Committee 
as related to future membership of the Security Council. On 
28 Apri.l, Forde and Evatt reported to Curtin: 
Australia elected to the Executive Committee. We had 
been omitted from original list prepared by the sponsors 
and our election resulted from direct diplomatic measures 
taken by Evatt in Washington, Paris and London during the 
past three weeks. The result is eminently satisfactory 
and we finally secured the support of the British, 
Americans and Russians. Membership of this important 
body wi.Ll a.llow us to take a more effective part in 
Conference work and we hope that the recognition we 
have gained will also help at a later stage when the 
Security Counci.l is se.lected.24 
23. §ydngy..lf2.mi.llg HeraJ.Q., 2 May 19451: 
24': H/45/771 ~ Pro.Q_Q.filli.n_g_9__~f:i!·lipn Policy: This telegram 
bore an 'E' prefix which probably indicates an origin in 
Evatt' s office. The personal telegram from Forde to 
Curtin, cited above, bore an 'S.F.C.' prefix. 
This report also includes the highly significant statement, 
'Up to date the nature of thework on the Steering Committee 
has meant that the greater part of the work has necessari.ly 
to be done by the minister [for External Affairs]. 225 The 
official Australian Report on the Conference subsequently 
stressed the importance of Austra.lia' s election to and 
participation in the Executive Committee!: 
One of the notable successes of Australia at the 
Conference was its se.le ction to a seat on the Executive 
Committee, and hence to the Coordination Committee as 
wel.l o These appointments helped to establish our 
stat,11-s at the Conference and afforded an exceptional 
opportunity to make a major contribution to the work 
of the Conference. The position which the Australian 
Delegation established for i tse.lf was in a large 
measure due to the manner in which it discharged its 
duties as a member of the Executive Committee.26 
Evatt had Australia's vote on the Executive Committee, 
even if Forde had claimed, in his telegram of 26 Apri.l to 
Curtin, that Evatt would 'representY him on that Committee~ 
In their joint telegram to Curtin on 28 April, however, Forde 
and Evatt noted 
251: Ibid: 
20: The Report was written in the Evatt office fol.lowing the 
Conference and before the de:egation left San Francisco. 
This information was supp.lied in an interview by one of 
Evatt's Advisers and is supported by H/45/776 
!\eJ?ort . ...Q.:f...Au§.tra.1~n DeJ~£:at.Q.§.~ 
Emphasis to this quotation is added. 
It has been arranged between us that Dr: Evatt will 
represent Australia on the Executive Committee while 
Mr~ Forde represents us on the Steering Committee 
and will exercise the vote but Dr': Evatt will also 
attend and have the right to speak gS Minister for 
External Affairs whenever necessary: 27 
Evatt 1 s election to the Executive Committee; the effect 
of this in requiring his presence at, and participation in, 
the Heads of Delegations Committee; and the fact that he, 
because of his knowledge and ability, spoke for Australia on 
almost all matters in the Heads of Delegations Committee, 
meant that he had now added obvious and visible superiority 
over Forde in the Conference power structure to the domination 
of policy which he had effectively established through the 
expertise and disposition of his departmental personnel within 
the Australian delegation~ It is thus possible to speak of 
Evatt's posture at the Conference as Australia's posture as 
well as to speak of his policy as Australia's policyo Evatt, 
however, allowed Forde the nominal chairmanship 9'f the 
Australian delegation inasmuch as Forde retained Australia's 
vote on the Heads of Delegations Committee and spoke for 
Australia in the Second Plenary Session of the Conference': 
If Evatt's campaign for membership of the Executive 
Committee must be regarded as part of Australia's policy at 
27r: H/45/77.1 o Proceedin~and Australian Paligy~ 
the Conference, it was, nonethe.less, a type of policy c.losely 
re.lated to his assertive posture in its reflection of 
dissatisfaction with war-time Great Power consultation on 
the peace settlement. Evatt~s posture was to be clearly 
evident in his manner and argument during the second meeting 
of the Heads of De.legation Committee: 
A major issue discussed at this meeting was the question 
of Conference voting procedure. In this discussion Evatt 
played a central role. The voting procedure suggested by the 
Conference secretariat was as follows: 
l~ Each delegation should have one vote in each body 
of the Conference in which it was represented~ 
2: In public sessions and meetings, such as plenary 
sessions and public meetings of the Commissions, 
procedura.l matters should be decided by majority 
vote; voting on the text of documents on substantive 
questions should be by 2/3 vote': 
3: Voting procedures and rules in all closed meetings 
of al.l bodies of the Conference should be 3stablished 
on an ad hQ.£. basis by the body concerned~ 2 
Evatt both in London and on his arrival at San Francisco, 
had expressed concern at the difficulty, under the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals, of amending the Charter of the new organization·~ 
2s: 'Meeting of the Heads of De.legations to Organize the 
Conference, 27 Apri.11945', Doc30, DC/5(1), 27 April 
1945, U .N • q. I .O. Docume11.t§., vol: 5, p': 86': 
His interest in this problem and his earlier interest in 
amendment of the Australian constitution no doubt predisposed 
him to regard the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as in effect a 
constitution which had to be amended at the Conference~ 
He began by asserting that questions two and three of the 
suggested voting procedure were of 'vital importancet, and 
continued 
As I understand question two, it would mean this that 
now [no] amendments to therDumbarton Oaks proposals 
on a.RY text or substitute tsubstantive] question 
can be accepted by the Conference without a two-thirds 
vote of the de.legations present·~ Now it is quite true, 
Sir, that amendments to that text, or to that Charter 
when it becomes a Charter, should not be accepted 
lightly. At the same time, I think this Steering 
Committee should be warned that with regard to some 
amendments such a majority is unreasonab.le to ask for~ 
It means that one third o:trthe who.le Conference can 
prevent any amendment to the proposal [proposals] 
on any question which is regarded as a"'substantive 
question and not merely a matter of procedureo29 
He further emphasized that substantive matters which in private 
committee or commissions sitting privately a bare majority could 
carry, at subsequent public sessions would have to be carried by 
2/J majority. He felt that it was not right that this should 
be the case for all substantive amendments'~ though it might 
be necessary for some: Evatt concluded 
291: Ve12ba,!im Minutes, Second Meeting of the Heads of 
Delegations Committee 27 April 1945, Running number 29 
(Reel 9). 
I haven't got the experience in these Conferences, 
Sir, that so many de.legates here have, and it might 
be that this will resolve itse.lf as we go along, but 
it occurred to us - to Mro Forde and myse.lf as 
representing Australia, which desires to put some 
amendments before the Conference - that it would not 
be right with regard to some of them at any rate, 
that a two-thirds majority should be required~JO 
The Secretary-General of the Conference, Alger Hiss, 
noted in reply that the Secretariat felt there had to be some 
voting rules. As it was not anticipated that there would be 
business sessions of a pub.lie nature for several days this 
matter would not have to be reso.lved at once': Whereupon 
Fraser suggested 
that it might be possible for Dr~ Edwards [Evatt] 
to consult with the Secretariat and the sponsoring 
powers in regard to certain parts of the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals~3l 
The discussion was thereupon closed on the understanding that 
the Secretary-General would raise the matter again at the next 
meeting of the Heads of Delegations Committee': 
Later in the same meeting some members, notably Field 
Marshal Smuts, suggested that a time .limit should be placed on 
the Conference in view of the increasing urgency of events 
. E ,;.J2 in urope·., Forde opposed this suggestion in the same demo-
JOi~ Ibid: Running number JO~ 
31: Ibid~ 
'Meeting of the Heads of Delegations to Or9anize the 
Conference, 27 April, 1945', Doc JO, DC/:? ll), 27 April 
1945, U.N.C.I.O. Documents, vo.L 5, p:s9. 
cratic spirit as Evatt had objected to the two-thirds rule, 
when he argued that it would lessen the opportunity for 
amendments to be made to the Dumbarton Oaks draft. 
I think we are a.11 agreed that very satisfactory 
progress has been made up to date and if you decide 
now to limit the sittings of the Conference you wi.11 
probahly be taking another step thatwould prevent 
amendments being fully considered, amendments which 
in the opinion of many Governments should be moved, 
and debated and considered'.33 
A decision on this matter was also postponed: 
Forders speech to the Second Flenary Session of the 
Conference on that afternoon (Friday, 27 March) showed how 
much detailed thought the Australian de.legation had given to 
the provisions of the proposed Charter': In thefirst place the 
speech was notable, as was Evatt's initial press conference, 
for the fact that it touched on specific issues of the 
Dumbarton Oaks draft instead of fol.lowing the generalities of 
the previous speakers in the opening plenary sessions. It 
was thus reinforcing an Australian posture of open discussion 
and debate~ 
This was commented upon by Michael Foot in the ~-lY 
Hera.lq of 1 May 1945 -
33;: Verbatim Minutes, Second Meeting of the Heads of 
De.legations Committee 27 April 1945, Running number 49 
(Reel 9) o 
She [Australia] has stated publicly some of the private 
arguments which have been raging in every hotel room in 
San Francisco~ She has drafted out __ for public inspection 
the delicate subject of trusteeshipr: She. 1 s threatening 
to put these matters to the test of what Mri: Churchill 
in the House of Commons calls 'Faithful Voting'~ One 
of her delegates even mentioned to me afterwards the 
old phrase so much detested by orthpdox diplomats: 
1 Open covenants, openly arrived at 1 r: 
It must be stated that there are doubts as to whether 
Forde's speech was written by his section of the Delegation: 
It has been suggested by a member of the Delegation that the 
speech was composed in the Evatt office and then sent down 
to Forde 1 s group page by page. At all events, in the course 
. " 
of a question in the House of Representatives on 1 May on 
the terms of the truce reached by Forde and Evatt, Menzies 
interjected 1 0ne of them wrote the speech and the other read 
Forde stated that the cardinal points of Australia's 
policy in relation to security could be expressed as follows: 
{a) T.here must be speedy and orderly procedures for 
the peaceful handling of disputes between nations 
(b) T.here must be a system of santions which can he 
imposed very rapidly and which will be based on 
the united military strength of the great powers 
but shared in by al.1 powers 
34~ C.P.D., vol~ 181, 1 May 1945, p:1210: 
I 
! 
310. 
(c) A permanent system of security can be made 
effective and acceptable only if it has a 
foundation in economic and social justice, and 
real international stability can be achieved 
only by promoting measures of economic advance-
ment as well as by maintaining securi ty'~35 
The first Australian emphasis was on the hope for an effective 
system of collective security~ Australia felt that the 
obligation to contribute to enforcement measures should be 
accepted by all members and that decisions of the Organization 
to apply enforcement measures should be equally binding on all 
members~ 
The expectation that there will be complete and 
immediate application of measures for col.lective 
security is essential both to deter the would-be 
aggressor, and to bring reassuranc~ to the peoples 
of the world who look for securityf: In our view. 6 
the acceptance of this obligation is fundamental.J 
Australia in this speech also publicly raised the issue 
of the veto on the :12.ea2fil_g;J__1?_ettle!!!.fil}j;_ of disputes: 
Th.e term 'veto' is not altogether a happy one. 
In relation to sanctions it means only this: 
that if the world organization is to exercise 
economic or military sanction against an aggressor, 
which of course involves acts of war, its leading 
members must act unitedly or not at a111: But the 
very considerations which are appropriate to enforce-
ment action by the greater powers are out of place 
35~ 'Verbatim Minutes of the Second Plenary Session, 27 April, 
1945 1 Doc 20, P/6, 28 April 1945, ~N .C.!-h9...!......Q.Qcument~, J, 
p.1 
JG: Ibid~, p.172. 
in relation to the settlement of disputes by such 
means as conciliation, arbitration or by other 
specific means. In such cases, which are covered 
Jll. 
by Chapter VITI A of the Proposals, the Security 
Council should be empowered to act by the proposed 
majority of seven withoutthe requirement of the 
approval by each and every one of the five great 
powers. I think that this point of view is implicit 
in the Yalta formula, which in relation to Chapter VIII 
A prevents a power which is a party to a dispute fr.om 
voting at all. Why any of the five powers which is not 
a party to a dispute should be empowered to prevent 
attempts to settle it by means of conciliation or 
arbitration, we are quite unable to discover. We 
think a mistake has been made, and that all the powers 
concerned should be ready to cancel it at this 
Conference.37 
Forde in this speech also stressed, with an emphasis which 
had been absent from Australia's previous po.licy statements, 
the powers of the General Assembly of the new body 
Ul timat e.ly it should become the central organ or the 
forum in which the conscience of the peoples of the 
world should have its most potent expression. We 
a&nit one exception, and one exception only, to the 
right of the Assemb.ly to consider and to make 
recommendations as it thinks fit with regard to any 
matters affecting international relations~ While the 
Security Council is hand.ling a dispute in accordance 
with Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, 
nothing should be done to diminish the authority of 
the Council or to hamper the prompt settlement of 
the dispute.JS 
By far the largest single part of Forde 1 s speech, however, was 
devoted to a restatement of Australia 1 s case for representation 
on the Security Counci.l of the new organization. Here the 
J7. Ibid:, p.173. 
3120 
arguments of Berke.ley and London were reiterated before the 
assembled allied nations. It will be noted that this 
continued emphasis was given even after Australia had been 
elected to the Executive Committee on that morning. 
It wil.l have to be recognized that outside the great 
powers there are certain powers who, by reason of 
their resources and their ~geographical location, 
w.i.ll have to be relied upon especially for the 
maintenance of peace and security in various quarters 
of the wor.ld. Like France, Canada, and other countries, 
Australia has consistently maintained this princip.le. 
But there is another princip.le of even greater 
importance. 
Certain powers, not classified as great, have proved 
by their record in two world wars that they not only 
have the capacity but also the will to fight in 
resistance of aggressors threatening the world with 
tyranny. These powers are in a sense proved 
veterans in the strugg.le against Fascist dictatorship 
threatening the security of the world: They are in 
truth security powers. They have a c.laim to special 
recognition in any security organization:39 
Here the primary emphasis on a proved capacity and will to 
fight on the part of certain nations as a criterion for non-
permanent membership of the Security Council was a change from 
Evatt's Berkeley argument which, like his speech of 8 September 
40 1944, had emphasized in this context Australia 1 s regional 
security role in the South West Pacific~ 41 At his Savoy Press 
3 9 : Ibid: , p •. 1 7 5 • 
40: ·~e above p. I 
41: See above p. 
313. 
Conference in London, however, Evatt, while emphasizing 
Australia's 'distinctiv·e regional interests' 42 in relation 
to the peace settlement had also based his case for an 
'important part' for Australia in 'the Security organization' 
on her 'capacity and will to fight in resistance of 
aggression 1 • 43 It is possible that Evatt felt in London 
and i_ni ti ally at San Francisco that regional emphases should 
not be,stressed in a context of pub.lie commitment to, and 
support for, collective security~ But he had also in London 
pointed out, in a telegram to Curtin, 44 that the operation 
of the veto on enforcement action in conjunction with a 
possib.le veto or amendme~t might require a greater attention 
to regional security arrangements~ While·there was no mention 
of such regional arrangements in this speech delivered by 
Forde, this element of Australian policy was to reappear 
among the full list of.her amendments as subsequently submitted 
to the Conference on 3 May~ It was not to receive emphasis, 
however, until discussions on policy had commenced in the 
technical committees of the Conference: 
42: Aust:r.glian Report on U.N.C.!.!..&• p~ 
43-: Ibid~ 
44': See above p. J, )0. 
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Forde also referred to the question of economic justice 
and social security~ 
Australia's foreign po.licy has .long been especial.ly 
concerned with arrangements for economic and socia.l 
co-operation. We take the view that peace and 
security must rest on economic justice and social 
security.45 
He urged that the Economic and Social Council be made one of 
the principal organs of the world organization: He also 
urged, though here in somewhat muddled terms, the case of 
the incorporation of a p.ledge to promote full employment 
in the Charter. 
Apart from the re.lationship of welfare to security, 
welfare is an end in itself. Greater welfare, 
emp.loyment for all, and rising standards of living 
for all have been promised in int ernationa.l dec.larations 
such as the At.lantic Charter, and in the national 
declarations of the po.lici es of most of the socially 
advanced countries of the world: All this has been 
p.ledged. It is necessary to redeem the p.ledge. The 
pledge should be written into this Charter of the 
world organization as an objective, but that is not 
enough. Suitable machinery must be provided for the 
progressive fulfilment of the pledge·:46 
On the question of trusteeship, the stand which Australia 
had privately taken in London was publicly maintained~ 
Australia was in favour of a continuation of the mandate 
45'~ 'Verbatim Minutes of the Second Plenary Session. 27 
April .1945. Doc 20, P/6, 28 Apri.l .1945, !L!_fuC .I~. 
~ment.s_, p.176. 
46~ Ibid:, p.176. 
system for existing mandates and its extension to territories 
'taken away from our enemies in the present war 1 • 47 There 
should be, in addition, a recognition in the Charter 'that 
the main purpose of the administration of dependent or 
undeveloped territories is the welfare and advancement of 
the peoples of those territories 1 • 48 Not only should 
territories under mandate and detached territories of the 
present war be 'administered under terms which will impose 
upon the administering power a duty to the United Nations 
to promote the welfare of these dependent peoples'~ but also 
such other territories 1 as may be determined upon by appropriate 
t . r ,49 ac ion • Forde then noted 
It would be quite wrong to ca.11 such a system 1 inter-
national direction 1 or 'international supervis:Lon 1 • 
There would be no interference with sovereignty. 
Al.l that would be done would be to treat the welfare 
of dependent peoples as a matter not only of local 
but of international concern.5° 
Fina.Lly Forde commented on the prob.lem of amendment of the 
Charter~ In a phrase a.lmost identical with Evatt' s usage at 
Chatham House in London,51 Forde noted that the Dumbarim Oaks 
47: Ibid~, p •. 177~ 
48: Ibid~ 
49· Ibid., p •. 178. 
50. Ibid: 
51. See above p. , Evatt' s words at Chatham House were 
'very many characteristics of a mere prolongation, into 
the years of peace, of the type of "Big. Three" .le<fder-
ship that has been found necessary,to_win the war • 
~i.Qn R,epQr:t;~., p.68. 
Jl6. 
plan as it stood bore Yvery many characteristics of a mere 
prolongation into the years of peace of the type of great-
power leadership that has been found necessary to win the 
warY '~ 5 2 Similarly he argued, as had Evatt in London, that 
the amending process needed greater flexibility and announced 
that Australia would propose an amendment for this purpose. 
In placing Australia's view before you, my co.lleague, 
Dr~ Evatt, and I have endeavoured to state our position 
frankly and realistical.ly. There is no time to waste 
on mere genera.lities. There is, as we have been 
reminded, a jobto be done.5J 
At 9 a.m. on Monday, April JO, Evatt attended the first 
meeting of the Executive Committee as Australian representative. 
The proposed agenda for this meeting inc.luded the invitation 
of representatives of White Russia and the Ukraine to the 
Conference and the question of whether an invitation should be 
extended to the Government of Argentina to attend the Conferenc~~ 
Evatt moved that the Executive Committee recommend to 
the Steering Committee that the White Russian Soviet Socia.list 
521: 'Verbatim Minutes of the Second P1enary Session, 27 Apri.l 
1945', Doc 20, P/6, 28 Apri.l .1945, !L.!,N.C!..I.O. Documents, 
pp •. 178-9 0 
5J • Ibid~, p •. 1 79 • 
54. 'Proposed Agenda for the F'irst Meeting, JO April 1945', 
Doc J4, EX/l, JO April 1945 1 U .N&! .. !.2.: ... J2ocuments, 
vol~ 5, p.J7J• 
J17o 
Repµblic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic be 
permitted to take their seats at this Conference~ Evatt's 
motion was as follows -
The Executive Committee recommends to the Steering 
Committee that, the Conference having decided that 
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the 
White Russian Soviet Socialist Repub.lic be invited 
to be initial members of the proposed Internationa.l 
Organization, their representatives be permitted to 
take their seats at the Conference immediately as 
they have requested through the representative of 
the Soviet Union·. 55 
In the course of Cammi ttee discussion Evatt made the 
point that the two repuhlics should be 'permitted' rather 
than 1 invited 1 to attend the Conference1 ~ 
Mr: Ste,itinius: 
Gent.lemen, you have before you a motion by 
Dr~ Evatt that has been seconded by Mr·. V.Bl.loso 
[Brazil] that the two Russian republics, White 
Russia and the Ukraine be invited to attend this 
Conference. 
Would al.l in favour of this motion please raise 
their right hand? 
Dr: Evatt: 
I was rather careful in the form. 
Mr. Stettinius: 
I didn't hear what you said. 
Dr~ Evatt: 
I said 'permitted'. I refrained from say,ing 'invited' 
to come.56 
55· 'Meeting of the Executive Committee, JO April 1945', 
Doc 41, EX/2, JO Apri.l 1945, U.N.C.I.O. Documen.:.t§., 
vo.l. 5, p. J77. 
Verbatiw Minute~ First Meeting of the Executive Committee 
JO April 1945, Running number .10 (Reel 9) • 
Earlier in committee discussion Evatt had given a reason 
for this semantic distinction when he pointed out that the 
Republics had a.lready requested, through Russia, permission 
' 
to attend the Conference.57 I 
Evatt applied a similar distinction to the question of 
the admission of the Argentine to the Conference~ After 
Senor Padilla of Mexico had moved that an invitation should 
be extended to the Government of Argentina to attend the 
Conference, Evatt moved, as an amendment to Padilla's motion, 
that this question be postponed until the next meeting of the 
Executive Committee. He emphasized that no in:Y:.itation should 
be issued and that the delay he envisaged would allow 
Argentina to make formal application for admission to the 
Conference which could then be considered':58 In the official 
summary report of the Executive Committee meeting AustraliaYs 
stand on the admission of the Argentine is reported as 
follows: 
Dr~ Evatt said that if this question stood alone, 
Australia would not be in favour of admitting 
Argentina to the Conference, on account of its 
past record in this war. He felt that it would 
5 7: Ibid:, Running number 6. 
58. 'Meeting of the Executive Committee,. JO Aprii 1945', 
l)oc 41, Ex/2, JO April 1945, Q.:_N.c.r.o. J?ocuments, 
vol: 5 PoJ79. 
be impossihle pennanently to deny to Argentina 
readmission to the Community of States, especially 
in view of the attitude of the Latin American 
countries, many of whom were good friends of 
Australia.59 
An official correction to this report read~ 
Dr. Evatt said that if this question stood alone, 
Australia would not be in favour of admitting 
Argentina to the Conference, on account of its 
past record in the war. However, he felt that it 
would be impossible permanently to deny to 
Argentina readmission to the Community of States 
especially in view of the attitude of the6Latin 
American countries and the United States1 : O 
This summary report scarce.ly gives sufficient indication of 
Evatt's expressed feelings in the Committee on the admission 
of the Argentine. Indeed it would appear that what had been 
a semantic point in the case of White Russia and the Ukraine 
had now become for Evatt a means of specifically discriminating 
against the Argentine and ensuring its admission to the 
Conference on a somewhat inferior basis1: The verbatim report 
is worthy of quotation in full because it shows that Evatt, 
while bowing to po.litical expediency in withdrawing his 
motion, voiced strong fee.lings in the subject which were not, 
at the time, puhlicized. 
59 • Ibid. 
60: 'Corrigenda to Summary of Meeting of the Executive 
Committee, JO April 1945', Doc 41, EX/2 (l), .12 May 
1945, U.N.C.I.O. Documents, vol. 5, p:J9.1. 
Now in support of this amendment I would like 
to say a thing or two about this measure': If 
this were Argentina considered by itself; that 
is to say if we were just looking at the case of 
Argentina, the views of my country would be over-
whelmingly opposed to their admission: We think of 
them being Facist throughout the war; having done 
everything they could to trip us up, that they are 
Fascist in sympathy as far as the evidence is con-
cerned pretty well up to the present time': In 
fact, the American newspapers announced on Saturday 
that it is nowforbidden to have any delebrations 
in the Argentine marking the downfall of Germany, 
and yet theoretically they, are at war with Germany. 
That is how we feel about it and I wouldn't be 
frank with the Executive if I didn't say that. 
But here are the South American Republics, some 
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of whom are very goodf'riends of ours during the war, 
and they want this done, and in the end, we cannot 
prevent - no one could prevent - the admission 
of the Argentine or the readmission into the Community 
of Nations, and, therefore, I think at the proper time, 
it will be correct to allow Argentina to come to these 
deliberations, but I feel we should take the same course 
in relation to the Argentine as the delegate for Columbia 
took on Thursday in relation to White Russia and the 
Ukraine, that is, to let the thing be dealt with in a 
more orderly fashiono 
I am opposed to an invitation being sent to the Argentineo 
Why should we invite· Argentina to come? Let them apply~ 
Let them apply in the regular way and they can do ~hat 
between now and the next meeting of the Executiveo l 
Later in the meeting IDvatt withdrew his amendment when it 
became clear that the Great Powers were in favour of dealing 
with the matter at once, but reiterated his desire for 
permission rather than invitation. Although IDvatt 1 s action 
Verbatim Minutes~ First Meeting of the Exe·outive 
Committee, JO April 1945, Running numbers 18-9 (Reel 9) 0 
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would seem to have been largely 'political' it does not 
seem to have been completely so. 
The reporting of Australia's agreement to the admission 
of Argentina not surprisingly gave rise to questions in the 
House of Representatives, and in the light of a know.ledge of 
the verbatim records of the Conference it :is interesting to 
notice that one of them J.P. Abbott, on 3 May, included the 
fo.llowing -
Did either the Government or its ministerial 
representatives, before Australia's vote was 
recorded in favour of the admission of Argentina, 
give consideration to the statements made last 
year by the late President Roosevelt and Mr: 
Cordell Hull denouncing the preg~nt Argentine 
Government as a Fascist regime? 
The most important aspect of Evatt 1 s participation in 
this meeting of the Executive Committee is the fact that he 
figured so largely in the business of the meetingo On both 
the "White Russia and Argentine issues most of the discussion 
was centred around motions put forward by Evatt·: This may be 
taken as ref.lecting both his energy and his legal ability~ 
Later in the same morning the Heads of Delegations 
convened for a meeting in which Australia took no notable part·: 
621: C.P.D., vol. 181, 3 May 1945, p:131s: There were 
further questions on 4 and 8 May·: 
I 
I 
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This meeting of the Committee decided to permit Argentina 
to take her seat at the Conference at '· once. 
At the meeting o.f the Executive Committee on the fo.llowing 
morning, 1 May, Evatt once again demonstrated an aggressive 
attitude towards possib.le Great Power domination of the 
Conference in a similar manner to that which he had shown 
on the question of Conference voting at the second meeting 
of' the Heads of Delegations Committee: The question here 
was the allocation of Commission and Committee officerships. 
France objected to the fact that she had not been allocated a 
Commission rapporteurship in the list which had been drawn 
up by the four inviting powers. Evatt supported this objection 
and the further protest made by M. Bidault that, as the 
Conference had now been estab.lished, the inviting powers should 
no longer be considered as having prerogatives such as the 
allocation of these offices~ 63 
Mr~ Evatt (Australia) expressed general agreement 
with Mr. Bidault both with respect to the possible 
usurpation of the Executive Committee's functions 
by the four powers and with respect to the omission 
of France from the list of officers of Commissions 
and Committees. Mr~ Evatt reported that he had 
63': 'Summary of Second Meeting of the Executive Committee, 
1 May 1945', Doc 51, EX/J-, .1 May .1945, U.N.C.I.O. 
Doc.11ID~U~~' vol~ 5, p.J98o 
received the list only an hour before and that 
there was no real opportunity to make suggestions~ 
That was quite inadequate. If suggestions were to 
be made, it could only done as part of a reconsideration 
of the whole list ••• with referenpe to the position 
of the four sponsoring powers, he LEvatt] emphasized 
that once the Conference had been assembled, it was 
master of its own business and important decisions 
should be ig-itiated by the Executive Committee and not 
outside it. 4 
At what wou.ld have been the Fourth Meeting of the Heads 
of Delegation Committee, had not that Committee been renamed 
the Steering Committee which now met under its new title for 
the first time fo.Llowing the Executive Committee meeting on 
the same morning, the question of voting in the Conference, 
discussed at the second meeting of the Committee under its 
former title, was the main item of discussion~ Argument 
centred on a revised version drawn up following Evatt's protest 
in the second meeting on 27 April, of Section IV of the 
revision read 
The Secretariat, after discussion with the Chairman 
of the Australian Delegation and certain others, 
submits the following revised text of Section IV 
of the memorandum of Rule!L .. Qf P;rQ_~.§l~ 
64': Ibid: pp .J98-9 and 'Corrigendum to Summary of Second 
Meeting of the Executive Committee', Doc 51, EX/J 
(1), 12 May .1945, Ibid., p.405. 
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IV VOTING 
l: Each de.legation shall have one vote in each 
body of the Conference on which it is represented~ 
2: Vo,i:!I!g:_in Public Sessions anA_Mee:thlli~.§.: In all 
public sessions and meetings of the Conference 
(in Plenary Sessions and in Public Meetings of 
the Commissions) voting, at this stage, on all 
questions shall be by majority vote of the 
Delegations present~ It may later be desirable 
in certain cases, when a text or an amendment is 
concerned, torequire a vote by some proportion 
.larger than a majority. It shall be open to the 
Conference in any given case to determine whether 
the bare majority would be sufficient to carry a 
text on an amendment~ 
3: Voting_in_.QlQ§..QQ. Meetings: The voting procedure 
and rules in closed meetings of the Conference 
(in closed meetings of the Commissions and in 
meetings of the Technical Committees) shall be 
by majority vote or shall be decided .ad hoc by 
the body concerned~ 
4. The Conference shall normally vote by show of hands, 
except that any De.legation in any body of the 
Conference may request a ro.ll call which shall be 6 
taken by countries in Eng.lish alphabetical order. 5 
The original Secretariat proposal, as has been seen 
66 
above, required a 2/3 majority for substantive amendments 
in public sessions and public meetingsj: This meeting of the 
Steering Committee could, not reach a decision on the matter, 
and decided to refer it to the Executive Committee. M~ Molotov, 
for example, favoured retention of the original proposa.l 
65~ 'Meeting of the Chairmen of the Delegations - revised text 
of Section IV of the memorandum on "Rules of Procedure"', 
Doc 37, DC/9 (a), JO Apri.l .1945, U ·R~ . .9,.!..f~-~ Documents, 
pp Jlt2-J. 
66~ See above p. 
because he had seen the voting power of the Latin American 
bl .•67 oc. 
In the course of his argument to the Steering Committee, 
Evatt once again showed his desire to lessen Great Power 
predominance at the Conference by making it easier to amend 
the Dumbarton Oaks proposals~ 
You might have an amendment which is not a procedural 
amendment, which is very important and goes to the root 
of the whole Dumbarton Oaks p.lan~ On the other hand, 
you may have an amendment that is not a procedural 
amendment, but which does not affect the general scheme 
of the Dumbarton Oaks p.lan. To throw all these proposals 
together and require a 2/3 majority vote for each amend-
ment of substance would be to make the chance of carrying 
any amendment at the highest level very difficult indeed~ 
And I would point (.,his out to M: Molotov, that if a 
majority of the Conference can be aligned or align itself 
in the way he has indicated, it follows logically that a 
lesser majority, namely one third of the Conference p.lus 
one, can prevent any amendment of substance to this 
document. And I don't think - and this is my point -
that at the beginning of the proc~gdings we should make 
such a self-restrictive decision: 
67: 'Summary of Meeting of Steering Committee, l May 1945', 
Doc 50, ST/2, l May 1945, U.N~Q.:_!.O • .J22.cument~, vol~ 5 
p.175: 'The Chairman indicated that there was a choice 
between the original proposal and the revision which had 
been suggested by Mr~ Evatt~ He explained that the 
United States Delegation favoured the original proposal 
but that the revision had been made as a courtesy to 
Mr~ Evatt'. Ibid. 
68': Verbati!!! Minutes, First Meeting of Steering Committee» 
l May 1945. Running numbers 11-2·: 
326. 
It would appear that Evatt here, as in his earlier 
comments in the (Heads of Delegations) Committee on Friday 
27, was primarily concerned with the difficulty of altering 
the Dumbarton Oaks proposals~ He appears to have regarded 
the Dumbarton Oaks text as something already accepted -
an existing framework to be amended by the Conference. 
On the following day, 2 May, the Conference began to get 
further under way with a meeting of Presidents of Commissions, 
Rapporteurs and Assistant Secretaries General: The need 
to hast.en Conference proceedings was.:indicated by the suggestion 
of the Secretary General of the Conference that Committee 
meetings start at once without the need for preliminary 
formal Commission meetings·~ 
The Chairman [Field Marshal Smuts] stated that the 
Conference ha~ been sitting for a week discussing matters 
of organization with the result that the p~glic had a 
growing sense of frustrated disappointment': 9 
It was decided, therefore, that the officers of the four 
Commissions should meet separately with the officers of their 
Committees on the following day to discuss questions of 
organization and procedure.70 
Friday, 4 May, had been set, as a resultaf a suggestion 
of Fraser of New Zealand in the Second Meeting of the Heads 
69: 'Meeting of Presidents of Commissions, Rapporteurs and 
Assistant Secretaries G.eneral, 2 May !945' l Doc 59, G/16, 
2 May 1945, !G.~.I.Oo Uocumeuts, vol'. 1 p.66. 
70~ Ibid~, p.68. 
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of Delegations Cammi ttee, 71 as the deadline for the submission 
of amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks draft as supplemented by 
the Yalta voting proposa.ls. 72 The Australian amendments were 
forwarded by Keith Waller, Secretary of the Delegation, to 
Alger Hiss, Secretary Genera.l of the Conference, on J May and 
were officially recorded as having been received by the 
Secretariat on 4 May~ 73 On J May Evatt held a large press 
conference at which he explained the main points of the 
Australian amendments~ 74 These points close.ly reflected the 
emphases given in Forde's speech to the Second Plenary Session. 
At the press conference Evatt issued the fol.lowing statement 
1 Meeting of the Heads of Delegations, 27 April 1945' 
Doc JO. DC/5 (1), 27 April .1945, U.~...!S2 .. ~I·hJ2ocuments, 
vol. 5, p. 86. 
72~ These amendments had first been invited in the text of 
the official invitation to the Conference. The invitation 
is reprinted as Doc J/ G/2, 26 April 1945, U.N.C.I.O. 
Do ClJ!ll..§.!!1:..§., vol~ 1, p .1 • 
73~ United Nations Archives, New York, U~Q.I.~_g.§.!!~ral 
Fi.le~;§.~_2, Dumbci:.:£j:;on Oaks Proposals,2., Comment§_and 
Amendments. The fuLl text of the Australian amendments 
is prlnt;d as Doc 2, G/14 (1), 5 May, .1945, l!:.:E!-<2• I .Q_. 
Documeni;;_§., vol. J, pp.543-553. It may also be found 
in the Aust~a.:!!.....RepQLt in.. . .Q.!.N .c ! I..O., pp'~ 71-5. 
74': Ag_e, Me.lbourne, 5 May 1945. 
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Australia is submitting amendments to the World 
Organization plan. Some are concerned with clarifying 
the draft., but nine are directed to matters of importance 
affecting both world security and economic welfare~· All 
the amendments are positive, constructive and helpful~ 
Their adoption will greatly improve the proposed constitu-
tion without in any way interfering with its basic 
principihes. Perhaps the most important amendment is 
~hat dealing with the power of future amendment. The 
constitution should not be too flexible, but to keep it 
practically unchangeable would be utterly wrong. 
The Australian amendments are designed: 
(l) To prevent the possibility of a single Great Power 
vetoing amendments to the constitution, providing 
such amendment is twice approved by a two-thirds 
majority of the General Assemb.ly including three 
permanent members of the Security Council. 
(2) To exclude the "veto" of the permanent members from 
all arrangements re.la ting to the peaceful settlement 
of disputes and to confine such "veto" to decisions 
involving the application of economic and military 
sanctions. 
(3) To require a pledge from all members to respect the 
territorial integrity and political independence of 
other members. 
(4) To declare that justice and the rule of law shall 
be the principles guiding the action of the Security 
Counci.l and for this purpose to require the maximum 
employment of the Pennanent Court in determining the 
.;:Legal aspects of international disputes~ 
(5) To see that the Security Council is in fact composed 
of "security" Powers, i.e~, Powers which by their 
past military contribution to t.he cause of world 
security, have proved able and willing to assume 
substantial security responsibilities, or which are 
willing, and byvirtue of their geographical position 
in relation to regions of primary strategical 
importance are able, to make asubstantial contribution 
to the maintenance of international peace and security. 
i. 
(6) To require members to pledge themse.lves to take 
action both national and international for the 
purpose of securing for all peoples, including 
their own, improved labour standards, economic 
advancement, emp.loyment for all, and social 
security, and as part of that pledge to take 
appropriate action through the Assembly, the 
Economic and Social Council and the International 
Labour Organization and, in particu.lar, to make 
regular reports to the Assembly as to what they 
have actually done to carry out the p.ledge o 
(7) To elevate the Economic Council into a principal 
organ of the Wor.ld Organization and to give the 
Economic Council under the General Assemb.ly specific 
new functions, inc.luding power to initiate action 
for the making of internationa.l conventions on all 
matters not being dealt with by other specialized 
agenci.es ~ 
(8) To give the General Assembly a wider jurisdiction 
over, and a fuller share in, the genera.l work of the 
Organization and in particu.lar to vest the Assembly 
with power to prevent situations and disputes from 
becoming "frozen" in the Security Council, as occurred 
in the League of Nations in the notorious cases of 
external aggression against China, Ethiopia and 
Czechoslovakia. 
(9) To lay down the princip.le that the purpose of 
administration of all dependent territories is the 
we.lfare and development of the native peoples of such 
territories, and to p.lace an obligation on nations 
contro.lling particu.lar dependent territories, to be 
specified by appropriate action, to report regularly 75 
to advisory bodies consisting of expert administrators. 
On .1 May Waller had forwarded to the Secretary-General 
the fo.Llowing memorandum and list o 76 
75: Printed in Aust£.q,1i@ R~rt._on U.N.C.IoO., pp.78-9~ 
761: United Nations Archives, New York, U .N .c.!.~..:......::.._ Ge~,9-1 
Ei!..§., Box 2, Assigull!ent§.....19 CoTI!!!!i§.J?J-..Ql!.§__and Cammi ttees. 
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In comp.liance with the request made at the meeting 
of the Steering Committee this morning, I am forwarding 
herewith a list of the members of the Australian 
Delegation to serve on the four Commissions to be 
set up in connection with the work of the United 
Nations Conference on International organization. 
Commission I - General Provisions 
Rt; Hon. F.M. Forde and the Rt~ Hon: H.V. Evatt 
lDelegates to the Conference) 
W.D. Forsyth, (Secretary and Executive Officer of 
Delegation group concerned with Commission I) 
Senator The Hon: George McLeay 
Senator R.J. Nash 
H.A.M. Campbe.1.1 
Mrs: J.G.M. Street 
w: Macmahon Ball 
Commission II - General Assemb!Y. 
Rt: Hon. F.M. Forde and the Rt. Hon: H.V. Evatt 
(Delegates to the Conference) 
Dr: J.W. Burton, (Secretary and Executive Officer of 
Delegation group concerned with Commission II) 
The Hon. Sir Frederic Egg.leston 
The Hon. R.T. Pollard 
J .F. W a.lsh 
O.D.A. Oberg 
J.B. Brigden 
Dr: Roland Wilson 
L.F. Crisp 
CommissiQ.!! III - Se£1!.!:11Y.,_Cou!1£.b!. 
Rt: Hon. F.M. Forde and the Rt: Hon:: H.V. Evatt 
(Delegates to the Conference) 
A.S. Watt, (Secretary and Executive Officer of Delegation 
group concerned with Commission III) 
The Hon. John McEwen 
Lt~ Gen·. Sir John Lavarack 
Air Marsha.l R: Wi.lliams 
Commander S.H.K. Spurgeon 
E.V. Raymond 
P.E. Coleman 
i 
I 
i 
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Commission IV - Judicial 
Rt~ Hon. H.V. Evatt, (Delegate to the Conference) 
Professor K.H. Bailey, (Secretary and Executive Officer 
of De.legation group concerned with Commission IV) 
The Hon. Sir Frederic Egg.leston 
It is intended that the External Affairs Advisers (namely, 
Mr~ Watt, Mr. Has.luck, Mr. Forsyth and Dr: Burton) 
together with the Consultant to the Attorney-General 
(namely, Professor Bai.ley), shall attend all four 
Commissions as their services may be required~ 
It would seem, therefore, that Forde and Evatt would be the 
spokesmen at Commission meetings with the other members of the 
delegation present in an advisory capacity. The specia.l 
position of Evatt's External Affairs Advisers is clear both 
in their capacity of Secretary and Executive 0ff'icer of 
Delegation groups on the various Commissions and by the fact 
that they alone could attend a.11 four Commissions as their 
services were required. 
But the main work of the Conference was not lbo be 
conducted in the Commissions. Each of the Commissions was 
served by a number of technical committees and it was in these 
twelve c onnni tt ees that the detai.led daily work of the Conference 
took place: On 3 May, Wa.ller forwarded the fol.lowing 
memorandum to the Secre:bary General. 
77. Ibid~ 
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The list of members of the Australian Delegation to 
serve on Commissions of the Conference, which was 
forwarded with my note of lst May, wi.ll also serve 
for the allocation of members of ourDelegation to 
Committees. 
It is our wish that members of our De.legation should 
be regarded as eligible to attend al.l meetings of the 
Committees set up under the respective Commissions to 
which they have been nominated, and that the official 
advisers should be able to attend any Committee of the 
Conference when their services are required~ If it is 
necessary for the purposes of the Secretariat, the names 
of their [sic] officials (which wil.l be supplied if 
requested~ may be placed on the .list of our representat-
ives for each of the Committees 
The Australian De.legates, the Rt: Hon: FoM• Forde and 
the Rto Hon. H.V. Evatt, wi.Ll be spokesmen on al.l 
committees and in their absence alternates wil.l act 
as fol.lows: 
C . . N 1 r' 1 p . . 78 Ol!J.mission o •. ~!!§~ rovisions 
Committee No.l (Preamble, Purposes, Principles) 
Senator Nash and Mr. Macmahon Ba.ll 
Committee No.2 (Membership and General) 
Senator McLeay and Mr. Macmahon Bal.l 
Commission_No .£. Ge~c.11._As.§...embly 
Committee No.l (Structure and Proceedings) 
Sir Frederic Eggleston and Mr·. Brigden 
Committee No. 2 (Poli tic al and Security Functions) 
Mr. Po.l.lard and Mr. Has.luck 
Committee No.J (Economic and Social Cooperation) 
Dr. Wi.lson and Dr. Burton 
Committee Noo4 (Trusteeship) 
Sir Frederic Egg.le ston and Mr: Forsyth 
78: The terms of reference of the Commissions and Committees 
may be found in tOrganization of the Conference - Addendum 
to Verbatim Minutes of the Fifth Plenary Session, 30 April 
.1945 1 , Doc 42, P/10 (a), 6 May 1945~ U.N.C.I....:..Q .. ~ .. J2.Q.Q11~!!.i§., 
vol. 5, pp.402-5. 
Committee No.l (Structure and Procedure) 
Mr. Watt and Commander Spurgeon 
Committee No.2 (Peaceful Settlement) 
Mr. McEwen and Professor Bailey 
Committee No.3 (Enforcement Measures) 
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Sir John Lavarack, Mr. Co.leman and Mr~ Has.luck 
Committee No.4 (Regional Arrangements) 
Air Marshal Wi.l.liams, Mr. Co.leman and Mr. Watt 
Comm;j,_..§.§_ion ~...2...Ji Judicial ...Q,;r'ganization 
Committee No.l (International Council) sic 
Sir Frederic Egg.leston and Professor Bai.ley 
Committee No.2 (Legal Prob.lems) 
Sir Frederic Egg.leston and Professor Bai.ley 
Besides its pre.l iminary remarks consolidating the position 
of power of Evatt and h1s offic1al advisers w1 th1n the 
Delegat1on, as has been noticed in Chapter V, this listing 
also demonstrates the l1mi ted extent to which members of the 
De.legat1on outside of the circle of Evatt' s departmental 
adv1sers and his group centred on floor 17 of the Sir Francis 
Drake Hotel were able to contribute to Australia's representation 
at meetings of the technical committees~ At least one of the 
Alternates was 1n every case a member of Evatt 1 s team and in 
fact only Senators Nash and McLeay, Mr~ McEwen, Mr. Pol.lard, 
Dr': Wilson, Mr. Coleman, Commander Spurgeon, Air Marsha.l 
Wil.liams and S1r John Lavarack represented among the Alternates 
334. 
those members of the delegation outside Evatt's group.79 
On Friday, 4 May, the Technical Committees held their 
first meetings which were largely organizational. In 
Committee I/l - (General Provisions - Preamble, Purposes 
and Principles), as in all Committees, ad hf!.£. decisions were 
taking on voting procedure until the Executive and Steering 
Committees had reached a_decision on the matter~ In the course 
of discussion the Chairman of the Committee said: 
I should like to mention specifically the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals to which Mr. Boncour referred. I don't 
think there is any reason by which the two-thirds 
major~5y rule should not apply to that as to anything 
else. 
This was a point which had not emerged in previous discussion 
on the matter of Conference voting in the Executive and Steer-
ing Committees and one which, it would seem, had escaped 
Evattts attention. For his whole argument against the two-
thirds majority voting rule stemmed from regarding the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals as somehow accepted with a consequent 
necessity to render them easily amendab.le in the Conference. 
79': United Nations Archives, New York, U.N.C'!.I.O. =-General 
~' Box 2, Ass;h.gnments to Commissions sn..Q. Coll!!!!ii.t~· 
so: Verbai:i~inutes, First Meeting of Committee I/l, 4 
May 1945, Running Number 8 (Reel l). For official summary, 
account see 'Summary Report of First Meeting of Committee 
I/l, 4 May 1945, Doc 95, I/l/2, 5 May 1945, U.N.C.l.!,Q.:.. 
Docum~, vol. 6, pp.268"."70. 
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The meetings o:f the Technical Committees on 4, .5,7and 
8 May were largely concerned with procedural matters such 
as interim voting procedures, methods o:f recognizing speakers, 
and the di:f:ficul ty o:f commencing proper proceedings until the 
amendments had been col.lated and published by the Secretariat o 
Australia, it would appear, had circulated its amendments 
to all delegates, independently o:f the Secretariat, on 
Friday, 4 Mayo In the :first meeting o:f Committee II/4 (Gen-
eral Assembly - Trusteeship) on .5 May, Lord Cranborne, o:f the 
United Kingdom, said he :felt that such action could lead to 
confusion, and that it should be le:ft to the Secretariat to 
circulate amendments~ 
Nobody would quite know what was being issued, and to 
whom, and I would have thought :for the sake of uniformity, 
and to be sure that everybody was getting what they ought, 
it would be wise even at the risk o:f a little delay, to 
stick to the ru191 that all documents should be issued by 
the Secretariato 
In the second meeting o:f Committee III/l (Security 
Counci.l - Structure and Procedure) on Satuday, .5 May, the 
Chainnan conveyed to the Nether.lands representative the warmest 
~batim...filnutes~ First Meetin&' o:f Comydttee IT/~, . 
.5 May 194.5, Running number 23 lReel 3). For o:f:ficial 
summary account see 'Summary Report o:f First Meeting 
o:f Committee II/4, .5 May 194.5', Doc 113, II/4/2, 
6 May .194.5, U.N.C.I.O. Documen.1.§., vol~ 10, pp.423-4. 
congratulations of the Committee on the liberation of 
Holland and its heroic peopleo 
The teuton ogre and his hideous war machine have been 
pulverised by the valient legions of the United Nations 
and more particularly those of our great Al.lieso May 
we soon celebrate also the liberation of the noble 
Norwegian people, which should come soon: The success 
of your labours would constitute the best epi.logue to 
these historic world events.82 
The end of the war in Europe was at hand; and some of the 
delegates would very soon have to return to their own countrieso 
The Conference Secretariat and the Commission and Committee 
officers were therefore concerned to expedite proceedings of 
a Conference which, in the course of almost two weeks, had 
done little more than organize itself - and in the matter of 
organization the vital question of voting procedure was still 
unsett.led. 
On the morning of Monday, 7 May, a meeting of Commission 
Presidents and Committee chairmen was held to speed the 
deliberations of the Committeeso It was decided firstly to 
reorganize the roster of Committee meetings so that the previous 
82: Verbatim Minutes, Second Meeting of Committee ITI/l, 
5 May .1945, Running number .1 (Reel 4). For official summary 
account see 'Summary Report of Second Meeting of Committee 
ITI/l, 5 Mayl945', Doc 120, ITI/l/J, 6 May 1945~ 
U.N.C.I.O. Documents, vol 11, pp:252-5~ 
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schedule whereby Committees met on alternate days only was 
1 d b f' t t . SJ rep ace y more requen mee ings. More importantly, 
f'rom the point of' view of' Australia's participation in the 
conference, it was suggested that, with the authorization 
of' the Steering Committee upon the recommendation of' the 
Executive Committee, the twenty-seven amendments jointly 
proposed by the sponsoring Governments on 4 May, might be 
read into the Dumbarton Oaks proposals: It was agreed to 
recommend to the Executive Committee that the twenty-seven 
84 
amendments be incorporated into the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. 
SJ: 'Summary Report of' Meeting of' Presidents of' Commissions 
and Chairman of' Committees, 7 May .194.5', Doc .lJ.5, G/Jl, 
8 May 194.5, U.N.C.I.O. Documents, vol. 1, p~89. 
84~ Ibid. p.90. The text of' the 27 amendments is printed as 
'Amendments Proposed by the Governments of' the United 
States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China', 
Doc 2, G/29, .5 May 194.5, U.N.C.I.O. DQ_cuments, vol. 3 
pp~622-8. See also 'Note by the Secretariat Regarding 
the Conclusions Reached at the Meeting held on May 7 
of' the Commission Presidents and Committee Chairmen', 
Doc 142, EX/.5, 8 May .194.5, !l..:E•C.I.O. Documents, vol~ .5, 
p.41.5. This Note inc.luded the following among the 
Conclusions of' the meeting 'Priority should be given 
by the technical committees to the consideration of' the 
amendment jointly propo'Sed by the sponsoring governments. 
These amendments shouldbe incorporated in the Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposa.ls. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as thus 
amended should be re-issued as the basic document of' the 
Conference f'or the work of' the commissions and technical 
committees'. Ibid. 
338. 
• The aggressiveness and force of Australia's dissatisfied 
small power posture was not long in manifesting itself on 
this matter. In Committee I/l which met later on the same 
. 85 
morning, the Chairman, Senator Henri Rolin of Belgium, 
announced that he had just come from the meeting of Presidents 
of Commissions and Chairmen of Committees: 
Now at the meeting I have just come from, it was 
proposed and it was decided that the best way of 
going about things was that the amendments by the 
in~i~ing powers should be incorp?~ated in the 
original Dumbarton Oaks docum·ent. tsp 
Evatt, who was present in the Committee, immediately 
objected that he felt it would be 'a very wrong procedure' 87 
to treat the amendments of any power or group of powers as the 
basic document. 
I think it would be a great mistake to allow our 
proceedings to be overshadowed by a group of amend-
ments which, to some extent, are acceptable, and in 
other respects are not acceptable, so as to give 88 
priority and consideration to any group of amendments. 
Later in the proceedings he referred to the general body 
of amendments -
85: 'Summary Report of Second Meeting of Committee I/.1, 
7 May 1945', Doc 133, I/l/7, 8 May 1945, pp~276-7. 
86: Verbatim Minu~, Second Meeting of Committee I/l, 
7 May 1945. Running number 3 (Reel l)~ 
87: Ibid. 
88': Ibid. 
I . 
I 
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Most of these amendments were in long before the Big 
Four amendmentso Certainly some of them are much 
better, some of them are not quite so good, and we 
might make better progres~ if we call at the proper 
time the first paragraph Lof the Dumbarton Oaks 
proposals] and then proceed to determine that, allow-
ing each member of thy Committee the opportunity to 
move an amendment as lhe] is called in some regular 
order.89 -
The Committee adjourned leaving the question undecided. 
On Wednesday, 8 May, the Executive Committee met at 
11 a.m. to discuss, as the main agenda item, Section 4 of 
the Rules o:( Procedure on voting, and, as a further item, 
the recommendation of the Commission Presidents and Technical 
Committee Chairmen that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as 
amended by the twenty-seven proposals submitted jointly by 
the sponsoring Governments should form the basic document 
of the Conference. The meeting began, in accordance with 
the Order of the Day, with a minute of silence as the formal 
90 
observance by the Conference of the victory in Europeo 
The Executive Committee then moved to consider Section 
4 of the Rules of Procedure on Conference votingo It had 
before it a new document from the Secretariat91 setting out 
Ibid~ Running number 5. 
'Summary of Third Meetin&" of the Executive Bommittee, 
8 May 1945 1 , Doc 164, EX/9, 9 May, 1945, U.N.C.I.O. 
Documents, vol. 5, p.421. 
'Alternative Proposals on Conference Voting Procedure 
(To Form Section IV of the Conference Rules of Procedure)', 
Doc 141, EX/4, 8 May 1945, UoNoC.I~Do£1!!!!.ents, 
vol 5, p.407. 
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four possible proposals in place of the two, (the original 
secretariat proposal and the proposal made following 
discussion with Evatt and certain others), which had been 
considered at the .last meeting of the Steering Committee. 92 
Proposal 1 was the Secretariat 2 s original proposal of 23 
A · 1 93 pr1 .• Alternative A (Proposal II) was designed to provide 
for the possibility of voting on substantive questions in 
Commissions and plenary sessions by a majority instead of a 
normal two-thirds vote, under certain conditions. 94 Alternative 
B, (Proposal III), which was closest to the Australian pJ::'pposal 
of April JO, provided for voting by two-thirds, instead of 
a normal majority vote, d t . d"t" 95 un er cer ain con i ions. Alter-
native C, (Proposal IV) was an app.lication of the two-thirds 
voting requirement to al.l bodies when dealing with substantive 
questions instead of only applying it to public sessions and 
meetings as in the origina.l Secretariat proposal •96 It might 
92; See above Pf 
93: See above P• 
9u,: 'Alternative Proposals on Conference Voting Procedure 1 , 
Doc 141, EX/4, 8 May 1945, U .N~..2..~..'?.. Documents, vol 5, 
pp .40t7-8. 
95: Ibid; pp.409-10. 
96: Ibid. p.410. 
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be expected that Evatt would object more strenuously to 
Alternative C than he had to the Secretariat's original 
proposal~ And indeed at the start of the meeting he dido 
The Secretary of the Executive Committee, Alger Hiss, 
placed the Secretariat's original proposal, which he said 
had been approved by the sponsoring powers, and the three 
alternative proposals before the Committee: Evatt was the 
first speaker. The main object of his attack was Alternative i 
C: 
But this last proposal, which is Alternative c, 
No. 4 in this draft, goes right against the original 
views expressed at the Steering Committee, because 
it requires a two-thirds majority 1::: and I think it 
is a very unsatisfactory No. 4 and I think it would 
be better to revert to the original proposal, than 
to lay down our Qriginal ru.le.97 
Padi.lla, of Mexico who fo.llowed Evatt, supported Alternative 
C th d th t . t . l d t . ' 98 on e groun s a 1 was simp e an cer ain. Bidaul t, 
of France, seconded Padilla, using similar reasons and both 
proposer and seconder then accepted an amendment from Eden 
that the words 'present and voting' be added after the two-
thirds requirement. 99 It will be seen that Evatt had modified 
98 
99· 
Verbatim Minutes, Third Meeting of Executive Committee, 
8 ·May 1945, Running number 4 (Reel 9 )': 
Ibid~ Running number 5o 
Ibid: Running number So 
I 
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his position, taken at the second meeting of the Heads of' 
Delegations Committee, to the extent that he now supported 
the original Secretariat proposalo This may have been his 
reaction to a prudent appreciation of' the f'orces aligned 
behind Alternative c: But his decision was probably also 
inf'luenced by a realization, which however seemed somewhat 
tardy, that both the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and the twenty-
seven amendments of' the great powers would have to be voted 
on in Committee in the same way as the amendments of' the 
small powers. 
For Evatt now raised the matter of' the twenty-seven 
amendments even though they were listed as the f'ollowing item 
on theagenda. 
: •• I don't want tof'ind this attempted~ that the 
27 amendments now proposed will al.l be accepted, 
and that the two-thirds majority will be required 
each date the technical committees pref'er to amend 
these amendments o Let us employ one rule all round. 
It may be found that that wt·11 work satisfactorily, 
so .long as your amendments presumably the Great ~5wer] 
amendments run the gauntlet-of' these Committees.1 
The Chairman immediately replied - 'They will'. At this 
point in proceedings Russia supported the Padilla-Eden motion. 
The Secretary of the Committee, Alger Hiss then commented 
100. Ibid. 
343. 
With respect to Dr. Evatt' s .last statement, I would 
like to say that the status of the Four Power Amendment 
proposals comes later on the agenda~ It is my under-
standing that the proposals themselves, the original 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals, before being adopted by any 
Committee, would have to go through the normal voting 
procedureo 
Mro Evatt: Let us be quite frank about it: 
I said a minute ago that my understanding was that 
any amendments, whatever power might move them, would 
have to run the gauntlet at the time of the majority 
of the Committees. We donrt want them to be treated 
differently to those of other countries: 
Mr. Hiss: And that is0 true of the Dumbarton prop~als themselveso 1 l 
Evatt then requested an assurance from the Chairman that a 
matter which had been passed or rejected by a two-thirds vote 
in a Committee would be subject to review and possible reversal 
in a Commission. The Chairman stated that such would be the 
case. The Padi.l.la-Eden motion was then carried by a show of 
hands. Al.l members voted in favour except Evatt who reserved 
.102 
the position of his delegationo 
It will be noticed how Hiss, in his remarkss had linked 
the twenty-seven Four Power amendments with the Dumbarton Oaks 
pcoposa.ls and had thereby foreshadowed his statement at the 
101. Ibid. Running number 9. 
102~ 'Summary of Third Meeting of the Executive Committee, 
8 May 1945', Doc .164, EX/9, 9 May 1945, U~N.CJ.O. 
~ents, vol. 5, p.422, with c~rrigend~m, p.429. 
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commencement of the discussion on the next item on the agenda -
the status o:f the twenty-seven amendments o:f the :four 
sponsoring Governmentso Hiss began by reporting to the 
Executive Committee the relevant proceedings o:f the meeting 
o:f Commission Presidents and Committee Chairman held on the 
7th May. According to the official summary o:f Third Meeting 
o:f Executive_QQmmittee: 
The Secretary-General said that, at a meeting on 
May 7 o:f the Commission Presidents and Committee 
Chairman with Field-Marshal Smuts (South A:frica) 
presiding, it was recommended to the Executive 
Committee that the 27 amendments o:f the :four 
sponsoring Governments be incorporated in the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals as rart o:f the basic 
documents o:f the Conference. 03 ' 
The extent o:f the proposed incorporation is clear in an 
extract :from the verbatim minutes o:f the same meeting where 
Hiss was recorded as saying inter alia 
The position was taken that the basic document 
be:fore the conference was a document agreed upon by 
the :four sponsors as 'amended by their agreement 
a:fter the Yalta conference and that :further amendments 
which they have just submitted should be regarded as in 
the same legal category as i:f they had been adopted 
three or :four weeks ago. That recommend5tion was to 
be placed before you :for consideratiort:1 4 
103~ 'Summary o:f Third Meeting of the Executive Committee, 
8 May 1945', Doc 164, EX/9, 9 May 1945, U.N.C.I.O. 
Documents, vol~ 5, pp.422-3. 
104~ Verbatim Minutes. Third Meeting o:f the Executive 
Cammi ttee, 8 May ,1945, Running number ,12 (Reel 9). 
345. 
Bidau.lt, on behalf of France, objected to the proposed 
consolidation of the joint Four Power amendments with the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals on the grounds that it had been 
agreed that the latter only were to be the basis of the 
Conference discussion. He did, however, al.low the amendments 
of the sponsoring powers to be given prior consideration over 
the other amendments. 105 At this point Evatt tried unsuccess-
ful.ly to speak - the Chair had already recognized Van Kleffens 
from the Nether.lands. Like Bidau.l t, Van Kleffens was prepared 
to allow priority of consideration to the Four Power amendments 
but opposed their incorporation in text on the grounds 1) 
that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had been the basis of 
discussion since the previous October and 2) that it would 
be unfair to submit the amendments of the sponsoring powers 
to a different voting procedure to that required for amend-
106 
ments of the other powers. 
Is it right, I should like to ask in the circumstances, 
to create a position in yhich these amendments, as Dr. 
Evatt has just remar:ked Lin the previous discussion 
on conference voting procedure] after having been 
adopted without discussion en bloc, to require a two-
thirds majority to be altered whereas a one-third 
minority would suffice to bar amendments from other 
sources.1o7 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
107. Ibid. 
Running number 13. 
Running number 14. 
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Evatt, after agreeing with Van Kleffens on this point, which 
is surprising in view of Hiss's assurances earlier on a two-
thirds vote being required for the Dumbarton Oaks proposals 
and the Four Power amendments whether the latter were 
incorporated or not, then raised an important new point: 
~. ~ eo .long as it is understood that the printing 
of these amendments is simply for the sake of aiding 
discussion in Committees, aiding discussion of them; 
printing them alongside more in a form that is 
convenient for discussion, then there would be no 
objection. But to incorporate them in the text, treat 
them as the new text, would put the country that wished 
to amend a particular amendment in an impossib.le 
position.lOB 
Whereupon Eden said that the sponsoring powers had of course 
no intention of putting their amendments without a requirement 
for a two-thi.rds vote for their adoption~ Having thus disavowed 
the suggestion of the Commission Presidents and Committee 
Chairmen, he proceeded to suggest, in the words of the 
official report 'that the new text might be reproduced showing 
the [Four Power] amendments in italics for the convenience of 
the delegates' •109 This suggestion by Eden was supported 
Ibid. Running number 15. 
'Summary of Tb.1.·rd Meetin~ of the Executive Committee, 
8 May 1945', Doc 164, EX/9,. 9 May 1945 1 U.N.C.I.O. Documents, vol. 5, p.423. This quotai1oii"J5rov1des a 
c.lear example of the dangers inherent in an uncritical 
approach to the text of the unofficial Verbatim Min~. 
The corresponding entry[in the MinJtes reads as follows 
'Would it be practical Eden asked to produce a new 
text without amendments~written in the text so that 
everybody could see what was new and what was old'. 
Verbatim Minutes, Third Meeting of the Ex~cutive 
Committee-;--s-Ji.Ia'Y .1945, Running number 17 lReel 9). 
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by Padil.la; but Evatt immediate.ly showed the strength of 
his sma.11 power fee.ling when he suggested that not only the 
twenty-seven Four Power amendments but ~ amendments, might 
be reproduced alongside, but not as part of, the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals. 
Dr. Evatt: 
Might I suggest this. You have your D.O. text. 
opposite each page put the amendment in the form 
that is recommended by the sponsoring powers but 
at the same time inc.lude at the re.levant point 
the amendments by the other nations so that the 
Committee can ata glance (inaudihle) (compare them?] 
Mr. Hiss.: 
There would be some .1,000 pages. 
Mr~ Stettini1!.§..: 
There are so many of them, some thousand amendments 
that have been submitted. 
Dr. Evatt: 
I don't see why they can't be considered equa.lly. 
Mr. Stettinius: 
D E .110 r. vatt, it wi.1.1 be considered equal.ly. 
After Van Kleffens had dec.lared himse.lf' happy so long 
as the two-thirds rule applied to al.l votes Bidaul t supported 
Evatt 
I think that Dr. Evatt~s proposal 
110. Ibid. Running number 19. 
111. Ibid. Running number 20. 
. . l.11 is wise. 
Evatt himself spoke further -
Take the position of a committee of Commission I. A 
sponsoring power suggests an amendment to clause one. 
How can another country which has got no form of its 
amendment ready for distribution have its amendment 
properly considered by the Committee unless they have 
got it before their eyes? 
To which Stettinius replied 
Dr. Evatt, let me repeat and make very clear that there 
is no desire on the part of the United States that the 
amendments suggested should be given a position of 
prominence or priority above those amendments of 
any other country represented at this Conference. I 
am perfectly delighted to accept your suggestion of 
having the amendments suggested by others placed side 
by side if it were physical.ly possib.le todo so. 
But the Secretariat has said that would be in a volume 
of a thousand pages, therefore I cannot::be.lieve that 
you would make a further statement on that~ll2 
The meeting thereupon adjourned without a decision on 
this point having been reached. 
At the meeting ofthe Steering Committee on the same 
afternoon, Evatt summarized discussion on the question of 
Conference voting procedure at the prior meeting of the 
Executive Committee. He said he thought that Alternative Ce, 
as modified by Eden's suggestion of 'present and voting', 
had been accepted because of its simplicity. He also pointed 
out that all proposals would have to be voted on and that he 
112~ Ibid~ Running number 21. 
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had been particularly impressed by the fact that Committee 
decisions could be revised in Commissions and Plenary 
S . 113 essions. The Steering Committee then considered the 
question of' the status of' the twenty-seven amendments. of' 
the sponsoring Governments. The Secretary;--General announced 
that -
••• at a recent informal meeting .of' the officers 
of' Commissions and Committees it was suggested that 
a new document be prepared containing the Dumbarton 
Oaks Prosposa.ls and the twenty-seven joint Amendments 
of' the Sponsoring Governments. Fo.llowing the 
Executive Committee meetings of' May 8, 1945, a 
further discussion had been held with the various 
delegates, as a result of' which the Secretariat 
recommended that the new document contain in three 
separate columns (.1) The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals 
(including the Crimea Proposals on voting); (2) The 
amendments agreed upon by the four Sponsoring Govern-
ments; and (3) The index to all amendments proposed 
by all delegates.114 
A sample page of' this proposed document was circulated 
at the meeting. Bidault expressed his satisfaction with the 
proposal as giving due emphasis to the amendments of' the 
Sponsoring Governments while preserving the princip.le of' the 
equality of' nations •1 ·1 5 
.113~ 1 Summary Report of' the Second Meeting of' the Steering 
Committee', Doc 165, ST/4, 9 May 1945, U.N~.I.O. 
Doc'!d!!!,gnts, vol. 5, p.188. 
114~ Ibid. pp.188-9. 
115~ Ibid. p.189. 
Although it is not known to what extent Evatt was 
influential in the discussions following the meeting of the 
Executive Committee, it wou.ld not seem unreasonable, in the 
.light of his part in discussion in the Executive Committee, 
to claim as Forde and Evatt did to Chifley on .17 May -
After the Conference opened sponsoring powers 
proposed a .list of 27 further amendments to the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals and Yalta proposals. 
An attempt was made to have these joint amendments 
incorporated in Dumbarton Oaks text but Steering 
Committee, at our instigation, decided that they 
should be placed before Conference as amendments 
to the basic text and voted on in similar manner 
to the proposals submitted by other participating 
Governments .1.16 
Evatt's work in this matter, furthermore, did not cease at 
the meeting of the Steering Committee. The Secretariat and 
at .least one Committee chairman were stil.l anxious, as wil.l 
be seen, to give priority to the amendments of the sponsoring 
powers. Evatt in the Executive Committee had secured from 
Stettinius the assurance that al.l amendments were to be 
:breated ~,guall_y. But the Secretariat was anxious for speed 
in de.liberation. Evatt sought tomeet this objective in a 
way consistent with his smal.1-power viewpoint. 
1160 H/45/771/1. Proc~edj]Jg£.......§.!1Q__,t\-usi;;ral,.iau_.Rfil-_qy. 
This te.legram had an l! E' prefix. T.hereis no reference 
to this Australian contribution in the Australi.§JL)<.enQ!'t 
2!1.. U .~.!_. o,. Chif.ley had been Acting PrimeMinist er 
since JO April be cause of Curtin ts i.llness. 
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On the afternoon of 8 May, he personally wrote a letter 
to Hiss in which he formal.ly suggested -
In order to expedite the Conference deliberations, 
that the Executive proceed quickly to establish 
either the Coordination Committee contemplated 
by the Rules, or a special exp e.diting Committee, 
for the purpose of considering all amendments 
in their overall relation, eliminating unnecessary 
questions and issues, generally bringing the 117 
questions not yet determined to an early issue. 
At 1.1 a.m. on the following day Evatt called on the 
Secretary-General and asked for a special meeting of the 
Executive Committee to be held on the next day. 'Ihe 
Secretary-General noted in a memorandum of the meeting -
After discussion, however, he agreed that such a 
meeting is not necessary provided the Coordinatiog 
Committee can meet informally tomorrow inst.ead.11 
On the same afternoon Robert B. Stewart$ an Assistant 
Executive Secretary in the Secretariat and Executive Officer 
of Plenary Sessions, wrote to the Executive Secretary, 
C~ Easton Rothwell, that Evatt in Committee I/l had been 
'strongly contending that the Executive and Steering Committees 
did !!Q.t. decide to give priority in discussion to the Four Power 
117~ United Nations Archives. New York, U.N.C.I.O. - Papers 
of the_..§.ecretary General, Box 74, Correspondence. 
118~ Memorandum, dated9 May, .11.00 a~m:, attached to Evatt-
Hiss letter. Ibid. 
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amendments and that these amendments must be taken up in 
the same way as all other amendments. Stewart had obviously 
been discussing the matter with Hiss -
Alger states that we should be represented at the 
6.00 meeting. He also suggests that we discuss 
the matter of amendments with the Executive officers 
tonight. He believes that the officers of each 
Committee should start at once to negotiate with 
each delegation to see whether the delegation wi.11 
agree that its amendments have been taken care of 
in the Four-Power.Amendmentso In the process of 
negotiation, he believes, many of the proposed 
amendments will be dropped, and will not have to 
be considered by the Committee meetings, thus saving 
a great amount of time. 
This negotiating work is of greatest importance; 
it should be started at once and should be handled 
with utmost tact. 119 
T:he official Summary Report of Third Meeting of Committee 
I/l, 9 May 19.fl:.2 described Committee discussion on procedure 
as fo.Llows -
119. 
T:he 6hairman proposed that discussion commence on 
the basi~ of Chapter I of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals 
as modified by the joint amendments of thef'our sponsoring 
powerso Objection to this procedure was voiced on the 
ground that the joint amEindments of the four sponsoring 
powers were on a par with, and did not have priority 
over, the amendments submitted by other delegations. 
It was generally agreed that Chapter I be discussed 
paragraph by paragraph and that the various amendments 
offered by each country re.lating to such paragraphs be 
considered equal.ly. T:he Committee fe.lt that immediate 
consideration should therefore, be given to Chapter I 
of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposalsol20 
United Nations Archives, New York, UoN.C.I.O. = General 
File, Box 5~ Qumbarton 
Amendments Lsi-;:J: 
Doc 197, I/1/9, 10 May 
vo.l o 6, p • 281 • 
Oaks ProR_osals - Comment .au.Q. 
1945, U.NoC.I.O. Doc~nts, 
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In the Verbatim Minutes, however, Evatt's contribution 
is clear~ After the Chairman had proposed that discussion 
should proceed on the basis of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals 
as modified by the amendments of the four sponsoring powers 
Evatt immediately objected 
•••• There was a misunderstanding in the Chairman's 
mind about the amendments of the four sponsoring 
powers, and I speak not only as a member of this 
Committee, but as a member of the Executive Committee 
and of the Steering Commit.tee. It was laid down 
yesterday that these amendments take their p.lace as 
other amendments of other countries take their placeo 
So that there is an error - no doubt unintentiona.l -
of the Secretary in describing the meeting of today. 
If you will look at your agenda, you will see 
"discussion on Chapter I of the Proposals as amended 
by the Four Governments and other amendments". They 
are not yet amended. They will have to be considered, 
I submit, in their proper place'.121 
A study of Australia's activity at San Francisco during 
the first fortnight of the Conference shows it to have been 
large.ly concerned with questions of procedure and organization, 
rather than with po.licy. This is not surprising as discussion :ID 
the Conference its elf was largely centred on these matters. 
But this activity is easily overlooked in any analysis which 
121. Y.fil;:batim Minutes, Third Meeting of Committee I/l, 
9 May 1945, Running number 6 (Reel 1): 
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begins from a consideration of Australiavs amendments 
at San Francisco. The first fortnight in fact large.ly 
displayed Australia's assertive smal.l power 1?..2.§.~· It 
also disp.layed the assertion of her distinct internationa.l 
status in the successful campaign for a seat on the Executive 
Committee. The assertion of distinct international status, 
at the Canberra and Wel.lington Conferences primari.ly a 
means, had at San Francisco, become also an end of AustraliaYs 
foreign po.licyo 
CHAPTER VIII 
AUSTRALIA AT THE CONFERENCE II. POLICY. 
J55. 
It is not the pu:rpose of this chapter to attempt a 
detailed account of the argument of Australian policy during 
the San Francisco Conference. It is intended, however, to 
indicate more specifically than has been done hitherto in 
this thesis the content of Australia's policy at the 
Conference anl to draw attention to some e.lements of that 
policy, which, while not emphasized in Australia's initial 
statements, nonetheless formed part of the Australian 
amendments as submitted on J May, and received subsequent 
emphasis during the course of detailed discussions on policy 
in the Committees, Commissions and Plenary Sessions. 
An Australian policy which, while not initially stressed 
by Evatt or Farde, received emphasis in the course of 
Committee discussion was that relating to regional defence 
arrangements and their connection with the envisaged world 
collective security.system. During his visit to Washington 
in March 1945, Evatt mentioned, as he had mentioned on many 
occasions during the previous two years, the importance of 
1 
regionalism as part of a world collective security-system. 
2 In his comments to Curtin from London in April on the 
question of the Great Power veto on enforcement action under 
VIII B of Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Evatt had referred to a 
l. See above p.;z.!>J. 2. See above p.270, 
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consequent added importance of regionalism in Australia's 
defence, but had also, in those comments, stressed the 
importance of removing the Great Power veto on anendment 
of the Charter, so that the Great Power veto on enforcement 
action might possibly be modified in the future. The belief 
in the efficacy of collective security, which was the basis 
of Australia's approach to the San Francisco talks, had 
been clearly evident in Forde's opening address to the 
Plenary Session of the Conference on Friday, 27 March. 
I have al ready emphasized the princip.le that under 
the proposed security system the obligation to 
contribute wi.11 be binding on all memberso 
Acceptance of that princip.le implies that we must 
be ready to give, but in return there must be an 
assurance of security; an asslil'.'ance that, if we are 
attacked, the nations of the world will come to our 
assistance just as we have, in fact, gone prompt.ly 
to their assistance in the past.3 
He made no reference in that speech, however, to a need for 
regional security arrangements. Evatt, similarly, had not, 
in his statement of the nine objectives of Australian po.licy 
4 
on 3 May, made any reference to the Australian amendment 
3~ 'Verbatim Minutes afthe Second Plenary Session, 27 April, 
1945', Doc 20, P/6, 28 Apri.l 1945, U.N.C.T.O. Documents, 
vo.l. l, p.176. 
4. Australian Report o-n u~~.:..!..:.Q.•, pp~78-9. 
. " 
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designed to increase the potential ro.le of' regional security 
arrangements under the world bodyo '!his .lack of' emphasis may 
well have been due to a desire on Evatt' s part to make quite 
clear, at the start of' the Conf'erence, Australia's f'irm 
commitment to the idea of' co.llective security. 
The relevant Australian amendment to Chapter VIII 
(Maintenance of' Internatiortal Peace and Security) of' the 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals reads as follows: 
At the end of' Section (c) [Regional Arrangements] 
a new section to be added as follows -
Section (D): Other Arra~ments f'or Maintaining 
International Peace and .Security o 
If' the Security Council does not itself' 
take measures, and does npt authorize 
action to be taken under a regional 
arrangement or agency, f'or maintaining 
or restoring international peace, 
nothing in this Charter shall be deemed 
to abrogate the right of' the parties to 
any arrangement; which is consistent 
with this Charter to adopt such measures 
as they deem just and necessary f'or 
maintaining or restoring international 
peace and security in accordance with 
that arrangement.5 
Chapter VITI C 1 of' the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had provided 
f'or the use of' regional arrangements f'or the settlement of' local 
disputes 'either on the initiative of' the states concerned or 
'Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals Submitted 
9n behalf' of' Australia', Doc 2, G/14 (l), 5 May 1945, 
'!L!.!i•C.I.O. Documents, yolo J, Po552o 
I -
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by reference from the Security Council' • 6 VITI C 2, dealing 
with the use of regional arrangements in relation to enforce-
ment action, pointed out that the Security Council could, 
when appropriate, utilize such arrangements for en;forcem~nt 
~ 
action under its authority but added 'no enforcement action 
should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional 
agencies without the authorization of the Counci.l Yo 7 The 
Australian amendment had the effe..ct of further al.lowing for 
enforcement action on the part of regional agencies or 
through regional arrangements after the Security Council had 
failed to take measures itself and had not authorized action 
to be taken under regional arrangements. An amendment from 
five Latin American countries, on the other harrl, sought 
to provide for the autonomous functioning of the Pan-American 
System as a prior alternative to action by the Security Council, 
action which might however follow Ywhen it has not been or is 
not possib.le to settle the dispute or conflict satisfactorily 
by applying the measures contemplat~d in the corresponding 
6'. YDumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International 
Organization 9 , Doc'.l, G/l, ~c.r.o. Documents, vol. 3, 
p.17. 
7 ~. Ibid. pp •. 17-8. 
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regional arrangements or statuies, and it will be the duty 
of the said regional body to determine, in agreement with 
the procedure set forth in its statutes, when such a case 
. 8 
arises'. 
The intentions behind Australia's amendment were set 
out by Forde and Evatt in a telegram to Chifley, then 
Acting Prime Minister, on .17 May. The Australian amendment, 
they reported, was designed 
(a) to retain primary control by the Security Council 
over regional enforcement action. 
(b) to permit remission of a dispute by the Security 
Counci.l to a regional body for enforcement action 
by a majority vote of the Counci.l including three 
only of the permanent members (thus avoiding 
paralysis of action by the veto of one Great Power) 
and 
(c) to make it clear that if and when the Security 
Council decides not to take enforcement action 
itself and not to remit the matter to a regional 
body, then states which are parties to any arrange-
ment consistent with the Charter shall haye the 
right to adopt such measures as they deem fit 
for maintaining or restoring peace and security.9 
The rea.l interest of Austra.lia in this issue at the Conference 
was noted by Senator Vandenberg, who represented the United 
8. 'Joint Draft Amendment to Chapter VIII, Section c, of the 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals by the Delegations of Chi.le, 
Co.lumbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, andPerut, Doc 2, G/28, 
6 May 1945, U.N.C.I.O. Documents, vol. J, pp.620-1. 
9: E/45/1/8. Europe an Affair s...!.--2:.§.neral. San Franci§..£.9.. 
Conference This telegram has an 'E' prefix. 
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States in the re.levant Cammi ttee III/4. Vandenberg's 
comments. :following the first meeting of· this committee 
inc.lude the following - 'not only are the Americans hot 
about protecting Chapultepec but the Australians are equally 
anxious not to be left in their far corner of the earth. 
They want liberty of regional action if some one of the 
10 Big Powers vetoes Organization action in the Councilw. 
The Australian amendment in fact represented a middle 
course between that of the Sponsoring Powers11 which retained, 
with exceptions, the need for prior Security Council authori-
zation of regional enforcement action, and the Latin-American 
amendment. Article 51 of the Charter12 is somewhat closer 
to the Latin-American than to the Australian position in that 
it provides for the possibility of regional action in self-
defence until the Security Council has taken measures to 
maintain international peace and security. 
10. A.H. Vandenberg, Jr., op. cit., p.189. 
11~ 'Additional Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals 
Agreed to by the Governments of the United States, United 
Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China, Doc 2, G/29 (a), 
11 May 1945, ~6I.O. Documents, vol. 3, · pp.629-30. 
la~ ~ .c. I_&.:_..QocY!!!,gn-1.§., vol. 15, pp ~344-5. 
J61o 
A further Australian amendment which had not received 
emphasis in either Forde's Opening Address or Evatt's 
Statement of Objectives was an amendment seeking to prevent 
recommendations being made under the terms of Chapter VIII B 
of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals in re.lation to matters 
fa.ll ing sole.ly within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
states concerned. Although Evatt in London had referred 
to the veto on enforcement action under Chapter VIII B, 
he did not appear to recognize the scope for recommendations 
to be made by the Security Council in situations when there 
were acts of aggression or threats to the peace. Australia, 
after the London talks an:l before the submission of her 
amendments on J May, became aware of this power of recommend-
ation and filed an amendment to 'maka quite clear the Security 
Council's power to lay down terms of settlement under 
Chapter VIII B' •13 Chapter VIII B l of the Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposals had read as follows: 
Should the Security Council deem that a failure to 
settle a dispute in accordance with procedures 
indicated in paragraph J of Section A, or in 
accordance with paragraph 5 of Section A, c9nstitutes 
a threat to the maintenance of international peace 
and security, it::hould take any measures necessary 
for the maintenance of international peace and 
lJ. Australian ReQort_on U.N.C.I.O., p.29. 
security in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter. 1 4 
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The Australian anendment made quite clear that 'any measures' 
was to include the power to make recommendations. Austra.lia 
proposed that Paragraph l of Section B of Chapter VITI be 
amended as fol.lows: 
Should the Security Council deem that a failure 
to settle a dispute in accordance with the pro-
cedures indicated in paragraph (3) of Section A, 
or in accordance with its recommendations made 
under paragraph (5) of Section A, constitutes a 
threat to the maintenance of international peace 
and security, it shall, in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations lay 
down just terms for the settlement of the dispute~ 
and take any measures necessary for carrying out 
that settlement and1~or maintaining international 
peace and security.· 
The Dumbarton Oaks Proposa.ls contained a paragraph, VITI A7, 
making it clear that paragraphs l-6 of Section A of Chapter 
VIII should not apply to situations or disputes arising out 
of matters which by international .law were sole.ly within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the States concerned. Th.ere was no 
such .limitation in the terms of VIII B. Whi.le Australia was 
prepared to accept that enforcement actions under VITI B 
14. 'Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General Internati ona.l 
Organization'~ Doc 1, G/l~ IGB.C.I.O. Documgn.t§., 
vo.l • 3 j p •. lJ • 
'Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals submitted 
on behalf of Australia', Doc 2~ G/14 (1), 5 May .1945, 
~~&..!.!. 0 ~-12,Q.£1!.]!!~3 vol • J, p • 5 51 • 
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should not be prevented because a threat to the peace or act 
of aggression had arisen out of matters solely within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the states concerned., she took 
steps to make it clear that the recommendations made under 
VIII B would be prevented in such circumstances. The 
relevant Australian amendment reads: 
After paragraph 2 of Section B [of Chapter VIII], 
a new paragraph to be inserted as follows: 
(3) If a situation calling for preventive or 
enforcement action under paragraph {l) or 
paragraph (2) above has arisen out of a matter 
which by international law is solely within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned, 
the Security Council shall not make any 
recommendation or decision which would curtail 
that Staters lawful freedom of action, but shall 
take, in accordance with this Section whatever 
preventive or enforcement action is necessary 
to maintaig or restore international peace and 
security. 1 
The Sponsoring Powers, however, put forward an amendment 
proposing that VIII A7 of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, which 
had prevented the application of paragraphs l-6 of Chapter 
VIII A to matters solely within the domestic jur,isdiction 
of the states concerned, should be replaced by a new paragraph 
in Chapter II Principl~s, which would relate, therefore, to 
the Charter as a wholeo The proposed paragraph IT (7) read: 
16. Ibid. pp.551-2. 
7. Nothing contained in the Charter shall authorize 
the Organization to intervene in matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of the State concerned or shall require the 
members to submit such matters to settlement 
under this Charter: but this principle shall 
not prejudice the application of Chapter VIII, 
Section B.17 
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The Australians, therefore~ found themselves faced with a 
<Four' Power amendment which appeared to quite clearly permit 
recommendations as well as enforcement action under VIII B 
in regard to matters within the domestic jurisdiction of 
the states concerned. In Committee I/l, Preamble, Purposes 
and Principles, discussion centred on the F.our· Power amend-
ment. 
18 On 11 June, Evatt issued a lengthy memorandum 
setting out the Australian case for limiting the exception 
under the · .. :Four Power amendment to enfQ..!:£.fil!!,fil1t measures 
only under VIII B. Evatt argued that as the amendment of the 
Sponsoring Powers then stood it also exempted recommendations 
made under VIII B. He argued that this exemption might 
17. 'Amendments Proposed by the Governments of the United 
States, The United Kingdom, The Soviet Union and China'~ 
Doc 2, G/29, 5 May 1945, U.N.C.I.O. Documents$ vol. 3, 
p.623. 
18. 'Amendments by the Australian De.legation to the Proposed 
Paragraph 8 of Chapter II (Principles), Memorandum by 
Dr. H.V. Evatt on behalf of the Australian Delegation', 
Doc 969, I/1/39, 14 June 1945, U.N.C.I.O. Documents, 
vol. 6, pp.436-40-
encourage parties to a dispute involving matters which~ by 
international law, were s o.lely within the domestic jurisdiction 
of' the States cone erned to create a situation involving a 
threat to the peace or act of' aggression so that the 
Security Council might subsequently be able to intervene 
through a recommendation made under VITI B, a recommendation 
which it would have been prevented f'rom making in terms of' 
VIII A. 
Such a provision is almost an invitation to use or 
threaten f'orce, in any dispute arising out of' a matter 
of' domestic jurisdiction, in the hope of' inducing the 
Security Council to extort concessions f'rom the State 
that is threatenedo Broadly, the exception cane els 
out the rule, wherever an aggressor threatens to use 
f'orce. 'Ihe freedom of' action which international law 
has always recognized in matters of' domestic juris-
diction becomes subject in ef'f'ect to the f'ull 
jurisdiction of' the Security Counci1.19 
Australia, therefore, put forward a new anendment, at the 
end of' Evatt's memorandum, to limit the exception under the 
Great Power amendment as fol.lows: 
'Ihis principle shall not prejudice the application 
of' enforcement measures under Chapter VIII, Section 2u----B. 
Evatt' s and Australia 1 s argument were succe.ssf'ul. 'Ihe voting 
in Committee I/l was thirty-one in favour of' the Australian 
19. Ibid. p.438. 
20 0 Ibid. Po440o 
1 d thr . t . t 21 proposa an ee agains 1 o 
Australia's immigration policy has been described as 
one of i the interests that we have been accustomed to 
d t "tall ff t" •t t 2 2 regar as mos vi y a ec ing our securi y • That it 
was immigration po.licy which Evatt had most in mind when 
arguing for the app.lication of limitations re.lating to 
domestic jurisdiction to recommmlations under Chapter VIII B 
is apparent both from the Australia,n.....Repor.t on U.NoCoI.Oo 
and from a telegram which Forde and Evatt sent to the 
Austra.lian government during the Conference o The Report 
notes that when the Australian amendment was adopted by 
Committee I/l. 
The Minister for External Aff?irs took the opportunity 
during thediscussion to make ~it] clear that the 
clause as final.ly adopted is a recognition, among 
other things, that the decision of any nation as to such 
~ernal matters as migration cannot become the subject 
of any action by the United Nations. The only possible 
ground for intervention by the Security Council will 
be to prevent a breach of the peace or to suppress 
aggression. 2 3 
In their telegram to Chif.ley on 17 May, Forde and Evatt made 
the object of Australia's interest clearo 
21. 'Summary Report of Sixteenth Meeting of Committee I/l, 
13 June 1945?, Doc 976, I/1/40, 14 June 1945, 
!L:.1i.e.fuI.O._Doc11m&J1:£li, vol. 6, Po499. 
22. Gordon Greenwood, 1 Australia rs Foreign Policyw, 
Australian Out.look, vol. 1, no. 1, March 1947, p.55. 
23. Australian Renort on UoNoC.I.O.~ pp.29-JO. 
We regard it as essential that the exclusion of 
matters of domestic jurisdiction should apply to 
decisions of the Security Council under Section B 
as well as under Section A. Without such a 
provision~ it would be ·possible for an A~iatic 
power to object to our migration po.licy and if it 
could be shown that a threat to the peace had 
arisen the Security Council could proceed to 
recommend a settlement involving a change in our 
migration po.licy as a condition necessary to 
remove the threat to the peace.24 
* * * 
Australian trusteeship po.licy at San Francisco had 
been clearly foreshadowed in Forde's Opening Address. 
Australia, at San Francisco, found herself, on this issue, 
in a position of residual, and distinctive, radicalism. With 
the increase of British conservatism which had been evident 
in London and the American movement to the position embodied 
in the Yalta trustee ship proposals, Australia found herself 
as the only country at San Francisco which argued for a 
system which provided for compulsory accountability by 
colonial powers to an international body analogous to the 
permanent mandates connnission. Australia's trusteeship 
policy was the consistent extension of the deve.lopment of 
th8;t po.licy during the previous three years o Australia's 
draft chapter on trusteeship which is, in itself, very brief 
24. E/45/l/8. Eur2.J2_g~!!....!ffai!:.§..t._~tl.,_§.~-Fran£i.§.£.Q. 
Co nf .§.!'..fill.~. 
is nonetheless clear in its intent when seen against the 
history of its developmento It began with a general declara-
tion on trusteeshipo 
Al.l members of the United Nations responsible for 
administration of dependent territories recognized 
in relation to them the principle of trusteeship -
viz. that the main purpose of administration is the 
welfare of the dependent peop.les and their economic, 
social and political deve.lopment o 25 
The Australian draft chapter on trusteeship which in the 
absence of any Dumbarton Oaks Proposals on this matter, was 
in the nature of a set of proposals rather than amendments, 
embodied a trusteeship system which would be applicable to 
mandates which had been authorized by the General Assembly. 
But whereas the Yalta proposals had provided that the 
trusteeship system might also inc.lude t any territory which 
might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship 1 , 26 Australia 
had a provision that the system would app.ly to such territories 
as might be placed under it by 'the voluntary action of the 
member administering the territory or the General Assembly 
after consideration of the recommendations of a Conference or 
Conferences, special.ly convened by the United Nations~ of 
25. 'Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Pro'posals Submitted 
on Behalf of Australia', Doc 2, G/14 (1), 5 May 1945, 
U.N.C.J..!..9-!_Documents, vol. J, Po548. 
26. See above po 
members responsible for the adn inistra tion of' dependent 
t . t . t 27 erri ories • 'Ihe Australian draft provided that powers 
administering territories under the system, whether as 
mandatory powers, or as parent powers of' colonies placed 
under it compulsorily by the process provided, should pe 
under the obligation to report upon the administration of' 
the dependent territories to an expert commission, with 
advisory functions, which would be subject to the General 
Assembly. 'Ihe British draft chapter, 28 while bearing some 
resemblance to the Australian, also differed markedly from it. 
It resembled the Australian draft in containing a general 
declaration on trusteeship but distinguished this declaration 
from a section of' the Chapter embodying a trusteeship system 
which followed the Yalta mode.lo 'Ihe British draft thus 
contained no element of' potential compulsiono If' the 
Australian genar-al declaration was by way of' a preamble to 
the trusteeship system contained in the Australian draft 
chapter the British declaration in fact provided an alternative 
27. 'Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals Submitted 
<:>n Behalf' of' Australia', Doc 2, G/14 (1), 5May1945, 
U .N. C .I .O. Documents, vol o J, po 54.9 o 
28. 'Territorial Trusteeship, United Kingdom Draft of' Chapter 
for Inclusion in United Nations Charter', Doc 2, G/26 (d), 
6 May 1945, UoNoC.IoO. Docum~, vol. J, ppo609-14o 
to the trusteeship sys tern· which was a.lso contained in the 
British chapter. 29 The American draft chapter closely 
resembled the Ya.lta proposals~ with the addition of' special 
provis.ion for strategic areas. 
Fo.l.lowing general statements of po.licy Ln Committee 
II/4 by the countries which had presented draft chapters, 
and by Mexico, which had supplied comments, Lt was proposed 
by Commander Stassen of the United States on 15 May that a 
working:paper which he had ,drawn up should be used, in the 
absence of a relevant section of the Dumbarton Oaks 
P l b . f . . tt d" . JO roposa s, as a asis or commi ee iscussions. Evatt, 
'whose efficient assistants contrived to have him present 
at whichever committee meetings were like.ly to prove most 
t J.l 
exciting , gave, on this occasion, a further illustration 
of' his aggressively small power attitude. He reportedly said 
29. 'Arrangements for Internationa.l Trusteeship. Additional 
Chapter Proposed by the United States', Doc 2, G/26 
(c), 5 May 1945, U.N.C.I .. ~~Docu:ments, vul. J, pp.607-8. 
JO. 'Summary Report of Fifth Meeting of Committee II/4, 
15 May 1945 2 ~ Doc 364, II/4/13~ 17 May 1-945, 
U.N.C._!.O. Documents, vol. 10~ p.447. 
31. William T.R. Fox, 'The Super-Powers at San Francisco', 
The_Bev:h~.2:f._Po.litice, vol. 8, no. 1, January 1946, 
p.123. 
'I'.here has been no consultation by the United States 
Government with the Government I rep resent, which 
put the first paper ino I think that should be 
given, if there is to be a working paper, if that 
is to be given any priority oeoo Let us treat this 
question, I ask, as the question has been treated 
in other committees. Give every country that has 
its views on this point the chance to state 9 in the 
form of issues or questio~ what should be the 
decision or recommendation of this Committee.32 
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After some discussion in which Stassen equated the function 
performed by his Working Paper with that performed by the 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals in other committees he concluded 
as follows: 
I also say that I fu.l.ly want to have the most 
harmonious possible relationship with the 
distinguished De.legate for Australia and I make 
the further suggestion; we might work it out 9 and 
I would be perfectly willing to consult with the 
De.legate for Australia tomorrow and,, work with 
him as to the manner in which Amendments could be 
presented to this working paper to present, for 
the decision of the committee the points that he 
wants decided.33 
Evatt, having won this 'concession' was apparently content. 
At the following meeting of the Committee, discussion 
commenced on the basis of the Working Paper. 
During Committee discussions it became clear both that 
Australia did not have a particular interest in hastening 
independence for dependent territories and that she did have 
32. ~~im_Minut.§.§., Fifth Meeting of Committee II/4, 
15 May .1945, Running numbers 13-14 (Reel 6). 
33. Ibid. Running number 22. 
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a very strong interest in accountability on the part of all 
colonial powers to an international expert body. When it 
became c.lear that a trusteeship system of .limited applicability 
on the lines of the Yalta proposals was favoured by the 
majority of the Committee, Australia sought to have attached 
to the proposed General Declaration.in the Working Paper a 
requirement that parent powers should furnish reports. On 
25 May, following the 10th meeting of the Committee~ Australia 
issued a proposed additional Section C of the Working Paper 
which was to represent an expansion of Section A of that Paper 
containing the General Dec.laration and was thus to bind all 
administering nationso Under Section C entitled 'Promotion 
of Welfare and Deve.lopment', 34~ustralia proposed that, to 
ensure that the general principles of Section A and C were 
observed, there should be an extensive system of reportingo 
Under Section A of the Working Paper there was ll.Q. ob.ligation 
to report, whereas under Section B which estab.lished the 
trusteeship system on the Yalta model the General Assembly 
was able to arrange periodic visits with the consent of 
34 0 'Proposed New Part (c) to be added to Working Paper, 
Submitted by the Delegation of Australia', Doc 575, 
II/4/12/(a) 3 25 May 1945, U.No~!IoOo_Docu!!!.fil!ts~ 
vol. io, pp.695-6. 
administering nations, and administering nations were 
furthermore required to submit 'an annua.l report to the 
General Assembly upon the basis of questionnaire formulated 
by the Trusteeship Council'. 3 5 Under the new Australian 
Section C 1 (f) all nations administering dependent 
territories were required 'to furnish regularly to the? 
Secretariat al.l avai.lahl e st a ti sti cs and other information 
of a technical nature re.lat ing to the heal th, nutri ti on 5 
welfare, education, economic and labour conditions of the 
peoples of each such territory'. 36 Under C 2 (a) '•••• the 
General Assembly may specify territories in respect of which 
it shall be the duty of the states responsible for their 
administration to furnish annual reports to the U.N. upon 
the economic, social and political development of territories 
concerned'. 37 At the Fifteenth Meeting, the United States 
delegate announced that as a result of informal consultations 
on the Australian proposals and views expressed by the 
Philippines and other delegations, he now wished to pro pose 
35. 'Proposed Working Paper for Chapter on Dependent Terri-
tories and Arrangements for International Trusteeship'~ 
Doc 323, II/4/12, 15 May 1945, U.N.C.I.O. Documents, 
vol. 10, p.680 0 • 
36. 'Proposed New Part (c) to be added to Working Paper, 
submitted by the Delegation of Australia'$ Doc 575, 
II/4/12/(a), 25 May 1945, U.N.C._!.O. Documents, vol. 10, 
p.695. 
37. Ibid. p.696. C 2 (b) contained the additional require-
ment that 'before specifying any such territories the 
General As semb.ly shaLl convene a Conference or Conferences 
374., 
amendments to Sectio..ri A of the Working Pap·ero 38 These 
a~endments were approved by the Committee. While they 
embodied the welfare and research proposals put forward by 
Australia the reporting provisions were truncatedo Australian 
amendment C 2(a) was not among the U.So amendments and C 1 (f) 
was modified to the extent that regular information was only 
to be supplied 1' subject to such limi ta ti on as security and 
constitutional ~onsiderations may require 1 ~ 39 The information 
was to be 1 statistical and other information of a technical 
nature re.lating to social, economic and educational conditions'~O 
Australia's amendments in relation to Chapter IX 
'Arrangements for International Economic and Social Cooperata-
tion' of the Dumbarton Oaks Draft bore a similarly close 
resemblance to an Australian po.licy which had developed 
during the preceding three yearso Chapter 1, Purpose~» of 
the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had contained a statement in 
-----
37 con 1 td. 
of states responsible for the administration of territories 
inhabited by peoples not yet ab.le to stand alone under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world, and shall take 
into account the recommendations made by any such 
conference' o 
38. 'Summary Report of Fifteenth Meeting of Committee II/4, 
18 June 194.5', Doc 1090, II/4/43» 19 June 194.5, 
U.N.C.I.O. Documents, volo 10, po.56.1. 
39~ Ibid. p.563. 
40~ Ibid. 
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paragraph 3 that one of the,purposes of the world body 
should be 
To achieve international cooperation in the solution 
of international4Iconomic, social and other humani-
tarian pro bl ems. 
Australia, conscious of the importance of 'freedom from want', 
proposed that this be strengthened to read 
To promote human welfare in all lands; and to that 
end to promote internationa.l cooperation in the 
so.lution of economic, social, cultural and other 
like prohlems. 42 
Another Austra.lian amendment which was related to the 
subject matter of Chapter IX of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals 
was to Chapter IV, Principa.l Organs. Australia proposed the 
addition of a new paragraph {d) which would make the Economic 
and Social Council one of the principal organs. 43 The 
Australian amendments to Chapter IX itself provided that 
Paragraph .l of Section A 9 Purposes and Re.lationships 9 Which 
in the Dumbarton Oaks draft had read 
With a view to the creation of conditions of 
stability and weLl being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations, the 
Organization should facilitate solutions of inter-
national economic, social and other humanitarian 
41. 'Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General Internationa.l 
Organization1 9 Doc 1 9 Gjl, U.N.Q.I.Q. Do£!!!!1~, vol. 3, 
p.2. 
42. 'Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposa.ls Submitted 
on behalf of Australiai, Doc 2, G/14 (l), 5 May 1945 
(hereafter 'Australian Amendments') U.~.C • .!_.~.2.!__Doqug~, 
vol. 3, p.543. 
43. Ibid. p.544. 
problems and promote respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Responsibility for the 
discharge of this function should be vested in the 
General Assembly and, under the authority of the 
General Assembly, in an Economic and Social 
Counci.l. 44 
376. 
should read 
With a view to the creation of conditions of 
stability and well-being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations amongst nations, 
the United Nations shal.l be responsible for making 
continuous studies of economic and social conditions; 
for promoting the solution of inter-national economic, 
social 9 cu.ltural and other like problems; and for 
promoting respect for human rights and the observance 
by all members of fundamental freedoms. Responsibility 
for the discharge of these functions shall be vested 
in the General Assembly and, under the Authority of 
the General Assembly 9 in an Economic and Social 
Counci1.45 
Australia also proposed the inclusion of additional sections 
(3) and (4) at the end of Section A. These embodied a full 
employment pledge. 
44. 
45. 
(3) All members of the United Nations pledge themselves 
to take action both nat iona.l and international for 
the purpose of securing for all peoples including 
their own, improved labour standards, economic 
advancement, social security and employment for 
all who seek it; and as part of that pledge they 
agree to take action through the instrumentality 
of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social 
Council, the International Labour Organization, 
and such other bodies as may be brought into 
relationship with the United Nations. 
'Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International 
OrganizationY, Doc 1, G.l (hereafter 'Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals') U.N.:.2..!h~J?..9...£1!-fil~l!.1.2., vo.l. 3, p.18. 
'Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks,,.Proposals Submitted 
on behalf of Australia', Doc 2, at?:14 (1), 5 May .1945, 
U.N.Q.I.O. D0.£1!!!.!.fil1.ts 9 vol. 3, p.546. 
(4) All members of the United Nations undertake to 
report annually to the Genera.l Assembly upon 
the action they have taken in fulfilment of 
the pledge set forth in paragraph (3), and 
generally upon the action they have taken in 
relation to the reco~mendations of the Economic 
and Social Councilo4 
377. 
An amendment to paragraph 1 (b) of Section C of Chapter IX 
reinforced the changes which Australia had proposed in 
Chapter I 3o While the Dumbarton Oaks text had empowered 
the Economic and Social Counci.l to make recommendation:s, on 
its own initiative, with respect to international economic, 
social and other humanitarian matters, 47 the Australian 
amendment provided that the recommendations could be made 
1 to the General Assembly or to individual members of the 
United Nations' and that they were able to be made not merely 
with respect to economic, social and other humanitarian 
matters but with respect to 'international, economic, social, 
cultural and other like matters, for the advancement of 
48 human welfare 1 o Australia also proposed that a new 
sentence be added at the beginning of paragraph l of Section 
D, Organization and Procedure, to permit the Economic and 
46. Ibid. pp.546-70 
470 'Dumbarton Oaks Proposals', Uo~~· Documents, 
vo.l. 3, p.20. 
48~ 'Austra.lian Amendments'~ UoNo~~~...!:fil:i.§., vol. 3, 
Po547. 
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Social Council to function continuously. 4 9 
In the course of the Conference, it became apparent 
to Australia 'that it would be easier to secure acceptance 
of the pr.i ncip.les of the main proposals by inc.luding in the 
statement of objectives the matters we had proposed should 
be covered by the pledge and by adding the pledge as a 
separate obligation 2 • 50 In other words, the reference to a 
pledge was to be separated from Australia's proposed Section 
A (3) and made a separate paragraph. A detailed account of 
the way in which Austra.lia, particularly Dr. Roland Wilson, 
argued successful.ly for the inclusion of the p.ledge in the 
Charter has subsequently been written by a member of.the 
A 1 . 1 t" 51 us tra ian de ega ion. 
Australia's a:nendments re.lating to the ro.le of the Wor.ld 
Court and the need to have armed force available for use by 
the Security Counci.l, were la rge.ly the extension of Evatt' s 
comments on tbe se subjects in 1943 and 1944, a.l.though he had 
not spoken of compulsory jurisdiction for the international 
court until he reached London for the British Commonwea.l th 
49. Ibid. p.548. 
50. ~ .. :ti;::alian Ren.2.tl_on U.N •. C.I_;&., p.21. 
51. L.F. Crisp, 'The Australian Full Employment Pledge at 
San Franciscoi, Austra.lian Out.loQk, vol. 19, no. 1, 
April 1965, pp. 5-.19 o 
Meeting. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had provided, in 
Chapter VIII B 6 that 
In order to enable urgent military measures to be 
taken by the Organization there should be he.ld 
immediately available by the members of the 
Organization national air force contingent5 for 
combined international enforcement action. 2 
The Australian amendment provided that the first sentence 
of VIII, B 6 should read as follows -
In order to enable urgent mi.lit ary measures to 
be taken by the United Nations, there shall be 
held immediate.ly avai.lab.le by the members national 
air forces or mixed contingents for combined inter-
national enforcement action.53 
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Here was clearly an attempt to strengthen the effectiveness 
of a collective security system 9 an attempt which was further 
reflected in Australia's amendment to VITI B 5. This amendment 
proposed that agreements to place forces at the disposal of 
the Security Council should be 'negotiated on the initiative 
of the Security Council' and should be 'concluded between 
the Security Council and members or groups of membersof 54 
52. 'Dumbarton Oaks Proposals' 9 U.~?~I.O. Documents, vol. 3, 
p.16. 
53~ 'Australian Amendments', UoN .C.I.O._Docl!!!!§l.!ts, vol., 3, 
p.552. 
54~ Ibid. VIII B 5 in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had 
required that all manbers should undertake to make armed 
forces availahle to the Security Council, on its call, 
and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements 
concluded among themselves. 'Dumbarton Oaks Proposals' 9 
!L:li•C.I • ..Qo Documents, vol. 3, p.,.15~ 
Under the Dumbarton Oaks Proposa.ls, Chapter VII, An 
International Court of Justice, paragraph 4 had provided that 
Al.l members of the Organization should ipsQ .. fac:!ill_ 
be parties to the statute of the international 
court of justice.55 
Australia pro posed that this should read 
A.1.1 members of the United Nat:bns shall, by virtue 
of their membership, be parties to the statute of 
the Internati anal Court of Just ice, and as between 
themselves shall recognize as compulsory, without 
special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court 
in the c.lasses of .legal disputes specified in the 
statute, and subject to the te:rms and conditions 
therein contained.56 
Australia also proposed the inclusion, in this Chapter, of 
an undertaking by members of the United Nations to comply 
with any decision of the Court to which they might be 
parties and a provision that members of the United Nations 
should undertake not to enter into any agreement inconsistent 
with the Charter. The Australian amendment providing for the 
extensive uti.lization of the Court in the settlement of 
international disputes proposed that paragraph 6 of Section A, 
Pacific Settlement of Disputes, of Chapter VIII, which provided 
that justifiab.le disputes should normally bereferred to the 
55. Ibid. p.ll. 
56~ 'Australian Amendments', ~C.I.O. Documents, vol. J, 
p.553. 
International Court and that the Security Council should 
be empowered to refer to the Court, for advice, lega.l 
questions connected with other disputes, 57 should be 
J81. 
amended, subject to the adoption of the Australian amendment 
to VII 4,to read as follows: 
In appropriate cases the Security Council shal.l 
ensure that the International Court of Justice is 
invoked in accordance with paragraph (4) of Chapter 
VII and in general the Security Council; shall avai.l 
itself to the maximum extent, of the services of the 
Court in the settlement of disputes 0£ a legal 
character, in obtaining advice on legal questions 
connected with other dis~utes, and in the ascertain-
ment of disputed facts.5 
A declaration that members of the proposed International 
Organization shou.ld refrain in their relations from the threat 
of force and use of f~rce against the territorial integrity 
or po.li ti cal independence of any State, .had been inc.luded 
in the Wel.lington Conc.lusions. Evatt spoke in support of 
this proposal in L.ondon, but also spoke of the need for the 
Charter to allow for alteration of the st~ guo.59 In 
Committee I/l at the Conference Australia took a less rigid 
57. 'Dumbarton Oaks Proposals', U.N.fub~cuments, 
vol • J, p o 14 • 
58. 'Australian Amendments', ~c.:i;:..'!"0._]2Q.Q1!!.!!ents, vol. J, 
p.553. 
59. 'Statement by the Rt. Hon. H.V. Evatt at the Fifth 
Meeting of British Commonwealth Representatives~ London, 
6 April, 1945', Au§..il;:~lian Report on U~N.C.I.O., 
pp.64-5. 
J82o 
stand than New Zealand in discussion on this . 60 lSSUeo 
Australiats amendment read 
Chapter IIo Principleso 
4o All members of the United Nations sha.1.1 refrain 
in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity 
in political independence of any member or State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the Charter.61 
Austra.lia' s amendment relating to criteria for non-permanent 
membership of the Security Council provided that elect ion 
should be made from among those members 
which, by their past military contribution to the 
cause of world security, have proved able and 
wi.l.ling to assume substantial security responsibi.li ties, 
or which are wi.l.ling, and by virtue of their geographi-
cal position in relation to regions of primary strate-
gical importance are able, to make a substantial 
contribution to the maintenance of international peace 
and security. 62 
Chapter XI of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals required that 
amendments to the Charter should come into force when they 
had been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of 
the General Assembly and had been ratified, in accordance 
with their respective constitutional pncesses, by the 
perrmnent members of the Security Council and a majority of 
other members of the Organization~J The amendment of the 
60. 'Summary Report of E.leventh Meeting of Committee I/l' 
Doc 784, I/1/27, 5 June 1945, U .N~...::;:r:-2.o. DQ.£1!.men:t§.~ 
vol. 6, poJJ4. 
61. 'Australian Amendments', U.N.C.I.O •. Documents, vo.l. J, 
p.543. 
62. Ibido 
63. 'Dumbarton Oaks Proposals', U.N.C.I .• O. Do.Q11.mtmts, vol. J, 
p.2Jo 
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Sponsoring Powers cal.led for the retention of the Dumbarton 
Oaks provisions but suggested that, in addition, provision 
should be made for a general conference of the members of 
the United Nations to be held 
at a date an:l place to be fixed by a three-fourths 
vote of the General Assembly with the concurrence of 
the Security Council voting in accord\i}nce with the 
provisions of Chapter VI» Se9tion c, laffirmative 
vote of seveg- members] for the purpose"ofreviewing 
the Charter. 4 
At such a conference each member would have one vote. Any 
alteration of the Charter recommended by a 2/3 vote of the 
general conference would come into force only when ratified 
by the per'manent members of the Security Council and by a 
majority of the other members of the Organization. 
Australia's amendment read as follows: 
Chapter Jc;=!;,. Alnend men ts. 
This Charter may be amended by a resolution of the 
General Assemb.ly which is 
(a) adopted by a two-thirds majority o:fthe General 
Assembly~ and confirmed by a like majority at 
the next session of the General Assembly; and 
(b) concurred in on each occasion by at least three 
permanent members of the Security Counci1. 6 5 
The Australian proposal therefore removed the possibility of 
64. 'Amendments Proposed by the Governments of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China', 
Doc 2, G/29, 5 May 1945, !!.:,~.I.~!2.2.£uments, vol. J, 
p.628. 
65~ 'Australian Amendments', U.N.C.I.O. Documents, vol. J, 
P• 544 • 
the veto of an amendment by a s:in gle permanent power o In 
the course of discussion in Committee I/2, the United States 
on behalf of the Sponsoring Governments, put forward a 
further- amendment reducing the requirement contained in the 
Sponsoring Powers amendment for the calling of a general 
conference from a 3/4 to a 2/3 vote of the General Assemhl. y 
and seven members of the Security Council. The United 
States delegate also moved that an additional paragraph be 
added to the amendment of the Sponsoring ~vernments, as 
amended by his further anendment, which would provide that if 
such a general conference had not been held before the 
tenth annual meeting of the Assembly fo.llowing the entry 
into force of the Charter, the proposal to call such a 
conference should be placed on the agenda of that meeting 
of the Assemblyo The decision to call the conference would, 
however, still require a vote of 2/3 of the Assembly and 
of seven members of the Security Council. The United 
States subsequently put forward yet another proposal to 
facilitate the calling of a general conference 
If such a general conference has not been held 
before the tenth annual meeting of the Assembly 
following the entry into force of the Charter, 
the proposal to call such a conference s~all 
be placed on the agenda of the meeting of the 
A~sembly and the conference shall be:held if so 
decided by a simple majority of the Assembly ggd 
by any seven members of' the Security Councilo 
3850 
Australia supported this proposal but abstained in the final 
vote because an individual Great Power veto was still 
applicab.le to the ratification of decisions by the amending 
conference o 67 
The tenacity of Evatt's fight at San Francisco on the 
subject of whether an individual Great Power should be able 
to veto Security Council action in relation to the pacific 
settlement of disputes under VITI A of the Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals, no doubt reflected the fact that debate on this 
issue wa,s contemporaneous with discussion on the question 
of Charter Amendment in Committee I/2~ During the London 
talks, Evatt had told Curtin in a telegram of his anxiety 
at the Great Power veto on enforcement action under VIII B. 
66~ Tb.is accrunt is based upon 'Report of the Rapporteur of 
Committee I/2 in Chapter XI (Amendments)', Doc 1069, 
1/2/73(1)» 18 June 1945, U.N.C.I.O. Documents, volo 7 
pp.435-4460 
67. Ibid. p.442. 
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While he had been willing to accept such a veto as necessary 
for the establishment of an International Organization with 
the full support of the Great Powers, he had linked this 
acceptance with an increased emphasis on a need to remove 
the Great Power veto from Charter amendment; a need to limit 
the application of the veto; and a need to give greater 
emphasis to regionalism as a second line of defenceo 68 At 
the time, (June 9-13) when Evatt was taking his stand in 
Committee III/l on the question of the Great Power veto on 
pacific settlanent of disputes, it had become clear in 
Committee I/2 that the Great Power veto on amendment of the 
Charter was being strongly adhered to by those powers despite 
minor concessions in regard to the calling of a general 
conference. If Evatt in London had been prepared to accept 
a veto on enforcement action in the hope of possible future 
Charter amendment, it is hardly surprising that, having become 
aware at San Francisco of what he considered to be an 
unnecessary and mistaken application of the Great Power veto 
to the peaceful settlement of disputes, the strength of his 
opposition should have been reinforced by the likelihood that 
amendment of the Charter would remain subject to the Great 
Power veto. 
68~ See above poZ7o, 
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An illustration of Evatt' s aggressive attitude in 
discussion in Committee III/l is provided by the verbatim 
minutes of the Sixteenth Meeting on 9 June. The Representative 
of the United Kingdom (not nan ed) commented that he was 
very glad to know that the Honourable Delegate of 
Australia [Dr. Evatt] accepted the credentials of 
the five powers, and those credentia.ls were des-
cribed by Senator Conally and I think they may be 
summed up in the words, tblood, sweat and tears'. 
DelQ.gate of Austra.lia: Other countries have suffered too. 
Renr~sentative .QL_~nited KinggQ!!!: Certainly. 
De.legat!L_of A~alia: Then don't introduce the topic. 69 
These verbatim minutes a.lso provide evidence of the way in 
which Evatt was conscious of the re.lationship between the 
Great Power veto on amendment of the Charter and discussion 
in Committee III/le on the veto on pacific settlement. 
If you could go to your peop.les and say 'We can 
alter it. If it is a failure after seven or ten 
years and one Great Power acts unreasonab.ly you 
can alter the constitution or get rid of it' 
[Individual Great Power veto in pacificsettlement 
of a dispute]. But you have to say 'No, you can't 
alter it, because every alteration is subject to a 
veto.' I say that it is the difficulty we are in. 
If that process, the amending process, if the veto 
were modified in relation to that, matters of this 
kind could be more easi.ly explained. 70 
Verbatim MinY.tQ.§., Sixteenth Meetin~ of Committee III/1, 
9 June 1945, Running numbers 46-7 lReel 4). 
70. Ibid. Running numbers 35-6. 
In the Australian amendment relating to voting in the 
Security Council, the Yalta voting formula was modified to 
read as follows: 
(1) Each member of' the Security Counci.l shall have 
one voteo 
(2) Except as otherwise expressly provided, a decision 
of' the Security Council may be made upon the 
affirmative vote of' seven memberso 
(3) In decisions of' the Security Council under Section 
A of' Chapter VIII and under the first paragraph of' 
Section C of' Chapter VITI, a party to a dispute 
shall abstain from voting. 
(4) Under Section B of' Chapter VIII a decision of' 
the Security Council shall require the af'f'irmati ve 
vote of' seven members including the five permanent 
members. Under paragraph (2) of' Section C of 
Chapter VIII, a decision of' the Security Counci.l 
shall require the affirmative vote of' seven 
members, including at least three of' the permanent 
members.71 
The main object of' the Australian amendment was to prevent 
the application of' the veto by a single Great Power, not a 
party to a dispute, to the procedure for tle peaceful settle-
ment of' a dispute under Chapter VIII Ao Forde in his opening 
address at San Francisco had shown the increased pr~c±sion 
of' Australia's understanding of' the Dumbarton Oaks draft 
when he had.noted 
Why any one of' the five powers which is not a party 
to a dispute should be empowered to prevent attempts 
to settle it by means of' conci.liation or arbitration~ 
71·. 'Australian Amendments'~ UoNoCoioOo Documents, vol. 3, 
Po550• 
we are quite unable to discover. We think that a 
mistake has been made,· and that all the powers 
concerned should be ready to cancel it at the 
Conference.72 
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The Sponsoring Powers, however, were to show no such willing-
ness, as became clear in discussions in Committee IIT/l. 
Although a United Kingdom delegate assured the Committee, in 
response to a request by the Prime Minister of New Zealand 
that he give an interpretation of the Yalta voting proposals, 
that the veto did not apply to paragraphs 1, 2, or J o:f 
Chapter VIII A and that therefore investigation of a dispute 
could not be blocked by a permanent member not a party to a 
dispute, he felt that the veto would apply to recommendations 
under paragraph 4. 73 Evatt, speaking at this meeting, provided 
aninterpretation of the Dumbarton Oaks text in which he made 
clear that, by a strict reading of the text, even the 
invest:ig ation of a dispute wou.ld not be free from the veto. 74 
72. 'Verbatim Minutes of the Second Plenary Session, 27 April, 
1945', Doc 20, P/6, 28 Apri.l .1945, U .N .c •!.J2..::._£.Q..c~nts, 
vol • 1, p •. 173 • 
73. 'Summary Report of Ninth Meeting of Committee III/l, 
17 May 1945', Doc 417, ITI/1/19, 18 May 1945, !L:_N.~oioOo 
Documents, vol. 11, p.305. 'Committee III/l, Statement 
of Questions by the Delegate of New Zealand and of Replies 
by the Delegate of the United Kingdom at Ninth Meeting, 
17 May 1945', WD/3, Ibid. pp.317-25. See also Australian 
Renart on U.N.C.I.o., p.16._ 
74. Ibid. and 'Corrigenda to Summary Report of Ninth Meeting 
of Committee III/l, 17 May 1945', Doc 417 9 III/1/19(1), 
21 May 1945, U.N.C._!,! . ..0• DQ.£.1!!!!!3nts, vol~ 11, p.309. 
A sub-committee of Committee III/1 9 inc.luding representatives 
of the Sponsoring Powers~ Australia, Cuba, Egypts the 
Nether.lands~ Greece 1 and Frances was established at the 
. 75 fol.lowing meeting to clarify the meaning of the Yalta text o 
A questionnaire containing twenty-two questions, in the 
formu.lation of which Australian suggestions played a part, was 
drawn up by the members of the sub-committee other than the 
representatives of the Sponsoring Powers and was submitted to 
76 the Sponsoring Powers on 22 Mayo In their answer on 7 June, 
the Sponsoring Powers, having overcome an initial reluctance 
by Russia to except any part of Chapter VIII A from the opera-
tion of the veto, would now only except from its operation 
preliminary dis cuss ion of a question under paragraph 2 o 77 Evatt 
thereupon took a prominent part in spirited debates in Committee 
III/l. A roLl-call vote was finally taken on 13 June on an 
Australian amendment to the Yalta proposals which would have add-
ed the fo.Llowing to VI, C3 2 of the Dumbarton Oaks text, which was 
75. 
76. 
77. 
'Summary Report of Tenth Meeting of Committee III/l, 
18 May 1945' 9 Doc 459, I.II/1/22, 21 May 19453 ~~~Oo. 
Documents, volo 11~ p.JJ6. 
tMemorandum - Questionnaire on Exercil?e of Veto in 
Security Council', Doc 855, III/l/B/2laL 8 June 1945 9 
u.~.c.r.o. Docl!l!lents, vol. 11~ ppo699-708. 
'Statement by the Delegation of the Four Sponsoring 
Governments on Voting Procedure in the Security Council~ 
7 June 1945', Doc 852, III/1/37 (.1), 8 June 1945s 
U .N .c. I .o. Documents., vol. 1.1, pp. 71.1-2. 
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identical with the second section of the Yalta voting 
proposals which formed the basis of committee discussion. 
Decisions made by the Security Council in the exercise 
of any of its duties, functions an:l powers under 
Chapter VIII, Section A, shall b78 deemed to be 
decisions on procedural matterso 
The Australian amendnent was defeated by twenty votes to ten 
with fifteen abstentions. 7 9 As the Australian ReJ2 orLQ.u 
u.~~C I~Q· points out, the effect of carrying this amendment 
would have been to remove the veto from the pacific settlement 
80 
of disputes o 
Evatt .in his uncompromising fight in this Committee 
did not however feel that he was running the risk of causing 
a major failure in the Conference as a whole by pressing this 
point against the Sponsoring Powers. It is certain that he 
was convinced before the final vote in Committee III/l on 
13 June that his proposal would be defeated. Two days before 
the vote Evatt told Chif.ley in a telegram that he would not 
secure the required 2/3 majority al though he wou.ld press the 
issue until the last. 8 ·1 
78. 'Summary Report of Nineteenth MeetL~g of Committee III/lj 
13 June 1945?, Doc 956 1 III/1/47, 13 June 1945, 
U .N_&.J._.o. Documents, vol. 1.1, p .494. 
79. Ibid. p.495. 
80. Aus~.J:i.an R~nor.t._on ~Q~!.·2..e.., p.so. 
8lo H/45/771/1. Proc~~dipgs and Australiqn Policyo This 
telegram has an E prefix. 
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The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had provided under Chapter 
V Bl that the General Assemb.ly 
should have the right to consider the general 
principles of' cooperation in the maintenance of' 
international peace and security, including the 
princip.les governing disarmament and the regu.lation 
of' armament; to discuss any question re.lating to the 
maintenance of' international peace and security 
brought before it by any member of' members of the 
Organization or by the Security Council; and to 
make recommendations with regard to any such 
princip.les or questions o Any such question on 
which action is necessary should be referred to 
the Security Council by the General Assembly either 
before or after discussion. T'ne General Assembly 
should not on its own initiative make recommendations 
'on any matter relating to the main 
of international peace and security which is 
being dealt with by the Security Counci1.82 
Australian amendments were designed ·both to broaden the 
scope of' discussion in the General Assemhly and to prevent 
a dispute being 'frozen' in the Security Council. Paragraph 
.1 of V B was therefore to be amended as follows: 
(1) The General Assembly may consider, and may make 
such recommendations as it thinks fi± -with 
regard to any matter affecting the international 
relations (including the principles governing 
disarmament and the regulation of armaments1; 
provided that~ while in re.lation to any dispute 
or situation the Security Council is exercising 
the functions assigned to it under Chapter VIII, 
too General Assemhl y may not, uunless on the request 
of the Security Council, make any recommendation 
with regard to that dispute or situation. 
82. 'Dumbarton Oaks Proposals', U.N.C.I.O. !22£™nt.§, 
vol. J, pp .4-5. 
(2) When the Security Council commences to exercise 
its functions in relation to any dispute or 
situation, and also when it has ceased to do so, 
the Secretary-General shall immediate.ly notify 
the General Assembly through its Presidento 
The President of the Genera.l Assembly may at 
J9Jo 
any time require the Secretary-Genera.l to report 
on the position of any dispute or situation before 
the Security Council. If the General Assembly by 
a three-fourths majority is of the opinion, 
having considered the Secretary-General's report, 
that the Security Council has ceased to exercise 
its functions in relation to the dispute or 
situation9 it may proceed to make any rgcommenda-
tion it thinks fit with regard thereto. J 
On 29 May, Committee II/2 voted at its Fifteenth 
Meeting to adopt a text of Chapter V Bl al.lowing the General 
Assembly to discuss 'any matter within the sphere of inter-
national relations'. 1'11.e Summa;rL].gQ,ort of this meeting notes 
that the qu.estion of safeguarding domestic jurisdiction was 
raised in discussion on this text. Some delegates are 
reported to have suggested that this matter was adequate.ly 
cared for by 'a paragraph to be inc.luded elsewhere in the 
Charterr [paragraph 7of Chapter II] which would be app.licahle 
to the Charter whole. 84 On .17 June 9 after the is sues as a 
of tm veto in the Security Council and tbe veto on amendment 
of the Charter had been decided in favour of the Great Powers@ 
8J. i Australian Amendments' 9 U .N. C. I .o ~-Docum..§.nts, vo.l. J~ 
pp. 544-5. 
84. 'Summary Report of Fifteenth Meeting of Committee II/2, 
JO May .1945, Doc 686, II/2/J4:1 JO May 1945, U.N.C.LO. 
f>.ocu~nts~ vol. 9, p.109. ---- ---
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Russia called a meeting of the Executive Committee to 
re-open this question of the Genera.l Assembly's powers of 
discussion. Russia's argument was that the words 'any 
matter within the sphere of international relations' allowed 
interference in matters of domestic jurisdiction.85 Evatt 
led the opposition to Russiais argument claiming that 
paragraph 7 of Chapter IT would be applicable to V B l. 
He and Gromyko virtually monopolized discussion in the meeting. 
Evatt was unyielding. 
But I will say this Mr. President, that the nations 
that have been anxious on the matter, and who have 
succeeded in spite of opposition in the early stage 
of the Conference, in getting this great right of 
discussion and recommendation vested in the Assembly 
wil.l not give up that right.86 
It was decided at this meeting to establish a sub-committee 
of the Executive Committee comprised of Stettiniusll Gromyko 
and Evatt to attempt to agree on a text. 87 The Soviet 
subsequently agreed to a text, drafted by Evatt, which provided 
that the General Assembly could discuss any questions or any 
matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the 
85. 'Summary Report of Ninth Meeting of the Executive 
Committeell 17 June 1945'll Doc l06J, EX/27, 18 June 
1945, U .N~.!.Q.:_Doc'!11!!.fil!ts 11 vo.l. 5, pp. 522-3. 
86. ~atifil__Minutes, Ninth Meeting of Executive Committee, 
17 June 1945, Running number ll (Reel 9). 
87. Ibid. pp.526-7. 
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powers and fnnctions of any organs providea in the Charter, 
and that the General Assembly should have the right to make 
recommendations on any such questions or matters either to 
members or to the Security Council or to both, except only 
in the case of matters actually being dealt with by the 
S •t c ·1 88 ecuri y ounci .• 
Tll.e fact that at the Final Meeting of the Steering 
Committee the De.legate of Penn~ Mr. Gal.lagher, could propose 
a motion 'to pay homage here to the smal.l nations represented 
at the Conference and to their great champion, Dr 0 Evatt 1 , 8 9 
was a reflection not only of Evatt' s legal abi.li ty, or of 
the fact that Australia was a small power and as such shared 
the interest of many small powers in democratizat.ion of the 
Charter. It was a.lso a reflection of the prominence which 
Evatt had achieved for himself and his country through his 
membership of the Executive Committee and of the persistence 
and aggressive energy with which he had argued Australiars 
policies at San Francisco. 
88. 'Summary Report of Tenth Meeting of Executive Committee~ 
18 June 1945! 9 Doc .1108, EX/28 9 20 June 1945~ ~.!..C.IoQo 
Documents, vol. 5, p.536. See also Austra1Lc!!L_Beport .Qll 
~~., p.20. 
Verbatim Minu~, Eleventh Meeting of the Steering 
Committee, 23 June 1945. Running number 40 (Reel 9). 
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Dr. Evatt, and therefore Australia, assumed an aggressive 
sma~l-power posture at San Francisco. He also espoused 
policies, Wiich may be called policies of national assertion, 
of (i) obtaining a seat for Australia on the Executive 
Committee of the Conference with a view to Security Council 
membership and (ii) advocating criteria for non-permanent 
membership of the Security Council which would further 
increase the chances of Australia's early election to that 
body. Both this posture and these po.licies sprang largely 
from a strong desire to assert and enhance Australia's 
distinct international status. The exercise of distinct 
international status had become the predominant means of 
Evatt' s foreign po.licy with the imp.lementation of the 
Australian-New Zealand Agreement in a cont ext of dissatis-
faction with Great Britain in particular, and the Great 
Powers in general because of their apparent willingness to 
take decisions affecting the Pacific peace settlement without 
consulting Australia. 
Evatt's intense interest in the Pacific peace settlement 
(which could be expected to include questions of terri toria.l 
disposition and interim po.licing arrangements) rested on his 
conviction that Australia's post-war security was closely 
related to the extent to which she was able to play, with 
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New Zealand, a dominant role in the military security of the 
South-west and South Pacific. The event s of a war in which 
the Australian mainland had been bombed, and in which the 
source of aggression had lain to Australia's Asiatic north 
no doubt contributed to this sense of the immense strategic 
significance of the South-west and South Pacific to Australia. 
'Never again, t Evatt said in March .1944, 'wi.ll the people of 
Australia and New Zealand .leave their vital interests in the 
[south-west Pacific] region unprotected.' 1 
The significance which Evatt attached to the South-west 
Pacific region did not, however, imply a concomitant isolation-
ism. Nor, on the other hand, did it invo.lve concepts of close 
American or increased British invo.l vement in the defence of 
the area. Menzies~ for example, had always stressed the 
Empire connection rather than regionalism and had pointed to 
the value of friendship with the United States. 2 Even 
Curtin had placed emphasis on the Commonwealth, although he 
showed an additional awareness of the need for an Australian 
role in the Pacific. Evatt' s view of the need for Australian 
l. H.V. Evatt, For~ Poll_c:rY of Australia, p.173. 
2. See his contribution entitled 2 Post-war International 
Relations t in D.A.S. Campbell (ed.) op. cit., pp.ll-50. 
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and New Zealand predominance in the region was allied to a 
belief in the efficacy of co.llective security. Regionalism 
was to provide the basis of Australia's defence in the 
transition to a stable peace in the period before the 
Internationa.l Organization was established and working 
efficiently. Once that body was functioning, regional ism 
would fonn part of a collective security system - iBecause 
of its vulnerable position, Australia is vi tally concerned 
in the establishment of a successful peace and a world 
security system, and as portion thereof, a regiona.l defence 
system.' 3 
Given that Evatt rs South-west and South Pacific regions 
were to form part of a co.llective security system, it would 
still have been possible, as one imagines Curtin would have 
been more inclined to do, to seek to foster and increase 
American and British invo.lvement in the post-war security of 
the area. That Evatt, whi.le acknowledging British, and paying 
due regard to American, participation in the post-war security 
of the areas sought~ with the Australian-New Zealand Agreement, 
to prevent United States territoria.l expansion in the South 
3. C.P.D., vo.L .179, 8 September .1944, p.602. 
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Pa c:i:fi c; in a strat c context~ of' a re due ti on of 
the British colonial presence in these areas; and spoke 
o:f Australia and New Zealand having a pivotal role and a 
decisive voice in these regions, may have been in part a 
reflection of the nationalism of the Australian Labor Party 
and of a personal nationalism which had, no doubt~ been 
stimulated by the events of the waro Evatt' s national 
sentiment is evident in a statement made in March 19440 
'Australians are a great and virile people. They have proved 
magnificent pioneers in many fields of human endeavour. 
Above all Australians fought in many battle fronts of this 
war and the last war with unexampled courage and resource. 
I suggest that the conduct of the foreign affairs of this 
country, which in the .long run serves the same ends~ should 
be worthy of our soldiers.' 4 
But Evatt may well have had further reasons for seeking 
an Australian and New Zea.land 2redominance in the regiona.l 
security of the South-west ani South Pacific. Britain, after 
all, had been of .li tt.le he.lp in Austra.lia 7 s struggle with the 
Japanese, whom Evatt, .like many at the time, saw as Austra.lia' s 
probable post-war enemyo Evatt had, furthermore, been 
concerned at what he regarded as BritainYs failure either to 
administer effectively or to fortify her Pacific colonieso 
He would, presumab.ly, have been very conscious of the 
struggle which the Australian Government, on occasion using 
him as its instrument, had waged to have tbe Pacific war 
regarded as more than a mere holding operation while Al.lied 
preference centred on the European theatre. Although Evatt 
made no known reference in this period to the possibility of 
a future return to isolationism in the United States, he may 
reasonably have chosen to rely more on the hope of an American 
commitment to a world-wide collective security system than such 
a commitment to the long term defence of a far corner of the 
Pacific. If America stayed in the Pacific, north of the 
Equator, so much the better. What Australia wanted above 
all was to ensure a degree of military preparedness and social 
and economic stability in the South-west and South Pacifico 
If it is borne in mind that this regionalism was to be 
associated with a collective security sysiam Evatt's view seems 
a tenab.le approach to his country's post-war defence. 
P.E. Corbett, for instance, wrote in 1945 in the Austral-
~tic Bul.le:til! 
Even after the establishment of the United Nat ions 
and as a long term project, Australia and New 
Zealand might profitably be encouraged to accept 
responsibility, as a provisionally autonomous unit, 
for the regional defence zone roughly sketched in 
4010 
the Canberra Agreement. There can hardly be a better 
way of securing their wholehearted col.laboration in 
keeping pace in the Pacific than in this kind of 
initiative. 5 
Whether Evatt should or should not, in this pre-atomic, 
pre cold-war situation, have placed such faith in the efficacy 
of a world coLlective security system, is related more to what 
Geoffrey Sawer has called Ya general dispute between conser-
vatives and progressivesY 6 than to any ultimate standard of 
judgment. It cou.ld be suggested, however, that EvattYs 
adoption, on the eve of the San Francisco talks, of the 
notion that regionalism might serve as a second line of 
defence in the event of a failure of collective security, 
was evidence of both a .limited belief in that concept and 
an inconsistency in his foreign po.licy. What use, after all~ 
would this second line be without appreciable British or 
American support? It is suggested, however, that E\ratt' s 
5. P. E. Corbett, t North America Views Anzac Agreement. 
Vital Questions Seen', Aust,;i;:al-A..e..!fil~J.letin, vol. VI, 
no. J, September 1945, p.21. 
6. Geoffrey Sawer, 'The United Nations', in Gordon Greenwood 
and Norman Harper (eds.), Australia in World 4ffJ;tirs, 
1.2..2.Q:~, Me.lbourne, 19 57, p. 97. 
faith in col.lectiv e security would at this time have out-
weighed any real expectation of its failure. At the time of 
his reference to the second line he was also speaking of the 
need to amend the Charter to prevent, in the future, the 
continued possibility of a Great Power veto. Australia's 
opening address to the Conference contained a strong p.lea for 
effective collective securityo And at the end of his fight 
on the veto on the pacific settlement of disputes, Evatt, as 
quoted in the Aus t:i;::~li~Q R~~2!L:!L?E.:.9!....J..!...Ch, 7 placed faith 
in assurances by the Great Powers on the limited use of the 
veto in the resolution of international conflict. 
Evatt's awareness of the importance of South-west and 
South Pacific regionalism to Australia had been accompanied 
by an intense interest in the Pacific peace settlement -
1 The decisions which wi.11 be made on this matter [disposition 
of Japanese occupied territory] at the Pacific Peace Settlement 
will vital.ly affect the future security of these two countrieso 
Anyone who denies this js not prepared to face the realities 
of the posi tiono The same conside:rmtions apply to non-Japanese 
7. Austra~ian R&.J2ort on U.N.C.I.O., p.18. 
Pacific islands.' 8 This interest was accompanied in turn 
by difficulties in consultation with Great Britain and other 
Great Powers on this subject, difficu.l ties which had led to 
an increasing re.liance on the exercise of distinct international 
status rather than reliance on Empire consul ta ti on as the 
predominant means of Australian foreign policyo It was 
inevitable that there should be a concomitant concern to 
augment and assert that status. As Evatt remarked on 22 
February 1945s 'This [external] policy is designed to allow 
Australia to work to the ful.lest extent possible with the 
other United Nations in plans for the post-war world order. 
Its object is also to ensure, so far as we can, that the place 
and status of Australia among the United Nations, and in 
the major post-war international arrangements, shall be 
commensurate with what Australia has contributed to the 
common cause during the war, not only in the field of 
operations, but also in supp.ly and production at home. v 9 
Whether Evatt 2 s pursuit of status at San Francisco was 
8. HoV• Evatt, Foreign PQlicy_Q_f Australia, p.175. 
9. C.~., vol. 181, 22 February 1945, po65. 
relative neglect of' detailed consideration of' the f'orm and 
f'unctions of' the international body which was to replace the 
League of' Nations. Dur.ing late 1942 and in 1943 Evatt's 
commitment to collective secur.i ty, and his desire to ensure 
that the international body be supplied with adequate armed 
f'or ce, were established. He had also shown a concern that the 
peace should be built not only on f'reedom f'rom f'ear, aithough 
he was ever mindf'ul of' the need f'or military security, but 
also upon f'reedom f'rom want - a concern that men should live 
in conditions of' social and economic justice. t No wor.ld or 
regional system of' security, however, can be pennanent unless 
it has an adequate basis in economic justice. 111 This concern 
f'or social and economic justice would explain, in part, and 
in part only, the interest which Evatt took in the questions 
of' trusteeship and international f'u.11 employment policy. 
The f'ormer question, which had given rise to discussion 
between Great Britain and the United States in 1942 and 1943, 
11. 'The Post-war Settlement in the Pacif'ic', address 
delivered by Dr. H.V. Evatt at the Overseas Press Club, 
New York, 28 April 1943, C.N.I.A., vol. 14, no. 5, 
15 May 1943~ p •. 140. 
was of interest to Australia not only because of a general 
concern for economic justice, or for her position as a 
colonial and mandatory power in Papua and New Guinea 
respectively, but because trusteeship was an issue with 
direct relevance to the mi.li tary stability of the post-war 
Pacific. As Evatt put it in 1943 'One striking result during 
the Papuan campaign has been the devotion and loving care 
shown to our wounded by the Fuzzy-Wuzzieso We must further 
develop those great and valuable territories, treating the 
lf f th t . f t . t• d t• t 12 we are o e na ives as one o our mos impera ive u ies. 
With full employment policy a desire for social and economic 
justice was allied to an awareness of the possible need for 
Australia, as a trade dependent nation, to maintain tariffs 
in the post-war period. It was also accompanied by advocacy 
of a novel approach to the expansion of world tradeo Consider-
ab.le attention was given to both these policies in Australia 
during 1943 and 1944. In regard to both she was to make 
distinctive contributions to the content of the United Nations 
Chartero 
12. 'T.h.e Australia's Future Role in the Pacific', an article 
by Evatt in the Sydney Daily Telegraph, 18 August 1943. 
T.h.is article is reprinted in H.V. Evatt, Forei,gn Policy 
of Austr~, pp.131-3. T.h.e quotation is from p.133. 
The Wellington Agreement, although, unlike the Australian-
New Zealand Agreement, it gave some sustained attention to 
the proposed general inte:nnational organization, represents 
.little more than a COdi:fica tion of po.licie s already clear in 
Evatt's, or, in the case of the enhanced power of the 
General Assembly, in Curtin' s, speeches during the preceding 
two years. The question of the territorial integrity and 
political independence of nations, although urged by Evatt, 
had a particu.lar attraction for New Zealand. Evatt in his 
speech of 8 September 1944 had already made reference to the 
need to uti.lize the Wor.ld Court in the determination of 
facts in disputes. If he had fai.led, in this speech to make 
the reference to increased powers for the General Assembly, 
which Curtin had made in July, 13 it was perhaps a reflection 
of the attention which Evatt gave to the question of defining 
criteria for representation on the Executive Authorities of 
the proposed body. This was a policy which was not, however, 
represented in the Wellington Conclusions. It was a 
policy, nonetheless, which oontinued to occupy a centra.l 
position in Evatt's public addresses in the United States on 
13. C.P.D., vol. 179, 17 July 1944, p.37. 
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his way to the pre-San Francisco Commonwealth meeting in 
London and during that me et ing o In London it was complemented 
by his campaign to obtain a seat for Australia on the 
Executive Committee of the Conference. 
The London talks were to show, also, an increasing 
Australian attention to the detail of the Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals which had only been recently finalized at the time 
of the Wellington Conferenceo Thus Evatt 1 s alarm, following 
Fraser's suggestions, at the possible operation of the Great 
Power veto on enforcement action under VIII B of the Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposals, was accompanied by a strong attachment to 
the principle of removing the veto from Charter amendment. 
The recognition of a necessity to accept the veto on 
enforcement action reinforced the importance which Evatt 
gave to the removal of the veto on amendment. In London 
also Evatt spoke of the need for compulsory jurisdiction for 
the World Court and of the need to augment the powers of the 
Economic and Social Council. 
Australian policy~ in full detail, was embodied in the 
amendments submitted on 3 May at San Francisco after further 
detailed consideration of the Dumbarton Oaks draft. An 
awareness of the application of the Great Power veto to the 
Pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter VIII A of 
the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals was accompanied by an amendment 
to prevent such app.lication. An awareness also of the power 
and need to make recommendations under Chapter VIII B 
was accompanied by the desire to prevent such recommendations 
in relation to threats to the peace or acts of aggression 
arising from matters coming solely within the domestic 
jurisdiction of nations. The Economic and Social Council 
was to be a principal organ of the wor.ld body. Regional ism, 
as Evatt had foreshadowed in London, was given added 
importance as a second line of defence,, but within what 
clearly remained an attachment to the operation of a 
col.lective security system. 
The deve.lopment of Australian policy has the overa.11 
characteristic of a consistent evo.lution even if the process 
was somewhat hurried in its final stages. It is quite 
impossible to agree with Hasluck's judgement of Evatt, 
delivered some ten years after the Conference when Hasluck 
has not only left Evatt' s service but had subsequently become 
a Member of Parliament and a Minister in the Government of 
R.G. Menzies. 
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Just as Mr. Stettinius was first and last a success-
ful American organizer of industry, so Dr. Evatt was 
first and last a successful po.li tician. The ha.Llmark 
of the po.lit ician is that he looks first at "is sues 11 • 
I think that was probably characteristic of his 
judgments when on the Bench - though on that I am not 
qualified to speak - and I know it was true of his 
approach to the materia.l for the San Francis co 
Conference. He detected them easily: tr•I'liis will 
be one of the main issues"; "This is a good issue"; 
"No, that is not the issue; the real issue is this." 
The veto~ powers of the Genera.l Assembly, trusteeship, 
and so on were "issues" to him. Having detected the 
issues, the next po.li ti cal step is to decide what 
side you are on, and then you work like hell to 
see that you win. Dry Evatt always went through that 
sequence in a f.lash 0 ·1 4 
It is quite untrue that Evatt showed this kind o:f tsequence' 
in regard to trusteeship, full employment and the idea of 
collective security as earlier chapters have shown in detail. 
It might be argued that Evatt's opposition to the veto in 
the Security Counci.l was something which occurred to him 
suddenly and might have been worked out earlier; but his 
attitude towards the veto was essentially derived from his 
views about the need. for effective collective security and 
for small and middle powers to have a say in security matters. 
It can be regarded as largely an application, in particular 
circumstances, of those views. Hasluck may have 
mistaken Evatt s resource.fulness in immediate circumstances 
for the as sump ti on of basic attitudes. Only 
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rarely did Evatt have to 'decide which side he was on', 
and this was usually on matters of tactics. Most of the 
time he knew what he wanted, because he had thought it out 
in advance, and because it arose from his deeper convictions. 
He may have been awkward in dealing with other people, and 
sometimes unaware of the implications for Australia's future 
of what he was advocating; but he had a solid basis of 
constructive belief for what some times appeared to be 
wilful or thought.less action. 
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